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It was precisely one year before the 2008 Olympic Games would be-
gin, and a deep smog covered Beijing. The day, August 8, 2007, was
‹lled with the symbolism of anticipation. An of‹cial ceremony, trig-
gered by the magic moment marked on a special clock, began the
grand unveiling, with 10,000 carefully selected people celebrating in
Tiananmen Square. This would be the best and the biggest Countdown
Ceremony in Olympic history precisely because it could be no other
way. Everything about Beijing 2008 had to be spectacular, superlative,
outsized. At least such was the hope of China and the Beijing Organiz-
ing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG). Even
the smog, reframed as just another barrier for the powers that be to
overcome, would be turned into a sign of what Beijing could and
would accomplish.
That day and the week surrounding it were a dress rehearsal not only
for the Olympics’ of‹cials but also for those seeking to seize the occa-
sion to make their own global point. The very day of the countdown
ceremony a group of young Canadians and others sought to subvert
the of‹cial line and gain global press notoriety by rappelling down a
portion of the Great Wall to reveal a banner emblazoned with the
words “One World, One Dream, Free Tibet.” That week, as well, Re-
porters Without Borders staged a demonstration with participants
wearing T-shirts that depicted the Olympic Rings transmogri‹ed into
handcuffs. And Amnesty International (2007), Human Rights Watch,
and the Committee to Protect Journalists (2007) all used the count-
down moment to issue sober and critical reports on China’s shortcom-
ings in the ‹eld of human rights.
The staged happenings that week, of‹cial and unof‹cial, serve as a
metaphorical preface to this book on narratives and counternarratives.
They offered a foretaste of this extraordinary chapter in the history of
sport, media events, the evolution of China, and the shaping of global
civil society. What occurred then encapsulated the contradictions in
the Games, the many and diverse efforts to control how they are un-
derstood, and the global interest in their outcome. Rather than one
strong uni‹ed message, the Beijing Olympics had already become poly-
phonic, multivoiced, many themed.
In view of this multiplicity of competing voices and themes, it may
be worth starting with what, from an Olympics point of view, could be
deemed the of‹cial story. The chair of the International Olympic Com-
mittee (IOC), Jacques Rogge, was present at the Tiananmen celebration
to give the blessing of the IOC, and he praised the already completed
achievements. The physical markers of the Olympics—the great sta-
dia—were almost all standing, built not only on time but ahead of
schedule and, thus, strong symbols of China’s ability to conceive
grandly and execute with ef‹ciency. Another high of‹cial, Liu Qi,
BOCOG’s president, attributed to the people of Beijing a phrase that
captured the sense of solidarity that China wished to communicate.
Beijingers, he said, had expressed their relationship to the Games with
this minor chant: “I participate, I contribute, I enjoy” (Yardley 2007).
Xinhua, the of‹cial Chinese news agency, also conveyed the impres-
sion that a nationwide consensus marked this hallmark moment:
Across the country, Chinese people are celebrating the occasion in var-
ious ways. In the city square of Urumqi, capital of northwest China’s
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, residents performed roller-skat-
ing, martial arts and Taiji under red banners reading “Fitness campaign
to welcome the 2008 Olympics.” More than two thousand Tibetan na-
tives and tourists gathered on Wednesday morning in Lhasa to mark
the countdown. The celebration starts with a domino display by 2,008
middle school students from Lhasa as they dropped to the ground one
after another on the plaza before the Potala Palace, forming the pattern
of the Olympic rings and the number “2008.” “I am honored to be part
of the celebration and I hope I can visit Beijing to watch the games
next year,” said Ouzhu, an 18-year-old Tibetan student. Residents in
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Beijing found various ways to express their joy. A resident named Zhao
Yue’e in Huanghuamen community around Jingshan in downtown
Beijing gathered with friends at the countdown clock in her commu-
nity. “We are not just waiting for the Games, we are welcoming and ex-
pecting it to come,” she said. (2007)
With a remarkable lack of irony, the authorities were responding to var-
ious kinds of global criticism. While the Olympics had undoubtedly
united the residents of Beijing present, these images of Beijing solidar-
ity were in stark contrast to the claims of many, including the Geneva
Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, which had in June published
an extensive critical study on the impact of the Olympics on the de-
struction of housing (COHRE 2007). And Xinhua, by invoking joy in
Tibet, was taking on the highly controversial issue of China and hu-
man rights.
One could feel the tensions generated by the various efforts to ‹x
the meaning of and de‹ne these Games through news accounts across
the world, a large number of which featured unof‹cial narratives not
sponsored or devised by the IOC or China. The big story in the New
York Times on Countdown Day dealt with the counternarrative that
was the subject of the Geneva study: the human and aesthetic cost in-
volved in the massive patterns of destruction in Beijing (Yardley 2007).
Under the headline, “In Beijing, a Little Building Is Defying Olympic
Ambitions,” Jim Yardley wrote, “The two-story building where Ms.
Sun’s ancestors opened a bakery in the 1840s—their clientele included
the Qing emperor and his court—has been on Beijing’s demolition list
since Monday. Local of‹cials have noti‹ed the Sun family that the
building is along the route of the Olympic marathon. Land is needed
for a beauti‹cation project. A bulldozer is parked outside. Demolition is
not new in the surrounding Qianmen area, a historic neighborhood be-
ing razed and rebuilt as a shopping district for the Olympics. What is
unique is that Ms. Sun is refusing to leave. She is the last holdout on a
street once lined with shops. Landscapers have already covered the rest
of the block with saplings and a sheet of green grass. Her building is an
unsightly stump marring the view.”
The Los Angeles Times marked the occasion by raising other themes
relating to human rights. In an editorial, it concluded that “it is con-
sumers, the international media and cultural colossi such as Steven
Spielberg—not preachy foreign governments—who can best further re-
form in China by speaking out before the Olympic torch arrives. We
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wish China peace, prosperity and successful Games—but not a system
that jails journalists, silences dissidents and ignores the brutalization of
the people who make the products the world enjoys” (2007).
The Guardian celebrated with a long essay, of more than 7,000
words, that included the following summary: “As the ‹rst Olympics in
a communist state since Moscow in 1980, a battle looms over the mes-
sage of the 2008 games. For the ruling party, it is the ultimate propa-
ganda opportunity to show the government’s success in lifting hun-
dreds of millions of people out of poverty. For Tibetan independence
activists, human rights campaigners, supporters of the banned Falun
Gong spiritual movement, persecuted peasants and environmentalists,
it is a chance to expose the dark side of the planet’s biggest one-party
state. But perhaps more than anything, it will show how China’s mar-
ket reforms, begun 30 years ago, have transformed the country into
one of the great centres of globalisation; how movement—from the
countryside to the city, and between the homeland and the rest of the
world—has changed millions of lives” (Watts 2007).
Other media focused on themes relating to the environment, labor
abuses, Tibet, and Darfur. Canadian papers reveled in the story about
their young citizens who had been arrested for the Great Wall Tibet
event. The group was interrogated for 36 hours and bundled off by
plane to Hong Kong and then back to Canada. According to the Globe
and Mail, at least one participant was unapologetic about “her role in
the audacious stunt. ‘As a Canadian who enjoys the rights we have, I
feel we have a responsibility to step up and take action on behalf of
others who don’t have those rights,’ she said. ‘When I see something
wrong, I was taught to do something about it. Well, Tibet has been bru-
tally occupied by China for 50 years, and that’s wrong’” (Mickleburgh
2007).
The German press (Wolf 2007) gave signi‹cant coverage to German
politicians who struck the human rights theme with respect to China.
Martin Zeil, an of‹cial with the Free Democratic Party, threatened the
possibility of a German boycott of the Olympic Games (two U.S. mem-
bers of Congress had introduced boycott resolutions that week as well).
“We must not stand idly by, but need to build up public pressure in-
stead,” Zeil said. He had been “shaken by the deplorable incidents in
China brought to light” in human rights reports. “We cannot say: sport
is one thing and politics another.” An article in the Russian press nev-
ertheless suggested that the world is not of one opinion on China and
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the Olympics (Kashin 2007). The piece suggested that with a year to go
before the Beijing Games, the West was “launching a China-criticism
campaign,” apparently concerted, and that not only would pressure on
China increase but “the anti-China campaign” should be seen as a
warning for Sochi (site for the 2014 Winter Olympics), where propa-
ganda pressure on Moscow “was likely to be even more intense.”
All of this—the world spinning narratives and counternarratives
from the phenomenon that was already becoming the Olympics of Bei-
jing—was grist for our editing mill. By summer of 2007, many of the
main themes, of‹cial and nonof‹cial, surrounding the Olympics were
beginning to fall into place. One of our authors, Briar Smith, who
taught at Peking University that summer, describes her experience of
domestic press coverage, where the Beijing Olympics were frequently
tied to an important national historical narrative.1 In this context, the
Olympics were seen literally as a Chinese renaissance, a term used over
and over again by Smith’s Chinese students. According to Smith’s ob-
servations, limited to be sure, of the reactions of one group of students,
the Olympics were intended to suture the painful wounds of coloniza-
tion and humiliation at the hands of foreign powers. They would heal
the wounds of the past partly by forcing the rest of the world to take
notice of the strength and power of the PRC. Again and again Smith
heard that the Games were a historical mandate, part of the country’s
birthright and part of what it was owed for its decades of decay and loss
of face in the world. In the national consciousness, a triumphant
Olympics will mark the return of the Middle Kingdom’s reputation for
acting as a proud host to the rest of the world, as epitomized during the
Tang dynasty—a time of great cultural sophistication, complex infra-
structure, and technological advancement.
Smith’s students also used the Olympics to develop a new and
highly compressed history of modern China. According to this narra-
tive, when China was colonized by Japan, there was no Olympic team.
During the civil war and transitory period when the Communists took
over, troubled China had a paltry medal count. Taking a nearly 30-year
break from the Olympics, a period that included the turbulent era of
the Cultural Revolution, allowed Taiwan to get its Olympic team off
the ground (in›icting a wound on PRC national pride that has endured
ever since). When China reemerged in the 1980s, stronger economi-
cally and ideologically, the country immediately stunned the world
with its medal count in Los Angeles and has remained in the ascen-
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dancy ever since. But the dramatic climax would come now, in 2008,
with China (or Beijing) acting as host astride a great economy and in-
creasing world in›uence.
One of the central themes of this book is that there is an inherent in-
stability about great events that makes them subject to capture in sur-
prising and unanticipated ways. China intended the “One World, One
Dream” theme to project a benign, harmony-seeking China emerging
as a powerful yet positive global force. Reinforcing the idea of a renais-
sance or restoration of political place, the Olympics were presented
time after time as China’s “coming out party,” its reinvention for world
recognition as an economic, political, and social power. China wished
to show itself as having a massive population that was united in want-
ing China to succeed. Internally, the desire was to surmount what
China might characterize as the sideshows of quarreling over the
means by which the state was making one of the great transitions in
world history. If this were to be the century of China, then the
Olympics would be a useful point of departure.
But this did not mean that there would not be jockeying to be on the
global public agenda or involved in the de‹ning of China. On Count-
down Day in August 2007, a representative of the thousand-strong
Uighur community who lived in the United States appeared on WNYC
in New York in an effort to bring global attention, through the
Olympics, to that Muslim ethnic minority who are living on the iden-
tity margin of China and seeking greater autonomy. Those concerned
with the future of Darfur and China’s related role at the UN and in Su-
dan were closely calibrating what Olympics-related steps to take, and at
what stage to leverage them, in order to affect China’s policy in Sudan.
The Falun Gong had somehow fallen out of the mainstream news cov-
erage of China and human rights, but there were undoubtedly strate-
gies in place to reintroduce that narrative as well.
The various actors or authors involved—China, global civil society,
corporations, religious organizations, and others—have displayed a va-
riety of techniques for affecting public understanding. Each recognizes
the potential of surprise: unanticipated global crises, guerrilla ap-
proaches to alter agendas, the locus and ef‹cacy of demonstrations,
tactics that will attract press attention. Before the Games, there will be
gestures, even grand gestures, dramatically designed to affect global
perceptions. It is clear that the Chinese government and its spokesper-
sons have been taking intense lessons in crisis management though the
consequences have thus far been mixed. Some Chinese Olympic
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of‹cials and IOC of‹cials sought to defuse controversy by arguing that
advocacy organizations should not “exploit the Games” to further their
own agendas. Others took a cooler approach, growing accustomed to a
steady stream of criticism from a wide range of groups in China and
around the world. Jiang Xiaoyu, an executive vice president for the Bei-
jing Olympic Committee, said, on Countdown Day, “We are mentally
prepared that such voices will become louder in the future.” After the
Games, there will be a studied effort to measure the reaction of author-
ities: how prepared they were; how China and its massive security ma-
chinery exercised force; and how the Federations, the IOC, and others
exercised control through kindness and offers of assistance.
Of course, there have already been “surprises.” The efforts to link the
issue of Darfur to China and the Olympics are one. In the summer of
2007, it was the rise of stories about product defects, from pet foods to
toothpaste to lead-tainted toys. These stories would have been
signi‹cant without the Olympics in the background. But the proximity
of the Games, the signi‹cance of establishing a positive rede‹ning nar-
rative for China, made each negative story linked and cumulative, cre-
ating its own swarm effect. No one knows what other large issues loom,
ready to seize the attention of a public that might otherwise remain at-
tuned to the well-rehearsed and established Olympic narrative.
As can be seen from the chapters in this book, one task for those
who are seeking to leverage the public power of the Games on behalf of
issues they deem important has been to seek a connection between
their cause and the Olympics story. In some cases, the linking has not
been dif‹cult. As we have seen, the question of urban development and
the displacement of populations could be easily tied to the planning of
an Olympics-ready Beijing. And, as other chapters in this collection
demonstrate in greater detail, global civil society groups were able to
link the exploitation of child labor to the manufacture of Olympics-re-
lated mementos, mascots, and clothes. Among the questions worth
posing here is which groups are most effective (and why) at gaining a
public window or platform for their themes.
This project has its intellectual origins in the insights of my coeditor,
Daniel Dayan, insights that grew partly from his collaboration with my
colleague Elihu Katz. In 1992, Dayan and Katz published Media Events:
The Live Broadcasting of History, which has become one of the canonical
texts in the ‹eld of communications and society. The present volume
takes its cue from Media Events in a number of ways. In addition to be-
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ing inspired by that earlier book, it also attempts to build on and re‹ne
it by using the 2008 Olympics to understand how such events func-
tion in a differently mediated world. Media Events captured a
signi‹cant structure of communications in modern society—great po-
litical transformations (the coming of Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem), ex-
traordinary global celebrations (the marriage of Charles and Diana),
and occasions like the Olympics—to tell the story of a new relation-
ship between audience and subject. Dayan and Katz demonstrated
how these events marked a dramatic reformulation of the idea of the
public and the function of the media. But 15 years is an eternity in
modern broadcasting, and the idea of revisiting this subject through
the lens of the 2008 Olympics seemed a useful one. The forces of glob-
alization, the establishment of a stronger global civil society, the tech-
nological changes shaping public opinion, and China’s increasingly
central role in the new geopolitical environment—these and other de-
velopments suggested that the 2008 Olympics would be a rich ‹eld for
study.
Part 1, “De‹ning Beijing 2008: Whose World, What Dream?” com-
prises three chapters, each of which was designed to help understand
Beijing 2008 as a media event. Jacques deLisle’s chapter builds an
agenda for the rest of the book by describing how narratives and coun-
ternarratives become a challenge both to the organizers and to those
who set out to seize the public’s attention. His chapter outlines speci‹c
ways in which China has attempted to use the Olympics to win greater
global acceptance by establishing a general perception of itself as a
prosperous, stable, normalized country. DeLisle also weighs the possi-
ble modes of countering this agenda.
Alan Tomlinson explores the relationship between Olympic ideals
and contemporary capitalism. Examining the bidding rhetoric for Bei-
jing and London against the involvement of sponsors in The Olympic
Partner program, he ‹nds a central contradiction in the political econ-
omy of the Games. The chapter by Monroe E. Price speci‹cally explores
Dayan’s theories of the “hijacking” of the Olympics platform as a
modi‹cation of a general approach to media events and demonstrates
how this Dayanesque turn is the source of thinking about narrative and
counternarrative. Price then tries to show how global civil society orga-
nizations use Dayan’s approach in their efforts to seize the Olympics
and de‹ne them to their advantage.
Part 2 of the book, “Precedents and Perspectives,” captures the 2008
Olympics through a somewhat wider lens. Our purpose here was to in-
Introduction
8
vite scholars to place these Games in a series of distinct contexts. For
example, in his chapter, Nicholas J. Cull looks at the Olympics as an ex-
ercise in public diplomacy. He locates Beijing and China’s administra-
tion of the Games in the government’s efforts to engage in public
diplomacy (with respect to the Olympics and in other areas) over half
a century. Heidi Østbø Haugen allows us to look at the philosophical
underpinnings of the Beijing Olympics not through the implementa-
tion but rather through the bidding process. She examines the themes
of the winning bid as a window on China and the Games award
processes as well. Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom discusses the long history of
dual or binary perspectives on China. Wasserstrom traces this global
schizophrenia, de‹ned by those who demonize China on the one hand
and those who praise it on the other, to the nineteenth century, if not
earlier. And he notes that the current narratives and counternarratives
surrounding the 2008 Olympics continue patterns of demonization
and romanticization that emerged long before. Complementing this
discussion, Sandra Collins’s chapter contrasts Beijing 2008 with the
shadow history of the voided Tokyo Olympics of 1940 and the legacy
of Seoul, portraying them as part of a dual approach that highlights
both tradition and modernity. Collins explores a hybrid identity that
trades in a celebrated past and a vaunted technological future. The
chapter by Briar Smith dissects Beijing’s recent decision to relax restric-
tions on foreign journalists for a set period, noting how this decision
relates to Beijing’s assurances on human rights to the International
Olympic Committee while enabling it to retain a grip on information
circulated by its domestic press.
Part 3 is entitled “Theaters of Representation.” Here we have asked
our contributors to identify and discuss the sites where the authors of
the of‹cial and unof‹cial narratives of China are playing out their dra-
mas and seeking to in›uence opinion. Carolyn Marvin, for example,
writes about architecture and public space, or megaspace, as she puts it.
She draws on the social theorist Henri Lefebvre’s idea that every society
produces its characteristic space and uses it to describe the contending
forces that have helped to shape the physical environment of the cur-
rent Olympic drama. Building on their own research on the Olympics
in Barcelona, Christopher Kennett and Miquel de Moragas report on
the closing ceremony in Athens, describing it as one of the ‹rst oppor-
tunities in which China was able to develop its themes before a global
audience. Lee Humphreys and Christopher J. Finlay show how the
promise of a “High Tech Games” establishes an important feature of
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the “modernity arc,” as described in Collins’s earlier chapter.
Humphreys and Finlay look at how Lenovo, now one of the leading
personal computer companies in the world, is using sports sponsorship
(of the Olympics especially) to de‹ne itself as both an international
and a distinctively Chinese company that exempli‹es, in particular for
those at home, some of the most notable achievements of the state it-
self. Their chapter also examines how the effort to implement 3G tech-
nology to push and expand the uses of mobile telephony (in diffusing
information about the Games) has become part of the of‹cial High
Tech narrative and its opposition.
Hai Ren examines the IOC’s choice of sports to be included or ex-
cluded as an index of the failure of the Games to globalize. He uses
Wushu (Chinese martial arts) as a case study of the role China could
play in altering the Games. Andy Miah, Beatriz García, and Tian Zhihui
expand on a theme that has become especially signi‹cant as a result of
our expanding de‹nitions of the term journalist and the large number
of reporters and writers who will cover the Olympics. They look at a
growing approach of creating legitimated opportunities for “nonac-
credited journalists.” Their contention is that “narratives about the
Olympics arise largely from the stories ‹led by the mass of journalists—
press and broadcasters—who attend the Games and spew forth ac-
counts of what occurs on and off the competition ground. Who those
journalists are, what they do, how they are channeled through the
Olympics world—each has implications for what is represented, what
the billions around the globe see and read.” The ‹nal chapter in this
section, by Sonja K. Foss and Barbara J. Walkosz, reviews how the “elite
press” in the United States has framed China in the American imagina-
tion in the run-up to Beijing 2008. Looking at some of the same indi-
cators as deLisle, Foss and Walkosz identify four “ideological spaces”:
de‹nition, equivocation, accumulation, and anticipation.
In our concluding section Christopher J. Finlay looks forward to the
London Olympics (2012) and other future settings for the Games. He
asks what we are learning, or think we have learned, from Beijing that
can be used to understand the major players as they move on to other
forums, other audiences, other narratives and counternarratives. Is Bei-
jing the progenitor of a new kind of Olympic internationalism? And
Daniel Dayan re›ects on the ways in which geopolitical events have
radically transformed the context of media events.
There are many areas we would like to have covered more exten-
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sively. Our understanding of narrative and counternarrative still comes
primarily from the printed press and from broadcasting, and our ac-
count is consequently somewhat tilted toward representations in news-
papers and published reports. We have been more concerned with ef-
forts outside China’s borders to alter the Olympic narrative, paying
insuf‹cient attention to the civil society activities within the country.
The power of the Internet to mobilize, to seize, to quickly alter agendas,
is worthy of separate and substantial focus. We were not able, to the ex-
tent we desired, to capture the narratives that will be projected by NBC,
the global broadcast licensees, and advertisers. What they say intersti-
tially about China and about the themes highlighted in this book—or,
more likely, do not say—will probably also be a signi‹cant factor in the
integrated ‹nal impact of the Games. Some of the terms that we use in
our analysis—such as, for example, ambushing—come from the in-
ternecine ‹ghting among advertisers for control of the platform, but it
is clear that more attention must be given to understanding ambushes
organized by civil society players. And the control of symbols (explored
by many of our authors) and intellectual property clearly has become
vital to our ability to do so. Surveillance, control, exercise of authority:
all these appear in the book, but here, too, these themes will develop
far beyond the scope of this particular collection, in the public ac-
counts that will struggle to de‹ne the Beijing Olympics for years to
come.
Virtually no part of this book focuses on the sports and athletics of
the Olympic Games themselves. But, of course, athletics and athletic
prowess spin their own narratives of power. It is not for nothing that
China seeks to top the medal table and use the symbol of gold as an in-
dex of its place in the world. Sports are implicated in narratives of gen-
der, race, and class; the manifestations of sports tell much about a soci-
ety, and all of that will be on view at the Olympics. But these
questions—including the narrative of doping—represent a substantial
and different ‹eld of scholarship from what is at play in these pages. As
BOCOG, China, and others continue to prepare, this book is an exper-
iment in taking a longer view of the “event,” thinking of it as some-
thing that stretches over a prolonged period and includes the run-up as
well as the occasion itself.
There are many people to thank and acknowledge. The book was one
of the ‹rst efforts of a new Project (now Center) for Global Communi-
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cation Studies (CGCS) at the Annenberg School for Communication,
established by the dean, Michael X. Delli Carpini. It became clear that
one area for focus by CGCS should be China, and Professor Joseph
Turow suggested that one possibility would be to encourage a network
of communication and communication-related academics who were
interested in the 2008 Olympics. This led, in due course, to a joint ef-
fort with the Communication University of China (CUC). The distin-
guished Dr. Hu Zhengrong, now vice president of CUC, was an ener-
getic coconvener of a one-day conference in China in 2006 that
brought together many scholars, some of whom are participating in
this book. Several of Dr. Hu’s graduate students were instrumental in
planning that effort. 
At Annenberg, two graduate students, Chris Finlay and Briar Smith,
were indispensable. They were creative in terms of the themes of the
book; resourceful in considering potential authors; and vigorous, gen-
erous, and immensely valuable in terms of actual editing functions.
They functioned virtually as coeditors of the book. Libby Morgan be-
came research and editorial coordinator during the midstage of the
book’s development and has played a strong hands-on role in re‹ning
the project and identifying the precise work necessary in the drive to-
ward editorial completion. She maintained contact with authors and
was the liaison with the publisher. Our authors were immensely game.
They welcomed a time line that would allow the publication of the
book in advance of the 2008 Olympics, and cooperation and perfor-
mance were generally superb.
The Annenberg Foundation, responsible for the endowment for the
Center for Global Communication Studies, is also to be recognized for
making this research project, and its potential links to communication
studies in China, possible. At the University of Michigan we were for-
tunate to be in the excellent hands of Alison Mackeen, our editor, and
to be included in the New Media World series, edited by Professor
Turow.
NOTE
1. Correspondence with author. Smith’s chapter in the book covers other
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Whose World, What Dream?

“One World, Different Dreams”
The Contest to De‹ne the Beijing Olympics
Jacques deLisle
“One World, One Dream”—Slogan of the Beijing 2008 Games
“Same Bed, Different Dreams”—Chinese Colloquialism
The Olympics are as much about stories—many of them political—as
they are about sports. The ancient Games famously included an imper-
ative to warring city-states to cease hostilities, an af‹rmation of a Greek
identity coextensive with civilization, and other matters beyond ath-
letics. Political narrative also has been central to the modern Games.
Particularly in the television age, the host nation, journalists, and oth-
ers have sought to de‹ne the plotline of each Olympiad. Many recent
Games have been entangled with weighty political themes: Nazi Ger-
many’s rise (Berlin 1936), Middle East con›icts (Munich 1972 and Mel-
bourne 1956), the Cold War (Helsinki 1952, Moscow 1980, and Los An-
geles 1984), and host states’ political rehabilitation (Tokyo 1964, Rome
1960, and arguably Munich) or arrival on the world stage (Seoul 1988
and arguably Tokyo).
Politics and narrative are again prominent in the Beijing Games. The
host regime is determined to assure a positive story, especially on polit-
ically charged issues. The 2008 Olympics have produced propaganda
and mobilization efforts on a scale unseen in China since the begin-
ning of the post-Mao Zedong Reform Era. Regime efforts, along with
genuine popular enthusiasm, brought huge crowds to the streets the
night Beijing won the right to host the Games (MacLeod 2001c; Pan
and Pomfret 2001; People’s Daily 2001). Starting years earlier and accel-
erating as 2008 approached, Beijing authorities covered the city with
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billboards and banners urging citizens to welcome the Olympics and
make Beijing an impressive host city. Major, mostly state-linked Chi-
nese companies touted—loudly, even by Olympic sponsorship stan-
dards—their support for the Games (China Daily 2005a; Xinhua
2004b).1 Olympics-related content grew pervasive in state media and
on ubiquitous television screens in public spaces. A giant countdown
clock was erected at Tiananmen Square, the political heart of China,
with satellite versions elsewhere. Much fanfare attended milestones
such as the 500- and 365-day marks. The one-year point brought more
than a million to central Beijing and a countdown by a chorus of thou-
sands led by ‹lm star Jackie Chan and accompanied by ‹reworks.2
China even sought out Steven Spielberg and China’s most internation-
ally famous ‹lm director Zhang Yimou for the Games’ opening and
closing ceremonies (Coonan 2006; Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2007b).
This agenda has been especially urgent and these regime efforts have
been especially ardent because the 2008 Games offer potential re-
demption from the failure of Beijing’s bid for the 2000 Olympics.
When the International Olympic Committee (IOC) denied the PRC’s
quest to host the Games of the XXXVII Olympiad, it brought outrage,
anger, and embarrassment among China’s leaders and ordinary citizens
(Tyler 1993b; E. Rosenthal 2000).
The 2008 Games also provide a compelling opportunity to press
very different—but equally political—counternarratives. For many of
the concerns that motivate international civil society organizations,
foreign governments, and others, and that generate friction in interna-
tional political and economic relations, China is uniquely important.
On human rights issues, China combines massive scale with a notori-
ously poor record in matters ranging from political dissent and demo-
cratic participation; to religious, media, and reproductive freedoms; to
self-determination for ethnic minorities; to social justice. On environ-
mental questions, China’s sheer size, rapid industrialization and weak
regulation have made the PRC a rival to the United States in green-
house gas emissions, home to many of the world’s most polluted cities
and waterways, and a source of environmental harms throughout East
Asia and beyond.
For those concerned with these global issues, and for those—both
foreign and Chinese—who focus on China’s practices and policies, the
2008 Olympics offer exceptional conditions for bringing international
attention to these matters and pressure on the PRC. The Games de-
mand extraordinary openness in China’s restrictive political and media
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environment and shine a rare spotlight on Chinese circumstances that
still receive disproportionately little global coverage and consideration.
For outsiders seeking to change China and Chinese reformers as
well, the Games offer extraordinary opportunities to advance their
broader agendas through linkage to the Olympics—whether deeply res-
onant or shallowly ad hoc. The Games present mirror-image opportu-
nities—as well as risks—for a regime seeking to enhance its stature at
home and abroad. On both sides, multiple actors pursuing diverse
agendas and seeking to de‹ne the story of the 2008 Games can draw
upon Olympic ideals in ways that range from invoking to resonating to
hijacking. While struggle for control of the 2008 Olympic narrative is
dramatic, confrontational, and centered on the fortnight when the
world comes to Beijing, more signi‹cant effects likely will be more 
subtle, diffuse, and long-term.
The Regime’s Main Narrative: Prosperous,
Orderly, Normal, and Globalized China
The Chinese regime’s preferred narrative began to emerge years before
the Games. It includes several strands that are broadly, if not fully, con-
sistent with one another and Olympic ideals. First, the Olympics offer
an opportunity to present China as a developed, prosperous and there-
fore powerful country. China’s economic prowess and modernity per-
vade Chinese discussions of the Olympics. President and Party General
Secretary Hu Jintao and other current top leaders have explicitly linked
Beijing’s ability to host the Olympics to the regime’s central policy of
promoting economic development. A year before the Games, a Polit-
buro Standing Committee member declared that the “rapid economic
and social development” China had attained under policies of “reform
and opening up to the outside world” had given China the “capability
and conditions to host” the Games and display China’s “splendid ac-
complishments.” When Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Games was still
pending, Hu’s predecessor Jiang Zemin similarly cited China’s and Bei-
jing’s “healthy growth” and “steady [economic] development” as a
“powerful material guarantee for hosting the Games.” In his 2002 New
Years message, Jiang ranked winning the right to host the Olympics
alongside China’s WTO entry as the preceding year’s key milestones in
China’s pursuit of prosperity through international openness and en-
gagement (Xinhua 2006b; Renmin Ribao 2000; Chen J. 2007).
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One of the of‹cial concepts of the Beijing Organizing Committee of
the Olympic Games (BOCOG) underscores the desire to showcase
China’s economic advancement, promising a “High Tech” Olympics.
So too does the original—and still ubiquitous—slogan of the bid com-
mittee, “New Beijing, Great Olympics.” The same idea animates
unof‹cial discussions in Beijing that express hope the Games can dis-
pel foreign misperceptions that the capital’s residents wear Mao suits,
rely more on bicycles than cars, or otherwise trail the modern world
(author’s interviews, 2007).3
Material foundations for the “developed and prosperous China” im-
age are in place. They are the product of three decades of post-Mao eco-
nomic reforms and near-double-digit annual growth, the skewing of
development to major eastern cities, and the regime’s formidable abil-
ity to mobilize resources for favored projects.
China’s new wealth has transformed Beijing. Almost all of the city’s
gleaming of‹ce and residential towers, international hotels, and luxury
shopping malls are less than twenty years old. The most impressive
ones are of more recent vintage. The notorious traf‹c jams of foreign-
branded, joint-venture-produced vehicles are a phenomenon mostly of
the last decade. Like many arriviste metropolises, China’s capital has
sprouted would-be iconic architecture. New facilities for the Games are
massive and designed to impress, with a price tag of over $3 billion and
a scale that recalls the sensibilities of the emperors who created the For-
bidden City. Many of Beijing’s older architectural treasures—including
the Imperial Palace and the Temple of Heaven—have undergone ex-
tensive restoration timed for the 2008 Games. Major infrastructure 
projects, including subway lines, roads, a rail link to the airport and its
new world’s-largest terminal, and environmental improvement pro-
jects are part of the pre-Games construction agenda as well—at a cost of
$40 billion (Financial Times 2007a; Abrahamson 2005; Japan Economic
News-wire 2005).
When reality inconveniently has fallen short of image, Chinese au-
thorities have turned to Potemkin village tactics to hide, or distract at-
tention from, the incompleteness or the deleterious side effects of
China’s breakneck modernization. For an IOC visit during Beijing’s un-
successful bid for the 2000 Games, buildings along the guests’ route re-
ceived fresh coats of paint and slogans welcoming the Olympics. De-
crepit athletic facilities were patched up. Peddlers, homeless people,
and beggars were kept out of sight. Traf‹c restrictions were imposed,
and coal-‹red furnaces were shut off (despite the impact on production
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and the comfort of city residents) (Associated Press 1993; Cater 1993;
United Press International 1993). Although reforms responding to vote-
buying scandals limited IOC visits eight years later, Beijing deployed
similar tactics in its successful quest to land the 2008 Games. Authori-
ties “greened” the city through planting trees and painting brown win-
ter grass. They cleared the air by ordering factories to close and repris-
ing earlier restrictions on residential coal heating. They again signaled
enthusiasm with numerous banners and enthusiastic citizens (includ-
ing a bicycle rally of 10,000 in central Beijing) (Byers 2001; Japan Eco-
nomic Newswire 2001; Kuhn 2001).
To the extent that intervening years of economic growth, real estate
development, and Olympics-related construction have not solved such
problems (and have worsened some of them), means redolent of the
1993 and 2001 efforts to land the Games are in the repertoire for the
2008 Games. Some have been clearly and explicitly adopted—for ex-
ample, limiting pollution and traf‹c congestion. Others are not
of‹cially acknowledged but certainly will be in the mix—for example,
removing or hiding those whose presence or advocacy reveals persist-
ing poverty and rising inequality, including Beijing-based dissidents,
provincial petitioners who come to the capital seeking redress for their
grievances, and migrant laborers who work in countless construction
projects and other more marginal jobs in the city. Less certain is
whether such measures, some of which worked reasonably well for
brief site visits, can succeed when 30,000 journalists, and half a million
participants and spectators, stay for two weeks.
The hosts’ use of the Games to display China’s modernity and pros-
perity ‹ts a pattern of the Olympics as grand spectacle and, more im-
portantly, reprises prior Olympics’ roles as national “coming out par-
ties.” The Beijing Games here resemble the Seoul Games of 1988 or
perhaps the Tokyo Games of 1964. The Seoul Olympics came shortly af-
ter Korea’s ascension to the ranks of lower-middle-income countries—a
group the PRC has now joined (World Bank n.d.). Although Japan
decades earlier had become a developed, industrialized country, the
1964 Games underscored its recovery from postwar economic devasta-
tion. The parallel to the Seoul Games has become a cliché in foreign
commentary and informal discussions in China. (The analogy unsur-
prisingly occupies a much lower pro‹le in orthodox Chinese commen-
tary. PRC authorities are unsurprisingly averse to outsiders’ speculative
suggestions that the Games also might portend political change similar
to Korea’s democratization. And, like Chinese leaders before them, they
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are hardly inclined to celebrate the former vassal state as an appropri-
ate model or worthy predecessor for China in any signi‹cant interna-
tional endeavor—with the limited exception of Korea’s rise as one of
several “tiger” economies from which post-Mao economic reforms
drew lessons.)4
For China, the link between prosperity and development is rein-
forced by promises of more concrete economic effects. Of‹cial sources
tout the Games’ contribution to “the nationwide struggle” to achieve
the Reform-Era goal of a “well-off society.” Olympics spending may add
as much as 1 percent annually to Beijing’s economic growth. The im-
pact of Olympics-driven infrastructure improvements will extend far
beyond 2008 (Xinhua 2001c; Xu 2007). The rapid growth of Beijing’s
economy, population, and need for infrastructure means the host city
faces less danger of common Olympic hangovers of white-elephant
projects and popular resentment of vast expenditures on Olympics-re-
lated projects to the neglect of other needs. A mid-course retrench-
ment—directed by Premier Wen Jiabao and prompted by concerns
about excessive and inef‹cient spending and doubts about the future
utility of the Games’ venues—promised to reduce such risks further
(Xxz.gov.cn 2007; Ling and Lee 2007).
The Games are also expected to spur upgrading of Beijing’s service in-
dustries. Unlike resident expatriates and experienced visitors who have
become accustomed to many frustrations, the foreigners who will come
for the Games are expected to demand—and thus Chinese authorities,
determined to win favorable press, are pushing to provide—services that
meet international standards. Sectors targeted for improvement range
widely, including hospitality, transportation, media, and health care
(China Daily 2006b; Xinhua 2005b; China Daily 2007e).
A second central theme in the of‹cial narrative is to portray China
as politically stable and orderly. All host governments, and the interna-
tional Olympic authorities, want to avoid Games marred by poor orga-
nization or political disruption. This is a core (if not explicit) Olympic
value, re›ected in the factors considered in the site-selection process,
the insistence that the Olympics are about sport (not politics), and the
related mantra that the Games should not be politicized. Commitment
to political order and control looms especially large for Beijing in 2008,
as top Chinese of‹cials have noted (Xinhua 2001a). The harsh mea-
sures to relocate migrant workers, provincial petitioners, and develop-




PRC leaders also have been sensitive to the in›uence of Chinese dis-
sidents, who have embarrassed the regime abroad and who, properly
handled, might aid the regime’s Olympic pursuits. In the most notable
example, Wei Jingsheng, China’s internationally best-known dissident,
was released from prison during the quest for the 2000 Games, in part
to burnish the regime’s image and respond to foreign human rights cri-
tiques. Wei was soon jailed again, having irked authorities by criticizing
to foreign media the regime’s attempts to trade political prisoners for
the Games, and meeting with the U.S. State Department’s chief human
rights of‹cial to urge continued pressure on the PRC (Tyler 1993a; Tem-
pest 1994).
The period preceding the 2001 vote on the 2008 Games brought
similar tactics. By this time, China had sent Wei into exile as part of its
effort to lessen the foreign condemnation of China’s human rights
record that had helped scuttle Beijing’s bid for the 2000 Olympics.
With the 2008 site choice nearing, Chinese authorities detained known
dissidents, keeping them from IOC visitors and the press, and impris-
oned at least one democracy activist who signed a letter urging the IOC
to press China on human rights. Authorities also reined in media, both
traditional organs and newly emerging channels for heterodox opin-
ion, including the Internet and wangba (Web cafes) that provided many
users with access points, as well as anonymity (Faison 1997; MacLeod
2001a; E. Rosenthal 2001; Pan and Pomfret 2001). The more-immediate
run-up to the Olympics—and the politically sensitive Chinese Com-
munist Party Congress the preceding fall—brought tighter restrictions
and increased harassment of political dissidents, regime-criticizing
NGOs, and old and new media.5
The regime’s commitment to staging a trouble-free Olympics is
sometimes overstated (for example in the occasional suggestion—
‹rmly and credibly rejected by PRC authorities—that the pre-Olympics
period might permit Taiwan to move toward formal independence be-
cause fear of a Moscow or Los Angeles Games-style boycott would deter
Beijing from using force to check secession).6 Still, the storyline of a
smooth and successful Olympics is a high priority for a regime with
considerable commitment and capacity. Maintaining order and control
is a particularly deeply entrenched imperative in China, where “fear of
chaos” (paluan) is a centuries-old political trope and where the ruling
regime initially drew much of its legitimacy from having ended
decades of civil war, foreign invasion, anarchy, and semicolonial en-
croachment. Of more immediate relevance, the forcible suppression of
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the Democracy Movement, the smothering of dissent during the nearly
two decades since, and the ongoing repression of Falun Gong under-
score the regime’s ability to maintain political order and quash chal-
lenges when leaders perceive suf‹ciently strong reasons to do so. For
the Beijing Games, the prospects for disruption are dim, at least on
anything approaching the scale of the Tiananmen Democracy Move-
ment of 1989 or the Falun Gong activities of a decade later (including
the surprise assembly of 10,000 followers outside the top Chinese lead-
ership’s residence). Enforced silence predictably awaits dissidents, and
expulsion, con‹nement, or other restrictions face vagrants, petty crim-
inals, mental patients, rural-to-urban migrants, and other unsightly
types, for the 2008 Games.7 To further assure order, PRC authorities
have devoted massive resources to security work for the Games. It may
also help that major venues are clustered in areas removed from both
central Beijing and the chronically politically troublesome university
district.
In more quotidian but economically signi‹cant ways, PRC authori-
ties have used their power to control citizens’ and enterprises’ behavior
to create an impression of orderliness and cleanliness during key
Olympics-related moments. They shut down factories and limited driv-
ing for IOC visitors in 2001, creating unusually clear skies and quiet
streets (Japan Economic Newswire 2001; Kuhn 2001). Two years before
the Beijing Olympiad, capital-area factories, taxi drivers, and others
were on notice that their “fog”-producing and traf‹c-snarling activities
would be severely curtailed during the Games. Factories were to close
for months preceding and during the Olympics, and much of the city’s
workforce was to be told, or encouraged, to take vacations.8 The China-
Africa summit in October 2006 and a test ban on driving for 1.3 million
vehicles in August 2007 provided small-scale dress rehearsals for
Olympic traf‹c restrictions. A year before the Games, authorities an-
nounced that hundreds of domestic ›ights would be canceled in the
weeks surrounding the Games to reduce airport delays (McGregor
2006a; China Daily 2007a; Harvey and McGregor 2007; Xinhua 2007l).
And, most expensively of all, much of the Olympics-driven infrastruc-
ture building blitz served this same goal of avoiding chaos from an in-
adequate transportation system.
Other of‹cial efforts also show commitment to orderly, trouble-free
Games. For example, city authorities launched a campaign to improve
Beijingers’ manners in advance of the Olympics. Targeted behavior in-
cluded booing athletes who perform badly, spitting or swearing in pub-
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lic, failing to queue for buses, and using embarrassingly bad English
(Xinhua 2006a; Yardley 2007b; Xinhua 2007m). Methods were devel-
oped and tested to seed clouds to reduce the chance of rain during the
image-de‹ning opening and closing days and to wash pollution from
the skies (China Daily 2007c; Xinhua 2007i). With controversy erupting
over Chinese exports of dangerous food, medicine, and toys in the
summer of 2007, PRC authorities rushed to address another perceived
threat to a smooth and orderly Olympics, pledging high-tech tracking
and inspection systems to assure the safety of consumables at the
Games (Yardley 2007c).
A third element in the preferred of‹cial narrative uses the Beijing
Olympics to assert China’s achievement of, or return to, international
respectability and normal membership in the global community. The
Olympics’ utility in promoting such political rehabilitation and accep-
tance is not a formally recognized Olympic principle. It is understand-
ably not stressed in of‹cial Chinese discussions. But it is an obvious
power of the Olympics and ‹gured prominently in debates over
whether China should be awarded the Games and motivated the Chi-
nese regime’s desire to host.
The still-fresh memory of the 1989 Tiananmen Incident (and human
rights issues generally) helped defeat Beijing’s bid for 2000. The award-
ing of the 2008 Olympics marked zealously pursued and hard-won
progress from this dismal baseline. The Games will offer further oppor-
tunities. The visual richness of the Olympics and the worldwide atten-
tion they draw provide a singularly promising chance to supplant im-
ages from 1989, such as a lone man standing in the path of tanks or an
army vehicle toppling the Goddess of Democracy.9
Here, the 2008 Games can give China what the 1960 Rome Games;
the 1964 Tokyo Games; and, arguably, the 1972 Munich Games (espe-
cially read against the backdrop of the 1936 Berlin Games) gave their
hosts: a symbolic af‹rmation of the country’s recovery from political
pariah status that had followed odious actions. To be sure, the Tianan-
men Incident and other recent PRC human rights violations pale in
comparison to Axis governments’ atrocities in World War II. On the
other hand, China’s quest for reacceptance is complicated by the con-
tinuing in power of the regime responsible for the behavior that led to
ostracism.
Ongoing, post-Tiananmen human rights abuses have remained a
challenge for China’s rehabilitation and normality agenda. China’s for-
mer recalcitrance toward the international human rights regime has
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softened, grudgingly, in the face of regular critical reports from NGOs,
the U.S. State Department, and others; threats by the U.S. to remove
trading privileges; the remarkable (if modest and constrained) growth
of human rights discourse and advocacy in China; and the partly hu-
man rights–based and temporarily successful international opposition
to China’s entering the WTO and hosting the Olympics.
As the role of human rights concerns in China’s Olympics bids un-
derscores, China’s efforts to use the Games to enhance its normal, ac-
cepted state status partly depend on more effectively engaging the in-
ternational human rights norms that have become a feature of the
Olympic movement. This connection between human rights and the
Games may have its roots in venerable Olympic ideals of sport free
from politics and open to individual merit. It expanded through the
resonance of human rights issues with Olympic tragedy and contro-
versy at Munich in 1972, retrospectively for Berlin in 1936 and arguably
in the Afghanistan invasion–linked boycott of Moscow in 1980. The tie
has strengthened further through Olympics-focused efforts of human
rights NGOs in recent years. The Olympic Charter and Code of Ethics
now include such human rights–related provisions as preservation of
human dignity, harmonious development of man, and prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of race, religion, gender, or politics (IOC
2004).
Recognizing the seriousness of international discontent and con-
cern, Chinese Olympics authorities assured wary Olympics decision
makers and decision in›uencers that awarding Beijing the Games
would promote human rights in the PRC and bring Games-speci‹c
changes in such key areas as press freedom, especially for foreign me-
dia. These arguments and promises helped China land the Games but
have limited prospects for wider effect. Poor implementation, contin-
ued abuses, and tighter controls (some Olympics driven) have pro-
duced a torrent of criticism as the 2008 Games draw near (Xinhua
2006f; Tian 2007; Dickie 2007a).10
For China, the rehabilitation-and-arrival theme extends beyond re-
covery from Tiananmen and later human rights problems. Beijing’s
successful bid to host the Games, and the Olympics’ placing the host
city at the center of world attention, are seen as bringing closure to
China’s “century (and a half) of humiliation” that began with the
Opium Wars, the shattering of a Sinocentric world order, and China’s
relegation to the margins of the international system. While this issue
has not been central to of‹cial views, it is a signi‹cant theme, espe-
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cially common in unof‹cial and foreign discussions of the Beijing
Olympics and China’s rise more generally. It likely also helps explain
the seemingly outsized importance that the Games appear to have for
China’s leaders (C. Smith 2001; Frank 1993; Chen J. 2007; Xu 2007; au-
thor’s interviews 2007).
Addressing environmental problems is also part of the “normal” or
“conforming” nation strand in the of‹cially preferred narrative. China
increasingly draws international opprobrium for failing to engage this
set of international norms. It faces criticism and alarm for having re-
jected the Kyoto accords, allowing its waterways and urban air to be-
come among the world’s most polluted, threatening the environment
and public health of its neighbors and, on some views, using lax pollu-
tion controls as an export subsidy.
The Olympics bring special pressures, incentives, and opportunities
for China to address its environmental rogue status. Environmental is-
sues have distinctive ties to the Olympics. The environment formally
joined culture and sport as international Olympic themes in the 1990s.
Environmental concerns and the Games are broadly and informally
linked by the connection between sport and public health and the im-
pact of pollution on the Olympics’ many outdoor events. And
Olympics of‹cials early and often raised the environment as a serious
concern for a Beijing Games (Cha 2007; United Nations n.d.; China
Daily 2007b; IOC 2004; World Health Organization 2005; Japan and
China 2007).
Against this problematic backdrop, PRC authorities made a “Green”
Olympics one of the Beijing Games’ of‹cial concepts. They have
adopted and publicized regulations incorporating international
“green” standards and pursued cooperation on Games-speci‹c envi-
ronmental measures with the United Nations Environmental Program
and environmental protection authorities abroad. They have made and
emphasized pledges to minimize energy use and adopt solar energy,
water recycling, and other green technology for Games-related build-
ing projects, transportation, and other activities during the Games.
They have touted campaigns to plant trees, directives to curtail or close
(permanently or temporarily) polluting factories in the Beijing area,
convert capital-area power plants from coal to cleaner fuels, and restrict
driving during the Games. Some of these undertakings have been
costly and somewhat effective. They command greater of‹cial atten-
tion and extra public resources (totaling several billion dollars) partly
because they seem vital to the regime’s Olympic story that China is a
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responsible and respectable participant in an increasingly important
aspect of the international system (Xinhua 2006c; China Daily 2005b;
China Daily 2004c; Xinhua 2007n; Landsberg 2007b; MacLeod and
Wiseman 2007).
Prospects for success remain questionable, however. The measures
are small relative to China’s problems, both of substance and image.
Some of the commitments surely will be honored in the breach or will
prove inadequate (Harvey and McGregor 2007; Deutsche Presse-Agentur
2007c). The latter problem was underscored when, with a year to go,
the IOC warned it might postpone endurance events if pollution re-
mained severe (Blitz and Dickie 2007). Other pledges risk diminished
impact because they may be recognized as only symbolic (seeming
green without being green), temporary and local (reducing haze and
traf‹c jams only in Beijing and only during the Games), or cost-shift-
ing (moving factories elsewhere in China).
Intellectual property plays a similar role in the of‹cial Olympic nar-
rative of China’s international normalcy and conformity. The PRC has
faced mounting criticism for being ineffective or unwilling to imple-
ment international norms—and China’s WTO-related commitments—
for the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR). China’s behavior
has brought growing calls for action, including chronic complaints
from foreign companies and industry groups and the United States’ ini-
tiating long-contemplated WTO proceedings before the one-year mark
in the countdown to the Games (Puzzanghera and Iritani 2007; USTR
2007).
Like human rights and the environment, IPR is a special concern of
the Olympics that poses serious risks and possible opportunities for the
Beijing Games’ hosts. Olympics-related IPR protection has become a
major IOC focus. Selling sponsorship rights and licensing Olympic lo-
gos are highly lucrative and vital to paying for costly Olympics opera-
tions. China’s broader record of rampant piracy has compounded such
concerns for the 2008 Games.
PRC authorities have sought to assuage those worries and, in turn,
avoid reinforcing an important count in the international indictment
charging China with shirking global rules. Across Beijing, specialized
stores and booths have sprung up, prominently and apparently accu-
rately proclaiming that they sell “of‹cially licensed” Olympics prod-
ucts and offering them at premium prices. PRC authorities have
pledged increased IPR enforcement, adopted Olympics-speci‹c IPR reg-
ulations, declared that those rules “meet usual international practices”
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(China Daily 2004a; PRC State Council 2002), launched contests to in-
crease popular knowledge of Olympics-related IPR laws (Xinhua 2007j),
devoted a disproportionate share of antipiracy enforcement efforts to
Olympics knockoffs, and publicized enforcement successes.11 Authori-
ties clearly are sensitive to reports of Olympics IPR piracy, apparently
believe that they may face signi‹cant costs if they fail to follow
through on high-pro‹le commitments to improve IPR protection, and
surely are solicitous of the interests of state-owned or state-af‹liated en-
terprises that produce licensed Olympics merchandise.
Here too, the impact of promises and efforts is doubtful. Unlicensed
Olympics paraphernalia has been on offer from street hawkers many
months before the peak demand that will accompany the Games.
Of‹cially touted crackdowns on Olympics counterfeiters are still few
relative to the likely scale of 2008 Games-related piracy. And the au-
thorities’ moves face a skeptical international audience that may well
regard publicized efforts as being more about image than ef‹cacy.
A fourth theme in the of‹cially favored narrative is a “globalized”
China (to be inferred from an apparently globalized Beijing). This ele-
ment is facially consistent with international Olympic norms of inter-
nationalism and universality. It is also imbedded in the Beijing Games’
principal slogan, “One World, One Dream,” which tellingly enjoys a
special place as a giant billboard at the most heavily touristed—and
photographed—part of the Great Wall. One of the Games’ of‹cial
themes—a “Humanistic” or “People’s” Olympics—emphasizes benevo-
lent cultural and social implications of the Olympics and similarly sig-
nals cosmopolitanism, harmony, and universality.12
Much that supports the “normal” and “accepted” nation strand also
serves this element of the regime’s preferred interpretation of the 2008
Games. The claim that China is “globalized” is a key aim of the PRC’s
self-congratulatory embrace of international norms—generally and in
speci‹cally Olympics-related moves—on issues ranging from intellec-
tual property to environmental protection to labor standards.
Similarly, developments that support the of‹cially preferred
Olympics story line of China’s economic prowess also help the regime’s
claim to cosmopolitanism. Because foreign trade and investment have
loomed so large in China’s rapid development and because coastal ur-
ban China’s burgeoning consumer class has a strong taste for foreign
brands, the advertisements (many of them invoking the Olympics)
that festoon the capital’s main roads and shopping areas are mostly for
internationally famous companies. In the Olympics context, the
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regime has not left this visible commercial face of internationalism at
risk of shabbiness. As the Olympics-driven urban facelift that followed
the awarding of the Games began in 2002, city of‹cials ordered the re-
moval of down-market signs (including some of longtime Olympics
sponsor McDonald’s) (Xinhua 2002).
Many of the most recent additions to the architectural backdrop for
such signage also embody the regime’s globalization narrative. Promi-
nent examples include controversial French architect Paul Andreu’s Na-
tional Theater with its ›attened, re›ective dome and Rem Koolhaas’s
“twisted arch” headquarters for China Central Television. Major
Olympic venues are similarly internationalized. The main stadium for
the Games, designed by the Swiss ‹rm Herzog and de Meuron, has an
open-weave facade that has prompted the moniker “bird’s nest.” While
this popular nickname evokes Chinese cuisine, the design is not dis-
cernibly Chinese. A leading architect at the local ‹rm that collaborated
on the project tellingly described the stadium as “such a good, modern
design that it would be accepted and liked by Chinese culture” because
of those virtues, not because of its Chineseness. Another Chinese ar-
chitect with a major role in the project similarly described the stadium
as “a very bold design for a nation that wants to prove itself part of the
international family, to show we share the same values.” Australia’s
PTW Architects’ fanciful natatorium evokes blue bubbles—and the so-
briquet “water cube”—and has no discernibly Chinese features (Pom-
fret 2000; South China Morning Post 2007; China Daily 2006c; Watts
2007). This internationalization of building styles has displaced former
mayor Chen Xitong’s more nativist directives that prompted often-
tacky Chinese motifs on many buildings from the 1980s and early
1990s.
These changes to Beijing’s cityscape have been so striking that that
they have generated a backlash. Local companies and of‹cials have at-
tacked foreign brands’ outdoor advertisements for overwhelming Chi-
nese competitors (Xinhua 2005c). Chinese architects, of‹cials, and
commentators have lamented displacement of Chinese aesthetic tradi-
tions and criticized foreign-designed projects for not ‹tting their envi-
ronment. Such charges (along with concerns about cost and safety)
were suf‹ciently powerful to bring retrenchment of key projects and re-
consideration of the rush to foreign styles (Xinhua 1993b; Hawthorne
2004; China Daily 2004b). Chinese celebrities’ contributions to pack-
aging the Beijing Games also have supported the cosmopolitan theme
but without drawing nationalist critiques. Some of the most prominent
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roles, tellingly, have gone to movie actor Jackie Chan, basketball star
Yao Ming, and ‹lm director Zhang Yimou—whose appeal goes far be-
yond the Chinese world and much of whose fame comes from accom-
plishments in non-Chinese settings.
This of‹cial narrative of universality and globalization that echoes
and appropriates established Olympic ideals also serves a broader Chi-
nese foreign policy agenda. The Olympics story line of a cosmopolitan,
internationalized China dovetails with the PRC’s drive to assure skit-
tish neighbors and a wary world that China’s inexorable “rise” will be
a “peaceful” one in which China will continue to emphasize its own
economic development; deepen engagement with the outside world;
and eschew “hegemonism,” “imperialism,” and other modes of domi-
nating other states or abusing its new power. Chinese Olympic rhetoric
has picked up these themes, stressing that the Games will help make
Beijing and China more internationally open, and adopting as one of
the organizing committee’s three of‹cial themes a “People’s” or “Hu-
manistic” Olympics that will have transformative and internationaliz-
ing effects on China’s citizenry (Zheng 2005; Xinhua 1993a; Moon
2006).
Efforts to weave the strands of development, stability, normality,
and globalization into an effective narrative for the Beijing 2008
Games have faced signi‹cant challenges. Among the dif‹culties are the
weakness of empirical foundations for some key claims, and the
themes’ uneasy coexistence with another, very different dimension of
of‹cial China’s preferred vision of the Games.
The Regime’s Other Narrative: 
Chinese Nationalism
Nationalism is a familiar element in the Olympic experience and—
though less so—Olympic ideals. It has particular force and volatility for
the Beijing Games. While the most audible parts of the of‹cial narra-
tive have stressed international cooperation and assimilation and do-
mestic prosperity and order, nationalism has always been central to
China’s Olympic quest. It predictably comes more to the fore as the
Games approach.
Partisan patriotism may not be among the Olympics’ most lofty val-
ues, but it is an important facet of the Games, especially for the host
nation. For the 2008 Beijing Olympiad, the Chinese regime has cast
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winning the right to host the Games and staging a smooth and suc-
cessful Olympics as major points of national pride and signal moments
in China’s rise as a great power. A chest-thumping tone pervades dis-
cussions of the Olympics as a re›ection of China’s recent accomplish-
ments and return to international prominence and acceptance.
Against this background, Chinese successes at the Games are sure to
bring much of‹cial triumphalism, both re›ecting and feeding popular
sentiment and perhaps pushing beyond the point that serves the
regime’s longer term interests and re›ective preferences. China’s status
as a major and rising sports power and the Games’ typical home court
advantage promise many occasions for celebration of Chinese on-the-
‹eld accomplishments and China’s pursuit of ‹rst place in the medal
count. Long before the Games, public displays in Beijing celebrated Yao
Ming, 2004 hurdles gold medalist Liu Xiang, and other Chinese ath-
letes alongside Jesse Owens and other stars of past Olympiads.
Other Chinese characteristics of the 2008 Games may amplify the
ordinary Olympic temptations of nationalism. Head-to-head competi-
tion between PRC and U.S. teams invites jingoistic responses, especially
given two backstories. The approach and arrival of the Games of the
XXIX Olympiad recall the United States’ role in denying Beijing the
2000 Games and political efforts in the United States that opposed
awarding China the 2008 Games. Some of that opposition continued
long after the IOC’s site selection and included pointed (if futile) calls
in Congress, among NGOs, and elsewhere for a boycott of the Beijing
Games (Lengell 2007; Los Angeles Times 2007; China Daily 2007d; Smith
2007; Perlez 2001; Xinhua 2001b; Schweisberg 1993; Xinhua 1993c).
The Games will unfold against the backdrop of China’s rapid and
self-conscious rise as a great power and of‹cial and popular cha‹ng at
perceived American efforts to deny China its rightful place in the world
or to subject China to unfair standards and unwarranted criticisms. Key
irritants are unlikely to abate before the Games: a cavernous bilateral
trade imbalance; charges that China has not allowed its currency to ap-
preciate adequately; concerns about shoddy and dangerous Chinese ex-
ports; Washington’s characterization of China as less than a “responsi-
ble stakeholder” in the international system on matters ranging from
economics to human rights to international security to public health;
and sharp disagreements over the propriety, necessity, and motivation
of China’s quest for a blue-water navy, satellite-killing weapons, infor-
mation warfare capacity, and other military capabilities. The national-
ist strand in the Chinese of‹cial narrative and the developed and pow-
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erful China theme that PRC authorities also press (and that, in any
event, will be inescapably on display at the Games) are a heady combi-
nation that may provide ample fodder for the “China threat” school of
PRC critics in the United States.
The likelihood of Sino-American con›ict-fueled nationalism becom-
ing a major element in the Olympics story line will rise if these or other
aspects of U.S.-China relations become foci of the American presiden-
tial campaign and party conventions that will be held nearly opposite
the Olympics, or if PRC leaders—or unforeseen events—increase such
issues’ political salience (Luce and Ward 2007). Once accepted, China’s
invitation to President Bush to attend the 2008 Games promised some
assurance on this front, but at the risk of greater U.S. attention to the
Games and, in turn, greater impact on U.S. opinion and policy of any
developments that depart from the Chinese regime’s preferred Olympic
narrative (Stolberg 2007).
Japanese Olympic successes and direct competition with Chinese
athletes could become another ›ashpoint for Chinese Olympic nation-
alism. Bilateral relations remain chronically troubled, and clashes have
erupted after matches between Chinese and Japanese teams in recent
years and brought international expressions of concern about what
they portended for 2008 (Makinoda 2007; McNeill 2004; McGregor
and Pilling 2004).
Taiwan’s Olympic role—always nettlesome for China—is more prob-
lematic at a PRC-hosted Games. For decades, China has grudgingly en-
dured Taiwan’s participation under the name “Chinese Taipei.” At a
Beijing Games, however, the prospect of Taiwanese athletes competing
as representatives of an entity distinct from the PRC, or standing atop
medal platforms on mainland Chinese soil, puts Chinese authorities to
harder choices. In this setting, China’s customary acquiescence risks
implying greater PRC acceptance of Taiwan’s status in an event at
which competitors typically represent sovereign states, not lesser enti-
ties. Given the broader nationalist tenor of the Olympics for China,
temptation and pressure to push back may be formidable, despite the
cost to China’s efforts—at the Games and more broadly—to appear ac-
commodating and nonbellicose. This prospect will loom larger still if
Taiwanese athletes, media, or politicians cast Taiwan’s Olympic partici-
pation or successes strongly in Taiwanese nationalist terms.
Here too, broader politics, including election politics, likely will play
a role. A new president will have taken of‹ce in Taiwan three months
before the Games. If past patterns hold, the campaign will have in-
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cluded con›ict over Taiwan’s relations with the mainland and what-
ever initiatives concerning the island republic’s “status” the retiring
“pro-independence” incumbent Chen Shui-bian will have undertaken
during his ‹nal months in of‹ce. Among these is a ruling-party-backed
proposed referendum for the early 2008 balloting that calls for Tai-
wan’s entry into the United Nations. This long has been anathema to
Beijing (which insists that Taiwan is ineligible for what the PRC char-
acterizes as a states-member-only organization), and the referendum is
among the reasons offered for pressing a tough line on Taiwan policy at
the Chinese Communist Party Congress held ten months before the
Games.
Well before the Games, the Taiwan issue and the nationalist strand
in China’s Olympics agenda already had produced friction. In early
2007, controversy erupted over whether the Olympic torch would pass
through Taiwan on its way to the opening ceremonies. Beijing offered,
and Taipei rejected (and negotiations for a mutually acceptable alterna-
tive arrangement failed to resurrect), the ›ame’s journey through the
island as part of a ‹nal, intra-Chinese segment that also would include
the Hong Kong and Macao Special Administrative Regions.13
Tibet too has become part of an Olympics-related and politically
charged nationalist narrative concerning a region of disputed Chinese
sovereignty. Beijing Olympics organizers pointedly included Tibet as a
domestic leg of the torch relay and as the source of one of the Games’
mascots. Chinese authorities reacted sharply to efforts to use the
Olympics to display Tibetan opposition to China’s rule, quashing
Olympics-and-Tibet-related protests and restricting foreign media ac-
cess to the region (Macartney 2007; Yardley 2007e).
Chinese nationalism—or at least Chinese culturalism—pervades
of‹cial symbols and slogans of the 2008 Games, sometimes in ways not
obvious to outsiders. This is particularly signi‹cant as an attempt to
de‹ne the meaning of the 2008 Olympics because culturalism and na-
tionalism long have been closely linked in China and because Chinese
political discourse remains highly attuned to metaphor and symbol.14
The logo for Beijing 2008 is a human ‹gure evoking an Olympic ath-
lete and incorporating a stylized variant of the ancient seal-style ver-
sion of the character jing, as in Beijing. (To some observers, it resembled
not jing but wen, referring to culture [wenhua]—implicitly Chinese cul-
ture.) The logo provoked nationalism-related criticism on two fronts:
some complained that the design attempted to make a universal event
excessively Chinese; others attacked it for being insuf‹ciently nation-
Defining Beijing 2008
34
alist in snubbing the rest of China in favor of Beijing (BOCOG n.d.a;
Fang 2004b; Fang 2004a).
Olympic medals will feature the logo and incorporate rings of jade—
the quintessential Chinese stone and symbol of honor, virtue, and for-
tune—in descending levels of quality on the gold, silver, and bronze
medallions (Gao 2007). The fuwa—the omnipresent and insufferably
cuddly mascots for the Games—are an oppressive mélange of Chinese
symbols, leavened with Olympic icons. The ‹ve creatures represent the
carp, panda, Olympic Flame, Tibetan antelope, and swallow. Each is
color coded to one of the Olympic rings and one of ‹ve basic elements
that mostly track traditional Chinese cosmology.15 Each is also associ-
ated with a traditional Chinese blessing. The mascots’ names take
kitschy national-culturalism further still: Beibei, Jingjing, Huanhuan,
Yingying, and Nini use mandarin Chinese’s dense homophony to echo
the venerable tourism slogan, Beijing huanying ni (Beijing welcomes
you!) (BOCOG n.d.b; Gao 2005).
This pervasive cultural symbolism extends, with more subtlety and
less media hype, to the Games’ physical setting. As references to the
in›uence of the “‹ve elements theory” on the design of the Olympic
village underscore, traditional motifs are hardly absent. The Olympic
Green follows principles of Chinese geomancy (fengshui). The Games
complex is laid out to extend and remain harmonious with the capital’s
ancient north-south axis—an orientation that the founders of the
People’s Republic once sought to pivot with the postrevolutionary con-
struction of the broad east-west boulevard that passes before Tianan-
men. Construction for the Games also has unearthed archaeological
‹nds, which are always occasions for of‹cially sanctioned expressions
of national-cultural pride (Xinhua 2004a; Xiao 2002; Yardley 2007a).
Cultural nationalism is also re›ected in the vast Olympics-driven
restoration program for the city’s imperial-era architectural treasures,
and in plans for elaborate—even by Olympics standards—events show-
casing Chinese performing arts.
Even small and seemingly trivial matters convey attempted siniciza-
tion. The moment chosen for the Games’ opening—8:08 p.m. on Au-
gust 8, 2008—is a string of Chinese superstition’s lucky number. The
Chinese version of the Games’ widely used English slogan replaces the
bland “New Beijing, Great Olympics” with the more proprietary and
transforming “New Beijing, New Olympics.”
Some host country cultural nationalism in the Olympics is com-
monplace and consistent with the inclusion of “culture” alongside
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“sport” in the pantheon of Olympic values. Still, the Chinese hosts’ ef-
forts have been unusually pervasive and often overwrought. Less clear
are the prospects for success of this strand in the of‹cially preferred nar-
rative. Much of the content is, by any measure, clunky and contrived.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that educated and cosmopolitan segments
of the Beijing population (and perhaps others) wince at dated-sound-
ing, simplistic, and excessively nationalistic tones in the of‹cial fervor
for and pride in China’s Olympic moment and expected successes. The
nationalist drumbeating over the Olympics also seems to have little
carry beyond Beijing. Shanghai is far more focused on its own World
Exposition for 2010. The Olympics ‹gure far less prominently in con-
versations and local media coverage beyond Beijing, and many com-
ments are critical of the perceived waste and the expenditure of na-
tional resources on the already rich and subsidized capital (author’s
interviews, 2006–2007; Economic Reference News 2004; Wei 2007).
Moreover, the purveyors of the of‹cially preferred narrative surely
appreciate that moves that evoke or fan popular nationalism in China
can be dangerous and must be relatively carefully calibrated. Although
manipulable and often mobilized to regime ends (ranging from sup-
porting the Olympic bid to criticizing Japanese prime ministerial visits
to the Yasukuni Shrine to U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Bel-
grade), Chinese nationalism is a genuinely popular phenomenon that
is sometimes virulent and dif‹cult for the regime to control.
The nationalist strand in the of‹cially preferred story line also must
contend with more accommodating and cosmopolitan themes in the
regime’s principal narrative and the weight those derive from Chinese
authorities’ having emphasized them in their bid to secure the Games
and advance broader PRC foreign policy goals. Moreover, purveyors of
of‹cially preferred narratives must contend with other contestants in
a struggle to de‹ne the meaning of the 2008 Olympics. These rivals’
aims con›ict with the of‹cial agenda’s nationalist elements—and oth-
ers as well.
Counternarratives: Appropriating Olympic
Ideals, Playing Chinese Politics, and the
Games as Foreign Policy and Guerrilla Theater
The Olympics often spawns transnational, multisided contests to shape
a Games story line. Those battles are especially complex and high-
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stakes for the XXIX Summer Games. Challenges to of‹cial China’s pre-
ferred narrative come from diverse sources, including groups that fall
within the loose rubric of “global civil society”; foreign governments
with China policies and issue-speci‹c foreign policies; and other orga-
nizations, industry associations and ‹rms, and individuals in China
and elsewhere. Well before the Games, these actors began to press
Olympics-related agendas on a wide range of issues. These efforts to ex-
pose, publicize, or affect repressive, illiberal, or otherwise international
norm–violating PRC policies and practices predate and extend beyond
China’s pursuit of the Games. Several features of the Olympics, how-
ever, create especially promising contexts for long-standing partici-
pants and newcomers to try to change China.
First, the Olympics has facilitated linkages between agendas that crit-
ics and promoters of reforms press and goals that the Chinese leadership
values, including hosting the Olympics as a sign of China’s status and
prowess and, more broadly, securing China’s standing as an interna-
tionally accepted, normal state. Foreign actors’ in›uence on the IOC’s
choice of hosts and their ability to threaten credibly to diminish the Bei-
jing Games’ success (through high-pro‹le protests, boycotts, reports,
and the like) gave outsiders special leverage with the Chinese leader-
ship. Echoing the saga of China’s quest for WTO membership, Beijing’s
quest for the Games prompted pledges that otherwise would not have
been forthcoming from the PRC on issues that mattered to foreign gov-
ernments, international NGOs, and in›uential interest groups.16
In seeking the Olympics, as in pursuing WTO accession, China’s
promises gave new tools to critics and reform-promoters at home and
abroad. They could monitor China’s compliance and depict PRC short-
falls as not meeting requirements that Chinese authorities could not
dismiss as externally imposed, nonbinding benchmarks. A year before
the Games, this tactic became more prominent. Notable examples in-
cluded foreign media and international human rights NGOs and dissi-
dent and critical Chinese issuing high-pro‹le condemnations of Chi-
nese authorities’ failures to live up to Olympics commitments on press
freedom, labor rights, and human rights more generally.
Second, as these examples of linkage suggest, agendas of activists,
critics, and other proponents of change in China can invoke or appro-
priate Olympics values. Where they do, their preferred story lines have
a better chance of being woven into the Games’ principal narrative and
leveraging the Olympics’ capacity to affect PRC regime behavior and
Chinese circumstances.
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Human rights issues are the most notable example. The Beijing
Games’ background includes much that reinforces the already robust
linkage between the Olympics and human rights. NGOs and foreign
political leaders cast their opposition to Beijing’s unsuccessful bid for
the 2000 Games largely in human rights terms (Bondy 1993; Sun 1993).
As the IOC considered awarding Beijing the 2008 Olympics, critics and
opponents reprised earlier tactics and argued that China’s human
rights record disquali‹ed the PRC from hosting the Games.17 In one
widely noted example, Amnesty International timed the release of a
major report on torture in China to coincide with IOC representatives’
predecision visit to Beijing (MacLeod 2001b).
Chinese authorities have made it easier for NGOs and other critics to
connect human rights agendas, including maltreatment of political
prisoners and China’s suppression of political dissent, to the Beijing
Games. The release of selected dissidents to parry foreign criticism
made the former prisoners potent spokesmen and foci for linking criti-
cisms of China’s political repression to assertions of Beijing’s unsuit-
ability as a host for the Games. Perhaps the most striking case is twice-
imprisoned and exiled Wei Jingsheng’s call to deny China the 2008
Olympics, which was more potent because his ‹rst release had been
widely seen as a move to boost Beijing’s bid for the 2000 Games.
The seemingly ordinary practice of the host city’s mayor being a
prominent presence on the bidding and organizing committees
strengthened the human rights connection because of two incum-
bents’ problematic records. In the 2000 Games process, Chen Xitong
brought the burden of a signi‹cant role in the bloody crushing of the
1989 Democracy Movement. For the 2008 round, Liu Qi’s presence
spotlighted the suppression of Falun Gong, most dramatically when
his visit to the Salt Lake City Winter Games made possible service of
process against him in a suit over his leadership of a government body
tasked with eradicating the “evil cult” (Pomfret 2002; Doe v. Liu Qi
2004). Such damaging linkages were reinforced further by the aspiring
hosts’ tone-deaf short-lived contemplation of using Tiananmen
Square—site of the 1989 military action against peaceful demonstra-
tors—as the venue for the 2008 beach volleyball competition (Mackay
2001; Sohu.com 2005). More calculatingly and ultimately more power-
fully, Chinese authorities made the connections stronger still with
their bid-supporting reassurances that the Games would foster human
rights improvements and their pledges of speci‹c Olympics-related le-
gal reforms with human rights content.
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Since the decision on the 2008 site, those seeking to press the
regime have continued Olympics-linked critiques and calls for im-
provement of China’s human rights laws and practices. NGOs have
played the Olympic card and won related media attention in several
ways. Some have proclaimed “minimum human rights standards” that
China should be required to meet as host for the Games and published
periodic reports highlighting China’s failures to ful‹ll Olympics-re-
lated human rights promises (Olympic Watch 2004; Magnier 2004;
Pierson 2007; Lague 2006). The pace and pro‹le of this approach
surged at the one-year-to-go point with a series of headline-grabbing
publications. Amnesty International issued a report denouncing an
ongoing crackdown on Chinese media, an Olympics-related “cleanup”
ousting Beijing vagrants and migrants, a general failure to implement
Olympics-related pledges on press freedom and other matters, and
continuing abuses in criminal justice and media censorship. Invoking
the link to the Games, the NGO’s secretary general warned that
“[u]nless Chinese authorities take urgent measures to stop human
rights violations over the coming year, they risk tarnishing . . . the
legacy of the Beijing Olympics.” Human Rights Watch simultaneously
issued a similar report, criticizing the regime’s overall record on hu-
man rights, a growing crackdown on dissent and the media, and
Olympics-related increases in abuses of labor rights and forced evic-
tions (Amnesty International 2007; Human Rights Watch 2007b; Yard-
ley 2007d; Cody 2007b).
Chinese activists and critics have undertaken kindred efforts. Per-
haps most famously, a group of more than forty prominent intellectu-
als and activists issued an open letter to Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and Na-
tional People’s Congress head Wu Bangguo at the one-year mark,
calling for a recasting of the Beijing Games’ principal slogan as “One
World, One Dream, and Universal Human Rights.” The letter cataloged
familiar human rights problems, including media controls, persecution
of lawyers and activists who expose human rights abuses and environ-
mental problems, and aggrieved citizens petitioning for redress, forced
evictions, residency restrictions, violations of labor rights, and so on. It
added calls for amnesty for political prisoners, expanded and equal
freedoms for foreign and Chinese journalists, and establishment of a
system of citizen oversight over Olympics spending.18 Less elite Chi-
nese, including thousands of peasants, have expressed similar senti-
ments in their own letters and petitions.19 Such moves by PRC and in-
ternational actors foreshadow further efforts to promote scrutiny of
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PRC human rights conditions through the Games themselves—a
prospect that the regime clearly ‹nds disconcerting.
As the abuses cataloged in such omnibus human rights reports sug-
gest, the Olympics-linkage strategy extends to more speci‹c human
rights agendas. Connecting their issues to the Beijing Games has been
a promising project for opponents of China’s harsh treatment of rural-
to-urban migrant workers and urban dwellers whose homes stand in
the path of property development. Massive and rapid Olympics-related
construction brought dramatic residential displacement, by one NGO’s
account ousting nearly 10 percent of the city’s population. This helped
the Geneva-based Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE)
and other NGOs, activists, and media draw greater attention to the
broader issue of property seizures. Chinese activists similarly linked
their long-standing complaints about housing rights and forced evic-
tions to Olympics-driven projects, commencing their bold and risky ef-
forts several years before the Games and prompting the imprisonment
of one activist who had sought permission for a protest march (COHRE
2007; Watts 2003; Goff 2005; Daily Yomiuri 2007; Xinhua 2007d; Xin-
hua 2007k; Callick 2007).
Similarly, the army of construction workers who came to Beijing to
build the Games’ venues helped foreign NGOs and domestic critics
highlight, and gave an Olympic face to, the problems of poverty, inse-
curity, and discrimination facing internal migrants (Eimer 2007;
Guardian Unlimited 2007). So too did the authorities’ moves to elimi-
nate migrant villages and rumored plans to remove unauthorized resi-
dents prior to the Games, lest the capital’s unregistered underclass
damage the image of an orderly Olympics hosted by a prosperous
China (Xinhua 2005a; Shi 2006a).20 More than their foreign counter-
parts, Chinese activists and critics added other social and economic
rights concerns to their Olympics-invoking agenda, for example, link-
ing inadequate investment in health care and other public goods to
pro›igate spending on the Games.
Olympics-related developments also provided regime critics with
means to bring greater exposure to labor rights violations. A British
NGO reported that PRC ‹rms were using child workers to produce
Olympics logo-bearing products. The revelations, media coverage, and
PRC promises of remedial action helped bring international attention
to broader child labor abuses that labor rights NGOs argue are wide-
spread and growing in rural China. An Olympics-focused union-based
campaign, PlayFair 2008, reported “gross violations” of labor standards
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at four factories making Olympics-branded merchandise (McLaughlin
2007; Xinhua 2007h; PlayFair 2008 2007). Such reports increased pres-
sure on Chinese authorities to investigate and sanction problems of un-
derage labor and forced overtime among other producers of Olympics
licensed goods. The host regime thus helped NGOs bring further atten-
tion to such issues while seemingly gaining little credibility with skep-
tical foreign audiences that became increasingly concerned over Chi-
nese factory conditions in the wake of scandals over the low cost and
poor safety of Chinese exports (Financial Times 2007b; Barboza 2007).
Attempts to pressure the Chinese regime on “rights of peoples” is-
sues also invoke the Olympics. PRC authorities’ efforts to use the
Olympics to assert their claim to sovereignty over Tibet—by including
Tibet on the torch route and a Tibetan animal among the Games’ mas-
cots—have facilitated their nemeses use of Olympic linkages to ad-
vance their own Tibet agendas. Thus, exiled Tibetans have proposed a
separate “Tibetan Olympics” and asked the IOC to allow a Tibetan team
at the 2008 Games. Free Tibet groups have staged widely reported
protests, unveiling banners near the proposed torch route and at the
Great Wall, where the one-year countdown saw soon-to-be-deported
activists unfurl a call for “One World, One Dream, Free Tibet” (Hindu-
stan Times 2007; New Zealand Herald 2007; Statesman 2007; Kyodo News
Agency 2007). PRC of‹cials have fairly openly expressed concern that
long-repressed domestic dissident groups favoring separatist agendas in
Tibet and Xinjiang will attempt to seize the Olympic spotlight to ad-
vance their causes (Cody 2007a).
The banned Falun Gong sect poses similar threats and raises similar
concerns. Its supporters and advocates abroad have linked calls to cease
persecuting the group to the PRC’s broader Olympics-related human
rights commitments and Olympics-heightened international concern
over China’s human rights performance. Their tactics have included a
“Global Human Rights Torch Relay” (HRTR) alternative to the of‹cial
Olympic torch relay. The authorities reportedly worry that Falun Gong
adherents remaining in China will try to use the Olympic stage to high-
light their plight. And such worries seem plausible, given the extraor-
dinary determination evident in domestic Falun Gong followers’ and
activists’ persistence in challenging the regime despite extraordinary
suppression efforts and through sometimes desperate measures (in-
cluding self-immolation).21
Activists, including foreign celebrities, also have used Beijing’s host-
ing of the Games to focus attention on human rights violations in Dar-
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fur and China’s support for the Sudanese regime. China’s recalcitrance
on international sanctions and Hu Jintao’s uncritical tone during his
Africa trip a year and a half before the Games created a useful platform
for NGOs and activists. They dubbed the 2008 Games the “Genocide
Olympics,” arguing that China’s Darfur policy (as well as China’s do-
mestic human rights record) made Beijing an un‹t host, and planned
their own alternative torch routes through sites of twentieth and
twenty-‹rst century genocides and through more than twenty U.S.
states. Despite of‹cial PRC denials, some analysts credit such efforts—
and the attention those efforts received from foreign governments—
with making the PRC more cooperative in multinational efforts on
Darfur, including acquiescence in a Security Council Resolution en-
dorsing peacekeeping forces (Farrow and Farrow 2007; Dinmore 2007;
Xinhua 2007e; Cooper 2007; Yardley 2007e).
Media freedom and related issues of openness and free exchange are
another area in which critics and activists (as well as journalists, who
depend upon such freedoms) exploit resonance with Olympic ideals.
The now-entrenched Olympic expectation of unrestrained interna-
tional media access provides important leverage against any host gov-
ernment’s restrictions on coverage. The principles are particularly
salient for the 2008 Games, where the host regime is accustomed to im-
posing severe constraints on media coverage, information ›ows, and
free expression. PRC authorities have given proponents of media free-
dom additional leverage by bowing to strong international pressure
and promising a free (or at least freer than is normal in the PRC) media
environment for the Games (China Daily 2006d; McGregor 2006b).
This has provided a sturdy platform for NGOs’ and news organiza-
tions’ criticisms of moves by PRC authorities that portended Olympics-
related media restrictions, refused to extend promised Olympics-re-
lated freedoms to Chinese journalists or non-Olympics stories, and
harassed or restricted media in China during the run-up to the Games
(Yan 2005b; Reporters Sans Frontières 2006; Allen 2007). Here too, the
countdown’s reaching the one-year mark brought high-pro‹le critiques
by NGOs of tightening censorship of local media, harassment of for-
eign media, and unful‹lled promises of Olympics-related liberalization.
At the same time, Reporters Without Borders sponsored a demonstra-
tion in Beijing criticizing the failure to implement the press freedom re-
forms China had pledged when seeking the Games. The demonstration
gained extra publicity and impact when authorities detained Chinese
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journalists who covered it (BBC Monitoring International 2007; Amnesty
International 2007; Human Rights Watch 2007b; Landsberg 2007a).
Those with more commercial interests also press their regime-criti-
cizing and regime-pressuring agendas by invoking another estab-
lished—if less exalted—feature of the Olympics: the Games as business
venture. Those concerned with China’s IPR record especially can build
upon the IOC’s and of‹cial corporate sponsors’ concern with Olympic
branding and licensing, and exploit Chinese authorities’ interest in
avoiding high-pro‹le criticism of Olympics-related shortcomings in an
area that has been a source of con›ict and embarrassment in China’s
external relations. A prominent example of this tactic is the Motion
Picture Association of America’s airing familiar criticisms of Chinese
IPR protection from an Olympics-invoking platform. Another perhaps
is the U.S. government’s taking formal steps before the WTO to address
Chinese IPR infringement and negotiating enhanced bilateral coopera-
tion against piracy (Glickman 2006; Puzzanghera and Iritani 2007; As-
sociated Press 2007). While factors unrelated to the Olympics surely
drove such decisions, the Olympics connection was often cited in dis-
cussions of Washington’s moves and may well have made China more
pliable.
Environmentalists also are employing linkages to the Olympics in
pressing their China-related agendas. International groups’ efforts res-
onate with the Olympic movement’s of‹cial concern with environ-
mental issues. They leverage the IOC’s highly public worries about en-
vironmental conditions for the 2008 Games (including the mid-2007
threat to postpone endurance events). They exploit the PRC regime’s
proclaimed commitment to a “Green” Olympics and its desire to avoid
images of athletes struggling with choking haze, Olympics-related fea-
ture coverage of Beijing’s pollution problems, or the embarrassment of
pollution-postponed events. Even PRC successes have provided fodder
for such critiques, inviting NGO questions about why Games-related
clean-ups did not extend beyond the Olympics period or outside the
capital region (Magnier 2007). Efforts from Chinese NGOs and activists
generally have been broadly similar but more tempered. Thus, PRC en-
vironmental advocates report, and observers con‹rm, unprecedented
success in getting the authorities to take their concerns seriously, and
they attribute such developments largely to Beijing’s “Green” Olympics
pledge and Olympics-driven international scrutiny. At the same time,
prominent Chinese environmentalists have faced criticism for being
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too timid and cooperative—charges that are not often made against
their besieged counterparts who press various human rights agendas of-
ten at the cost of harassment or imprisonment (Yan 2005a; Larmer
2001; Fan 2007).
As these patterns of internal and external criticism and pressure im-
ply, Chinese actors have been less visible in pressing counternarratives
months or years in advance of the Games. They, of course, have much
less freedom, far fewer resources, and more constrained media access.
As the Chinese authorities’ reaction to some of the more bold domestic
critics (such as housing activists) makes clear, Chinese challengers to
the regime’s preferred Olympics story line can pay a high price for their
temerity. As PRC of‹cials’ reported worries over foreign-media-target-
ing surprises from domestic dissident groups suggest, PRC proponents
of counternarratives likely understand that their best hope may be to
wait for the Games themselves to make their most dramatic and visible
moves.
Third, Olympics norms and practices have combined with features
of Chinese politics to help proponents of critical counternarratives and
advocates for Chinese reform by limiting PRC authorities’ use of means
they ordinarily could employ against activities and actors that they
‹nd threatening or deem unacceptable. The Beijing Games will bring
an international media and visitor presence of vast proportions and di-
verse worldwide provenance that the PRC’s security apparatus will be
hard pressed to monitor and evaluate, much less control, despite allo-
cating formidable resources to the task. For the 2008 Games, the famil-
iar effects of international media and other Olympic visitors are likely
to be magni‹ed, given the extraordinary interest that the Beijing
Games have generated among traditional print and broadcast journal-
ists and the presence of an unprecedentedly large, diffuse, and particu-
larly hard-to-control cohort from new media. In this context, aspects of
PRC behavior that support critical counternarratives and mediagenic
actions that regime critics undertake in connection with the Beijing
Olympics are likely to receive extensive coverage that Chinese authori-
ties will be unable to stop at all or, at least, not without unacceptable
‹nancial and political cost.
The Olympics’ status as a singularly supranational event makes the
venue for the Games a global space in which ordinary sovereign pre-
rogatives of the host are limited. In the context of the Games, familiar
and otherwise internationally tolerated restrictions that PRC authori-
ties use to disable protesters, silence critics, or sti›e public debate may
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well appear illegitimate and face unusual international opprobrium
when exposed, as they are sure to be, in the glare of the Olympics spot-
light.
As this suggests, the “Olympic effect” of greater scrutiny and open-
ness may be especially signi‹cant for Games held in China. For Beijing
in 2008, the “gap” between the Olympic media frenzy and ordinary
coverage is unusually large. Although foreign audiences increasingly
appreciate China’s global importance, developments in China still re-
ceive disproportionately little international attention under ordinary
circumstances. This is partly a matter of the inherent dif‹culties of cov-
ering a large; poor; rapidly changing; and physically, culturally, and lin-
guistically remote country. It is also a function of political regime type.
While China has undergone a breathtaking opening during the last
generation, the PRC is still among a small handful of authoritarian
states, and (with the exception of the Soviet Union in 1980) the most
strongly authoritarian state since before World War II, to host an
Olympics. Such regimes severely restrict information and journalists
and do so in crude and obvious ways that are hard to sustain amid the
global interest and expectations of openness that come with hosting
the Games.
As Chinese authorities are acutely aware, an extraordinarily dense
foreign press presence and relaxed media controls previously have had
powerful political effects in China. Outside journalists who arrived to
cover Soviet President Gorbachev’s visit to Beijing helped catalyze, and
bring international attention to, the Tiananmen Democracy Move-
ment in 1989. In an exceptionally liberal period in Chinese politics and
regime policy toward students, intellectuals, and the press, the Democ-
racy Movement attracted an unusually large and unfettered media con-
tingent—both foreign and indigenous—that reported extensively and
dramatically on the movement and its violent suppression, with corre-
spondingly greater harm to the Chinese leadership’s international—
and domestic—reputation.
Many of the organizations and actors that seek to shape the story of
the Beijing Games and, in turn, the PRC’s behavior (and the media that
cover them) also enjoy insulation from some of the more subtle pres-
sures Chinese authorities ordinarily use to restrain those who are more
durably on the ground in China. The NGOs, corporations, government
of‹cials, interest groups, celebrities, and others that are primarily fo-
cused on China for the Olympics differ from the foreign businesses,
foreign-linked foundations and civil society organizations, and resi-
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dent foreign diplomats and journalists in China in a key respect: the
former are more nearly nonrepeat players. They have less need to worry
about angering Chinese authorities or putting Chinese counterparts in
dif‹cult positions. They need not be so concerned about future license
denials, regulatory hassles, adverse decisions on matters within gov-
ernment discretion, and alienating Chinese partners who are wary of
dealing with foreigners who have fallen into of‹cial disfavor or shown
questionable political judgment. The contrast with the concerns and
constraints facing domestic Chinese NGOs, dissidents, and critics is, of
course, greater still.
At the same time, those who seek to use the Olympics as a platform
for rival narratives and critical agendas bene‹t from the host regime’s
Olympics-based reasons for self-restraint. The Chinese leadership
shows every sign of feeling strongly the “pull” of securing a story line
that echoes the international “seal of approval” provided at Seoul in
1988 or Tokyo in 1964, and the “push” of avoiding the politicization
and loss of international goodwill that befell the 1980 Moscow and
1984 Los Angeles Games, or, much worse, the 1936 Berlin Games. While
this is to be expected from a political system that emphasizes symbolic
politics and national pride, PRC authorities have magni‹ed the effect
by binding themselves to the mast in so publicly staking their reputa-
tion on staging a “successful” Olympics.
Another structural feature of Chinese politics promises greater space
for international civil society NGOs and other regime critics, including
domestic ones, to advance their goals in connection with the 2008
Olympics. The commitments to hosting a successful Games and to ad-
vancing the regime’s preferred overarching narrative do not mean that
the Chinese Party-state will function as a disciplined machine pursuing
a coherent agenda. Although the PRC’s political system is authoritar-
ian, it is also famously “fragmented”: different components of the
Party and state pursue diverse and sometimes con›icting aims.22 This is
re›ected in the great but uneven importance that the Olympics has as-
sumed for Party and government organs, and the extensive but varied
responsibilities and commitments that various state and state-linked
entities have undertaken in conjunction with the Games.
Although the speci‹c alignments are too opaque and uncertain to
map in detail, different “pieces” of the Beijing and broader PRC Party-
state (as well as elite leaders and social constituencies) well may react
very differently to steps that NGOs, activists, and others take on the
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Olympic stage. For example, those portions of the Party and state ap-
paratus (and their patrons and constituents) that are especially deeply
invested in staging an Olympics that wins international praise are
likely to be more willing to tolerate actions critical of the regime, or at
odds with regime preferences, as a cost of achieving their goals. They
therefore are more likely to push, in the complex and informal world of
Chinese politics, against peer or rival organs (and their patrons and
constituents) that favor less accommodating lines.
Signs of this pattern emerged well before the Games. BOCOG and
the Beijing municipal authorities seem genuinely to accept an impera-
tive of greater tolerance for media freedom while other state entities
that traditionally regulate the media, international journalists, and the
Internet (including the State Administration of Radio Film and Televi-
sion, the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of the Information Industry,
and the public security authorities) appear to have taken harder lines
and adopted contrary measures, leading to dif‹culties for those who
made and must defend China’s Games-related pledges of increased
openness (Reporters Sans Frontières 2006). The apparent understand-
ing among authorities most involved in hosting the Games that it is
important to liberalize the political climate (albeit temporarily) di-
verges sharply from—and foretells friction with—public security au-
thorities, who have held forth loudly about the extraordinary resources
devoted to keeping order and the need for security forces to be “com-
bat ready” (Wang 2007).23
BOCOG, environmental protection authorities, city leaders, and
others have taken signi‹cant and unpopular measures (including cut-
ting off coal-‹red heaters for a wintertime IOC delegation visit, order-
ing restrictions on cooling and other electricity usage during the
Games, and banning more than a million cars from the streets) to im-
prove the environmental image and reality for the Olympics. Chinese
environmental activists and advocates have had kind words for state
environmental protection authorities and their Olympics-enhanced in-
terest in enforcing rules and cooperation addressing environmental is-
sues. Yet, with the Games barely three years off, speculation continued
that one of the capital region’s most polluting enterprises—a steel com-
pany with powerful state patrons and many employees—might suc-
ceed in resisting directives to curtail or suspend operations for the
Games. A year before the Games, a company spokesman sniffed that,
while sharp reductions in operations would be phased in through the
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Games and beyond, the ‹nal relocation in 2010 would have occurred
eventually anyway and had only been hastened somewhat by the
Olympics (Cha 2007; China Daily 2004c; Larmer 2001; Fan 2007;
United Press International 2005; Dickie 2007a; MacLeod and Wiseman
2007).
Beijing Olympics of‹cials and IPR enforcement organs sought to
strengthen (at least somewhat) measures to limit pirated Olympic
goods. But they seemed certain to ‹nd little cooperation from of‹cials
in China’s major fakes-producing regions where entanglements and
alignment of interests between local government and IPR-violating en-
terprises can be very close (Clark and Cheng 2007).
To the extent that more accommodating fragments of the Party-state
win out in such con›icts or have autonomy to implement their pre-
ferred approaches, there will be a more favorable environment for out-
siders and local reformers to push agendas that diverge from the princi-
pal narratives favored by the Chinese regime as a whole. At the same
time, some moves that more recalcitrant components of the Party-state,
or the regime as a coordinated whole, might undertake against foreign
critics’ or domestic dissidents’ agendas can redound to the targets’
bene‹t. For those pressing counternarratives and challenging regime be-
havior, sometimes nothing succeeds like of‹cial repression, at least
where it is high pro‹le and ham ‹sted or tin eared. Instances of this phe-
nomenon already have occurred in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics.
Examples from around the one year countdown mark include PRC se-
curity forces’ detention of local journalists who covered a foreign jour-
nalist organization’s protest in Beijing of China’s failure to implement
Olympics pledges of media freedom, and detention and deportation of
“Free Tibet” supporters who unfurled a banner at the Great Wall.
Still, such regime missteps—and other factors that limit Chinese au-
thorities’ capacity or will to suppress—provide little reason for compla-
cency among critics of the PRC regime and proponents of counternar-
ratives.
The Empire Can Strike Back
Although facing signi‹cant constraints and capable opponents in the
contest to de‹ne the narrative of the Beijing Games, the host regime
also has considerable advantages. These derive in part from key features
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of the Olympics, Chinese politics, and the critics and opponents of
of‹cial China’s preferred story line.
First, despite the partly self-in›icted erosion of its means of control
and intimidation over the last three decades, the Chinese Party-state re-
mains formidable, especially when it faces relatively short-term chal-
lenges. For the fortnight of the Games, Chinese authorities can main-
tain a level of vigilance and, if needed, repression that might not be
sustainable over a long period. In doing so, they will have human and
material resources beyond the considerable ones ordinarily on hand in
Beijing (Xinhua 2006e; Xinhua 2005d; Daley 2003; Xinhua 2007a;
Kwok 2007). They can use methods recently practiced in suppressing
remarkably determined Falun Gong adherents, honed in concerted
pre-Olympics drills, and enhanced by foreign-assisted Olympics-related
security forces training programs. The latter have proceeded despite in-
ternational criticism of liberal states for helping a repressive regime
build capacity and concern that heavy-handed security measures
might mar the Games (Xinhua 2007f; Xinhua 2007g).
Second, despite the decline of ideology’s importance in post-Mao
China, symbolic politics and political theater remain important in 
Chinese politics and stiffen of‹cial resolve to control the rich image-
making power of the Olympics. PRC authorities likely see it as vital to
prevent de‹nitive moments that serve a heterodox political agenda—
anything analogous to the raised ‹sts of African American athletes at
the Mexico City Games, much less the hostage crisis at the Munich
Olympics, or the Olympic equivalent of the lone man standing before
a tank near Tiananmen in 1989.
In trying to forestall such adverse imagery and broader counternar-
ratives, of‹cial Chinese sources and sympathetic commentators have
been adept (if not unchallenged or entirely successful) at invoking the
Olympic principle that the Olympics should not be “politicized” by
those who wanted to deny Beijing the Games or who want to use the
Olympics to change China’s human rights practices or political system
(Cody 2007a; Magnier 2004; Mackay 2001). Here, PRC authorities have
had help from the IOC and others who have a stake in the 2008 Games’
success and have made more muted versions of anti-“politicization” ar-
guments (B. Smith 2007; Rogge 2007).
Third, the PRC regime may well be able to blunt or de›ect criticisms
of its failure to satisfy external demands or expectations that China
adopt international norms. And it may be able to do so without major
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changes in its own behavior. On many fronts, China has been adept at
pledging conformity to foreign standards or global rules, avoiding ro-
bust implementation, and escaping the degree of condemnation from
abroad that would have accompanied ›at rejection of the norm or
commitment. That is, at least, a plausible characterization of how the
PRC has engaged international human rights law and international in-
tellectual property rights—both areas that have been especially at issue
in connection with the Beijing Olympics. Quasi-of‹cial Chinese
sources and defenders of the Beijing Games also have worked to under-
cut or preempt criticism of human rights, press freedom, and other
shortcomings by pointing to China’s recent progress and asserting that
hosting the Games will help foster improvement well beyond 2008.24
Pursuit of of‹cial China’s preferred narrative may bene‹t also from
low expectations that many Olympics participants and observers likely
hold because of their lack of familiarity with contemporary China.
First-time visitors and relative neophytes can be favorably surprised by
the cosmopolitanism, openness, sophistication, wealth, and lack of ob-
vious political repression in Beijing. Experiences of Beijing tend to
color impressions of the unvisited “rest of China,” notwithstanding an
intellectual appreciation that much of the country does not resemble
the glittering capital. This effect likely will be more pronounced given
the care taken to present Beijing’s best face for the Games.
Finally, the hosts’ prospects for controlling the Beijing Games’ story
line are enhanced by structural disadvantages among proponents of ri-
val narratives. Those seeking to invoke or hijack Olympic ideals and use
the Games as a platform to pursue alternative, regime-criticizing agen-
das are ideologically cacophonous and institutionally fragmented. Their
aims are strikingly varied: democratic reform; civil liberties and civil and
political rights; social and economic justice for migrants and displaced
urban residents; media freedom; environmental protection; intellectual
property rights protection; labor rights; “separatist” or “independence”
goals for Tibet, Taiwan, and the Muslim regions of Xinjiang; religious
freedom, primarily for Christians; ending repression of Falun Gong; re-
laxation of population control policies; and so on. Elements in interna-
tional civil society and foreign political circles that endorse such ends
range across a broad political spectrum. They have little demonstrated
or likely capacity for close cooperation with one another.
Perhaps more importantly, they have only modest accomplishments
and dim prospects for cooperation with their Chinese counterparts
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who have begun to pursue parallel tactics. Chinese dissidents, intellec-
tuals, activists, and NGOs have emerged to address—with varying de-
grees of success and risk—many of the same issues, including the envi-
ronment, forced evictions, migrant workers, human rights more
generally, and media freedom. While these local proponents of change
also have adopted tactics of linking their causes to the Beijing
Olympics, their actions have shown little coordination with or even
apparent impact upon the undertakings of the many foreign actors
seeking to de‹ne the meaning of the Beijing Games.25 The most inter-
nationally visible example of a domestic Chinese undertaking is the
August 2007 “open letter” from dozens of prominent intellectuals and
dissidents calling for adding “Human Rights” to the slogan “One
World, One Dream,” and asserting that the regime’s violation of
Olympics-related human rights promises and human rights abuses
more generally “violate the Olympic spirit” and worsen a “crisis of
rule” in China (Qianming.net 2007; Wu 2007; Cody 2007b). Even that
letter, however, prompted mostly citation and not collaboration
abroad (and much of the attention it received re›ected the preexisting
fame of its principal signatories abroad).
The Chinese regime bene‹ts from the many impediments to such
parallel undertakings’ blossoming into full alliances. Domestic and for-
eign critics’ aims are far from fully parallel. The Chinese intelligentsia
that provides ideas and leadership for such groups (and many “ordi-
nary” Chinese as well) has limited interest in agendas associated with
“separatism” or “cults,” attacking China’s Africa policy, and so on.
They also tend to be more susceptible to at least the more benign ele-
ments in the regime’s nationalist narrative and more modest in their
expectations of immediate reform in China. Compared to foreign gov-
ernments and international civil society groups, Chinese activists have
placed greater emphasis on linking the Olympics to education and
public health spending and release of political dissidents. More
signi‹cantly, Chinese and foreigners face radically different threats of
retaliation from Chinese authorities. Cooperation and the trust it re-
quires when grappling with an authoritarian regime are far more
dif‹cult when domestic actors face threats of ruined careers and im-
prisonment but foreigners rarely need worry about more than interro-
gation and expulsion. Such factors surely reduce the authorities’ need
to worry about a coordinated foreign or transnational effort to capture
the narrative of the Beijing Games.
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A Journey of a Thousand Li or the 
Death of a Thousand Cuts?
The victor (if any) in the contest to de‹ne the meaning of the XXIX
Olympiad will be determined only in retrospect. Rivals in the struggle
to shape the Beijing Games’ narrative have suf‹cient strengths and
weaknesses, and the dominant story of any Olympics can be so
strongly affected by exogenous factors and unpredictably resonant mo-
ments, that pre-Games predictions are little more than speculation.
Similarly uncertain, but more important, is the impact on bigger ques-
tions of “changing China” that have made the story line of the Games,
and China’s hosting, worth ‹ghting over.
A bleak assessment conjures the specter of a Beijing Olympics that
deepens China’s repression in domestic politics and intransigence in
foreign policy. Some who opposed awarding Beijing the Olympics, or
fear that the regime will win the battle over the Games’ narrative, see
the 2008 Olympics providing a propaganda coup and reinforcement of
self-image reminiscent of what the Berlin Games gave Hitler’s Germany
(A. M. Rosenthal 1993; Kynge 2001; Larmer 2001; Sun 1993; Frank
1993). Accounts of Chinese authorities’ actions sometimes have fed
these concerns, perhaps most astonishingly when foreign media re-
ported that they consulted with Hitler’s favorite architect’s son and
namesake on the design of the main axis for the Games site (Becker
2003).
This analogy has gained relatively little traction, and rightly so. It
overreaches. It overstates the impact of the Berlin Games (Terrill 2007).
It also oversimpli‹es the range of possible consequences of the Beijing
Games. If of‹cial China succeeds in holding the Games—and selling
the plotline—it wants, the regime might not become more set in its
ways or emboldened. It might become more tolerant of the types of in-
ternational links and liberalizing in›uences that the Olympics will
have promoted. A “successful” Games may increase con‹dence among
Chinese political elites that the regime can endure and bene‹t from in-
creased openness. Or it may strengthen the image of China as a power-
ful—and therefore potentially threatening—state and, in turn, the Chi-
nese leadership’s appreciation that China needs to appear, and
therefore perhaps to be, more open to international scrutiny and
in›uence and willing to conform to international norms.
More rosy assessments foresee the 2008 Games spurring rapid trans-
formation in China. One line of analysis imagines the 2008 Games as a
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possible reprise of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, which are often credited
with speeding South Korea’s transition from military dictatorship to
democracy, or the 1980 Moscow Games, which are sometimes depicted
as having helped open the door to Gorbachev’s reforms and, in turn, the
demise of communism in the former Soviet Union. IOC sources, veteran
U.S. diplomats, and foreign observers and proponents of Beijing’s bid
embraced moderate versions of this argument or folded the Olympics
into a broader pattern of using negotiated commitments, foreign advice
and assistance, and other tools of engagement to move China toward
greater liberalism at home and cooperation abroad (Wilson 2001; Liu
2006; Longman 2001; Lilley 2001; Rogge 2007). Of‹cial Chinese sources
concertedly—if perhaps sometimes disingenuously—encouraged this
view, promising that a Beijing-hosted Olympics would lead to a more
open China and promote further improvement in China’s human
rights conditions (Wilson 2001; Lev 2001; Longman 2001).
A less harmonious variation on this theme sees much potential for
foreign governments, international NGOs, Chinese dissidents and re-
formers, and media coverage to push China along this same path of
transformation by Olympics-focused or Olympics-enhanced pressure
on the PRC leadership, global exposure of problematic Chinese prac-
tices and policies, coordinated responses to PRC failures to implement
international promises and obligations, and success in the struggle for
a critical counternarrative of the 2008 Games. If this occurs, then post-
Olympics China may face greater and more sustained pressure on hu-
man rights, the environment, and other issues that have drawn criti-
cisms and calls for reform during Beijing’s two campaigns to host the
Olympics, the run-up to the 2008 Olympiad, and the Games them-
selves.
Prognostications of major near-term change are likely overly opti-
mistic and simplistic. The more strident critics and pessimists do have
a point: for the Chinese regime, Olympics success may reinforce the
status quo and its excesses. So too, the Chinese leadership has demon-
strated—most extremely in the aftermath of Tiananmen—the ability
and will to use political repression and endure international isolation
when openness, liberalization, and their sequelae embarrass or seem to
threaten the regime. Or the Games may simply fail to have any dra-
matic impact on China. Once the ›urry of attention and scrutiny has
passed, there may be a relatively rapid return to much that looks like
the ordinary regime practices that predated the Games and the broader
quest for the Olympics.
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More importantly, any lasting impact of the Beijing Olympics and
any signi‹cant transnational in›uences it will yield likely lie beyond
immediate or dramatic success or failure at the Beijing Olympics or in
shaping the “meaning” of the 2008 Games. Any such more subtle and
lasting in›uences are likely to favor liberalization and openness in the
long run. During the nearly three decades of China’s Reform Era, the
trend has been strongly toward greater engagement with and in›uence
from the outside world. Qualitative shifts toward openness and confor-
mity in Reform Era China generally have proved to be “one-way ratch-
ets,” not vulnerable to permanent reversal. The Games may well not
have that level of impact. If they do, and perhaps even if they do not,
they may mark another chapter in this long-unfolding story. Such de-
velopments can create space not only for previously repressed or ig-
nored critics of the regime but, perhaps more importantly and more
durably, for Chinese proponents of more moderately critical or re-
formist perspectives as well.
Here, the Olympics-related emergence and Olympics-focused efforts
of Chinese activists for human rights, the environment, and media
freedom are modestly encouraging signs despite their lack of success,
their political and legal vulnerability, and the weakness of their con-
nections to foreign counterparts. From a relatively long-run perspec-
tive, the organizational and ideological fragmentation on all sides—
among Chinese leaders, institutions, and interest groups and among
foreign and Chinese actors seeking to expose and change Chinese be-
havior—may be a positive factor. It multiplies the number of actors and
points of contact, and, in turn, prospects for meaningful transnational
ties and resilient channels of in›uence and cooperation (including the
diffusion of techniques for successful NGO and civil society activities).
The resulting numerosity, small scale, and seeming lack of connection
among such actors and networks also are likely to make them less vul-
nerable and seem less threatening to the regime and thus less likely to
provoke effective repression.
If the 2008 Olympics has these effects (and it is far from a foregone
conclusion that it will), it will have contributed to a much larger and
longer term process that has been transforming China in ways that are
generally consistent with many of the international norms that global
civil society groups; foreign governments and other external actors;
and Chinese NGOs, activists, and dissidents have been pressing in the
more immediate and perhaps less promising context of the contest
over the Beijing Games and its story line. The Games then will have
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been a step in a journey of a thousand li toward a more liberal and open
environment in China, or one slice among the thousand cuts that will
bring the end of a closed and repressive order.26
NOTES
1. The ‹rst “partners” and “sponsors” included: Sinopec and CNPC (the
giant oil companies), Bank of China, Air China, Haier (the white goods
maker), People’s Insurance Company of China, Tsingtao and Yanjing beer
companies, China Netcomm, China Mobile, Sohu.com (a major internet
portal), Volkswagen (China), Adidas and Johnson & Johnson. Almost with-
out exception, the sponsoring companies are variously state-owned, major-
ity-state-owned, in especially highly regulated sectors, or joint-ventures (or
partners to joint ventures) in which the Chinese partner is state-owned or
state-controlled. Lenovo (the Chinese computer company that bought IBM’s
PC division) announced that it would spend up to two percent of its yearly
turnover for Olympics-related marketing efforts (Xinhua 2007b).
2. See, for example, Chua 2007a, Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2007a, Chua
2007b, and Xu 2007.
3. See also Dickie 2007b.
4. See, e.g., Lilley 2001, Chen K. 2007, deLisle 2001, and China Daily
2006a.
5. These developments have been the foci of NGO and media reports
and are discussed more fully later in the chapter.
6. See, for example, Xinhua 2003 and Xinhuanet.com 2004.
7. See, for example, Shi 2006b.
8. See, for example, Spencer 2006 and Shi 2006b.
9. See, for example, Pan and Pomfret 2001, MacLeod 2001c, and Cater
1993.
10. The regulations, among other things, permit travel and interviewing
without prior permission, but are in effect only from January 2007 to Octo-
ber 2008. Critiques of shortcomings are discussed more fully later in the
chapter.
11. On many of these issues, see Clark and Cheng 2007, Xinhua 2007c,
China Online 2002, and Tsang 2007.
12. The Chinese term is renwen aoyun, fairly translated as “humanistic
Olympics.” The more common English translation of the phrase for the
Games is “people’s Olympics,” which would be the ordinary English render-
ing of the Chinese phrase “renmin aoyun”—a term that would refer in-
escapably to the Chinese people and that strongly evokes Chinese national-
ism. See also Humanistic Olympic Studies Center, Renmin University.
13. See, for example, Central News Agency 2007, Ni 2007, Shi and Chung
2007, and Lague 2007.
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14. For a strong and classic statement of this position, see Pye 1978.
15. The associated elements are water, wood, ‹re, earth, and air. The ‹nal
traditional Chinese element is metal, not air (which is among other cultures’
traditional lists of basic elements), and some Chinese sources have mistak-
enly substituted metal for air. The “internationalist” departure parallels—al-
beit perhaps unintentionally—the inclusion of the Olympic Flame as the
central mascot alongside the four Chinese animals. The traditional blessings
are prosperity, happiness, passion, health, and good luck.
16. On the WTO experience, see, generally, deLisle 2006 and Panitch-
pakdi and Clifford 2002.
17. See, for example, Larmer 2001, Kynge 2001, and Powers 2001.
18. For the text of the letter, see SperoNews 2007 and Cody 2007b. 
19. Such petitions are described in He 2007.
20. Treatment of these groups ‹gured prominently in the Chinese intel-
lectuals’ and dissidents’ August 2007 “open letter” (SperoNews 2007).
21. See CIPFG (n.d.) and HRTR (n.d.). See also deLisle 1999, Li 2003, and
Cody 2007a.
22. See, for example, Lieberthal and Lampton 1992.
23. Security preparation issues are discussed in more detail later in the
chapter.
24. See Pierson 2007, Wilson 2001, and Rogge 2007.
25. See, for example, RTHK Radio Web site 2000, Quan 2005, Shi 2006b,
Eimer 2007, and C. Smith 2001.
26. Lao-tzu so spoke of a journey of 1000 li (see Lao Tsu, Feng, and En-
glish 1997, 125); the thousand cuts refers to late imperial Chinese modes of
execution and dismemberment and often appears—sometimes in exagger-
ated forms—in Western accounts of the cruelty of Chinese imperial justice.
See Isaacs 1948, 63–64, and Costanzo 1997, 4.
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Beijing’s Olympic Games, and the 
Universal Market
Alan Tomlinson
Whether it is a comparative cultural, critical investigative, anthropo-
logically rooted, or media-oriented approach to understanding the
Olympic phenomenon, it is notable that the place of the sponsor in the
cultural and social construction of the Games is less subject to scrutiny
than are other aspects of the event, such as the media coverage, the na-
tionalist elements, and selected ceremonial dimensions. The relation-
ships within the purported Olympic Family—in particular, the increas-
ing pro‹le and in›uence of corporate partners of the International
Olympic Committee (IOC)—have received less extensive or sustained
critical analysis.
In a trilogy of studies, Andrew Jennings has pursued a relentless
course of investigative journalism (Symson and Jennings 1992; Jen-
nings and Sambrook 2000; Jennings 1996). His works have revealed the
underlying political and economic interests that have driven the
Games in the period since the former Francoist Juan Antonio Sama-
ranch’s succession to the IOC presidency in 1980, and the success of the
1984 Los Angeles Games that rewrote the rules for the staging of the in-
ternational sporting event. If the modern Olympics was in its early
years (1896–1928) based upon fragile alliances of political, cultural, and
economic interests, developing as a more explicitly political phenome-
non from 1932 to 1980, Los Angeles 1984 introduced a new economic
order that underpinned the initial survival of the Games—on the with-
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drawal of Teheran, Los Angeles was the only candidate to stage the
event—and its consequent expansion and escalation (Tomlinson
2005a, 50–56; Tomlinson 2005b). Writing on the eve of the 1984 event,
Richard Gruneau argued that for some time sporting practice had been
incorporated into an expanding international capitalist marketplace,
but that Los Angeles’ capacity to rewrite the rules of the host city’s
game produced a “unique” and “one of the most publicly visible busi-
ness deals in the history of corporate capitalism” (Gruneau 1984, 11).
Anything was now up for sponsorship, from the AT&T-sponsored torch
relay to the only two newly constructed sites, the McDonald’s Olympic
pool and the Southland Corporation velodrome (Tomlinson 2006a,
167); after the event, the organizing committee reported a surplus of
more than US$222 million. The claimed and perceived success of the
Los Angeles Olympics in 1984 established the framework for the politi-
cal economy of future Games, based upon escalating media rights and
forms of corporate sponsorship secured by both the IOC and the local
organizing committees of the host city: “From that point on, the
Games were guaranteed a future as one of the most high-pro‹le global
commodities” (Tomlinson 2005a, 56).
A study focusing upon the Beijing event has foregrounded this po-
litical economy, arguing that “there is an extraordinary convergence, or
elective af‹nity, between modern Olympism and the ideals and tenden-
cies of modern market capitalism” (Close et al. 2007, 1–2, 117). The Bei-
jing Olympiad and Olympics are seen, in this light, as a catalyst “in the
re-alignment process of the global political economy” (Close et al.
2007, 2, 117), as well as a focus for some potential internal reform, in re-
lation to human rights. The term elective af‹nity derives from the work
of the German sociologist Max Weber, whose studies were, to some de-
gree, framed as a methodological and epistemological debate with
what he saw as a form of economic determinism in the work of Karl
Marx. An elective af‹nity could be identi‹ed, Weber proposed, be-
tween, say, a set of religious beliefs and a particular social group or sys-
tem (Weber 1948, 62–63), and he referred—in contemporaneous ex-
changes concerning his study The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism (Weber 1965)—to “the unique and long-established elective
af‹nity of Calvinism to capitalism” (Weber 2001, 107). The notion of
elective af‹nity refers, therefore, to a correspondence between sources
of meaning that may not initially seem to be connected: “the contents
of one system of meaning engender a tendency for adherents to build
and pursue the other system of meaning” (Scott and Marshall 2005,
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182). Adapted to the Olympic context the argument goes that the
Olympic Ideals or Movement converge with the spirit of contemporary
market capitalism. The implication here is that neither one determines
the other, but that the values of the two meaning-systems are con-
ducive to a kind of reciprocal development. Weber concluded The
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism on a cautionary note, claim-
ing that it was not his aim to “substitute for a one-sided materialistic an
equally one-sided spiritualistic causal interpretation of culture and his-
tory” (Weber 1965, 183). “Historical truth,” he implied, does not lie in
the application of such theoretical extremes.
Close et al. offer the synonyms for elective af‹nity of mutual attrac-
tion and irresistible mutual desire (2007, 118). When referring to Beijing
as a catalyst they refer to how the city/event and the period (the
Olympiad) leading up to the event will contribute to re-alignments of
both the overall global political economy (2) and the “political econ-
omy arena of Chinese society” (117). They highlight ‹ve developments:
deepening institutionalization, on a global scale, of Olympism; a global
spread of the doctrine of individualism, in Western terms; global scales
of advance in liberal democracy and market capitalism; a consolidation
of global society within the continuing progress of globalization; and
China’s emergence as a superpower and player in the political econ-
omy, in both regional and global terms. These developments are said to
share “a formidable array of elective af‹nities” (2). All ‹ve develop-
ments are presented with the adjectival label “global,” which seems to
be the core feature of the meaning-systems that are claimed as con-
verging in the period of the Beijing Olympiad and Games. This is a bold
claim: that one sporting mega-event crystallizes political, economic,
cultural, and social changes at all conceivable levels of social organiza-
tion. The boldness of the conception may blur the speci‹cs of the
analysis, and this question will be returned to in the concluding sec-
tion of this chapter.
Close et al., though, rightly recognize the corporate partners as at
the heart of what the authors call the “Olympic social compact.” The
Beijing Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games (BOCOG) is
cited as embracing, in its own sponsorship program, the “IOC’s com-
mitment to a market-oriented, private-sector partnership approach to
‹nancing the Olympics . . .” (99):
. . . the response of the local (China’s), regional (East Asia’s), and global
business communities, and above all business elites, will have been at one
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with the way in which the IOC seems to have been convinced by the
Chinese delegation’s presentation and promises at the IOC’s session in
Moscow on 13 July 2001. (Close et al. 2007, 99)
Short (2004) has also focused upon the corporatization of the
Olympics, in terms of both the connected interests of key actors in the
Olympic network and the expansion of international product markets
more generally. In the light of these interpretive debates, this chapter
now presents a critical reading of the discourses characterizing the last
two winning bids for Summer Olympic Games, Beijing’s in 2001 and
London’s in 2005; followed by a commentary on the pro‹le of the
twelve select Olympic partner sponsors as presented on the Interna-
tional Olympic Committee’s Web site; and a concluding discussion of
how the contribution of corporate sponsors to the Olympic phenome-
non might best be understood.
Beijing’s Bid: Historical Pedigree 
and Modernity
In a lull during the program of the Sydney Olympics in September
2000, the press hall in the Main Press Centre at the Olympic Park in
Homebush Bay turned away from the events of the competitive pro-
gram or the cultural politics of the Australian event. A solemn, unsmil-
ing delegation of Chinese sport diplomats—four men and two
women—lined up on the platform of the hall, and a far from capacity
audience (of around 150) was invited into the thinking of the city as-
piring to stage the Games eight years hence. The Beijing bidding com-
mittee was hiding nothing: Beijing’s success in landing the 2008
Olympics was, with little doubt, the expectation in the minds of state
and city authorities, after years of campaigning and lobbying; failure
would mean that several individuals’ dedication to a lifetime’s profes-
sional goal would count for nothing, deleted in a blur of shame and
failure. No wonder, then, that the delegation looked so serious and joy-
less. The mood was lifted by the presentational video, New Beijing Great
Olympics (Beijing ShengYang 2000), a little more than four minutes of
beaming faces, colorful landscapes and carefully orchestrated individ-
ual and collective physical performance. The opening shot of nonelite
male athletes bursting from the starting line on a running track was
succeeded by shots of urban and historical skyscapes and landscapes;
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traditional culture and artistic performance; and gymnasts, cyclists,
and tennis players. The more serious performers were young, establish-
ing the aspirational motif for a coming generation. As the video short
progressed, this mix of urban modernity and classical allusion was sus-
tained, with shots of fun runs, urban calisthenics, mass ‹tness sessions,
happy-looking consumption in theme-park rides and smart-looking ur-
ban transport systems, and soaring ›ocks of birds speeding into a glori-
ously clear sky. Images of youth predominated, but elder people too
could be seen exercising in the public spaces of the city. The soundtrack
of the video transitioned from heavy orchestra to opera, as images of
ballet, dance and the concert hall were interspersed with acrobats and
children skipping in the streets. The focus switched to Olympic sports,
more intensely competitive forms of ice skating, skating, swimming,
football, gymnastics, martial arts, hurdling/running, basketball, and
memorable moments and footage of China’s Olympic triumphs, with a
‹nishing focus back on youth and children, representing a welcoming
and proud new China in the ›ag-waving groups of grinning children,
and superimposing the “New Beijing, Great Olympics” slogan on the
running track.
The press release accompanying the video reiterated this slogan, and
expanded the message:
Beijing in the new century will host the great Olympic Games and wel-
come athletes and friends worldwide with a new look and in a new
spirit: the modern Olympic Games will open a new chapter in its un-
usual history of over one hundred years with its ‹rst ever hosting by
China, the home to 1/5 of the population. And the time-honored charm
of the Olympic sports will also appeal to the world in a wholly new way.
(Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bid Committee [BOBICO] 2000b)
Seen as “a noble sport undertaking” which aims at “promoting mutual
understanding, friendship and safeguarding world peace by way of
sport,” the Olympic Games and the Olympic spirit were presented as
“the common desire and shared dream of the whole nation.” All this
talk of new looks and spirits matching Chinese values to those of the
historically and culturally established Olympics was given little elabo-
ration. But the elision of Chinese values and Olympism was smoothly
achieved. The attraction of the Games to Beijing and China as a vehi-




Either applying for the hosting of the Olympic Games or the actual
hosting of such games will help promote the city’s open-up commit-
ments, economic development and social progress, offering the world
a unique opportunity to better understand China and its capital Bei-
jing and facilitating integration between China and its capital and the
rest of the world. (BOBICO 2000b)
This is where the committee was getting to the core of the matter, after
the rhetoric of the new and the shared. “Open-up commitments”
linked to economic development and social progress—what is this if
not new international markets, and expanded consumption in both in-
ternal and external forms, in the expanding global marketplace?1 The
Olympics in Beijing:
. . . will provide a ‹t platform for the common celebration of human-
ity, civility, Olympic spirit, human achievements as well as an occasion
for self-improvements and progress. We 12 million citizens of Beijing
have the right infrastructure, the right expertise and the right people to
host the 2008 Olympic Games. We are in a position to make the 2008
Olympic Games a green, cultural and high-tech sporting event to high-
light environmental protection, cultural exchanges between the east
and west, and the use of new and high technologies . . . The economy
of Beijing, and that of China in general, are now growing faster than
ever before. Its urban infrastructure, from telecommunication, traf‹c,
to hospitality industry, and to sporting facilities, has been markedly
improved. (BOBICO 2000b)
Lest those of us in the audience doubted some of these infrastruc-
tural claims, further points and accompanying glossy literature and
handouts bombarded us with facts and ‹gures. The four concluding
points to the press release indicated that the “current bidding work” fo-
cused on ‹ve areas: the control of air pollution and the improvement
of the ecological environment, based on an investment of US$6.8 bil-
lion; second, the problem of traf‹c bottlenecks, with a priority being a
65-kilometer Olympic Boulevard, road-widening schemes, a subway
line connecting the city with the Olympic stadiums and the Olympic
Village, and a light-track railway around the village; third, building
from scratch thirteen new stadiums to complement the ‹fteen existing
ones; fourth, the development of the telecommunications infrastruc-




Further facts and ‹gures presented as evidence of Beijing’s prepared-
ness de‹ed logic, from the number of engineering research centers in
the city, to the number of medals, titles, and awards won by Beijing
sportsmen and women since the founding of the People’s Republic of
China in 1949 (Beijing Foreign Cultural Exchanges Service Center
2000a). The most interesting and—if at all reliable—categories in the
“facts and ‹gures” pamphlet concerned foreign trade, commerce, in-
dustry, construction and housing, and telecommunications, all of
which were presented as evidence of the opening-up and (economic)
reform theme. These were listed after sections on history and culture,
marking the typical mix of history and modernity that bidding cities
tend to emphasize. In this presentational barrage of facts, images, and
statistics, the nature of the Olympic Games as a commercial phenome-
non was never mentioned or raised. It is an extraordinary rhetoric of
international commonality that underlies the vision of would-be
Olympic hosts such as Beijing. Images and soundtracks supersede lan-
guage and analysis; a smiling child symbolizes the innate sweetness
and charm of humanity; a classical architecture invokes cultural charm
and historical signi‹cance, whatever might have gone on inside the
walls of the building; a determined youth represents the worldwide
generations and their future possibilities. Drawn into these bidding
rhetorics you would not know that McDonald’s or Coca-Cola existed,
let alone were at the heart of an Olympic political economy in which
up to 40 percent of Olympic ‹nances have been reported as coming
from partner sponsors.
A Famous Day in London Town: 
Perpetuating the Bidding Rhetoric
When London unexpectedly won the race to host the 2012 Summer
Olympics, managers cheered in their highly-pressured of‹ces in the
city of London. It is claimed that London 2012’s successful bid was
clinched by two factors: the audience granted by UK prime minister
Tony Blair to various IOC members in his hotel room in Singapore; and
the presentational video fronting London 2012 on the day of the deci-
sion itself (Lee 2006). No evidence exists concerning the former, and
the nature of the diplomatic discourse employed by Blair and his aides;
the latter is a matter of public record, available on the London 2012 or-
ganizing committee’s Web site, and deserves some scrutiny. The com-
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monalities in the presentational rhetoric of the Beijing and London
bids are striking.
The video (Full Moon 2005) was divided into three parts, the ‹rst
and the third entitled “Inspiration,” and the middle section compris-
ing Blair’s address to the IOC. The video built up with symphonic pre-
cision, the ‹rst part a fraction under 2 minutes, the Blair address 2 min-
utes 49 seconds, the culminating inspiration slightly over 4 minutes.
The ‹rst part introduced children of the world in 2005 dreaming of
success seven years on: a black boy runner from Nigeria; an Asian girl
gymnast; a white Western female swimmer; and a male cyclist. Four in-
dividual sports, three of them accessible worldwide, the other widely
recognizable as accessible. The voiceover stressed the nobility and po-
tentially heroic aspiration of the athlete, in the familiar tones of Lord
of the Rings mega-star Sir Ian McKellan. His voice was framed against
an original score that blended the elegiac feel of English classical music
with a Vangelis-style sound resonant of the Chariots of Fire anthem that
has come to embody the theme of heroic human striving.
Blair’s address promised the IOC its “very best partner,” assuring the
voters that the bid had “excited people throughout the country.” Nel-
son Mandela was recruited to the cause, and spoke of how a London
Games could ful‹ll a dream for future generations “beyond our own
time and borders.” The inspiration of the London 2012 vision would
draw in millions more young people, not just from Britain but across
the world. In the closing section the viewer was invited back into a se-
ductive world of youthful aspirations from across the world, skillfully
interwoven images and shots of young people growing toward the Lon-
don 2012 moment. The sweat of hard work was blended with the tears
of frustration and elation, as the video led in to its ‹nal textual message
and appeal: “CHOOSE LONDON AND INSPIRE YOUNG PEOPLE
EVERYWHERE TO CHOOSE OLYMPIC SPORT.”
There is a marked consistency of the messages transmitted in the
Beijing and the London visual shorts/presentations: youth, aspiration,
and the future are at the center of the frame. Prominently absent from
both is the actual fact of Olympic ‹nances, whether broadcasting, the
main source of Olympic revenues, or the partner sponsors who con-
tribute the second highest proportion of Olympic revenue. If, as Close
et al. (2007) argue, there is a convergence between the aims and values
of Olympism and those of contemporary capitalism, then these are at




TOP VI: The Hidden Presence
IOC president Jacques Rogge is unambiguous on the contribution of
corporate sponsorship to the Olympics:
Without the support of the business community, without its technol-
ogy, expertise, people, services, products, telecommunications, its
‹nancing—the Olympic Games could not and cannot happen. With-
out this support, the athletes cannot compete and achieve their very
best in the world’s best sporting event. (IOC 2007a)
The TOP (“The Olympic Programme” is the source of the acronym)
scheme is a huge success story in the history of sport sponsorship and
marketing, and transformational in terms of the political economy of
international and media-based sport (Tomlinson 2005b, 51; Barney et
al. 2002, 153–80). Since 1986, the IOC has granted exclusive worldwide
partner status to a limited number of sponsors; in the sixth phase of
this scheme, running from 2005–2008, there were twelve such spon-
sors. It is interesting to consider the pro‹le of these “members” of the
Olympic Family on the IOC Web site (IOC 2007b). The twelve
2005–2008 partners were (in alphabetical order):
1. Atos Origin—information technology
2. Coca-Cola—nonalcoholic beverages
3. GE—technical services and select products
4. Johnson & Johnson—healthcare
5. Kodak—‹lm, photography, imaging
6. Lenovo—computing equipment
7. Manulife—insurance/annuities
8. McDonald’s—retail food services
9. Omega—timing, scoring, and venue results services
10. Panasonic—audio/TV/video equipment
11. Samsung—wireless communication equipment
12. Visa—consumer payment systems (credit cards, etc.)
The following pro‹les are summaries of the Web pro‹les, and include
no interpretive commentary. A thematic interpretation follows this
listing.
Atos Origin, the worldwide technology partner, became a TOP partner
in 2001 under the label Schlumberger Sema, and con‹rmed the posi-
tion as Atos Origin for 2004–2012. It manages and integrates all of the
IOC’s technology partners, specializing in the management of (large-
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scale) operations. The company has annual revenues of more than 5
billion Euros, employing 45,000 people in 50 countries.
Coca-Cola boasts the longest continual relationship with the Olympic
movement, from the 1928 Olympics in Amsterdam onward. “The com-
pany has developed a strong tradition of creating programs and events
to bring the spirit of the Games to consumers in Olympic host cities
and around the world,” working closely with the IOC to support ath-
letes and teams in more than 19 countries. It was a charter member of
the ‹rst TOP scheme in 1986. In 2005, the IOC and Coca- Cola “ex-
tended their partnership agreement for an unprecedented 12 years un-
til 2020.” Coca-Cola has 230 brands of products and local operations in
more than 200 countries around the world.
GE is the specialist provider of power, lighting, security, and “modular
space solutions,” and supplies ultrasound and MRI equipment to help
doctors treat athletes. “NBC Universal, a division of GE, is the exclusive
media partner of the Games” through 2012.
Johnson & Johnson is, the pro‹le boasts, the ‹rst “broad health-care
products company” to be a TOP partner. “Johnson & Johnson and the
Olympic Movement share the common mission of developing the
healthy mind, body and spirit. Our common values of striving for ex-
cellence, achievement, high performance, teamwork, service and com-
mitment to the community provide a strong foundation for achieving
that mission.” Johnson & Johnson companies “support Olympic-re-
lated programmes that promote the health of people around the
world.” With more than 200 operating companies, Johnson & Johnson
employs around 115,600 men and women in 57 countries.
Kodak claims a major role in capturing the “most memorable images
in Olympic history,” having provided ‹lm for 27 Olympiads from 1896
onward. Kodak was a charter TOP member in 1986, and is presented as
“the leader in helping people take, share, print and view images for
memories, for information, for entertainment.”
Lenovo Group, previously the Legend Group Limited, reports an es-
tablished commitment to supporting sport, including women’s soccer,
in China. It joined the TOP program in January 2005. As the largest
manufacturer of personal computers (PCs) in China, it has led sales of
the product in the country (and across the Asian Paci‹c region apart
from Japan) since 1994. In December 2004 Lenovo announced a “ma-
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jor acquisition” of IBM, discussed in more detail below, that would
make it the third largest maker of PCs in the world.
Manulife Financial Services merged with the established TOP partner
John Hancock (which joined the scheme in 1993) in spring 2004. It
“shares the Olympic spirit with its sales intermediaries, consumers and
employees through an array of innovative grassroots initiatives. The
company has also developed a range of community outreach pro-
grammes that promote the Olympic ideals, particularly to young
people.” It gives support to athletes across the world, for training and
competition, so supporting “their ultimate dreams” of representing
their country at the Olympic Games. The ‹fth largest life insurance
company in the world, Manulife has 20,000 employees in 19 countries
and territories.
McDonald’s has a longstanding commitment to the Olympics. The
company became an of‹cial sponsor in 1976, but its pro‹le recalls an
earlier relationship still: “At the 1968 Olympic Winter Games, McDon-
ald’s airlifted hamburgers to U.S. athletes competing in Grenoble,
France, who reported they were homesick for McDonald’s food.” Since
then the company has served “its menu of choice and variety” to mil-
lions of athletes, family, and fans. McDonald’s is committed to TOP
through 2012. It has 30,000 local restaurants, conducting almost 50 mil-
lion transactions each day, in more than 100 countries. Around 70 per-
cent of McDonald’s worldwide are independently owned and operated.
Omega is one of the Swatch group’s 16 brands, and is “the largest manu-
facturer and distributor of ‹nished watches in the world.” A long-time
Olympic provider and licensee, it has provided the Olympic Games with
timing services in all but three Olympic Games since the Los Angeles
Games of 1932. It joined TOP as a worldwide Olympic partner in 2003.
Panasonic, as a branch of the Matsushita Electric Industrial Company,
provides state-of-the-art digital audio, TV, and digital equipment. Its
technology plays “a vital role in delivering the sights, sounds and
unique excitement of the Olympic Games, from the ‹eld of play to the
spectators through its large on-site video screens and professional au-
dio-systems, and to people around the world with its digital broadcast-
ing equipment.”
Samsung is the provider of wireless telecommunications equipment
“to the Olympic Family to support the operations of staging the
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Olympic Games. Samsung . . . helps Olympic athletes share their expe-
riences with family and friends around the world.”
Visa International, the exclusive payment card and of‹cial payment
system of the Games, is said to have “developed a tradition of programs
that support Olympic athletes in many countries, as well as programs
that teach the youth of the world about the history, values and ideals
of the Olympic Movement.” Visa joined TOP as a charter member in
1986. Its annual card sales volume is more than US$3 trillion, in more
than 150 countries and involving 21,000 member institutions. It is a
leader in Internet-based payments and a pioneer of what it calls u-com-
merce: “the ability to conduct commerce anywhere, anytime, and any
way.”
Several themes warrant comment in response to the summaries of the
sponsor pro‹les. First, these are giant companies that, on the whole,
want to become bigger; several have achieved this via mergers. Second,
they are primarily Western companies with worldwide pro‹les, seven
of them U.S.-based, two from Western Europe (Germany and Switzer-
land), and three from Asia (Japan, South Korea, and China). Third, they
are in the TOP program for longer-term bene‹ts, as testi‹ed by the
three continuous partners since 1986 (though the price is now so high
for such rights that this may be introducing some volatility in the pro-
gram, and this is considered further at the end of the chapter, with ref-
erence to the Kodak case). Fourth, most of them employ a rhetoric of
support for excellence in performance and for the wider population(s)
that are necessary to the Olympics as a large-scale media phenomenon,
though few if any of these are instanced or exempli‹ed in any speci‹c
way. Fifth, all generate products and services that have potential for
penetration into expanded and lucrative markets, and all but one,
Lenovo, will be excited by the presence of the Games in the massive
and still-expanding new market of Chinese consumers (for Lenovo, the
bene‹t is exposure outside of China). Sixth, their presence (though still
not adorning the Olympic stadium) will dominate the of‹cial sites of
the Games, their employees enjoying the best hotels, hospitality events
and “Olympic Family” tickets at the blue-ribbon and most high-pro‹le
events.
Lenovo, as the sole sponsor based in China, is a revealing case-study
of the emergent Chinese economy, in which enterprises and compa-
nies aspire to a global level of business competition (Ling 2006), and
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not just to compete in local markets. Its IOC Web site highlights the
company’s repositioning of itself as a global company. This was
achieved when US$1.5 billion was paid for the PC business of IBM, a
move designed to place Lenovo closer to the two world leaders, Dell
and Hewlett-Packard. This strategy was aimed at establishing the com-
pany as “one of China’s ‹rst home-grown brand names,” not just
clinching its TOP status but also “enlisting celebrities to promote its
products, hiring foreign executives and refashioning a company” (Bar-
boza 2006) that had grown from modest and small-scale roots. Lenovo,
with executive of‹ces in Beijing, Singapore, and Purchase, New York,2
was establishing its international pro‹le and worldwide infrastructure,
and appointed William Amelio as its president and chief executive.
Amelio was a former chief executive at Dell, and went on to bring sev-
eral more top Dell personnel into the Lenovo operation.
This close-up on Lenovo illustrates a central contradiction of the po-
litical economy of the Olympics. Though it invokes values of universal
appeal and the “celebration of humanity,” (Carrington 2004) the IOC’s
‹nancial well-being is dependent upon the patronage of aggressive
multinational companies more interested in monopolizing global mar-
kets than in so-called Olympic values. If Beijing’s Olympics is to be a
catalyst for anything, it is for the expansion of capitalist and consumer
markets in the post-communist world.
Conclusion: Reaching Beyond the Rhetoric
Some of the gaps between idealist rhetoric and the realities of the
Games’ ‹nances, economics, and political economy are further high-
lighted by giving space to the voices and postulations of the organizers
and the IOC itself. As an event like the Olympic Games comes closer in
operational terms, idealism can give way to pragmatism, and the orga-
nizers must always face practical problems of policy and implementa-
tion. BOCOG’s priorities change, its preoccupations less to do with ide-
alism and more concerned with market protectionism, or even pro‹ts
and surplus (Bloomberg 2006). Typical of the organizers’ concern are
the comments made at a June 2007 press conference, in which market-
ing of‹cial Chen Feng addressed assembled journalists in the Beijing
Olympic Media Center:
If we don’t prevent and ‹ght ambush marketing, more and more in-
terest-driven enterprises will join the ranks of ambush marketing com-
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panies, which will reduce the value of the Olympic brands and
dampen the sponsors’ enthusiasm. The Olympic Movement will lose
its ‹nancial support and this may imperil the 2008 Olympic Games 
. . . If ordinary citizens refrain from buying fake Olympic products and
report infringement cases, they will be making a sterling contribution
to the Olympics and to the protection of Olympic intellectual property
rights. (BOCOG 2007)
So your Olympic duty becomes to be an over-directed consumer and an
everyday snoop.
The IOC (2007b) in fact sees marketing as “the driving force of the
Olympic movement”:
The Olympic marketing programme has become the driving force be-
hind the promotion, the ‹nancial security and stability of the Olympic
Movement.
The challenge of ‹nancing the Olympic Games has been a recurring
theme throughout Olympic history. Since its founding in 1894, the
Olympic Movement has depended on partnership with the business
community to stage the Olympic Games and to support the Olympic
athletes. Today, marketing partners are an intrinsic part of the Olympic
Family.
This is an historical distortion: though commercialization was sought
early on in the history of the Olympics (Barney et al. 2002), systematic
and consistent business support was piecemeal and fragmented in
those early years. The IOC did not permit advertisements in brochures
and programs for the London 1948 Olympics, endeavoring “to ensure
that they are promoted not so much as a commercial venture but in the
best interests of sport” (Burghley 1951, 26). Ninety-two years into the
organization’s history the TOP scheme was transformative of the polit-
ical economy of a ‹nancially moribund institution. It is therefore disin-
genuous to locate the TOP sponsors within an established historical
tradition. A more accurate interpretation is available in former IOC
marketing chief Michael Payne’s account of this transformation (Payne
2005), and in his description (Tomlinson 2006b) of the contemporary
Olympics as a business sponsor’s dream, “commercially controlled and
ambush-free.”
The IOC recognizes the central place of its “support from sponsors.”
Corporate sponsors provided US$1.5 billion over a four year period, 34
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percent of the US$4 billion of IOC revenue in the Olympic “quadren-
nium” from 2001–2004, and 11 sponsors (before the arrival of Lenovo
as the twelfth) committed US$866 million for the 2005–2008 period:
The Olympic Movement provides unparalleled returns on the invest-
ment for sponsors. The Games provide a marketing platform that is
based on ideals and values. The Games provide unparalleled opportu-
nities for a company’s sales, showcasing, internal rewards, and com-
munity outreach programmes.
Support from the business community and other benefactors helps
the athletes and the teams promote the Games. In addition, many
sponsors’ products, services and expertise are essential to the staging of
an Olympic Games. Olympic marketing has developed signi‹cantly
over the past two decades to ensure the viability of the Olympic Games
for many decades to come. (IOC 2007a)
Here, the IOC con‹rms its commitment to the sponsoring model,
playing up the convergence of corporate and Olympic ideals. All
Olympic Games, though, con‹rm the malleability and ›exibility of
these ideals in what I have called a “necessary arrogation” (Tomlinson
1999). Beijing is an interesting case of such an arrogation—behind its
claimed and expressed values Beijing is doing the modern IOC and the
new China’s work, opening up vast potential consumer markets to am-
bitious and aggressive multinational companies in a consolidation of
the commodi‹cation of the Games (Tomlinson 2005c). Braverman
(1974), in his critique of monopoly capitalism, talked of how the uni-
versal market penetrates into the crevices of our life, in the creation of
new products related to personal and cultural aspirations. Some of
sport’s highest achievements and lofty ideals are now inextricably wo-
ven into the universal market, dictating what you can wear as a com-
petitor, how you can pay as a customer, what ‹lm you use for your sou-
venir shot, what quick bite or soft drink you can refresh yourself with.
The interests of the Olympics and of the corporations placing their
products through the Olympic brand are certainly a case of “mutual at-
traction,” to cite Close et al. again. But there is more to say: global cor-
poratism existed and would continue to exist without the Olympics;
the Olympics, without the TOP programme, would be enfeebled and
relatively insigni‹cant. As Short (2004, 96) has argued, the Olympic
Games have provided both a vehicle for economic globalization, and
“a platform for the penetration of selected corporations into global
markets and global consciousness.” There will be changes to the lineup,
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and in October 2007 Kodak announced its decision to end its partner-
ship with the IOC, citing its digital-led directions and changing market
conditions (Dobbin 2007; Christie 2007). Some top executives also
consider that the IOC and its host partners are setting too high a price,
as one has revealed (interview with author, September 2007). The
Olympics keeps its stadia free of perimeter advertising, and some com-
panies consider this too restricting a model for the high cost of the ex-
clusivity: imagine, then, an alternative scenario for a multinational. If
Paris had gained the 2012 Games, sponsoring the Eiffel Tower, for in-
stance, might look like better value than sponsoring events in a brand-
free area of the Stade de France. New forms of ambush marketing such
as this hypothetical French case might change the marketing landscape
of the Olympic event. But the basic formula of corporate and media un-
derpinning of the event remains in force, and the corporate partner
continues to be a primary player. Short also comments on the in›uence
of corporate sponsorship on the site of the Games: “The major corpo-
rations have been very eager to get the Games into China as a strategy
of promoting their products and name recognition to one of the largest
faster-growing markets in the world” (2004, 97). There is as yet little di-
rect evidence of this eagerness, as corporate sponsors balance the
rhetoric of their partner with the representation of their own global
pro‹les: the eagerness is without doubt there, but the nature of the
in›uence is not at all clear in empirical terms, and remains to be re-
searched. Key questions include: What is the proportional commit-
ment to TOP of each sponsor’s marketing budget? What evidence is
there of value-for-money in terms of marketing pro‹le and market
share? How many hotels and tickets are taken up by sponsors at the
Games? How do the sponsors participate more widely in the affairs of
the “Olympic Family” and the decisions of the IOC?
A closer look and deeper understanding of the role of the corporate
sponsors in the Olympic story is likely to reaf‹rm the major in›uence
of multinational capital upon that narrative. John MacAloon (2006,
32) has observed that Olympic of‹cials are perfectly capable of signing
sponsorship contracts while at the same time proceeding “to battle
those sponsors in defense of the values of the Olympic movement. In
the ›ame relay, the values of ritual and festival continue to prevail over
those of spectacle, due in great part to the effective political action of
such leaders and their volunteer staff.” But in pre-event discourse and
representational forms at least, the Beijing case reaf‹rms the process
whereby an Olympic rhetoric masks some primary motives of the cho-
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sen host, and its main partners. And this makes of the Olympics-Spon-
sor partnership less of an elective af‹nity, and more of an ideological
contradiction. As the Games are further commodi‹ed in the interests of
corporate sponsors and global consumption, the Olympics survives as
a lucrative brand in the international marketplace, not merely con-
verging with a system and ideology of consumer capitalism, but re-
shaped by it.
NOTES
1. The term open up commitments draws upon the concept of “open” or
“openness” which, I am informed by an anonymous reviewer, is a transla-
tion of the Chinese term kaifang. The words that I have cited from the bid-
ding team’s documentation have a speci‹c meaning: again I am indebted to
this reviewer—“For the Chinese listener, the words ‘the city’s commitments
on opening up’ is code for great political liberalization, and greater integra-
tion with the world order, whatever it is.” Nevertheless, the words were not
being addressed to “the Chinese listener,” but presented in the press release
to an assembly of the international press. I may misunderstand the speci‹cs
of Chinese semantics here, including a particular take on the politics of
progress and transformation, but the connection of such forms of openness
with the internationalization of markets is at the heart of the committee’s
statement.
2. Lenovo no longer has of‹ces in Purchase, New York. The U.S. of‹ces are
in Raleigh, North Carolina. The company had not made this change at the
time it appointed Amelio as president and chief executive.
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On Seizing the Olympic Platform
Monroe E. Price
When Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz wrote Media Events, their master-
ful analysis of mass ceremonies of the twentieth century (coronations,
the moon landing, the Kennedy funeral), the emphasis was on the cel-
ebratory or cohesion-building qualities of such global incidents. Now,
re›ecting on geopolitical changes that have intensi‹ed since the publi-
cation of the book, they have come to think more of the brutal compe-
tition that occurs to appropriate these phenomenona by a variety of
groups and powers in society. Katz has argued that “terrorism” has cre-
ated a new category of media event. Dayan, with whose modi‹cation
this chapter is more concerned, has used the word hijack to imply the
sometimes forceful, but certainly involuntary or antagonistic, seizure
of world attention by altering the expected and legitimated narrative of
these singular moments (2005). Dayan re›ects the hunger by a multi-
tude of groups to gain the extraordinary bene‹t of huge investments in
platforms established by others, and, in so doing, take advantage of
elaborately created fora to advance political and commercial messages.
Media events become marked by efforts by free riders or interlopers to
seize the opportunity to perform in a global theater of representation.
The most dramatic kind of hijacking is asymmetric, where small,
seemingly powerless groups gain momentary attention and sometimes
enduring strength by storming (literally or ‹guratively) a platform me-
dia event so as instantly to control the narrative (the Palestinian gun-
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men in the Munich Olympics). But the concept of hijacking raises
more complex questions of power and how narratives are generated
and diffused in society. Societies or public spaces are hijacked, ways of
living are altered, and the predominant notion of propriety and normal
behavior displaced. Hijacking can be supplemented by softer versions,
such as piggybacking, which I describe subsequently, and that too may
involve both marginal and established players (as in “ambush market-
ing,” described later).
Within these ideas there is a torque-like twist that transforms the
emphasis, place, and analysis of Media Events. This chapter, and this
book, co-edited with Dayan, locates this idea of hijacking or seizure,
looking at the 2008 Olympics as a case study. Through this study, I look
at the more abstract questions surrounding “platforms,” as the thing
that is hijacked, looking at the category as a relatively underexplored
vehicle for systematic communication. I turn next to the historic use of
the Olympics as a platform and, ‹nally, to a few examples of seeking to
seize the Olympic platform by external civil society advocacy groups
and others to exploit the 2008 Olympics to their advantage. I dwell
speci‹cally on a campaign to increase China’s pressure on Sudan over
the Darfur crisis. Because of the centrality of China and narratives of
China in the global and domestic imagination, the stakes in producing
and controlling the stories produced through the Beijing Olympics
have been great. Through this, the event has become something of a
watershed for altering perceptions and engendering change.
Platforms and Their Uses
What do we mean by platforms? For the purposes of this analysis, I con-
sider as a “platform” any mechanism that allows for the presentation of
information and its transmission from a sender to a receiver. The term
grants a sense of solidity and implies a locus for action, for platforms
that exist physically, in the electronic universe or simply as the rela-
tionships or links between various entities. Platforms have enormous
value if they are successful in attracting large, indeed massive, audi-
ences and serving the need of their sponsors, whether they are selling
goods or ideas or have the potential to do so. Of course, one can con-
sider newspapers and broadcasting as not only “media” but as historic
platforms, and the process by which various groups gain access and
in›uence with them has, of course, been much studied (Montgomery
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1990). But in this chapter, I want to use the term platform in a special
way. What I wish to emphasize is the appropriation of already created
platforms by those who seek new opportunities to deliver messages and
pathways to persuade. By restricting this approach to “already created”
platforms, I want to distinguish between the fostering of a new event as
a platform and the effort to take a platform created by others.
This phenomenon of platforms exists in a world in which much
clamoring for attention—to sell goods or alter political attitudes—en-
counters few effective channels to reach the desired audience. Further-
more, the existing channels are often tightly controlled and present
signi‹cant barriers to entry. Globalization plays a large role in the shift-
ing efforts to perform and persuade. In the twentieth century, media
systems were designed so that issues would be articulated, framed and
discussed largely within national boundaries, and the residue of that
system persists. Increasingly, however, issues such as human rights, en-
vironmentalism, and even the impact of domestic political choices are
seen with respect to their vast transnational implications. The interests
and actions of civil society and other groups shift from a national to a
global level. These passions are made all the more frustrating by the
fact that they are often blocked from entry (purposely or merely be-
cause of patterns of scarcity) into domestic media systems. As a result,
these groups seek new ways of reaching widely distributed elites (and
masses).
There is, of course, a very long history of alternate modes of gather-
ing audiences together through various mechanisms that allow persua-
sive messages to be articulated and widely diffused. Demonstrations,
marches, strikes or manifestations are exemplary. In the last several
decades, global civil society groups have organized huge concerts, ter-
rorists have caused immense catastrophes, and political ‹gures have
staged gatherings of dignitaries: all widely differing efforts to create an
opportunity for signi‹cant audiences to experience arguments or asser-
tions that would not otherwise come to their attention—or not with
such emphasis. Media coverage of such events plays a major role in
bringing them to the attention of the public. Much of the work in
Dayan and Katz’s well-known book, Media Events, is about the commu-
nications-related aspects of creating such platforms.
But in this chapter the emphasis is on the effort (and this is a rough
distinction) not to create a platform, but rather to appropriate one that
was already established or constructed for another purpose, turning the
message from that of its sponsors to those of others, commercial enti-
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ties or global civil society groups. It is that speci‹c irony—the notion of
hijacking or piggybacking—that becomes of interest with respect to the
Olympics. The central idea is to ‹nd a platform that has proven highly
successful in establishing a major constituency for one purpose and
then convert that constituency to a different, unintended objective.
The cost of creating the platform (very likely considerable) is borne by
one player, but the bene‹ts are then obtained by another. The Olympic
Games, which offer advocacy groups opportunities for alliances among
disparate groups that make up global civil society, provides an impor-
tant example of this phenomenon. Embedded in this idea are a variety
of subnotions: (a) that the Olympic Games are such a platform; (b) that
one can identify a dominant narrative that is the intended and ap-
proved narrative for which the platform was designed; and (c) in con-
trast, one can categorize other uses of the platform as counternarrative
in ways that are worthy of distinction. In other words, there is some
(possibly illusionary) accepted use for the Olympics that is crowded out
or violated and that it is possible to tell, sometimes in advance of the
event, who the contenders are for the secondary use.
Because of the ever-present danger of appropriation, one de‹ning
characteristic of signi‹cant platforms is the effort to protect them from
unwanted or unremunerated uses. In the Internet world, platform soft-
ware is created to protect a site from hacking. But what about complex
platforms like the Olympic Games? These are protected through phys-
ical modes of security (limiting who may actually enter the Olympic fa-
cilities or who receives press accreditation for coverage). They are pro-
tected through assertion of intellectual property and contractual rights,
using highly developed legal mechanisms to enjoin or impose high
costs on those who seek to be free riders. The International Olympic
Committee (IOC) sets terms for the uses of the platform (and limita-
tions on those uses) by the organizers, the sponsors, and the athletic
federations. And platforms are protected, most subtly, through intense
management of narrative and response to efforts to subvert or counter-
mand what is chosen to be dominant.
In the case of the Olympics, some fundamental problems present
themselves. First, there is a built-in ambiguity as to the “ownership” of
the Olympics platform. In some Games, the platform has belonged
more to the International Olympic Committee, and in some more to
the Organizing Committee; in recent Olympics, ownership is increas-
ingly a combination of these two. Further ambiguity is added as the
host city or country seeks to control part of the narrative. In China,
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while 2008 is the Beijing Olympics, there is no doubt that the Games
are an opportunity for China to tell its stories at home and abroad. And
‹nally, because of commercialization and the high revenues sponsors
engender (Payne 2006; Schmitz 2005), increasingly it is the sponsors
who have a stake in creating a platform (or using an already-created
one) to advance their goals, whether they are selling soda, burgers, or
large scale perceptions about citizenship, consumption, and identity.
Because ownership of the platform is multiple and ambiguous, so
too is the question of dominant or accepted narratives (Morgan 1995;
Hoberman 1997; Barney, Wamsley, Martyn, and MacDonald 1998). It is
not fully transparent how potential con›icts in narrative or even dif-
ferences in emphasis on narrative are negotiated among these com-
petitors for the accepted narrative. The IOC, for example, must moni-
tor for over-commercialization, for proper conduct of participants
during the Games, for coverage, and even for the architecture of the
venues themselves, to ensure its continued control over a particular
representation of the Olympic ideal.
I also distinguish among various efforts to appropriate the platform.
Such uses can be merely complementary (indeed reinforcing), in com-
petition with or in contradiction to the accepted narrative (assuming
that narrative can be speci‹ed). I use the term complementary for uses in
which the appropriator gains bene‹ts, but those who built the platform
bear no additional costs. For example, cities other than Beijing in
China may wish to use the Olympics to promote their value as tourist
destinations, rather than Beijing. Large commercial entities—including
Johnson & Johnson and other major sponsors—may wish to propagate
a vision of China (or a particular sense of “One World, One Dream”)
that is slightly different from that of BOCOG or the regime, though not
in con›ict with it. They may wish, for example, to emphasize China’s
advances in health technology or in science as opposed to achievement
in athletic prowess or, subtly, in military power. Or commercial spon-
sors may seek to integrate their product with the Olympic dream, prop-
agating a message that is a variant on what the state seeks to propagate,
or slightly (but not very) subversive of it. And ‹nally, The Olympic
Partner Programme (TOP) sponsors as a group may have messages that
subtly or less subtly reinforce attitudes toward consumption, or the in-
creased power of China and the pride that that should engender. John-
son & Johnson’s theme as a TOP Partner within China is “Golden
Touch, Golden Mom,” an idea that strongly ties the Olympics to moth-
erhood in Chinese society.
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Alongside these complementary narratives, there are major and mi-
nor efforts to throw off the dominant narratives of the Beijing
Olympics and, via a kind of jujitsu, turn global competition to images
of China that are less favorable, or to use the Olympics for some wholly
different purpose. The 1999 World Ministerial Conference of the World
Trade Organization was a hallmark recent event, not Olympics related,
exemplifying the exploitation of a platform created for one general
narrative (furthering one vision of world trade relationships) to convey
quite another. Just as China is using the 2008 Games to in›uence pub-
lic opinion at home and abroad, many advocacy groups and other in-
terests—both inside China and internationally—are using the occasion
to de›ect this of‹cial representation. These groups ‹ght for space in
U.S. and global media, mainstream and not, to reinforce China’s ›aws
and weaknesses, all issuing body jabs against the depiction of the new
Colossus. The Olympics magni‹es the attention given to the repeated
reports of manufacturing defects in China.
But from the point of the view of the Olympics there is little differ-
ence between a complementary and a competitive user (where the
dominant and alternate use are in more of a zero-sum game). Both are
“free riders”—sometimes involved in what might be more gently called
piggybacking, rather than hijacking, the platform. Free riders threaten
the exclusivity of the platform and the underlying marketing theory
that yields compensation for the IOC. Even where the free rider does
not damage the Games or its family of participants, the IOC has an in-
terest in capturing the economic bene‹t to the appropriator, thus in-
ternalizing the bene‹t of the Games and protecting those who pay for
the privilege. It is a widely told tale that at the 1984 Olympics, Fuji was
an of‹cial sponsor, but Kodak was a principal advertiser of both U.S.
television broadcasts of the Games and named supporter of the U.S.
track team. In 1992, at the Barcelona Olympics, of‹cial sponsors in-
cluding Reebok paid $700 million, but when the U.S. basketball team
won a gold medal, Nike sponsored the press conference. Increasingly,
legislation, at the behest of the IOC, restricts and bans such practices.
For the London Olympics, there is already legislation preventing any
business making reference to the 2012 Olympics in its promotions, un-
less it is an of‹cial sponsor (House of Commons 2005–6). There is a
speci‹c rhetoric that captures the commercial appropriation of the en-
dorsed and of‹cial narratives. “Ambush” or “parasite” marketing refers
to efforts by a company, not an of‹cial sponsor of the Olympics, who,
by centering its advertising campaign around the event, appears to
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have that status (Vancouver 2010). A nonsponsoring company, barred
from the use of of‹cial logos and other trademarks associated with the
sporting event, seeks to inveigle itself by sponsoring an individual ath-
lete or in other ways (Schmitz 2005; Davis 1996).
These commercial appropriations are a way of thinking about the
greater stories of the Olympic platform: because so much is spent, be-
cause the economy of the Olympics depends upon controlling them,
and because there are lawsuits with extensive explanations, struggles in
this sphere are better articulated than they are in connection to more
substantial areas of competition. More is written about a sneaker man-
ufacturer who is not an of‹cial sponsor trying to obtain market share,
than about competition over the generalized narratives established by
the IOC or the Organizing Committee. Dayan’s emphasis on hijacking
moves toward the effort to promote contrary or contradictory uses sub-
versive of the principal narrative. The most-cited “hijack” of the
Olympics, the frightening presence in the Olympic past, was the ter-
rorist attack in Munich. Each Olympic Organizing Committee is
haunted by Munich and its planning is to some extent about mecha-
nisms for avoidance.
The Problem of the “Base Narrative”
To have a category of the subversive, there must be an idea of what con-
stitutes the dominant. Hijacking assumes a legitimated base narrative
that is displaced. And that raises the question of who owns or controls
the platform—for example, whether it is the platform of the IOC or, in
2008, of the Beijing Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games
(BOCOG) or of China, or of the commercial sponsors, or of the great
transnational broadcasters, like NBC. A more radical perspective, with
respect to the Olympics, is that all claimants have only relative primacy
or ownership of the platform. One could go further and argue that the
Olympic platform has been seized from a purer Olympic past by com-
mercial interests (since 1984) or by various incarnations of the IOC
which, it has been argued, has not always been a true bearer of the
Olympic torch. John Hoberman, who has used “amoral universalism”
as a descriptor of IOC’s approach in the past, has written, in an inter-
view for this chapter, that:
I have read Coubertin’s major works and analyzed them in The Olympic
Crisis (1986), and I have no doubts about the authenticity of his ideal-
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ism and his good intentions about achieving world peace through in-
ternational sport. The problem, from my perspective, is that a lot of the
wrong people have wielded power over the “movement” from even be-
fore Coubertin passed from the scene in 1937—viz. the Nazi Olympics
and my account in “Toward a Theory of Olympic Internationalism” of
who played in›uential roles in 1936 and how they acquired them. So
the question here is whether the IOC has played politically wholesome
roles in international diplomacy in the past, and whether, in the light
of this past, they are capable of doing so now as 2008 approaches. (e-
mail exchange with the author, June 12, 2007)1
For Hoberman, it is precisely an absence of understanding of history
that renders the current acceptance of the dominant narrative of
Olympism possible. Only an absence of understanding allows the pos-
itive glow in which NBC and corporate sponsors, who underwrite the
Games, can thrive.
It is clear that the Olympic ideology satis‹es a deep yearning for glob-
alism (in the key of sentimentalism). The Olympic “movement” (along
with Esperanto and the Red Cross) is one of the late 19th-century in-
ternationalisms that has actually survived and succeeded. The differ-
ence is that ceding the Olympic Games to the sports entertainment in-
dustry has inevitably resulted in multiple forms of corruption from
which the Esperantists and the Red Cross people—shielded from temp-
tation—remain happily immune. (e-mail exchange with the author,
June 10, 2007)
It is against this perspective that one might examine more tradi-
tional views of the IOC and its efforts to affect and control the narra-
tive. Here, and elsewhere in this book, one major area for examination
is the use of the Games to advance speci‹c goals of civil society. Before
I turn to speci‹c areas of competition with respect to Beijing, it is use-
ful to look at expectations that the history of the Games sanction ef-
forts to legitimate pressures for change, and are not just an occasion for
measuring athletic performance. In this regard, I borrow from James
Nafziger (1992) in his analysis of the traditional interplay between the
Olympics and the processes of legal and political change.
Scholars such as Nafziger argue that political activity to this end
should be encouraged as strongly consistent with the Olympic ideal.
They invoke the Olympic Charter and its aspirations that render, for ex-
ample, as incompatible with the Olympic Movement “any form of dis-
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crimination with regard to a country or person on the grounds of race,
religion, politics, gender or otherwise” (IOC 2007). Here the dominant
Olympic narrative is the promotion of harmonious interaction between
peoples and states and the cultivation of international dialogue. Advo-
cates of this approach point to the role of the IOC in the decision of the
North and South Korean teams to march together at the opening cere-
monies of the 2006 Torino Olympics. This event was trumpeted as a
symbol of a renewed effort to cooperate and was commended as being
representative of the Olympic goal of camaraderie and peaceful rela-
tions. Olympic of‹cials encouraged North and South Korea to use the
Asian Games as a chance to mend diplomatic relations, despite a grow-
ing rift between the two over the communist regime’s recent missile
launches and nuclear test. When the two countries announced their in-
tentions to forge a joint team for 2008, the political decision was ap-
plauded by the IOC. A spokesperson announced: “Today marks a mile-
stone in the completion of this important project for the two Koreas
and the Olympic movement” (People’s Daily Online 2006).
Coursing through Olympic history are more aggressive notions of in-
tervention, for example using international sporting events as a bar-
gaining tool to criticize behavior of certain states. The prevailing exam-
ple of the embrace of international sport to advance the cause of human
rights is the IOC’s campaign to abate racial discrimination and
apartheid in South Africa. Between 1964 and 1991, the IOC not only pre-
cluded South Africa from competing in the Olympic Games, it urged all
International Federations to do the same until South Africa abandoned
apartheid. The IOC recognized that apartheid was “in contravention of
the Olympic Charter” (ANOC 1984) and by imposing penalties for its
practice, “the IOC rightly subordinated the Olympic goal of widespread
international sports participation to the more fundamental principles of
international human rights law” (Mastrocola 1995).
Individual states also use the platform of the Games for purposes
that can be easily classi‹ed as propagandistic and certainly are in-
tended to enhance national prestige: the decision of the USSR to absent
itself from the Games until 1952 because of the “bourgeois and capital-
ist” nature of the event is one well-known example. Intractable re-
gional or international con›ict can shift the meanings of, and the nar-
ratives expressed during, the Games, and underscore the importance of
the IOC to provide control. The 1936 Berlin Olympics was a misuse of
the Olympic ideal, exploited by the Nazi regime to strengthen its hold
at home while providing foreign spectators and journalists with a pic-
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ture of a peaceful, tolerant Germany. By rejecting a proposed boycott of
the 1936 Olympics, the United States and other Western democracies
acted in a way that skirted international obligations (Large 2007).
Nafziger recalls that “At the end of the Cold War, the Olympic Move-
ment helped end a sort of negative ping-pong in the form of reciprocal
boycotting by the United States and the Soviet Union, joined by their
national allies, of each other’s Olympic venues. With governmental
support initiated by the IOC, the national committees of the two coun-
tries signed an antiboycott and cooperative agreement that was
adopted by their Governments in an early hint that the Cold War was
drawing to a close” (Nafziger 1992, 497). And the IOC played a key role
in con›ict between North and South Korea during and around the
Seoul Games. It proposed that some of the scheduled events be held in
North Korea; though this was eventually rejected (and North Korea
boycotted the Seoul Games after it was refused status of co-organizer),
mediation encouraged competition that remained peaceful—and ulti-
mately encouraged negotiations to explore ending four decades of near
con›ict between the two Koreas.
Upon the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949,
the International Olympic Committee ruled that Taiwan’s Olympic
committee would represent China; after the PRC gained the Chinese
seat at the United Nations in 1971, the IOC recognized Beijing’s
Olympic committee. The con›ict over representation gained another
level of complexity when Taiwanese athletes were allowed to compete,
but only as part of the “Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee.” Under
the formal arrangement, the Taiwanese entrants were prohibited from
using Taiwan’s national symbols, such as Taiwan’s ›ag; the national an-
them of Taiwan would not be sung when its athletes won medals.
In this sense the dominant narrative of the IOC hurtles between a
more positive notion of Olympian harmony and global cooperation,
and a claim of interventionist achievement and the “amoral universal-
ism” in Hoberman’s term. The IOC af‹rms a role in forwarding
Olympic goals that seeks, rhetorically and in practice, to avoid the po-
litical. But a broad perspective—linked to the history of the IOC—asks
whether the IOC sees the Olympics as a mode for moving a society, and
the host city itself, “forward” along a number of dimensions. If that is
part of the legitimated narrative, civil society groups and others con-
sider advocacy not only an ethical use of the Olympics moment, but
wholly consistent with historic Coubertin-like objectives. There are
those, including the IOC itself at times, who hew to the notion that the
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principal overt purpose or intended narrative of the Olympics should
only have to do with sports and performance, and any attempt to in-
ject broader social or political meaning and impact is an intrusion, a
side effect of the extravaganza. Soon after China was awarded the
Games, Jacques Rogge, president of the IOC, said, “The IOC is not a po-
litical body—the IOC is a sports body. Having an in›uence on human
rights issues is the task of political organisations and human rights or-
ganisations. It is not the task of the IOC to get involved in monitoring,
or in lobbying or in policing” (BBC Sport 2001). And in 2006, Rogge’s
chief of staff wrote a letter to a protesting Tibetan group, the Interna-
tional Campaign for Tibet, rejecting the Tibetans’ appeal that the IOC
bring pressure to bear on China. Of course, the spokesperson said, a
Beijing Olympics would play a positive role “in China’s changing social
and economic fabric,” but “We believe your demands fall unquestion-
ably well outside the remit of our organization” (Hutzler 2006).
These expressions underscore the IOC’s reluctance to respond to pe-
titions and letters demanding action from a plethora of civil society
groups and others. In contradistinction, the Olympics’ capacity to pro-
mote positive political, economic, and social change is almost always
an element of the bid award process. Before the Games were awarded,
the IOC was less reluctant to tie the Games to China’s human rights
record: in April 2002, Rogge told BBC-TV, “We are convinced the
Olympic Games will improve human rights in China . . . However, the
IOC is a responsible organisation and if either security, logistics or hu-
man rights are not acted upon to our satisfaction, we will act” (Aus-
tralian 2002). One might argue that the Olympic Bid is the occasion for
setting forth competing narratives and that after the award, the role of
the IOC is reduced, but this would be an odd reading of intentions. The
con›ict among these views undergirds the extraordinary global interest
in what might be called “shaping China” from a variety of perspectives.
Thus, it is important to look at the way the International Olympic
Committee is being perceived, hectored, in›uenced, and pressured to
alter its sense of mission and how this is done by countries, interest
groups, and corporations within and outside China.
Competing Narratives, Civil Society 
and the Beijing Olympics
What makes the 2008 Olympics different from these previous experi-
ences is the increased complexity of issues and players involved in the
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process. Beijing is not only the most expensive Games and the Games
with the largest potential audience, it is also the Olympics with the
most substantial geopolitical consequences. It is about shifts in power
toward Asia and shifts in China’s role in the global imagination. It
comes at a time when every event, including the Olympics, has a trans-
forming environmental agenda. For China it is about the PRC’s ability
to promote itself as a harmonious society, both at home and interna-
tionally. In a not atypical comment, Qin Xiaoying, in China Daily
(2007), wrote that “Comparing the Olympic spirit and China’s quest
for a harmonious society, one sees clearly that the aspirations of the
Chinese people and the ideas of the Olympic movement have so much
in common with respect to interactions between people, between
people and society and between man and nature.” The of‹cial slogan
for the Games—“One World, One Dream”—encapsulates this theme of
harmony, and renders older competing narratives of China jarring. In
the run-up to the games, Chinese scholars have been scouring the for-
eign press to determine what is written about the PRC, and whether the
Games are being portrayed as a moment of potential glory or as symp-
tomatic of larger social and economic ›aws and political differences.
The 2008 Games are precariously poised between the zeal and so-
phistication of NGOs and builders of global civil society on the one
hand, and the many complex issues raised by the evolution and devel-
opment of China on the other. What in the past constituted a debate
among governments and national groups has been further transformed
and complicated as the battle over representations in the Olympics has
expanded and intensi‹ed. The major players in this new world are the
increasingly global NGOs, a group distinguished by notably more so-
phisticated means of leveraging power. With their political acumen
and reach, these civil society groups have become important entrants
in the struggle over the way Beijing is interpreted. In short, the 2008
Olympics are taking place at a moment when an expanding civil soci-
ety sphere more effectively organizes and communicates globally, and
the event provides an ideal opportunity for the relevant actors to mo-
bilize support for their various causes and appeals. The civil society or-
ganizations taking up the issue of the Olympics include general human
rights advocates and groups speci‹cally concerned with issues of reli-
gion and press freedom. There are groups involved in China’s relation-
ship with Tibet, and entities with speci‹c public agendas such as envi-
ronmental organizations and opponents of China’s one-child policies.
This emerging global society uses a variety of venues to mobilize, to
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generate support and achieve prominence. They set up BOCOG, the
IOC, China, and the advertisers and sponsors of the 2008 Games as
foils. They enlist their national parliaments. And in so doing, these
civil society actors have become the functional equivalents of the
of‹cial sponsors, seeking the looming billboard of the Games to attract
audiences and loyalties for their views and to reshape the Olympics as
an agent for change.
Though it is impossible to chart the various modes of shifting the
agenda of the IOC (and through it China) completely or exhaustively,
some examples should help to convey how these groups have aggre-
gated to form a kind of global civil society, and how, in competing and
different ways, they seek to shape an agenda around the Olympics.
Most of these efforts to open up a kind of public sphere—whether co-
ordinated or isolated—involve individual NGOs, some of which were
designed especially to bring pressure to bear on the IOC and China.
These groups use a variety of techniques and address them to a wide va-
riety of individuals and entities. They use sample letters and electronic
petitions to activate their members as intermediaries. They attempt to
assert pressure on groups, including the IOC, directly and through
sponsors such as Coca-Cola and other companies with vested interests
in the country. They act as clearinghouses of information on human
rights abuses, keeping track of developments and reporting on the ac-
tivities of other human rights groups regarding China and the
Olympics. They stress continued media pressure on China as a way to
directly embarrass or shame the CCP into improving its record and also
to prompt the IOC to in›uence China.
Among the various Christian groups seeking to make their claims
part of the Olympics agenda is the Cardinal Kung Foundation, which
asserts its ties to and advocates for the underground Roman Catholic
Church in China, detailing China’s record of religious persecution in
an attempt to include religious freedom on the Olympic change
agenda. In testimony to the U.S. Congress and in letters to President
Hu Jintao, the Foundation has sought to invoke the Olympic aura, de-
scribing the “current Chinese government religious policy” as the di-
rect opposite of the Olympic goal of friendship, decency and solidarity,
and calling on China to prove that the country “is honoring the spirit
of the Olympic Games” (Cardinal Kung Foundation, n.d. and 2005).
Groups concerned with issues in Tibet have been particularly active. In
2006, a group of Tibetan cyclists held a freedom rally in New Delhi to
protest Chinese rule and appeal to the Indian government to help re-
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solve the Tibet issue for its own security. The rallyists were also garner-
ing support for an Olympic boycott because of China’s poor human
rights record and in particular, the jailing and disappearance of the 11th
Panchen Lama, Tibet’s second-ranking religious ‹gure. A small group of
Tibetan monks and Tibetans held a hunger strike in Turin, Italy during
the 2006 Winter Games to pressure the IOC to pressure China to im-
prove human rights in Tibet. It is not just NGOs that are involved, but
a wide variety of organizations, tribal entities, and other political
forces. When an Uyghur activist (and Canadian citizen) was extradited
from Uzbekistan to China and jailed, lawyers and family members at-
tempted to exert pressure on the Canadian government to in›uence
China by invoking the Olympic values. In cases such as these, the
Olympic spirit becomes a kind of symbolic or disembodied code which
is invoked as an instrument of rhetorical power.
Some of the themes or tropes of these entities can be identi‹ed in a
letter issued on August 7, 2006, by an international coalition of human
rights organizations, including Olympic Watch (a human rights moni-
toring association created especially to focus on the Games), Reporters
Without Borders, the International Society for Human Rights, Solidar-
ité Chine, and Laogai Research Foundation. The letter maintains that
“The IOC has the obligation to protect the Olympic ideals of ‘harmo-
nious development of man,’ ‘human dignity’ and ‘peace,’ and to pre-
vent the political propaganda abuse of the Games.” And it alleges that
“the IOC has refused to face the reality in which Beijing 2008 is to take
place,” charging current IOC leadership with being “either too cynical,
or too incompetent, or both, to protect the Olympic ideals and take a
clear stance on the continuing human rights abuses in China.” The
group called on National Olympic Committees and individual athletes
“to start discussing ways how they can protest the conditions under
which the 2008 Games are to take place.” As to implementation, the
letter suggests that “At a minimum, the IOC could demand that the
Beijing Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games not be person-
ally linked to the perpetrators of human rights violations, the Chinese
Communist Party.” It recommended that National Olympic Commit-
tees organize boycotts, stage peaceful protests in Beijing during the
Games, include Chinese, Tibetan, and Uyghur exiles in their teams and
delegations and visit human rights defenders in prison. Corporate
sponsors were urged to “show their commitment to corporate social re-
sponsibility by making it clear to the IOC and to BOCOG that their
business philosophy does not condone propaganda abuse of the Games
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and human rights violations” (Olympic Watch 2006). The Human
Rights Watch Olympic campaign sought to open the narrative by fo-
cusing on three questions. One was “How will China’s pervasive cen-
sorship and control of domestic and international media and the In-
ternet play out when thousands of international journalists descend on
Beijing?” The implication here is of course that there will be necessary
consequences when the legions come to cover the Games. Their second
question was posed as follows: “How are the Olympic Games being
used to justify the violent forced evictions of thousands of people from
their homes?” And a third question, revisited later in this chapter, asks
“. . . how do China’s restrictions on labor rights affect workers on the
ground?” (Human Rights Watch n.d.).
Two Case Studies
I want to close this chapter by focusing on two speci‹c efforts of civil
society, one involving domestic policy in China and labor standards,
and the other involving foreign policy, in particular, China’s relation-
ship with Sudan and Darfur. The ‹rst example involves a campaign
that stretches across several Olympics, and the second involves one
that is targeted speci‹cally at 2008. Each example shows civil society
mobilizing to use the Olympics platform to gain global attention and
change China’s behavior.
PlayFair Alliance
An important case study involves the PlayFair Alliance, a group with
foundations in the international labor movement (among other bases)
which has been engaged in a long-term effort to improve working stan-
dards for children and others. Begun before Athens, as the “Play Fair at
the Olympics Campaign,” it claimed to be one of the “biggest ever
global mobilisations against inhuman working conditions” (Play Fair
at the Olympics 2004). Somewhat reconstituted for the 2008
Olympics, the PlayFair Alliance demonstrates modes of highlighting a
subversive narrative—the exploitation of child labor—and legitimating
its claims by bringing them into of the world of the IOC’s own docu-
ments. PlayFair has skillfully used the rhetoric of the Olympic move-
ment, including the IOC Code of Ethics, and has gained advantage by
mastering the intricacies of the IOC and national licensing agreements.
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In short, it appropriated an of‹cially proclaimed narrative of Olympic
decency and then sought to hold those involved to their articulated
high standard.
Their efforts resulted in a report that was published in June 2007 and
that documented the illegal use of child labor in China’s manufacture
of the Olympic-related mementos that were under license to BOCOG.
The report was well-documented and provoked an instant reaction
from Chinese authorities, always prepared for crisis management, in
which they announced that local of‹cials would be punished, busi-
nesses closed, and the contracts immediately terminated.
One of the striking features of the report is the way in which it
shows how traditional IOC rhetoric can be deployed to create a frame
for altering narratives. Quoting directly from extracts of the IOC’s Code
of Ethics, PlayFair invoked the following principles:
1. Safeguarding the dignity of the individual is a fundamental re-
quirement of Olympism.
. . .
5. The Olympic parties shall use due care and diligence in ful‹lling
their mission. They must not act in a manner likely to tarnish the
reputation of the Olympic Movement.
6. The Olympic parties must not be involved with ‹rms or persons
whose activity is inconsistent with the principles set out in the
Olympic Charter and the present Code.
The report details the Alliance’s efforts, since 2003, to discuss with
the IOC the conditions under which Olympic-branded sportswear is
produced. In response to requests for meetings, the IOC commented
“that it condemns the practice of unfair labour practices, which are
contrary to the spirit and ideals of the Olympic movement,” but that
day to day licensing is managed by the 202 National Olympic Com-
mittees around the world, and “The IOC has no direct involvement
with regards to such contracts.” PlayFair’s report also referenced a 1998
cooperation agreement signed between the IOC and the International
Labour Organisation (ILO) that focused on respect for social justice in
the labor ‹eld. In that agreement, “the IOC and the ILO undertake to
encourage activities in pursuit of this objective, particularly those
which contribute to the elimination of poverty and child labour . . .”
(PlayFair 2008 2007, 6).
Invoking this history, PlayFair urged the IOC to “Adopt a clear and
public statement, including inclusion into the Olympic Charter, in
On Seizing the Olympic Platform
101
support of labour standards and in particular in sporting goods supply
chains; Incorporate into IOC licensing/sponsorship contracts, binding
language on labour standards issues throughout the supply chains(s) of
the company(s) concerned; Establish an effective mechanism through
which cases of violations of labour rights in such supply chains can be
dealt with, in cases where it has not been possible to remedy these
through direct contact with the company(s) concerned; Take concrete
steps to ensure that national Olympic committees and games organis-
ing committees adopt and implement equivalent provisions.” (PlayFair
2008 2007, 6).
The Beijing 2008 Olympic Marketing Plan overview describes an
of‹cial Olympics Games License as “an agreement that grants the
rights to use Olympic marks on products for retail sale. In return, li-
censees pay royalties for the rights, which go directly toward funding
the Olympic Games. The program aims at promoting the Olympic
Ideals and the Olympic Brand, providing quality consumer touch
points for the inspiration of the Games” (BOCOG n.d.) Thus, PlayFair’s
style of argument made the IOC’s policies on merchandise licensing
much more transparent than they had previously been.
PlayFair understood the implications not only for the IOC story, but
for the China narrative as well. For China, much was at stake in terms of
the relationship between the Olympics and changing global perceptions
of the quality of domestically produced goods. The stated “mission” of
the Beijing 2008 Licensing Programme is to promote the brand image of
the Beijing Olympic Games and the Chinese Olympic Committee
(COC), that is, to “express the unique culture of China and Beijing by
offering an array of traditional cultural products; make a strong effort to
involve Chinese enterprises in Olympic licensing; showcase Chinese
products and build the brand image equation that conveys a quality
message, i.e. ‘Made-in-China = High Quality;’ and raise funds for the
Beijing 2008 Olympic Games.” (Chinese Olympic Committee 2004).
The “Genocide Olympics”
There is no gold medal for the NGO narrative that comes closest to hi-
jacking, usurping or piggybacking on the immense investment in the
Olympics. But if there were, one of the competitors for the 2008 award
might be Eric Reeves, an English professor at Smith College, who cre-
ated the accusatory concept of the “Genocide Olympics” as a way of al-
tering China’s dealings with Sudan. Reeves’s was a classic effort to seize
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the platform, and to use the social and ‹nancial capital invested in the
Olympics in order to turn it to the advantage of an NGO policy advo-
cate “free rider.” It is useful to trace the intense history of this effort and
its implications for the earlier discussion of platforms.
Many have remarked on China’s close relationship with countries of
marginal stability and democracy, seen to be partly an imperative of
the country’s growing domestic economy and need for oil reserves. A
prominent actor in this arena is Sudan. Since the mid-1990s, China Na-
tional Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has been the dominant player in
both exploration and production in Sudan’s oil reserves. Human Rights
Watch and others have charged that China’s involvement in oil explo-
ration has been marked by complicity in gross human rights violations,
including clearances of the indigenous populations in the oil regions
and direct assistance to Khartoum’s regular military forces. In addition,
China has purchased a great share of Sudan’s oil exports, and these rev-
enues are a major source of ‹nancial support for the Sudanese govern-
ment. These policies have undermined the effectiveness of sanctions
imposed by other global players.
Most important and relevant to the subject of Reeves’s use of the
Olympics platform has been international concern about widespread
killing and displacement in the Darfur region, and the speci‹c role of
China in this crisis. In September 2004, the UN Security Council
adopted a resolution threatening Sudan with oil sanctions if it did not
stop atrocities in the Darfur region. China abstained. In August 2006,
China abstained again in a vote on Resolution 1706 which provided for
the transfer of responsibility in Darfur to the United Nations from the
African Union (United Nations 2006). Many advocates felt that China
was shielding Sudan in its refusal to consent to the entry of UN forces.
The public efforts to pressure Sudan, and countries that can
in›uence Sudan, have, of course, been massive. What was particularly
novel however was the leveraging of the 2008 Olympic Games as a
method of bringing such pressure to bear. Eric Reeves’s “rebranding” of
the Beijing events as the “Genocide Olympics” was a kind of asymmet-
ric image warfare, which also proved to be a highly effective mode of
mobilizing support for his position. Various elements distinguish
Reeves’s counternarrative from those of the NGO advocacy projects de-
scribed earlier in this chapter. But there are also similarities. From the
outset, the most salient characteristic was Reeves’s rhetorical strategy,
deploying the evocative and immediately understandable phrase,
“Genocide Olympics.” This elegant and powerful formulation effec-
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tively juxtaposes two complex worlds that are not readily associated
with each other. It is a phrase that assaults and awakens the reader, and
invites further inquiry. It is a phrase that, for some readers, plays on
deep and abiding concerns about China and 2008 that could not oth-
erwise be easily summarized and compressed. The brilliance of this two
word phrase was what gave the project its initial momentum.
Reeves was able to build on Beijing’s own contribution to the notion
of multiple sorts of Olympics. As part of its expansive claims for the
Olympics, BOCOG chose the “One World, One Dream” motto to con-
vey the idea of simultaneous and overlapping Olympics, Olympics that
asserted and followed certain themes: a Green Olympics, a People’s
Olympics and a High-Tech Olympics. The Green Olympics would em-
phasize harmony and mutual promotion of man and nature, and
China’s commitment to sustainable development. The People’s
Olympics would promote an internally harmonious society, facilitate
the formation of a peaceful international environment and emphasize
solidarity between East and West.2 The High-Tech Olympics would, ac-
cording to BOCOG, “be a window to showcase [China’s] high-tech
achievements and innovative capacity” (BOCOG 2005). In another,
slightly more worrisome interpretation, however, the High-Tech
Olympics provides an “arena to exhibit the comprehensive power and
the highest level of the scienti‹c and technological development of
China” (Hua 2004). Playing against the quasi-hyperbole of Beijing’s
claims, the coining of Reeves’s phrase was a small act of jujitsu.
The second reason the phrase was so striking was that it broke
through the dense layers of complexity about Darfur, atrocities, geopol-
itics, oil, and weapons trading. The phrase “Genocide Olympics” was is-
sued and introduced to a global audience that understood something
horrible was proceeding in Darfur and that there had been numerous
seemingly ineffectual attempts to resolve the crisis. There was, as is of-
ten the case, a generalized hope for a new solution that could be under-
standable and workable. By ‹xing responsibility on China and suggest-
ing a potential solution, the concept of “Genocide Olympics” had
staying power. It gathered, under a single banner, much of the accumu-
lated discontent, anxiety, and suspicion about China and human rights.
Strategy and the Launching of the Narrative
Reeves’s public and transparent campaign makes it possible to docu-
ment and analyze what he proposed to do and how his small campaign
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played off of great platforms such as the Games. The campaign is an in-
teresting example of diffusion of an idea. Reeves has long experience as
a Sudan activist; his Web site, www.sudanreeves.org, carries many of
his writings and analyses on this subject. He has spent eight years fully
devoted to Sudan related-questions. And he has always had the ability
to use newspapers, radio, and other means to keep his views in the pub-
lic eye. When Reeves turned to the Olympics as a platform for mobi-
lization, he met with the Washington Post editorial board and con-
vinced them to write an editorial (2006) that had “Genocide
Olympics” in its title (the ‹rst such publication of the term). He wrote
an opinion piece in December, 2006 in the Boston Globe about his pro-
posed campaign. In March, Reeves appeared again in the Boston
Globe—this time as a subject of a story—with an account of his cam-
paign (Cullen 2007), which he launched with an e-mail manifesto sent
in February, an “Open Letter to Darfur Activists” (Reeves 2007a).
The manifesto is interesting for its differing modes of achieving the
goal of hijacking the Olympics for secondary purposes. The letter starts
by challenging current NGO techniques for citizen actions regarding
Darfur:
Enough of selling green bracelets and writing letters. . . . It’s time, now,
to begin shaming China—demanding that if the Beijing government is
going to host the premier international event, the Summer Olympic
Games of 2008, they must be responsible international partners.
China’s slogan for these Olympic Games—“One world, one dream”—is
a ghastly irony, given Beijing’s complicity in the Darfur genocide. . . .
The Chinese leadership must understand that if they refuse to use their
unrivaled political, economic, and diplomatic leverage with Khartoum
to secure access for the force authorized under UN Security Council
Resolution 1706, then they will face an extremely vigorous, unrelent-
ing, and omnipresent campaign to shame them over this refusal.
In opposition to the established means of exploiting the Olympics plat-
form, Reeves suggested that a boycott of the Games would not be the
most effective technique:
It is important to remember that this should not, in my strongly held
view, be a campaign to boycott the Olympics: a boycott would defeat
the whole purpose of the campaign, and be deeply divisive. Moreover,
if a boycott were successful (extremely unlikely) the political platform
from which to challenge China would disappear.
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Reeves’s aspiration, rather, was for the Olympics platform to foster a
global, grassroots movement. He intuited the bigger the platform (and
the Olympics is certainly among the biggest), the greater the room for
major uses by the appropriator:
There is tremendous scope for creative advocacy here, and for the de-
ployment of diverse skills and energies: linguistic, internet, communi-
cations, graphic design, advocacy writing, and organizational. What
happens, for example, if 1,000 students and advocates demonstrate be-
fore the Chinese embassy in Washington, DC, declaring with banner,
placards, and T-shirts that China will be held accountable for its com-
plicity in the Darfur genocide? What happens if such demonstrations
are continuous, and grow, and take place outside China’s embassies in
other countries? in many other countries? What happens if every-
where–everywhere–Chinese diplomats and politicians travel they are
confronted by those who insist on making this an occasion for high-
lighting China’s role in the Darfur genocide?
Diffusion and Losing Control of the Narrative
Almost immediately, there was rapid diffusion of the idea. Reeves gave
interviews to NPR and other broadcast outlets. On March 22, 2007, in a
stump talk barely noted in the United States, one of the candidates for
president of France, François Bayrou, called for a potential boycott of
the Olympics if China did not assist in altering Sudan’s stance (Keaten
2007). Even at this early stage, other candidates for the French presi-
dency seemed to concur in the idea of a Darfur-related Olympics ac-
tion.
But the most noticeable step occurred when Mia Farrow and her son,
Ronan, published an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal (2007).
Reeves had had long discussions, as a kind of tutor on Darfur, with the
actress, a goodwill ambassador for UNESCO and a committed Sudan ac-
tivist before the essay’s publication. The essay, not surprisingly titled
“The ‘Genocide Olympics,’” repeated much that was in Reeves’s cam-
paign manifestos and analyses. “[S]tate-owned China National Petro-
leum Corp.—an of‹cial partner of the upcoming Olympic Games—
owns the largest shares in each of Sudan’s two major oil consortia. The
Sudanese government uses as much as 80% of proceeds from those
sales to fund its brutal Janjaweed proxy militia and purchase their 
instruments of destruction: bombers, assault helicopters, armored 
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vehicles and small arms, most of them of Chinese manufacture.
Airstrips constructed and operated by the Chinese have been used to
launch bombing campaigns on villages.”
Then the Farrows introduced a new point—one that also likely orig-
inated with Reeves—that turned the rhetorical heat up by more than a
few notches. They aimed a verbal volley at the producer Steven Spiel-
berg who had been contracted to orchestrate and produce the opening
and closing ceremonies for the 2008 Olympics. “Does Mr. Spielberg re-
ally want to go down in history as the Leni Riefenstahl of the Beijing
Games? Do the various television sponsors around the world want to
share in that shame? Because they will. Unless, of course, all of them
add their singularly well-positioned voices to the growing calls for Chi-
nese action to end the slaughter in Darfur.”
Bringing Spielberg into the frame seemed to instantly alter the dy-
namic of the campaign. In a sense, it meant, for Reeves, a slight loss of
control of the narrative. All of a sudden, this was now a Hollywood
celebrity campaign. A great reputation (Spielberg’s) seemed on the line.
Diffusion spiked as more and more newspapers carried elements of the
story. The Washington Times, a frequent critic of China, found the
Olympic platform a suitable vehicle for their views. Nat Hentoff wrote
for them as follows:
It astonishes me that the same Mr. Spielberg so admirably founded the
Shoah foundation that records the testimony of the survivors of the
Nazi Holocaust. How can he fail to make any connection with Shoah
and the holocaust in Darfur?
The Farrows also ask whether “the various television sponsors [of the
Beijing Olympics] want to share in that shame” of the host’s complic-
ity in genocide along with such American corporate sponsors of the
games as Johnson and Johnson, Coca-Cola, General Electric and Mc-
Donald’s. (Hentoff 2007)
By mid-2007, the campaign sparked by Reeves and reinforced by Far-
row was beginning to be visible in many contexts. The world’s largest
mutual fund, Fidelity Investments, slashed its stake in PetroChina amid
pressure to sell shares in companies doing business in Sudan (Wall
Street Journal 2007). In May, more than 100 members of the United
States’ House of Representatives sent a joint letter to China’s President
Hu Jintao, urging him to use his in›uence with the Sudanese govern-
ment. The letter concluded on a Reeves-like note: “It would be a disas-
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ter for China if the Games were to be marred by protests . . . Already
there are calls to boycott what is increasingly being described as the
2008 Genocide Olympics” (U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs
2007).
Athletes also joined the campaign. A reserve player on the National
Basketball Association’s Cleveland Cavaliers, Ira Newble, inspired by an
article about Reeves in USA Today, convinced his teammates to join in
a plea to the government of China: “We, as basketball players in the
N.B.A. and as potential athletes in the 2008 Summer Olympic Games
in Beijing, cannot look on with indifference to the massive human suf-
fering and destruction that continue in the Darfur region of Sudan”
(Beck 2007). And in July, Joey Cheek, a speed-skating medalist from the
2006 Winter Olympics, delivered to the Chinese Embassy in Washing-
ton 42,000 signatures on a petition from the Save Darfur Coalition. He
proposed leading a group of American and Chinese athletes on a trip to
Sudan. A column in the New York Times celebrated his idealism (Araton
2007).
In July 2007, two scholars from Harvard, one of whom had previ-
ously worked with the Chinese government, wrote an op-ed piece for
the Boston Globe, later reprinted in the International Herald Tribune,
criticizing “some in the West” who were labeling Beijing 2008 as the
Genocide Olympics (Qian and Wu 2007). “Is China really turning a
cold shoulder to the humanitarian crisis in Darfur,” they asked, or, as
they suggested, “has the explosive charge of complicity in genocide
blinded observers to China’s aid and quiet diplomacy in Sudan?” “In
the face of increasing pressure from the international community,
China may consider bolder options,” but “China’s principle of exert-
ing in›uence but not interfering and imposing is consistent with
African practice, and the ‹nal political decision will have to be made
by Africans.” A few days later Liu Guijin, China’s special envoy to Dar-
fur, criticized American politicians who, he suggested, had “unfairly
played up the Darfur issue to burnish their moral credentials amid the
presidential election campaigns.” Those who linked Darfur with the
Olympics “were either ignorant of reality or steeped in obsolete cold
war ideology” (Dickie 2007). And the same week, Steven Spielberg
made it known that he might resign his appointment as artistic direc-
tor of the opening ceremonies if he did not receive a satisfactory re-





I mentioned earlier in this chapter that a platform is de‹ned in part by
the modes available to defend it from appropriation. Copyright and
trademark laws offer a ‹erce and aggressive way to protect the Olympic
platform from certain contenders who are usually but not exclusively
commercial “parasites,” as is discussed earlier. I have suggested as well
that enhanced physical security (protecting Web sites from hacking)
also serve this function. Far more intriguing and interesting, however,
are efforts by the dominant players (the IOC, China or BOCOG and the
sponsors in this case) to control the discourse and discourage coun-
ternarratives. Here again the case study of the “Genocide Olympics” is
illustrative.
The consequences of the Wall Street Journal essay by the Farrows
demonstrated that the launching of a campaign does not guarantee
control of how it will be carried and diffused. Reeves’s narrative was
carefully constructed and phrased, with speci‹c objectives and speci‹c
means of persuasion. It was to be a “grass roots”-supported narrative,
with a broad international base. It would engage and energize people
around the world concerned with Darfur (and the relationship between
Sudan and China). The option of boycott as remedy would be side-
lined. However, the publication of the Wall Street Journal piece subtly
shifted the campaign. Mia Farrow’s fame launched the concept of tar-
ring 2008 as the “Genocide Olympics” to a wider audience, as indi-
cated by the examples I have given. But despite (or perhaps because of)
the success of Reeves and others who initiated the campaign, control of
the narrative had been weakened. At the outset they could in›uence
almost every related element in seizing the Olympics platform. Now
the platform of Darfur and the Olympics had plural authors.
A different tale began to be told, and, in a way, the shaming seemed
to begin to have consequences. China (and Steven Spielberg) sought to
regain control of the narrative for themselves. In mid-April 2007, Spiel-
berg’s spokesperson, Marvin Levy, announced that the producer had
written a four-page letter to the Chinese president, Hu Jintao, urging
him to take further action regarding Sudan and Darfur. At the same
time, China—while denying any connection to the Genocide
Olympics campaign, or to Spielberg’s letter—announced that they were
sending a special ambassador to Sudan.3 These events led to a journal-
istic denouement—at least a temporary one—on the front page of the
On Seizing the Olympic Platform
109
New York Times, in an April 13 story by Helene Cooper that realigned
the Olympics narrative, placed Steven Spielberg in a good light, and
also shifted the dynamic from the perspective of the government of
China by suggesting political movement.4 The story was entitled: “Dar-
fur Collides with Olympics, And China Yields.” The following day, it
was republished in the International Herald Tribune, with the headline
“China acts on Sudan after Hollywood push.” According to one ob-
server, Cooper, instead of writing about the complexities of the issue,
“chose instead to write what seemed a jazzier story: ‘Hollywood vs.
Hollywood,’ with a happy ending in which Steven Spielberg ends up
wearing the White Hat and with a single letter to the Chinese govern-
ment does what no one else in the world can do, with little Mia Farrow
by his side.”
Two days later, Sudan agreed to allow UN support for African Union
troops. This was by no means the end, hardly even the beginning of
the end. For Sudan had not yet agreed to the entry of UN troops, which
many believed to be necessary for any possibility of resolution. The
monitoring of China, of Spielberg, and the rest would no doubt con-
tinue. Whether the narrative of a Genocide Olympics would survive—
or how it would continue to diffuse—remained to be seen.5
There is hardly a more important set of narratives for the twenty-‹rst
century than those concerning the role of China in the world and as an
internally-governing power. And, as a consequence, there are few nar-
ratives that so many actors seek to shape with such fervency. In this
chapter, I have concentrated on global civil society groups as actors in
this narrative-shaping effort, but it is clearly a process in which multi-
ple other bodies have a stake as well: states, regions, corporations, and
large scale movements. For all of these, the 2008 Olympics represents a
great opportunity—and both the IOC and China are mindful of this
fact. Russell Leigh Moses, professor of politics and international rela-
tions at Renmin University of China, put it as follows: “Beijing is
spending as much effort on controlling the environment for the
Olympics as it is on construction. For the sports authority this is about
gaining as much gold as possible. For the party, it is about the greatness
of their rule. For the construction team, it is about image and show-
case” (Marquand 2006).
The drama of constructing representations of China have under-
scored what might be called the jurisprudence of platforms: who con-
structs them and who has access; the mode of controlling their use or
defending them; and the modes of seeking access. Over decades, the
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way of thinking of traditional platforms has been well articulated.
There are ways of conceptualizing the structure of broadcasting and the
press, thinking about certain public spaces and even zones of transna-
tional discourse. In all these instances, beneath notions of rules and
practices, there is the issue of who has what degree of control over the
narratives that de‹ne our lives. As advocacy groups seek new platforms
to advance their messages, understanding of mechanisms by which
this takes place becomes crucial. The Beijing Olympics is a site which
can aid in this understanding, one in which the role of civil society
groups in the shaping of narratives and the effort to seize control of
them has been a sign of the increasing role of these groups on the
global stage.
NOTES
1. See Hoberman 1986.
2. Before 2006, the People’s Olympics was called the Humanistic
Olympics. However, the awkward phrasing of this term, as well as its seman-
tic signals to related concepts, such as humanitarianism, resulted in a change
to the People’s Olympics. The problems might have been even greater with-
out this change.
3. The Press Trust of India (2007) reported that “China’s latest attempts to
pressurise Sudan to allow UN peacekeepers in Darfur is [sic] partly a result of
the efforts of Hollywood actress Mia Farrow and ‹lm-maker Stephen [sic]
Spielberg . . .”
4. Reeves sought to keep the pressure on Spielberg. See Reeves (2007b):
“What are the obligations of artists in the face of genocide? Spielberg and the
others are at two removes from the ethnically targeted killing in Darfur; they
are helping with the Olympics that China’s government cares so much
about, and China is helping Khartoum. But how do we assess degrees of com-
plicity in the ultimate human crime?”
5. Cooper’s story was republished in abbreviated form in Scotland. There
were editorials in the Austin American-Statesman and in Syracuse, New York,
and New York Newsday; Daniel Schorr discussed Spielberg’s role on National
Public Radio’s Weekend Edition.
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The Public Diplomacy of the 
Modern Olympic Games and 
China’s Soft Power Strategy
Nicholas J. Cull
In 1965 a retired American diplomat turned college dean named Ed-
mund Gullion unveiled a new piece of terminology to help his coun-
trymen conceptualize the role of communications in foreign relations.
That term was public diplomacy. He and his team ›eshed out the con-
cept in a brochure for their new Edward R. Murrow Center for Public
Diplomacy at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Diplomacy as fol-
lows:
Public diplomacy . . . deals with the in›uence of public attitudes on the
formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimen-
sions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cul-
tivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the in-
teraction of private groups and interests in one country with another;
the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communica-
tion between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and for-
eign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications.
(Publicdiplomacy.org n.d.).1
It took more than forty years, the transformation of the world as a
result of the end of the Cold War, the global communications revolu-
tion, and the crisis following September 11, 2001 for the term to gain
real currency outside the United States. Today it is ubiquitous. Most
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states and many nonstate international actors either use the English
term or have a close equivalent to signify the task of seeking to advance
foreign policy by engaging foreign publics. The concept is frequently
linked to a second American addition to the international lexicon—
Soft Power—which is Joseph S. Nye’s term (2004) for the contribution
that attractive culture and values can make to an actor’s ability to op-
erate in the world. This chapter will look at the evolution of a key
venue of contemporary public diplomacy—the modern Olympic
Games—and the soft power policies deployed in recent years by the
People’s Republic of China, and consider how they have converged in
relation to the Beijing Olympics of 2008.
While Ed Gullion’s use of the term public diplomacy was new in 1965,
the phenomenon he described was not. International actors have
sought to engage foreign publics for as long as publics have had any
impact on statecraft. A simple taxonomy of public diplomacy divides
its practice into ‹ve distinct and well established activities: listening to
foreign publics and re‹ning policy accordingly; advocating to promote
a particular policy before a foreign public; engaging in cultural diplo-
macy to export particular practices and build good feeling abroad; ex-
changing diplomacy and building networks to develop links and facil-
itate mutual knowledge; and ‹nally, using international broadcasting
to provide news to foreign publics who might otherwise be denied ac-
cess to balanced information.
Sports can ‹gure in all areas of public diplomacy. Sports events are
branded by hosts to represent particular meanings, and the stars of
these events are regularly used as advocates for particular messages.
Sports can be a cultural export in their own right and the spectacle of
hosting or winning at a major sporting event can raise or maintain the
pro‹le of an actor. Sports are an ideal subject of exchanges; the shared
experience of viewing or participating in an event with foreign publics
is a powerful tool for people-to-people relationship building in world
affairs. The transmission of sports by international broadcasters is a
time-honored way to attract audiences. Finally, the wise practitioner of
public diplomacy listens to world opinion, notes the extent to which
his target audience cares about sport, identi‹es the speci‹c sports
which capture the collective imagination, and develops his sporting
diplomacy accordingly. As will be seen, all these dimensions of public
diplomacy have played a part in the development of the modern
Olympic Games, though not always in the way that the International
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Olympic Committee (IOC) or the host of any particular Games might
wish. In fact, the entire modern Olympic project may be conceptual-
ized as an exercise in public diplomacy.
The Olympics as Public Diplomacy for Peace
In the beginning, Pierre de Coubertin conceived his revival of the an-
cient Olympics as a form of diplomacy through culture with the hope
that nations might compete in peace and thereby overcome their dif-
ferences. His International Olympic Committee would be a foreign pol-
icy actor in its own right, advocating international brotherhood. The
games would be above politics and ideology. Chapter ‹ve of the
Olympic Charter holds that: “No kind of demonstration or political, re-
ligious or racial propaganda is permitted in the Olympic areas” (IOC
2007). Symbols, ›ags, and invented traditions accreted around Cou-
bertin’s original idea creating what might be a resource for any state
wishing to demonstrate its attachment to universal values of sports-
manship and peace (Espy 1979).
As the Olympic Games evolved, a number of practices were added to
try to underline the international peace building intent of the Games,
including a new format for the closing ceremony—‹rst seen in the
Cold War Games in Melbourne in 1956—in which the athletes mingle
freely together rather than parade in national groups (IOC n.d.). A sec-
ond strategy was the creation of the Coubertin medal to recognize true
sportsmanship and a value above the prize of simply being “faster,
higher or stronger” than other competitors. The ‹rst winner was Euge-
nio Monti, an Italian bobsledder at the Innsbruck Winter Games of
1964, who sel›essly loaned a bolt from his own sled to repair that of a
British competitor, Tony Nash. Nash went on to win the gold (Wash-
ington Post 1964; IOC 2006).
The idea of restoring international brotherhood, the rubric of the
ancient Olympic Truce, and new ideals of global citizenship were
prominently featured in the host’s rhetoric during the Athens Games of
2004—the ‹rst Games of the post-9/11 era (Roche 2006). But appeals to
brotherhood and internationalism, while present at every Olympic
Games and an essential part of the athletes’ experience, are usually
drowned out by more dominant stories, the foremost being the quest
for national prestige.
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The Olympics and the Public Diplomacy 
of Prestige
It is ironic that simply by emphasizing the coming together of nations
Coubertin also ensured that national prestige would be at stake. The
games he imagined as an antidote to war soon became its analogue, as
the display of national physical prowess was used to increase the pres-
tige of a country and gain in›uence in the world as a result. The ‹rst
modern Games—the Athens Olympics of 1896—have in fact been
blamed for provoking a war. Greek diplomat Demetrius Kaklamanos ar-
gued that the heady experience of his country’s hosting the Games and
especially the surge of nationalism sparked by Sprio Louys winning the
marathon led directly to its launching of the ill-starred war with Turkey
in 1897.2
In the aftermath of the Great War, nationalist and revolutionary so-
cieties like Mussolini’s Italy and Lenin’s Soviet Union emphasized sport
and physical culture as symbols of the virility of their political system,
and achievement in Olympic competition became a profound concern
of governments.3 Similar attitudes could also be found in more demo-
cratic cultures. In the run-up to the Antwerp Games of 1920 the British
Olympian and war hero A. N. S. Strode-Jackson declared:
If the war has taught us anything it has proved the value of propa-
ganda: knowing this, we should remember, always, that there is no
British propaganda so valuable as the perpetuation of the old idea that,
on the ‹eld of sport, British prestige is supreme, and that none can out-
rank us in stamina and virility. (Jackson 1919)
As the emphasis on national prestige increased, so the Games suffered.
The Paris Games of 1924 were marred by a series of incidents which
suggested that the spirit of international sportsmanship was in jeop-
ardy: anti-American booing and ‹st ‹ghts in the crowd at the Olympic
rugby match; a French boxer, Roger Brousse, biting his British and Ar-
gentine opponents; and an extraordinary fracas between an Italian
swordsman and a Hungarian judge, which culminated in a challenge to
a duel. The London Times responded by proclaiming the doom of the
entire Olympic movement. But for all the bad sportsmanship the
movement survived (Times 1924a; 1924b; 1924c).
Notable examples of the Olympic competition becoming a stage to
display the prestige of a nation include the various appearances of
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Hungarians at the Melbourne Games of 1956, which followed hard on
the Soviet crushing of the Hungarian uprising. Each event became a
celebration of national pride and de‹ance of the Soviet Union, culmi-
nating in the notorious “blood in the water” water polo match between
Hungary and the USSR. To the enduring delight of the Hungarian
people, their team not only beat the Russians but went on to win the
Gold medal in that sport (New York Times 1956).
However, the prestige of victory in an Olympic event was soon held
as nothing against the kudos of actually hosting the Games. The
Olympics became a major mechanism to make or remake the reputa-
tion of a city, region or entire country. When in 1920 a small group of
Southern Californian businessmen set out to Europe to bring the
Olympics to Los Angeles (the Games ‹nally came in 1932), they found
it necessary to produce a globe and point out the location of their city.4
Their Olympic bid quite literally put their city on the map. The 1976
Summer Games in Montreal were planned to provide a boost for the
province of Quebec through an exercise in regional public diplomacy.
Whatever their contribution to the international standing of the city
and its region, however, the costs outweighed the bene‹ts. Montreal
did not ‹nish paying its Olympic debt until December 2006. Local
branding has been especially apparent in bids to host the Winter
Olympics, which in only one case—Oslo 1952—have been held in a na-
tional capital.5 The Summer Games are routinely used not merely to
promote a particular city but to rebrand an entire nation.
The classic case of a national agenda emerging in an Olympic bid is
that of the Berlin Olympics of 1936. IOC awarded Berlin the Games in
1931 as a gesture to mark Germany’s return to the community of na-
tions following the Great War, which had prevented the Games sched-
uled for Berlin in 1916. They came as an invaluable windfall for Adolf
Hitler who, on coming to power in 1933, swiftly redirected plans for the
Games to showcase his regime. While in modern lore the big story of
the Games was the success of the African American athlete Jesse Owens
and the attending disruption to Hitler’s narrative of Aryan supremacy,
Germany still won more medals than all other nations present com-
bined (Mandell 1987). The prestige associated with the mounting of the
Berlin Games gave suf‹cient boost to the regime’s image at home and
abroad that Hitler planned to establish Germany as a permanent site
for the Games. This said, the Olympics—like the lavish musicals that
played in Nazi movie theaters—may have advanced Hilter’s purposes
only by providing a welcome distraction. At a deeper level their funda-
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mental message of sportsmanship and competition in peace played
against his strategy of readying his nation for war and intimidating
Germany’s potential adversaries. Other totalitarian regimes have also
queued up to host the games. In 1935 Japan won the right to host the
1940 event as part of the celebration of the 2600th anniversary of their
royal house, and would have done so but for the outbreak of war in
Asia. Mussolini’s Italy made an unsuccessful bid to host the Games in
Rome in 1944.6
Following World War II each of the Games seemed conceived to
serve a transparent public diplomacy agenda. Both London in 1948 and
Helsinki in 1952 presented their Games as gestures of national recovery.
Recovery was relative in the case of London, as athletes were asked to
bring their own food because of the persistence of wartime rationing
(Danzig 1948). The 1956 Games in Melbourne were intended as a com-
ing out party for Australia, and international press coverage about be-
hind-schedule buildings in the run-up to the games gave ample evi-
dence of that country’s need to update its sheep-and-bush-hats image
in the world. Fortunately, the Games hit their mark. Both the 1960
Rome and 1964 Tokyo Summer Games allowed nations of the wartime
Axis to showcase their postwar societies. In Japan, the symbolism was
underlined by the selection of Yoshinori Sakai, an athlete born in Hi-
roshima on the day the atomic bomb dropped, to light the torch at the
opening ceremony (New York Times 1964). Mexico City planned its 1968
Games to showcase a newly modernized nation with an emphasis on
exotic “Op Art” designs and monumental structures, while the Munich
Olympics of 1972 were intended to introduce postwar, post-Nazi West
Germany, with a sunshine logo and freundlichspiel (Happy Games)
motto (Zolov 2004; New York Times 1972).
Moscow in 1980 and Los Angeles in 1984 asserted rather than re-
branded their host nations, which added to the Cold War logic of each
superpower boycotting the other’s event (Hazan 1982). The Seoul
Olympics of 1988 and the Barcelona Games of 1992 returned to the mo-
tive of rebranding a society in transition. In the case of Barcelona the
transition was at a rather more advanced stage. The IOC awarded the
Games to Barcelona in 1986, the same year that Spain joined the Euro-
pean Community. The Games provided an excellent pretext to invite
the world to meet the new Spain. Atlanta’s bid for the 1996 Games be-
came a gesture to mark the achievement of the American South in tran-
scending its history of racial bitterness. The legacy of Martin Luther
King was cited everywhere in the publicity materials, which included
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abundant allusions to “the dream” of King’s “I have a dream” speech
(Reid 1990). In a similar vein the Sydney Games of 2000 provided a
stage on which Australia could present a new multicultural image and,
in its opening and closing ceremonies, pay tribute to the heritage of its
indigenous people (Waitt 1999).
The prospect of being an Olympic host tempts every emerging
power sooner or later, and it did not take long for China to catch the
Olympic bug. At the start of their very ‹rst Games since the Cultural
Revolution, the Los Angeles Games in 1984, the People’s Republic of
China called a press conference and announced its intent to host the
Games in 2000, thereby beginning the chain of events that would lead
to Beijing 2008 (Miller 1984). Yet there is much in the actual experience
of hosting the Games that should worry China.
The Olympics and Competing Public
Diplomacy Agendas
As the Olympics emerged as a spectacle to which a diplomatic objective
could be tied, so opponents of that objective (and adherents of any ob-
jective seeking world-wide publicity) had a mechanism to advance
their agendas also. As in the case of national prestige, the Berlin
Olympics showed the way. Hitler’s persecution of German Jews sparked
a boycott movement which split the U.S. athletic establishment and
prompted many Jewish athletes from around the world to stay away.
The Nazi regime made some concessions to world opinion by removing
many anti-Semitic posters and playing down the increasing military
presence in German life, but the Games had drawn attention to nega-
tive aspects of life in the Third Reich.7
Politics swirled around the Games of the Cold War, and the Mel-
bourne event was especially badly hit. China stayed away to protest the
participation of Taiwan; Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq stayed away because
of the Anglo-French invasion of Suez; while the Netherlands, Switzer-
land and Spain boycotted the Games to protest the Soviet invasion of
Hungary.
From the early 1960s and for thirty years thereafter the issue of the
participation of South Africa rubbed raw, prompting boycotts by many
African nations. Boycotts were threatened to keep Rhodesia out of Mu-
nich and—unsuccessfully—to exclude New Zealand from Montreal (a
punishment for a rugby tour of South Africa). The tit-for-tat boycotts of
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1980 and 1984 represented the high-water mark of nonparticipation as
a form of Olympic public diplomacy (Hoberman 1986).
On occasion domestic political agendas have seized the Olympic
spotlight. The run-up to the Mexico Games saw an abortive attempt by
African American athletes to organize a boycott of the U.S. team as a
protest against American racism. The debate led directly to the famous
incident in which American 200 meter runners Tommie Smith and
John Carlos performed their black power protest on the winner’s ros-
trum (Fradkin 1967; Allen 1967). Within the host nation, Mexican stu-
dents sought to take advantage of the presence of the world’s media to
present their own message of opposition to their authoritarian govern-
ment. Their protests in the months leading up to the Games culmi-
nated in the so-called Tlatelolco massacre of October 2, 1968, during
which the Mexican army opened ‹re on student protestors and by-
standers alike. Deaths numbered in the hundreds (Weiner 2004). Do-
mestic pressure for reform also played a role in the Seoul Olympics,
though in this case the government accelerated the reform process to
head off a major incident around the Games. The country that hosted
the Games in 1988 was very different from that which had planned the
bid at the end of the 1970s (Manheim 1990).
Munich 1972 brought the most blatant and brutal attempt to piggy-
back an alternate agenda on the organizer’s party when Palestinian ter-
rorists kidnapped and murdered members of the Israeli Olympic team.
The disaster was not wholly unconnected to Germany’s hopes for the
Games. Arguably, the lack of security at the Olympic village and bun-
gled police response to the crisis were by-products of West Germany’s
eagerness to live down its authoritarian stereotype (One Day in Septem-
ber 1999).
The Cold War was fought out in rival propaganda and public diplo-
macy operations from Moscow and Washington. In the Soviet case
these could be quite blatant: for example, their effort to appropriate the
Games in Helsinki 1952 when a festival operated by the Communist
front organization—the World League for Democratic Youth—sought
to spread propaganda among Olympic crowds and athletes (Axelsson
1952). In 1984 the KGB ran a covert campaign to undermine the Los
Angeles Games. KGB disinformation operations included circulating a
story that security in Los Angeles would include surveillance by Israel’s
Mossad and the anonymous mailing to twenty African and Asian
Olympic committees of faked Ku Klux Klan lea›ets threatening non-
white athletes who attended the games. One read: “African Monkeys! A
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grand welcome awaits you in Los Angeles! We have been training for
the games by shooting at black moving targets.” Thanks to speedy
countermeasures, none of the nations targeted by the Soviet campaign
withdrew from the Games.8
For its part, the United States has always been ready to use the
Olympic story to haul public diplomacy freight. In 1952 the State De-
partment, eager to counter the United States’ reputation for racism, en-
sured that black American athletes ‹gured prominently in U.S. inter-
national publicity around the Games (National Archives ca. 1951). In a
similar vein, during the Oslo Winter Olympics U.S. diplomats sought
to embarrass the Communist world by emphasizing the presence of
one of‹cial minder for each Eastern bloc athlete (National Archives
1952). The United States managed to piggyback on Tokyo in 1964 by us-
ing the opening ceremony to showcase its communications satellite,
Syncom 3, and mounting the ‹rst trans-paci‹c telecast (Gould 1964).
During the Munich Games the U.S. government’s Voice of America re-
ported Soviet achievements only by crediting the home republic of the
particular athlete—billing sprinter Valeri Borzov as Ukrainian and gym-
nast Olga Korbut as Byelorussian—to show support for the claims of
constituent nationalities and as a gesture of de‹ance against the claims
of the Soviet state (National Archives 1972). In 1984 the United States
sought to counter the impact of the boycott by boosting its efforts to
help poorer nations compete in the Olympics. The CEO of Madison
Square Garden, David “Sonny” Werblin, chaired a Private Sector Sports
Committee for the United States Information Agency, which raised
nearly $1 million in donations to bring African athletes to the Games
(Ronald Reagan Presidential Library 1984). The most recent U.S. use of
the Olympics in public diplomacy is its employment of Michelle Kwan
as a special “public diplomacy envoy” (Armour 2005).
By the turn of the millennium it had become clear that even if an
Olympic Games dodged attempts by others to piggyback, any number
of associated events could disrupt the intended meaning of the Games.
Scandals around doping, cheating, and lack of sportsmanship among
participants or their respective national media all posed threats to the
planned message of the of‹cial event. Revelations of malpractice
within the process of selecting Olympic venues—speci‹cally a bribery
scandal associated with the successful bid by Salt Lake City to host the
2002 Winter Olympics—posed further problems (Olympic Review 1999;
Roche 2002). The run-up to the Athens Olympics of 2004 was reported
as a suspense story focused on whether the Greeks would be able to
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cope and deliver their buildings on time. Athens made its deadlines but
the city’s pollution problems became a signi‹cant negative story to un-
dermine the Greek government’s agenda of national self enhancement.
On the eve of the Games the Worldwide Fund for Nature pointed to ex-
tra pollution arising from the Olympic construction effort (Environ-
mental News Service 2004).
All of the foregoing should be enough to set Coubertin spinning in
his grave and give pause to any potential host. That China would ad-
vance its bid regardless can be seen either as rank hubris or admirable
self-con‹dence in its own ability to confront the Olympic challenges
head-on and still deliver a Games that ful‹lls national and interna-
tional goals. But the onrush of China’s public diplomacy has been such
that it is all but unimaginable that China could resist the chance to
host so prestigious an event.
The Roots of Chinese Public Diplomacy
The Beijing Olympics is merely the latest phase in a sustained Chinese
government campaign to woo the world and engage foreign publics,
which writer Joshua Kurlantzick has dubbed China’s Charm Offensive
(Kurlantzick 2007). While this policy is new in its full-blown form, its
roots lie deep in Chinese political culture. Many elements of public
diplomacy have great antiquity in China. Confucius spoke of attracting
through virtue: “It is for this reason that when distant subjects are un-
submissive one cultivates one’s moral quality in order to attract them,
and once they have come one makes them content” (Analects of Confu-
cius). He argued that an image of virtue and morality was the founda-
tion of a stable state. The emperors of old certainly understood the im-
portance of maintaining their image at home and maintaining the
“tributary” relationships with the satellite kingdoms around their bor-
ders (Qing 2001). At an interpersonal level, the Chinese concepts trans-
lated in the west as “face” (Lian, a concept of personal honor and moral
worth, and Mianzi, a concept of social prestige), echo the enduring con-
cern of nations for their prestige and the contemporary discovery of
soft power (Ho 1976). These cultural concerns are fertile soil for a con-
temporary effort to improve the nation’s international standing by pro-
jecting or maintaining a favorable image. The traditional term for such
work is dui wai xuan chuan or wai xuan, meaning “external propa-
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ganda.” The term has none of the negatives attending to western usage
of propaganda (Wang Y. forthcoming).
Historically China has learned the importance of public diplomacy
and “external propaganda” the hard way. In the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century the country was targeted by masters of the art
including the European empires, American churches, Bolshevik agita-
tors, and the Japanese Empire. Would-be leaders in post-Imperial China
soon recognized the value of modern communication methods to es-
tablish their legitimacy both at home and abroad. The nationalist
regime of Chiang Kai-shek became adept at appealing to American pub-
lic opinion during World War II, while the seasoned revolutionary Mao
Zedong understood the value of international propaganda even during
his time at bay in Yan’an province, using foreign journalists such as
Edgar Snow to take the story of his Long March to the outside world
(Hamilton 1988).
Mao’s launch of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 can be com-
pared to a rebranding, with dramatic claims of a new era—most fa-
mously that “the Chinese People have stood up” (1949)—coupled with
rigid control over access to information about life within China for do-
mestic and foreign audiences alike. Favored journalists were allowed to
view China—selectively—and the state published a number of journals
such as Beijing Review to showcase its achievements. Major interna-
tional campaigns of the Mao period included a perennial battle to un-
dermine the reputation of Taiwan, and various activities designed to
extend the revolution overseas, ‹rst around East Asia and then, in the
1970s, in Africa and Latin America. Radio Beijing was an archetypal
propaganda station, haranguing the world about the Chairman’s mo-
nopoly on virtue. The opening of China in the 1970s saw a transition
from carefully stage managed events, such as Nixon’s visit to China or
the gift of a succession of pandas to assorted heads of government, to a
more recognizable participation in regular public diplomacy. The
diplomatic tussle between China and Taiwan around the Montreal
Olympics gave witness to a Chinese desire to establish a presence on
the international sporting stage (Wang H. 2003).
In the wake of Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping swiftly opened China’s
doors to international exchange and tourism. In September 1981 the
Reagan administration signed a new cultural exchange agreement with
China, and interaction gathered pace (Sterba 1981). In 1983 the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs opened an Information Department appointing
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one Qian Qicheng as its ‹rst spokesman (Wang Y. forthcoming). The
following year, as the Chinese state placed increased emphasis on its in-
ternational reputation, the world learned of that nation’s desire to host
the Beijing Olympics for the ‹rst time.
In 1989 the house of cards that was China’s international reputation
came crashing down with the negative images that issued from the re-
pression of the protests in Tiananmen Square. In the aftermath of the
crisis Beijing engaged the international public relations ‹rm Hill and
Knowlton to begin the process of rebuilding China’s reputation
(d’Hooghe 2005, 92). The parallel process of consolidation followed at
home included the recon‹guration of domestic and international in-
formation work under a single State Council Information Of‹ce
(SCIO), founded in 1991. Its declared purpose was to “promote China as
a stable country in the process of reform, a China that takes good care
of its population, including minorities, and works hard to reduce
poverty.” It was a foundation for future work (d’Hooghe 2005, 98–99).
Zhao Qizheng and Chinese Public 
Diplomacy Since 1998
As the 1990s progressed, Beijing placed renewed emphasis on its inter-
national image, a process which included the revival of the Olympic
bid. SCIO ›ourished under the dynamic leadership of Minister Zhao
Qizheng, who led the of‹ce from 1998 to 2005. A former vice mayor of
Shanghai (and hence part of the “Shanghai-clique” around Jiang
Zemin), Zhao was unafraid to confront his country’s international crit-
ics head on or to concede national error (Eckholm 1998). His interna-
tional appearances included addressing the National Press Club in
Washington in September 2000. From an early stage Zhao sought to
avoid using the term xuan chuan, which would be translated with neg-
ative spin in the west as “propaganda,” and described his work as “ex-
plaining” China [shuo ming] (Crowell and Hsieh 2000).9 Zhao’s deter-
mination to present China to the world was supported at the highest
level, and in February 1999 President Jiang Zemin called for China to
“establish a publicity capacity to exert an in›uence on world opinion
that is as strong as China’s international standing” (Kurlantzick 2007,
39). This led directly to a number of parallel policies, coordinated
through the duel structure of the Communist Party and SCIO.10
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One key problem facing Zhao Qizheng and his colleagues was the
need to ‹nd an overarching concept to de‹ne China’s approach to the
world and to puncture talk in certain Western quarters of the Chinese
threat. He found his answer in the term peaceful rise (heping jueqi), a
phrase coined by thinker Zheng Bijian in 2003 and swiftly embraced by
the Beijing government. The term was not ideal for translation—as
China-watcher Joshua Cooper Ramo has noted, its coining sparked a
brief debate over whether the concept of jueqi was best rendered as
“surge” or “emergence,” while the ideogram for the ‹rst part of the
word suggested an earthquake—but peaceful rise stuck (Ramo 2007;
Zheng 2005). By 2007 it had nevertheless been largely displaced by dis-
course focused not so much on China as on the international context
it wished to promote: the concept of “building a harmonious world”
(Li and Wang 2007).
The core of Chinese public diplomacy lies in deeds rather than
words. China has developed a keen eye for prestige events and show-
piece policy initiatives. One such event was the launch in October
2003 of China’s ‹rst manned space ›ight. The achievement certainly
played well at home—the primary audience—and in many locations
overseas, although as Times of India noted, the launch used essentially
forty-year-old technology. Its editorial dubbed the ›ight the “Great
Creep Forward” (Banke 2003). More signi‹cantly China has launched
major international aid and development initiatives, all couched in the
rhetoric of “win-win” cooperation. China has already delivered much
to Latin America, the Middle East, and most especially Africa, but
claims to need nothing in return (Kurlantzick 2007, 44). It has been
swift to build links with nations that are isolated from Western diplo-
macy. Its policy of “nonintervention” has enabled partnerships with
Iran, Venezuela, and even Zimbabwe. And, in the last case, Chinese aid
has included instruction in how effectively to jam opposition radio sig-
nals (BBC Monitoring 2006.) Despite the enmity these activities have
sparked in the west, they have also played a role in advancing the
country’s international reputation, as have China’s efforts to take a
leadership role in the diplomacy around North Korean nuclear
weapons (Shirk 2006).
Policies need to be publicized to have an impact, and Zhao Qizheng
was swift to move to maximize their reach. Zhao, his colleagues and
successors launched initiatives across the range of the ‹ve activities
that characterize classic public diplomacy practice: listening, advocacy,
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cultural diplomacy, exchange, and international broadcasting. Zhao’s
whole approach and much of his rhetoric was couched as a response to
what the world was saying about China. In June 2000 the minister
solemnly warned a conference on Tibet that “the enemy is strong and
we are weak.”11 China used polls to track its relationships. Innovations
included a poll in 2005 jointly designed and administered with Japa-
nese counterparts to survey the state of mutual opinion, which re-
vealed that much work needed to be done to build trust between the
two populations (Xinhua 2005b). Global polls suggested positive
trends for China, as with the BBC/PIPA poll of late 2004 and early 2005
across twenty-two nations, which found that almost all believed China
to be playing a more positive role than the United States in world af-
fairs (Kurlantzick 2007, 9). But Beijing is not complacent. Recent ‹ne-
tuning of China’s public diplomacy included a meeting of the Party
Propaganda Department in early 2007 that emphasized the need to
avoid offending Islamic nations when celebrating the year of the pig
and in›aming domestic anti-Japanese feeling when marking the 60th
anniversary of the Marco Polo bridge incident and Japanese invasion of
China (Rawnsley 2007).12 Yet more signi‹cantly, in the spring of 2007
international anger around China’s support for the regime in Khar-
toum in the face of the Darfur genocide brought modi‹cations of Chi-
nese foreign policy in this region (Boston Globe 2007).
Zhao Qizeng’s institutional reforms included upgrading China’s
ability to address the foreign media. In December 2004 he astonished a
gathering of journalists at Beijing’s Kunlun hotel by presenting them
with the names and phone numbers of the seventy-‹ve spokespersons
of every ministry and commission under the State Council. This, he
promised, would be an annual event. Xinhua hailed a step toward
transparent government (Xinhua 2004; BBC Monitoring 2005b). Other
advocacy initiatives included the launch of an overseas edition of the
People’s Daily and a number of English language Web sites (China Daily
2004). In parallel, as Kurlantzick has noted, the Foreign Ministry in-
creased its investment in regional expertise within its diplomatic corps,
sending thousands of its best students overseas to study their target
state and society ‹rsthand. Given that the Chinese Foreign Service al-
lows its of‹cers to work entire careers in their specialist geographical
area, the rising generation will be well placed to learn from experience
and provide advocacy nuanced by local knowledge for years to come
(Kurlantzick 2007, 65–66).
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Qizheng’s tenure at SCIO saw legion Chinese initiatives in the ‹eld
of cultural diplomacy including major exhibitions, “China Weeks” and
tours for artists. The centerpiece of these initiatives was the rapid ex-
pansion of the Confucius Institutes—culture and language teaching in-
stitutes located within world universities—in an effort to create a net-
work of more than one hundred institutes within ‹ve years (Xinhua
2006b).13
China has also invested in its exchanges, concluding new bilateral
agreements with partners around the world from Austria to Zimbabwe.
Institutions that claim to manage people-to-people exchanges, such as
the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Coun-
tries, have ›ourished. China has also expanded its recruitment of in-
ternational students, bringing 20 percent more with every passing year.
The Ministry of Education expects rolls to top 120,000 by 2008
(Kurlantzick 2007, 118).
Exchanges have been used to promote international study of the
Chinese language, lately targeting younger groups of students, provid-
ing a stream of foreign language teachers for overseas service and woo-
ing foreign school principals through trips to China, as priorities shift
from the university to the secondary and even the primary school sec-
tor. In June 2007 the Of‹ce of the Chinese Language Council declared
that 30 million people around the world were now learning Chinese
and predicted that this ‹gure would hit 100 million by 2010 (Xinhua
2007c).14 In February 2007 the premier of the State Council, Wen Ji-
abao, paid tribute to the value of exchanges in presenting China’s best
face to the world, noting that they have “fostered an image of China as
a country that is committed to reform and opening-up, a country of
unity and dynamism, a country that upholds equality and values
friendship, and a country that is sincere and responsible” (Wen 2007).
China’s newest resource in its approach to the world is the ‹rst gen-
eration of truly international Chinese stars. Individuals who have rep-
resented China in the world include basketball player Yao Ming and ac-
tress Zhang Ziyi. Both have been associated with international
children’s charities, as goodwill ambassadors for the Special Olympics.
China’s reputation is doubly enhanced as a result (PR Newswire 2006;
Xinhua 2006a). Both ‹gured prominently in pre-Olympic publicity.
Chinese international broadcasting has also been upgraded in recent
years. In September 2000 China Central Television launched its
twenty-four hour English language service CCTV 9 (Xinhua 2000). It
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immediately began negotiations to place the service on carriers around
the world and succeeded in brokering deals with carriers as diverse as
Rupert Murdoch’s Sky satellite in the United Kingdom and Fox services
in the United States, Vanuatu in the mid-Paci‹c, and terrestrial chan-
nels in East Africa (Gittings and Borger 2001; Australian Financial Review
2003; Xinhua 2005a; Powell 2005). The content of CCTV 9 has
re›ected a need to present something closer to real journalism than the
wooden litany of achievements and upcoming cultural events which
once typi‹ed broadcasts. From 2003 onward a new openness has been
evident, with CCTV 9 presenting stories about China’s pollution prob-
lems and its energy crisis that would have been swept under the carpet
in previous eras. In the spring of 2004 CCTV 9 announced a major re-
launch to include the employment of foreign anchors and a consultant
from the Murdoch stable, John Terenzio. The station’s controller, Jiang
Heping, told the South China Morning Post that “We are taking great ef-
forts to minimize the tone of propaganda, to balance our reports and to
be objective. But we de‹nitely won’t be reporting as much negative do-
mestic news as the Western media” (BBC Monitoring 2005a). New CCTV
services in Spanish and French followed. The network also organized a
conference on the theme of selling China overseas, while China’s me-
dia regulators have ‹nally given permission for Chongqing Television
to launch an international service (Rawnsley 2007).
Chinese public diplomacy seems poised to engage the same issues of
the boundary between news and advocacy that have loomed so large in
the history of western international broadcasting and similarly now
has to consider how domestic negatives should be treated in public
diplomacy. In February 2007 an article in the People’s Daily, under the
byline of Wen Jiabao, declared in its conclusion:
We should conduct public diplomacy in a more effective way. We
should inform the outside world of the achievements we have made in
reform, opening-up and modernization in a comprehensive, accurate
and timely manner. At the same time, we should be frank about the
problems we have. We should be good at using ›exible and diversi‹ed
ways in conducting public diplomacy programs. We should use per-
suasive ways to communicate with the international community to en-
sure that our message is effectively put across. We should work to en-
able the international community to develop an objective and
balanced view on China’s development and international role, so as to
foster an environment of friendly public opinion for China.
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It was a clarion call for a still more sophisticated approach to public
diplomacy.
China’s Image Problem
Despite such efforts, China’s international image still faces severe prob-
lems. The reputation of China is hostage to the reputation of its ex-
ports. When, as in the spring of 2007, America’s news carried stories of
well-loved pets dying after eating poisonous Chinese dog food or tod-
dlers’ health endangered by playing with toy trains painted with lead-
based paint by their Chinese manufacturer, China’s image suffers. As
the SARS crisis of 2003 showed, the government’s ‹rst instinct may be
denial, but only honesty and action can prevent a public relations ca-
tastrophe. Some image problems are yet more intractable. A visit from
the terracotta warriors cannot blot out the cause of Tibet in the West-
ern mind, or erase the memory of the repression of the Tiananmen
protests, or counterbalance stories of censorship and religious persecu-
tion, or bury news stories leaking out of major undercurrents of unrest
in China’s cities. All Beijing can do is try frantically to distract attention
from these issues by presenting alternative stories and rebuke the
world’s media for accentuating the negative. The 2008 Olympics are
perhaps the ultimate distraction story.
One fascinating and underanalyzed aspect of Chinese public diplo-
macy is its relationship to the domestic audience. The relationship is
re›ected in the fact that the Chinese ‹rst used the term public diplomacy
to refer to the process of explaining their foreign policy at home (the
task of public affairs in American parlance). This has been clear in the
case of other superpowers. In the heyday of Soviet Communism the
Brezhnev regime ached to present its own people with the spectacle of
the rest of the world admiring the Soviet way. The KGB soon became
adept at staging pro-Soviet demonstrations around the world to main-
tain the illusion. In George W. Bush’s America public diplomacy has
plainly been skewed by the administration’s desire to be seen to be win-
ning hearts and minds rather than actually building real relationships
for the long term. Outsiders can only speculate on the scale of the do-
mestic imperative in the Chinese case and the domestic advantages
that the regime must expect from hosting the Olympics. Certainly
much of the organization of the Beijing Olympics can be seen as a
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process of managing domestic opinion in order to deliver the spectacle
of the world coming admiringly to the Central Land. Success would
give the regime enhanced credibility, and the image of China standing
up promises to make the rhetoric of 1949 real. By the same token, a
public relations disaster at the Olympics would be a massive humilia-
tion. Interestingly, the organizers have sought to limit domestic expec-
tations around the Games, publicly aiming for what the secretary gen-
eral of the Organizing Committee, Wang Wei, called “a high level
Olympic Games” rather than the traditional target of the “best games
ever.” It is better to exceed expectations and delight the home audience
than to disappoint (Wang 2007).15 This wider point again underlines
China’s vulnerability: the fate of China’s international reputation has
signi‹cant domestic consequences.
Part of China’s soft power opportunity has been grounded in the
hard power aspect of America’s reputation. China is welcomed in some
quarters of the globe simply because it is not the United States. As
China’s strength grows and it closes distance on the United States this
advantage is diminished. The symptoms of this were apparent in the
Pew Global Attitudes Survey released in July 2007 (Fram 2007; Pew
Global Attitudes Project). Were China to surpass the United States it
would swiftly ‹nd that global leadership brings an immediate crop of
resentment. In the nearer term China’s international image depends on
its ability to deliver on its promises. The Soviet Union bought many
friends in the middle years of the Cold War and lost them swiftly when
its economy could no longer deliver, though if the Chinese economy
were ever to collapse the disgruntlement of Malawi would be the least
of Beijing’s worries.
Even assuming sustained growth and a strong economy, it is un-
likely that China will be able to deliver on the enormous promises that
it has made as part of its soft power approach. Soft power, in Nye’s con-
ception, is based neither on brute force nor ‹nancial leverage. In terms
of the metaphorical donkey, soft power is neither the carrot nor the
stick but the reputation for being nice to donkeys. China seems to
doubt—perhaps rightly—that its reputation or the ethical strength of
its values will win the day with foreign publics. It has been much easier
just to offer to build a sports stadium for a target state or a new of‹ce
for its ruling party.
The public diplomacy around the Beijing Olympics suggests that
China is all too aware of its image problems and is seeking moreover to
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‹ne-tune its Olympic experience to counter some of them and thereby
reposition the Chinese brand.
Beijing Olympics as Public 
Diplomacy for China
The Chinese government has approached the organization of the Bei-
jing Olympics with a conviction that the Games can be used to educate
the world about modern China. The heart of the plan is a blending of
ancient Chinese culture, which seems to strike a positive note around
the world, with images of modern China and the ideals of the Olympic
movement. China’s revolutionary history, with its red ›ags, stars, and
photos of “the Great Helmsman,” is nowhere to be seen. The priorities
are plain in the of‹cial logo for the Games: an image that doubles as
both a seal written in ancient script showing the jing (Chinese charac-
ter meaning “capital”) from Beijing and the outline of an athlete break-
ing the victory tape (conversation with Wang Wei, May 15, 2007).
The ideas and agendas that the Chinese government wishes to asso-
ciate with the Beijing Games are clear in the clutch of videos that it has
produced to promote the event (Promotion Video for the Beijing 2008
Olympic Games). The of‹cial Olympic video curtain-raiser from
2005—One World, One Dream—has a more complex purpose and
plainly aims to make visual the theme of “building a harmonious
world” while making use of the famous faces and views of China. Over
a soaring soundtrack it cuts from dawn over great monuments around
the globe to images of Zhang Ziyi wafting through the dawn and even-
tually leading an international phalanx of children and athletes as they
run with torches. Athletes from around the world perform amid
China’s great monuments: pole vaulting on the Great Wall and weight
lifting in the Temple of Heaven. The climax is a montage of crowds,
‹reworks, and Olympic events. We see Yao Ming and, among other
shots, an athlete in a wheelchair and a token elderly person. At the end
Zhang Ziyi only remains, contemplating an ancient Chinese historical
sight before melting into thin air, part of the dream of the spectacle
that is to come. There are no ›ags and no politicians (Beijing Olympic
Games: One World One Dream video).
The video that most obviously seeks to sweep away old images of
China is that created by the China National Tourism Administration
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entitled Welcome to China—Beijing 2008. The ‹lm illustrates the sensory
experience that is China with images that emphasize the vast scale of
the Chinese landscape, the history of Chinese culture, and the diversity
of China’s population. Colorful costumes and smiling children
abound, but the landscape is populated by single ‹gures or small
groups. Crowds are nowhere to be seen, and cities ‹gure only at the
end, apparently as a convenience awaiting the visiting Westerner. The
message is that China is friendly and somehow empty. It clearly aims to
be an antidote to pictures of streets teeming with blue-suited cyclists fa-
miliar from the 1970s. Needless to say, the video glosses over the cen-
trifugal forces in contemporary China—regional minorities, including
Tibetans, appear happily integrated into the harmonious whole, per-
forming their culture on cue. One of the ‹lm’s ‹nal images is of two
young Tibetan monks jumping for joy in slow motion. It was as if Mex-
ico City had promoted its Olympics with ‹lm of happy students or
Berlin with pictures of dancing rabbis.
The Challenge: Competing Agendas 
at the Beijing Games
From the moment of the Chinese bid it was clear that the Beijing
Olympics would be an occasion for competing agendas; a focus of crit-
icism against the regime, and an opportunity for its opponents to em-
phasize the extent to which China had not changed and remained a re-
pressive one-party state. The Games seem set to be used by Taiwan as an
opportunity for its own message. President Chen Shui-bian has
promised a referendum on independence to coincide with the run-up
to the games, while Beijing and Taipei have exchanged angry words
over the route to be taken by the Olympic torch, and associated impli-
cations regarding the status of Taiwan (Ford 2007). Beyond such na-
tional agendas, by the summer of 2007 there was already a formidable
lineup of groups tying long-running protests against China to the
Games, each with their own parody of the Olympic logo. Reporters
Without Borders began their campaign in 2001 with a striking image of
Olympic rings made out of handcuffs.16 The Free Tibet campaign has
chosen Olympic rings formed by bullet holes (Free Tibet n.d.). Other
artists have the rings serving as the wheels on a tank or made out of a
pile of skulls or stitched in cloth and ›oating above a child laborer’s
head (No Beijing Olympics 2008 2007). Protests of some description
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seem set to form an antiphony throughout the Games and the orga-
nizers are braced for this.
A second potential challenge could come from the internal agendas
around the Games. One paradox that every host with a sporting repu-
tation to protect and a home crowd to impress must face is the problem
of competing gracefully. The display of one’s own national strength
and skill craved by the home audience and the sporting bureaucracy is
not necessarily compatible with hospitality or the interests of public
diplomacy. At a time when the world is growing wary of Chinese
strength, China’s best interests would probably not be best served by a
run of Chinese victories, but rather by sportsmanlike gestures and dis-
plays of comradeship between athletes.
Conclusion
With more than a century of experience, what can be assumed about
the Beijing Games from the point of view of public diplomacy? First,
that the Olympics is a high-risk mechanism, but probably one that any
major power has to tackle at some point in its history. In the world of
the Internet and global satellite news, the days of Potemkin villages
and deceit are fast fading—like it or not China will be known as it is,
not as it wishes to be. It can only hope that these two intersect some-
how. Second, for all the meanings, images, and slogans contrived by
the organizers of an event like the Olympics, the event can be used by
an actor with its own public diplomacy agenda seeking to piggyback on
the global news coverage. Third, much hangs on the unfolding of the
competition, the experience of foreign athletes, spectators and their
media, and their interaction with locals. The problems are redoubled
when the Paralympics (scheduled for Beijing) are added to the mix.
Chinese culture has many virtues, but sympathy toward the disabled is
seldom considered one of them.17 Beijing must be able to host guests
with special needs whose discomfort would play exceptionally badly in
their home countries. The organizers can at least draw comfort from
the success of the Special Olympics in Shanghai in the fall of 2007,
which successfully insulated guests from the difficulties of life for the
differently abled in modern China. Finally, Beijing must be braced for
contradictory agendas as the enthusiasm of the home crowd threatens
to subvert the need to be a good host.
The interests of Beijing will not be best served by amassing a pile of
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medals but rather by creating an environment in which sportsmanship
can ›ourish and the athletes themselves provide the meaning of the
Games. The best public diplomacy strategy for China, having set its
frame for the Beijing Games, is to step back from the agenda of national
promotion which so begs challenge, to focus on af‹rming the shared
ideals of the Olympic movement, and to have enough con‹dence to al-
low the world to draw its own conclusions about the new China.
NOTES
I am grateful to Iskra Kirova and Carrie Walters for bibliographical research
and sharing their own ideas around Olympic public diplomacy; to Barry A.
Sanders for talking me through the maze of contemporary Olympic diplo-
macy; to Wang Yi We and Garry Rawnsley for their comments on my draft;
and to Niels Kjær Therkelsen, my companion for boyhood Olympic TV view-
ing and impromptu political criticism.
1. On Gullion and the evolution of the term public diplomacy, see Cull
2006.
2. This argument was made in a letter to the London Times on Cou-
bertin’s death by the Greek ambassador M. D. Kaklamanos. See Caclamanos
1937. (The contemporary transliteration of this name is Kaklamanos. The
Times used the older spelling Caclamanos.)
3. As an international pariah, the Soviet Union was initially excluded
from the Olympics and so, from 1928, organized its own rival series of “Spar-
takiads” for workers from around the world.
4. Barry A. Sanders, chairman, Southern California Committee for the
Olympic Games, to author, June 12, 2007.
5. The perennial loser in Olympic place-branding is Detroit, which bid
unsuccessfully for every Games from 1952 to 1972.
6. When Japan resigned as host, Helsinki stepped in as an alternative to
Tokyo, but the outbreak of European war killed that plan also. The 1944
Games were actually awarded to London in 1939. See Olympic Games Mu-
seum (n.d.)
7. This boycott is the focus of the Berlin Olympics exhibit mounted by
the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, which is preserved online at the Nazi
Olympics Berlin Web site.
8. The U.S. attorney general, William French Smith, personally de-
nounced the forgeries, while the United States Information Agency broad-
cast a special program over satellite in which the African American mayor of
Los Angeles, Tom Bradley, and the Games’ organizer, Peter Ueberroth, an-
swered questions from African journalists about the Olympics. See Snyder
2005, 108–11 and Active Measures 1986, 22–24, 54–56.
9. In 2005, an anthology of Zhao Qizheng’s speeches appeared with the
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title Xiang Shijie Shuoming Zhongguo (Explain China to the World). See also
BBC Monitoring 2005b.
10. On May 15, 2007 the author and others at University of Southern Cal-
ifornia met Wang Guoqing, vice minister in China’s SCIO, who spoke of his
own position as the equivalent to Karen Hughes in the United States. His
minister (Zhao Qizheng’s successor) is Cai Wu.
11. The Tibet conference was reported by the World Tibet Network News.
12. Similarly, in February 2007, when soft power was the focus of the an-
nual conferences of both the National People’s Congress (China’s parlia-
ment) and the National Committee of the Chinese People Political Consul-
tative Conference (CPPCC), participants acknowledged the scale of the
challenge that still lay ahead. See Li, Cheng, and Wang 2007.
13. The institutes are reassuringly titled to emphasize the classical Chi-
nese past, not its tumultuous present. In some poorer countries Chinese aid
ensures that it is cheaper to be educated at a Chinese-funded school than
within the national system (Kurlantzick 2007, 67–69).
14. See also Xinhua 2007a, 2007b.
15. The organizers seem also to be on guard against accusations of build-
ing for the world but ignoring the future of their own people, and hence the
domestic audience has also been a key target for publicity around the long-
term bene‹ts for the Games. They are swift to point to the four major venues
that will become part of universities around the capital and the thirty year
contracts to maintain Olympic facilities for the public good.
16. As of July 29, 2007, the handcuffs were the opening image at the site
http://www.rsf.org/. See also http://www.rsf.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique
=174.
17. For recent comment on Chinese attitudes toward mental and physical
handicap, see Hallett n.d. On preparations for the Olympics see Hallett 2006.
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“A Very Natural Choice”
The Construction of Beijing as an 
Olympic City during the Bid Period
Heidi Østbø Haugen
“Beijing has succeeded!” (Beijing chenggong le!) President Jiang Zemin’s
declaration on July 13, 2001 brought the enthusiastic crowd gathered at
Tiananmen Square the news they had hoped for. Millions of others
heard the announcement through TV and radio broadcasts in China
and abroad. This chapter examines how the Beijing Olympic Bid Com-
mittee and Chinese media presented Beijing to a foreign audience in
the period leading up to the selection of the 2008 Olympic host city. It
will show that Beijing was presented in a way that not only won the
city the right to host the Olympic Games, but also strengthened the
modernist ideologies of the Chinese Government and the Olympic
Movement. Finally, Beijing’s bid will be discussed in light of the incen-
tives to host the Olympic Games as well as the institutional context for
the production of the bid material.1
An Olympic bid provides an interesting opportunity to study the
process of assigning meaning to places. The limited duration of the bid
period, the large amount of textual material produced, the relatively
well-de‹ned goal of the bid campaigns, and the focus on an interna-
tional target audience are all features that make bids different from most
other processes of place construction. The Olympic Games take place
within narrow spatial and temporal con‹nes, during which the hosts are
subject to intense international attention. During this period, the host
cities try to project certain images, themes, and values (Hall 1992). As an
145
organizer of the Albertville Winter Olympics put it, “There will only be
16 days of television coverage, but we will have to live with the image for
‹fty years” (Larson and Park 1993, 246). The place identity constructed
during the bid period exerts a powerful in›uence over how the Games
are organized, and is therefore of great practical consequence.
Hallmark events such as the Olympic Games are important in
con‹rming, strengthening, and undermining power relations in the
places they are hosted. Their scale and nature necessitates a break with
the normal planning procedures. This may create opportunities for
new groups to assert their power. The break in routine can also be used
by established elites as an opportunity to push their own agendas and
to marginalize alternative opinions. The Olympic host selection
process—the International Olympic Committee (IOC) selection criteria
give extra points in the initial bid round to candidate cities with no
demonstrable popular opposition to the bid—and the ‹erce competi-
tion to host the Olympics may combine to deter critical public debate
during the bid period. In the case of Toronto’s 1996 Olympic bid, for ex-
ample, it was speculated that the public debate surrounding the bid
may have destroyed the city’s chances of hosting the Games. The dis-
cussion had led to a compromise in which the organizers promised to
provide low-income housing, environmental assessment, and employ-
ment for unionized workers in return for support for the Games (Hiller
2000). While attaching importance to public support for the Olympics,
the IOC does not require local public involvement, either directly or
through elected city governments, in the preparation process for the
Games.
The Stakes in the Bid Process
The stakes for the Chinese Communist Party were high in the 2008
Olympic bid round. Under Mao Zedong, China’s development model
represented an ideological alternative to capitalism, both to the rest of
the world and to its own citizens. Such an alternative was no longer of-
fered after Mao’s death and the reorientation of the national develop-
ment strategy toward “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” The le-
gitimacy of the Chinese government today rests largely on its ability to
create economic growth. Chinese leaders have attempted to ‹ll the
ideological vacuum in the post-Mao era by reviving Chinese national-
ist spirit (Ko 2001). Previous Olympic Games and bids had demon-
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strated to Chinese leaders that the Olympics could be an avenue both
to economic growth and to fostering a form of nationalism that is not
hostile to the outside world.
In most cities, economic growth is the primary rationale offered for
bidding for the Olympic Games (Hiller 1998). The Olympics are an im-
portant means for cities to build an appealing and progressive image
and enhance their position in a largely postindustrial economy by at-
tracting investments, residents, and visitors. Bidding for the Games has
itself become a promotional act, as the prolonged choice process can
ensure considerable publicity even for unsuccessful cities (Waitt 1999;
Ward 1998). Beijing has become one of the many Asian cities with a
strategic orientation that goes beyond the national space (Douglass
2000; Jessop 1999). In order to become hubs of global and regional eco-
nomic activity, these cities pour money into urban megaprojects,
theme parks, and events with high symbolic value: World Expositions
(Expos), the Miss World ‹nal, the World Soccer Cup and, the biggest of
all, the Olympic Summer Games. Both political and economic motiva-
tions drive the transformation of Asian metropolitan regions into
“world cities.” There is political credit to be gained when a city is inter-
nationally recognized as not only a major economic player, but also a
creator of cultural symbols (Douglass 2000; Kelly 1997).
The Olympic Games’ ability to incite patriotism is lauded as a posi-
tive quality in Chinese newspapers (Xinhua 2001b). Beijing’s Olympic
bid material furthers an of‹cial patriotic ideology in which aspirations
for national greatness and an internationally openminded optimism
are central features (Unger 1996). Such patriotism includes a vision of
Chinese national unity that the bid material promotes through a selec-
tive representation of multicultural diversity. When writing about mi-
nority cultures, emphasis is put on art and cultural performances rather
than on differences in systems of meaning and values. The diversity
represented is thus nonthreatening to Chinese national unity.
The harmonious nationalism promoted through the bid material
stands in contrast to the antiforeign popular nationalism triggered by
Beijing’s failed bid for the 2000 Olympics. The United States in partic-
ular was blamed for the loss, partly because the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives had adopted a resolution against Beijing hosting the Games
(Xu 1998). Antiforeign demonstrations were arranged by people who
accused Western countries of trying to hamper China’s development
(Zheng 1999). Such sentiments constituted a threat to China’s national
development strategy, and ultimately to the ruling regime, which de-
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rives legitimacy from economic growth (Renwick and Cao 1999). There
was also the threat of antiforeign demonstrations turning against the
Chinese government itself for acting submissive in the face of foreign
interests. The government eventually banned such demonstrations
and organized of‹cial campaigns to contain antiforeign nationalism af-
ter the loss in 1993 (Xu 1998; Zheng 1999). For the 2008 Olympics, in
order to contain the damage if the bid were lost, the Chinese nation
was no longer presented as the unit bidding for the Games. The slogan
of the ‹rst bid—“A more open China awaits the 2000 Games”—was ex-
changed for one that put Beijing at the center—“New Beijing, Great
Olympics.” The Olympic bid process was presented as an open and fair
competition from which all candidates gained something. A Beijing
Olympic Bid Committee (BOBICO) representative said that while the
Chinese people “calmly and wholeheartedly supported the bid,” a loss
would have been gracefully accepted because “if the bid were unsuc-
cessful, it would nevertheless have increased Beijing’s ‘celebrity rating,’
made even more people understand Beijing, improved Beijing’s image
abroad, increased the interest in investing here, and enriched Beijing’s
cultural life. The bid had many advantages for the development of Bei-
jing and the daily building of culture and civilization” (interview Janu-
ary 2002).
The Olympic Games have also been used to demonstrate the superi-
ority of a certain political ideology. The ‹rst example of this was the
1936 Berlin Games, which saw the introduction of certain elements,
such as the Olympic torch relay and a spectacular opening ceremony,
that we take for granted today (Byrne 1987). The Games were as spec-
tacular as they were well organized, and they were presented as proof of
the superior performance of the Nazi ideology. During the Olympic
opening ceremony, German of‹cials announced that their country had
become the center of world civilization, just as Greece had been during
antiquity. Similarly, the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow attempted to
exhibit the success of state Marxism to the western world, just as those
in Los Angeles in 1984 were a celebration of American capitalism (Hall
1992). One main reason why the Olympic Games are a useful tool for
promoting political ideologies is their perceived neutrality and univer-
sality. The Olympics are claimed to be about games and sports rather
than politics, and Olympism is purportedly above ideology (Killanin
1983; Hoberman 1995). When national ideology—be it fascism, com-
munism, or capitalism—is tied to allegedly universal Olympism, the
gap between nationalism and universalism is bridged.
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While the Olympic hosts bene‹t from tying their political values to
Olympic universalism, the International Olympic Committee is in-
creasingly aware that it is in its interest to keep strict control over the
symbolic aspects of the Olympics. In the past, countries have boycotted
the Games over objections to the ideologies the host nations promoted
through the event. In addition to the losses directly incurred, boycotts
pose a threat to the IOC’s long-term ‹nances. The brand name
“Olympic”—together with the Olympic rings—is worth billions of dol-
lars and is the IOC’s greatest asset. The brand would lose much of its
value if it became associated with a particular group or ideology. Juan
Antonio Samaranch, IOC president from 1980 to 2001, had ambitions
that went far beyond ‹nances, including becoming a Nobel Peace Prize
laureate and raising the status of the IOC to that of the United Nations
(Wamsley 2002). An example of a con›ict between the IOC and the
Olympic host nations over symbolic uses of the Games took place dur-
ing the Salt Lake City 2002 Winter Olympics. President Bush wanted to
use the opening ceremony as an occasion to commemorate the victims
of the September 11 terrorist attack. When the IOC objected to what
they perceived to be a display of American nationalism, Bush re-
sponded that the ideals behind the commemoration were universal
rather than American: “All people appreciate the discipline that pro-
duces excellence, the courage that overcomes dif‹cult odds and the
character that creates champions” (U.S. Embassy 2002). The universal
nature of these values would be con‹rmed through their incorporation
into the Olympic opening ceremony.
The Production of the Bid Material
Beijing’s Olympic bid material must be understood with reference to
the concrete circumstances within which it was produced. The most
important document presented to the IOC during the bid process is the
Candidature File. The bid cities are required to present their practical
arrangements for the Games in the Candidature Files, but the format
gives ample opportunity to set the bid apart symbolically. Beijing set
the tone by presenting the document to IOC members in golden silk
boxes closed with traditional Chinese locks. IOC guidelines, former
bids, and advice from international consultants and PR ‹rms all
in›uenced the making of the Candidature File and other BOBICO pro-
motion material. The administrative structure of the Beijing bid team is
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complex and dif‹cult to map, partly because of what one senior of‹cial
termed a Chinese system of “one organization, two names”; one could
simultaneously be the head of the Chinese Communist Party Propa-
ganda Department’s Sports Section, the section chief of the China
Olympic Committee News Committee, and a leading of‹cial in the
Chinese Sport Correspondents’ Association (interview January 2002).
In addition to the material published by BOBICO, English-language
texts about Beijing’s Olympic bid were published in Chinese news-
papers and magazines. Chinese media displays some distinct character-
istics, and the circumstances under which news stories on the Olympic
bid were produced therefore merit special attention. Many of the arti-
cles written by journalists from the state news agency Xinhua or the
newspapers People’s Daily or China Daily were judged suitable for pub-
licity purposes in their original form and republished on BOBICO’s
Web site. Chinese journalists were under the in›uence of different, and
at times contradictory, sets of journalistic conventions. At the National
Forum for Propaganda and Ideological Work in 1994, Jiang Zemin
charged the Chinese press with four major tasks: “arming people with
scienti‹c theory; guiding people with correct opinion; educating
people in high moral standards; and using outstanding works to inspire
people.” Chinese introductory journalism textbooks later added “being
pro‹table” as a ‹fth goal (Li 2001). This intertwining of Chinese Com-
munist Party logic with market logic has resulted in a journalistic style
dubbed “popular journalism with Chinese characteristics” (Li 1998).
The degree to which the Chinese government exerts control over ed-
itorial content depends both on the type of publication and on the top-
ics covered. National newspapers are generally more restricted than
provincial and local publications (Lynch 1999). The English editions of
Xinhua news agency reports, People’s Daily and China Daily are impor-
tant to the Chinese government as channels for communications with
a foreign audience. They are therefore tightly controlled and have
largely been shielded from demands to make a pro‹t. While the West-
ern media claims to be based on objectivity, the Chinese government’s
attitude toward objectivity as a guiding principle for journalism has
varied over time. In 1948, People’s Daily was upbraided by the govern-
ment for displaying an “objective tendency not to be allowed in our
propaganda work” (Li 1994, 228). During the liberalization period in
the late 1980s, on the other hand, top Party of‹cials stressed the infor-
mational and watchdog role of the press. The news industry again be-
came more restricted after the Tiananmen crisis of June 1989. However,
Precedent s and Perspectives
150
employees of the Chinese Communist Party Propaganda Department
and media institutions cited independence and objectivity as impor-
tant journalistic ideals (interviews January 2002). Reporters who write
for English national media are exposed to foreign ideas about journal-
ism, both through the Internet and through Western journalists hired
by their employers to help adjust the writing style to suit a foreign au-
dience. Despite this exposure, articles published by the Chinese media
are often different from what Western readers are used to. In the bid
material, descriptions of individuals—including residents of Tibet—
who go to great length to support the bid come across as especially for-
eign. The following report about four farmers from Shanxi, for exam-
ple, takes on an almost religious character:
Four farmers rode donkeys from the hometown in Shanxi province in
Northwest China to BOBICO headquarters in Beijing to express their
support for Beijing to bid to host the 2008 Olympic Games. The four
farmers could have taken a train or bus, but instead, they decided to
make their pilgrimage by riding a donkey all the way to Xinqiao Hotel
where BOBICO’s headquarters is located. (BOBICO 2001)
The different sets of writing conventions to which journalists are ex-
posed were sometimes re›ected in stylistic inconsistencies in their arti-
cles about Beijing’s Olympic bid. An example is Xinhua’s 2000 “Sport
Yearender.” While the piece generally portrays the bid for the 2008
Olympics in a very positive light, it includes one critical comment from
a foreign researcher based in China. In the next sentence, however, the
journalist dismisses the researcher’s concerns as “unnecessary” (Xinhua
2000b). When questioned about this article, the journalist who wrote
it said that he included the critical commentary to give a balanced view
and follow his “consciousness and the ethical rules of the reporter.” But
he also said he served another role as a Chinese journalist, one that
obliged him to discount the criticism: “I think BOBICO believes in us.
Everything we do is to make Beijing’s bid more appealing. We share
something; we both want to make Beijing’s bid successful. Therefore,
when we report, we need to know what should be reported and what
should not be reported” (interview January 2002).
The preceding incident is an example of how control over the Chi-
nese media often relies less on direct intervention than on self-censor-
ship on the part of the journalists. While the Chinese journalists I in-
terviewed in 2001 and 2002 all said they had a duty to be objective,
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they also said they wanted their writing to help Beijing win the
Olympics. For example, one journalist commented that negative re-
porting could cause con›ict with BOBICO, and he might be told that
“such things are a little inappropriate [to include in your article]; I
think you’d better omit it or just put it outside” (interview January
2002). When asked to cite such an occurrence, however, he said that
BOBICO had never actually needed to correct him because he antici-
pated such comments and edited the articles himself. This example
brings to mind a description given by a Polish poet writing in the 1950s
of how social norms conditioned his writing: “I can’t write as I would
like to. . . . I get halfway through a phrase, and I already subject it to
Marxist criticism. I imagine what X or Y will say about it, and I change
the ending” (Milosz 1990, 14–15). Another journalist said that BOBICO
did once suggest that he change an article they thought was too nega-
tive. He altered it but stressed that the change was also something he
personally wanted: “I complied because from the bottom of my heart, I
don’t want to . . . let somebody put their ‹nger on the bid. So I just re-
vised my plan, and they [BOBICO] accepted it. You know, it is right for
me to write the things I want to mention” (interview January 2002).
Although the relationship between BOBICO and Chinese journalists
was characterized for the most part by such mutual cooperation and
lack of dissent, the plan to host the Olympic beach volleyball games in
Tiananmen Square caused discord. The foreign press interpreted the
plan as an attempt to cover up the tragic events surrounding the 1989
student revolt and described it as an initiative that would “strike many
human rights campaigners as grotesque” (Financial Times 2000). How-
ever, Chinese journalists had very different reasons for being offended
by the idea of playing volleyball in Tiananmen Square. While in the
West the word “Tiananmen” invokes the strong televised images from
June 1989, the Chinese consider the square as the center stage of the
country’s modern national history. Chinese journalists were upset be-
cause the government planned to ‹ll the square they perceive to be the
embodiment of China’s national dignity with sand and people in
swimsuits, and they put pressure on BOBICO to release more informa-
tion about the plans. BOBICO claimed that Tiananmen was chosen as
a venue solely because the International Volleyball Federation had
pressured them to choose a prestigious site to promote their sport. BO-
BICO complied, but they were as uncomfortable with the plans as the
Chinese journalists were, according to one BOBICO representative (in-
terview January 2002). The decision was later reversed. This incident is
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an example of how the same event can be interpreted very differently
in China than it is abroad.
Situating the Beijing Olympics 
Within Space and Time
The material produced for Beijing’s Olympic bid combines to present a
worldview in which Beijing becomes “a very natural choice” to host
the Games (Xinhua 2000b). Certain notions of time and space are cen-
tral in this construction. The bid derives meaning from existing con-
ceptualizations of time and space by placing itself within a wider dis-
course on modernization and development. It also attaches meaning to
these notions by reproducing and reworking them. Our understand-
ings of time and space affect how we view the world—we approach and
make sense of the world through certain temporal and spatial perspec-
tives. In most circumstances these perspectives are taken for granted
rather than being objects of critical re›ection.
In presenting Beijing’s candidature, the Chinese government needed
to convince the IOC that Beijing possessed the qualities of an “Olympic
city.” Analysis of how meanings are attached to places is informed by
Jacques Derrida’s concept of “différance,” which holds that de‹nitions
do not rest on the entity that is de‹ned, but on the positive and nega-
tive references made to other de‹nitions (Rosenau 1992). The perceived
essence or identity of a place can only be constructed vis-à-vis a differ-
ent and deferred Other, and the attribution of meaning is thereby end-
lessly deferred. While pairs of opposites may be widely circulated and
accepted as legitimate ways to categorize places, meanings are never
entirely ‹xed. This is what makes deconstruction, that is, undermining
the binary oppositions by revealing their underlying assumptions and
contradictions, possible. Two binary oppositions related to time and
space are central themes throughout the body of texts about Beijing’s
Olympic bid—the division between the Orient and the Western world,
and between the modern and nonmodern. The bid material, in refer-
encing these dichotomies, makes bidding for the Olympics appear to
be a natural choice.
Strategic Self-Orientalization
One of the most in›uential works on the relational nature of identities
is Edward Saïd’s “Orientalism,” which outlines how “the Orient” is
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de‹ned in relation to and opposition to the West (Saïd [1978] 1995).
Saïd argues that Western academics, artists, and colonial administrators
have constructed the Orient as timeless, feminine, despotic, savage,
and irrational. Conversely, they present the West as modern, mascu-
line, democratic, civilized, and rational. The resulting worldview, Saïd
claims, made colonial rule both possible and desirable. Subsequent
work on the relationship between the construction of places and the
exercise of power raises two points of criticism against Saïd’s “Oriental-
ism.” First, the Orientalist system of power-knowledge was more het-
erogeneous than Saïd depicted it, and the European and American writ-
ings on the Orient did not contain one, singular essence (Gare 1995).
Second, Saïd is criticized for incorrectly assuming that the power over
representations of the Orient lies entirely with the colonizer. The colo-
nized are presented as passively accepting that the Orient is an inferior
mirror image of the West (Gregory 1994). Diminishing and devaluing
of the voices of opposition against Orientalism can serve a conservative
rather than a progressive purpose.
The way meaning is ascribed to a speci‹c term or action depends on
its context. Arguments made with reference to Saïd’s “Orientalism” in
China are examples of such a reappropriation of meaning. Chinese de-
bates about national identity in the 1990s were often cast in terms of
binary oppositions between East and West. “Orientalism” was used to
restore a Chinese discourse of Western hegemonic imperialism and in-
terpreted in ways that supported reactionary nationalist rather than
progressive forces within Chinese domestic politics (Zhang 1998). Saïd’s
work, created with the intention of challenging the dominant powers
in the West, was thereby employed to consolidate the dominance of
certain groups in China. The term Occidentalism has been coined to de-
scribe the stereotyping of the Western world for political purposes in
China (Chen 1995). Chinese “of‹cial Occidentalism” essentializes the
West in ways that justify restrictions on personal and political free-
doms. In “anti-of‹cial Occidentalism,” in contrast, the Western
“Other” is used as a metaphor for political liberation from domestic
ideological oppression. The of‹cial and the antiof‹cial Occidentalism
are in›uenced both by Western constructions of Asia and China and by
previous Chinese constructions of the Western Other (Chen 1995).
Beijing’s Olympic bid material placed heavy emphasis on the city’s
Oriental identity through text and images. The terms Asia, the East and
the Orient are used interchangeably to describe a part of the world that
shares a set of essential qualities. Eastern cultures are depicted as being
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founded in tradition and history, as opposed to the modern, developed
West—very much in keeping with Saïd’s “Orientalism.” In the words of
one Chinese journalist: “Beijing [is] more appealing to others because
we have such a long history. We have something you have never seen,
something very native, something very Oriental” (interview January
2002). Perceptions of Oriental culture as being rooted in the past were
reinforced by the bid material’s frequent references to historical build-
ings, traditional costumes, and traditional lifestyles. Asians are de-
scribed as being committed to ideals such as hard work and the pro-
motion of a common good and a harmonious social order. Authority is
sometimes added to such descriptions when they are presented as quo-
tations by Westerners. For example, the opera singer José Carreras, who
held a concert in the Forbidden City to promote Beijing’s Olympic bid,
was quoted in China Daily as saying: “China has a very good tradition
such as the respect to the old people. I think it is where the West could
learn from you” (China Daily 2001c; grammar mistake in the original).
The chosen director for the Beijing Olympic bid presentation video was
Zhang Yimou, whose previous movies, including Red Sorghum and Raise
the Red Lantern, had been instruments of collective Chinese cultural
self-assertion (Zhang 1997). The choice indicated a desire to focus on
the subjectivity of the Chinese nation and its roots in the past.
Beijing is not alone in constructing itself as essentially different from
the West in an Olympic bid. Istanbul—another contender for the 2008
Games—used a similar strategy by pointing out that bringing the
Olympics to Turkey would bring Olympism to the Islamic world. The
bid material of both cities described Olympism as fully developed in
the West, while having unrealized potential in the Orient and the Is-
lamic world. These arguments must be viewed in relation to the
Olympic movement’s global aspirations. The IOC claims to be the rep-
resentative of a global community that is united by Olympic ideals. As
former IOC president Juan Antonio Samaranch declared, “The Olympic
Games belong not to the IOC, but to humanity. The Olympic Games
are the whole world’s dream and the IOC’s role is to perpetuate that
dream” (IOC 2002). Beijing’s bid material con‹rms the Olympic move-
ment’s universalist claims, and uses them to argue its case. The differ-
ences between the East and the West are discursively created in order to be
transcended through Olympism. If Beijing were to host the Olympic
Games, Olympism becomes increasingly universal, and difference is
turned into sameness as the Eastern world adopts Olympic values al-
ready endorsed by the West. A quotation of Beijing’s mayor Liu Qi sum-
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marized the argument: “A chance for Beijing to host the Games would
provide a closer link between the Eastern and Western worlds, bring
fresh blood to the Olympic Movement and a true meaning of univer-
sality—which the Olympics represent” (China Daily 2001a). Symbolic
references to how the Beijing Olympics will unite the East and the West
abound in the bid material. The Olympic torch relay was planned
along the Silk Road, the ancient trade route connecting China and the
Mediterranean (China Daily 2001d). In a less subtle symbolic gesture, it
was proposed that Beijing’s mayor, who is an engineer, should con-
struct a steel bridge to represent the East meeting the West (China Daily
2001d).
Olympic Revival of a Mythical Past
Time is a central organizing concept in Beijing’s Olympic bid material.
The bid was placed within a temporal framework from the opening line
of the Candidature File: “Beijing, with its ancient past, dynamic present
and exciting future, has the honor to present its second bid to host the
Olympic Games.” The bid material depicted time in a way that ascribes
inevitability and purpose to China’s development process and the host-
ing of the Olympic Games in Beijing. The passage of time was repre-
sented as an unbroken process of progress, a unidirectional movement
from worse to better, and from lower to higher levels of development.
Since it was assumed that conditions necessarily improve with time,
the adjective new became an intrinsically positive characterization. The
word was used in Beijing’s main bid slogan—“New Beijing, Great
Olympics”—and was trumpeted even more loudly in the Chinese ver-
sion—“New Beijing, New Olympics” (Xin Beijing Xin Aoyun). The motto
of the bid’s promotional program—“New Century, New Culture and
New Technology”—was yet another example of the use of “new” to in-
dicate an intrinsically desirable quality (Xinhua 2000a). The bid mate-
rial employed the concepts of “development” and “modernization” to
describe both material and cultural changes for the better, and no es-
sential distinction was made between the two. China’s Report on Na-
tional Economic and Social Development Plans 2000 exempli‹es how the
material and the social were viewed as parts of the same development
process:
Radio coverage reached 92.1% of the population and TV coverage,
93.4%. The target for controlling natural population growth was
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reached. Major advances were made in reform of the drug and health
management system. Socialist spiritual civilization and democracy and
the legal system further improved. At the XXVII Olympic Games, Chi-
nese athletes scored their best achievements since China began partic-
ipating in the Games, greatly stirring the patriotic feelings of the
people all over the country and stimulating them to unite and work
hard. (Xinhua 2001b)
As the passage illustrates, the Chinese people, working under the guid-
ance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), were presented as the key
engines of China’s progress. Technological advances combine with the
Chinese people’s indefatigable struggle for a better future to move
China along the path of development. Through newspaper articles,
CCP of‹cials outlined which roles different groups of people were ex-
pected to play in the Olympic bid campaign and Beijing’s moderniza-
tion drive (Xinhua 2001a; People’s Daily 2001). This continued a tradi-
tion of instilling in the Chinese people a sense of their responsibility in
furthering the country’s progress. Another example came several years
earlier, when a patriotic education program was launched to teach stu-
dents where China was strong and where it lagged behind in order to
enhance their sense of responsibility and historical mission (Zhao
1994).
Within the ongoing progress, there is a timeless and unitary subject
that stays essentially the same—the Chinese nation. One of the sym-
bols used for this constant is the Great Wall. In Beijing’s presentation
video to the IOC, the Great Wall tied China’s past and present together.
The video images of the Wall were accompanied by a voice-over sug-
gesting that the past and present were in harmony: “The Great Wall. A
monument to the survival of a vibrant culture that has been able to
combine the greatness of the past with ever-changing economic, social
and technological advances of the present” (IOC 2001). Emphasis on
the historical continuity of the Chinese nation, as well as on the need
to develop and strengthen the country, have been important features
of Chinese postcommunist nationalism (Unger 1996). The way in
which the bid material provided meaning and direction to the passage
of time is an example of how nationalism can turn “chance into des-
tiny” and “contingency into purpose” (Anderson 1991, 12).
Both Beijing’s Olympic bid material and texts produced by the
Olympic movement were marked by a certain ambiguity toward the
project of modernization. While the texts conveyed a sense of in-
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evitable progress and faith in modernization, they also endorsed myths
of a distant past. Frequent references to Beijing’s long history were ac-
companied by images of physical remnants of the distant past. The
restoration of the past in the creation of a glorious future, termed
“restoration nationalism,” was central to of‹cial Chinese discourse in
the 1990s (Ko 2001). This stands in contrast to the tendency in the sec-
ond half of the 1980s to blame remnants of traditional Chinese culture,
such as Confucianism, for socioeconomic problems (Wang 1996).
While the desirability of traditional Chinese values has been ques-
tioned within China for a long time, both through intellectual dis-
course and popular culture, such as the TV series River Elegy (He Sheng),
they were constantly evoked and presented as admirable in the mater-
ial directed at a foreign audience. China’s ancient history is not de-
picted as an earlier stage in the present development process, but as a
golden age that illustrates the potential of China as a nation. The future
holds the promise for realizing this potential, and is thus as mythical as
the past. This resonated with IOC material describing the Olympic
Games as a revival of past greatness and virtue. The founder of the
modern Olympic Games, Pierre de Coubertin, contrasts the anxiety of
modern life with the happiness of the past and claims that sport has
the ability to return mankind to its origins: “O Sport, pleasure of the
Gods, essence of life, you appeared suddenly in the midst of the gray
clearing which writhes with the drudgery of modern existence, like the
radiant messenger of a past age, when mankind still smiled” (Cou-
bertin [1912] 2002). The IOC often draws upon such mythological im-
agery in explaining its behavior. The establishment of the so-called
Olympic Truce Foundation in 2000, for example, was claimed to be the
revival of an ancient Greek tradition.
In Beijing’s bid material, the present time was described as a period
marked by dizzying technological, economic, and social advances. The
city is undergoing a transition from underdevelopment to being a
modern “world city.” When the IOC Evaluation Commission visited
Beijing, the mayor expressed hope that the committee members would
see the potential in Beijing as well as its current achievements (China
Daily 2001b). The Olympic Games were assigned several roles in this
transition process. The ‹rst was to speed up the pace of development.
As the state news agency Xinhua wrote, “Chinese economists have said
that Beijing’s successful bid to host the 2008 Olympics will help the
city achieve modernization ahead of schedule” (Xinhua 2001c). Such
statements recon‹rm the Olympic Movement’s claim to be a universal
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force for modernization. In addition to adding momentum to Beijing’s
modernization process, the Olympic Games were expected to be a rite
de passage—a dramatic event marking Beijing’s transition from one
state to another. The term was originally used in anthropology about
ceremonies endowing a person with a new status, while simultaneously
recon‹rming the social order (van Gennep [1909] 1960). The Olympic
bid material asserted that the time was right for the world to recognize
that Beijing and China had changed. Hosting the Olympics would
mark China’s transformation from outsider to insider in the interna-
tional community, and from underdevelopment to modernity. Impor-
tantly, the bid material did not express any ambitions to reform the
system itself. While Mao aspired to make China an alternative model
for development and to overthrow the existing world system, his suc-
cessors sought to restore China to its historical greatness within the ex-
isting international economic and political order (Moore 1999).
Conclusion
The presentation of an Olympic candidature goes far beyond organiza-
tional issues. Constructing Beijing as an Olympic city was as much
about creating and naturalizing certain world views as it was about pre-
senting practical arguments. The variety of topics brought up in the bid
material re›ects the wide range of objectives that inform decisions to
bid for the Games. Beijing managed to strengthen the legitimacy of the
IOC by con‹rming the universality of the Olympic ideals, presenting
Olympism as a force for uniting the East and the West, and promoting
modernization. IOC president Juan Antonio Samaranch favored Bei-
jing’s candidature both in 1993 and 2001 and played an important role
in bringing the Olympic Games’ civilizing mission in Asia to the fore-
front of the debate within the Olympic movement (Booth and Tatz
1993–94). Although both the Chinese government and foreign propo-
nents of Beijing’s Olympic bid stressed the positive effects the Games
would have on China’s development, they may have had different
kinds of in›uence in mind. The government expects the Olympics to
bring economic growth and international recognition, while the West-
ern press expresses hopes that the Olympics will promote freedom of
expression, political reform, and human rights.
The focus of the chapter has been the presentation of Beijing’s can-
didature in of‹cial Chinese discourse. However, meanings attached to
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places are always potential terrains of contestation, never ‹xed. Differ-
ent agents resist and rede‹ne the dominant constructions of places for
their own purposes, and thereby recon‹gure power relations. When a
construction is moved from one social context to another, it may take
on new meanings and become the tool of new personal and political
objectives. A study of how the of‹cial narrative of Beijing as an
Olympic city was received, contested, reworked, and reproduced by
other actors is an intriguing extension of the analysis presented in this
chapter. The Olympic bid initiated social and physical changes in Bei-
jing, and in›uenced the image foreigners have of the city. As the plans
for hosting the Olympics are brought to life, the stakes grow ever
higher in the struggle to control the narratives through which these
Games are understood.
NOTE
1. The expression “bid material” in this chapter refers to promotional
texts and videos produced by the Beijing Olympic Bid Committee, as well as
articles about the Olympic bid published for an international audience in
Chinese electronic and print media.
REFERENCES
Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities. London: Verso.
BOBICO. 2001. Farmers Ride Donkeys All the Way to Xinqiao Hotel. Beijing
2008 Olympic Bid Committee Web site press release, January 18, 2001.
Booth, Douglas, and Colin Tatz. 1993–94. Sydney 2000. The Games People
Play. Current Affairs Bulletin 70 (7): 4–11.
Byrne, Moyra. 1987. Nazi Festival: The 1936 Berlin Olympics. In Time out of
Time. Essays on the Festival, ed. A. Falassi, 107–22. Albuquerque: University
of New Mexico Press.
Chen, Xiaomei. 1995. Occidentalism. A Theory of Counter-discourse in Post-Mao
China. New York: Oxford University Press.
China Daily. 2001a. City Pledges “Unprecedented” Games. Beijing, January 2.
China Daily. 2001b. Beijing Promises Unique Olympic Games. Beijing, Febru-
ary 7.
China Daily. 2001c. Beijing Betting on Three Tenors Concert to Boost Its
Olympic Bid. Beijing, June 14.
China Daily. 2001d. Beijing to Ful‹ll Dreams of Billions. Beijing, July 10.
Coubertin, Pierre de. [1912] 2002. Ode to Sport. www.olympic.org/upload/
news/olympic_review/review_ 20021913257_UK.pdf.
Precedent s and Perspectives
160
Douglass, Mike. 2000. Mega-urban Regions and World City Formation:
Globalisation, the Economic Crisis, and Urban Policy Issues in Paci‹c
Asia. Urban Studies 37 (12): 2315–35.
Financial Times. 2000. Editorial: Olympic Games. March 11.
Gare, Arran E. 1995. Understanding Oriental Cultures. Philosophy East and
West 45 (3): 309–28.
Gregory, Derek. 1994. Geographical Imagination. Cambridge: Blackwell.
Hall, C. M., ed. 1992. Hallmark Tourist Events. Impact, Management, and Plan-
ning. London: Bellhaven Press.
Hiller, Harry H. 1998. Assessing the Impact of Mega-Events: A Linkage Model.
Current Issues in Tourism 1 (1): 47–57.
Hiller, Harry H. 2000. Mega-events, Urban Boosterism and Growth Strate-
gies: An Analysis of the Objectives and Legitimations of the Cape Town
2004 Bid. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 24 (2):
439–58.
Hoberman, John. 1995. Towards a Theory of Olympic Internationalism. Jour-
nal of Sport History 22 (1): 1–37.
IOC. 2001. Video from 112th IOC Session, Moscow, July 12, 2001. Transcripts
made from recording viewed at the Olympic Museum in Lausanne,
Switzerland.
IOC. 2002. Olympic Charter. http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en_re
port_122.pdf.
Jessop, Bob. 1999. Re›ections on Globalisation and Its (Il)logic(s). In Globali-
sation and the Asia-Paci‹c: Contested Territories, ed. K. Olds et al., 19–38.
London: Routledge.
Kelly, Philip F. 1997. Globalization, Power and the Politics of Scale in the
Philippines. Geoforum 28 (2): 151–71.
Killanin, Lord. 1983. My Olympic Years. New York: William Morrow.
Ko Sunbing. 2001. China’s Pragmatism as a Grand National Development
Strategy: Historical Legacy and Evolution. Issues and Studies 37 (6): 1–28.
Larson, James F., and Heung-Soo Park. 1993. Global Television and the Politics
of the Seoul Olympics. Boulder: Westview Press.
Li Liangrong. 1994. The Historical Fate of “Objective Reporting” in China. In
China’s Media, Media’s China, ed. C. C. Lee, 225–37. Boulder: Westview
Press.
Li Lirun. 2001. Xinwenxue gailun (An introduction to journalism). Shanghai:
Fudan Press.
Li Zhurun. 1998. Popular Journalism with Chinese Characteristics. From Rev-
olutionary Modernity to Popular Modernity. International Journal of Cul-
tural Studies 1 (3): 307–28.
Lynch, Daniel. 1999. After the Propaganda State. Stanford: Stanford University
Press.
Milosz, Czeslaw. 1990. The Captive Mind. New York: Vintage International.
Moore, Thomas G. 1999. China and Globalization. Asian Perspective 23: (4):
65–95.
“A Very Natural Choice”
161
People’s Daily. 2001. Premier Urges Beijing to Rev up Development. Beijing,
January 20.
Renwick, Neil, and Qing Cao. 1999. China’s Political Discourse towards the
21st Century: Victimhood, Identity, and Political Power. East Asia (win-
ter): 111–43.
Rosenau, Pauline Marie. 1992. Post-modernism and the Social Sciences: Insights,
Inroads, and Intrusions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Saïd, Edward. [1978] 1995. Orientalism. London: Penguin Books.
Unger, Jonathan. 1996. Introduction. In Chinese Nationalism, ed. J. Unger,
i–xi. New York: M. E. Sharpe.
U.S. Embassy in the United Kingdom. 2002. President Bush Calls Olympics a
Celebration of Peace and Cooperation. February 9. http://www.usembassy
.org.uk/bush148.html.
van Gennep, Arnold. [1909] 1960. The Rites of Passage. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Waitt, Gordon. 1999. Playing Games with Sydney: Marketing Sydney for the
2000 Olympics. Urban Studies 36 (7): 1055–77.
Wamsley, Kevin B. 2002. The Global Sport Monopoly. A Synopsis of 20th
Century Olympic Politics. International Journal 57 (3): 50–65.
Wang Jing. 1996. High Culture Fever: Politics, Aesthetics, and Ideology in Deng’s
China. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Ward, Stephen Victor. 1998. Selling Places. London: E. and F. N. Spon.
Xinhua. 2000a. “Countdown Clock Set up to Support.” Beijing, December
22.
Xinhua. 2000b. Sports Yearender: New Beijing Bene‹ts from Great Olympics.
Beijing, December 28.
Xinhua. 2001a. Beijing Rounds off Bidding Report for 2008 Olympics. Bei-
jing, January 11.
Xinhua. 2001b. Report on National Economic Social Development. Beijing,
March 18.
Xinhua. 2001c. Olympic Games to Rev up Beijing’s Modernization Drive.
Beijing, July 30.
Xu Guangqiu. 1998. The Chinese Anti-American Nationalism in the 1990s.
Asian Perspective 22 (2): 193–218.
Zhang Longxi. 1998. Mighty Opposites. From Dichotomies to Difference in the
Comparative Study of China. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Zhang Xuedong. 1997. Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms: Cultural Fever,
Avant-Garde Fiction, and the New Chinese Cinema. Durham: Duke Univer-
sity Press.
Zhao Suisheng. 1994. “We Are Patriots First and Democrats Second”: The Rise
of Chinese Nationalism in the 1990s. In What If China Doesn’t Democra-
tize? ed. E. Friedman and B. McCormick, 21–48. New York: Armonk.
Zheng Yongnian. 1999. Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Precedent s and Perspectives
162
Dreams and Nightmares
History and U.S. Visions of the Beijing Games
Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom
In 1936, the United States participated in the Berlin Summer Olympics,
despite Adolph Hitler’s scheming to make the Games a Nazi showcase.
. . .
Should we go [to Beijing] in 2008?
I think not. How can memories not be considerable of the Tianan-
men tanks of 1989 . . . ? (Mizell 2001)
This will be the ‹rst time that China has hosted the Olympic Games,
and this historic occasion will be a landmark in the rest of the world’s
discovery of this wonderful and fascinating country . . . [And] greater
exposure of China to the world will undoubtedly help promote in-
creased openness and understanding over the coming years. (People’s
Daily Online 2006) 
Get ready. Over the coming months, before and during the Beijing
Olympics of 2008, you will be bombarded with stereotypes about
China that have accumulated over hundreds of years. (Mann 2007)
The Western discourse on the 2008 Olympics, which has periodically
reached high levels of intensity ever since the news broke in 2001 that
Beijing would get to host the Games, cries out for historical analysis.
Or, rather, as the preceding quotes suggest, it cries out for several dif-
ferent kinds of analysis that relate to history. For this discourse has
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been one in which historical analogies (see the Beijing 2008 equals
Berlin 1936 reference in quote 1 at the beginning of this chapter) and
historical allusions to the Chinese past (see the same quote’s reference to
the 1989 massacre) have ‹gured prominently. This discourse has also
featured the suggestion that the Games will mark a historic turning point
(see quote 2) and been shaped by a long history of Western commentaries
on China (see quote 3).
This chapter will have something to say about all of these kinds of
historical relevance, but will focus primarily on situating some of the
comments that have been made and are likely to be made soon about
the 2008 Games into long-standing patterns in Western media cover-
age of and thinking about China. Insofar as this analysis will also touch
on other ways in which history ‹gures in this discourse, I will stress the
extent to which analogies, allusions, and references to turning points
often come naturally to mind or take on a special power as a result of
being refracted through the lenses through which Westerners have
tended to view China.
For example, Westerners have long been accustomed to view China
as a land given to despotic rule. And for a shorter period (but still sev-
eral decades) some commentators have stressed similarities between
Germany’s Nazi regime and China’s Communist ones. The notion that
the Beijing Games should be compared to the Berlin Games—a 1936
event disparaged now for having given Hitler more international legit-
imacy than he deserved—should be understood as ‹tting within the
context of the general Chinese rulers equal despots and speci‹c Com-
munist leaders equal Fascist leaders patterns. 
Conversely, the idea that has been invoked in various IOC pro-
nouncements, including the statement by Rogge quoted previously,
that China is ‹nally on the right track and about to turn a historic cor-
ner, in terms of both its openness to and place in the world, is by this
point a familiar one—especially in the United States. The claim that
China was about to undergo a historic shift, which would make it eas-
ier for Americans to understand and deal with the Chinese people, was
put forward when Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) was inaugurated as presi-
dent of the new Republic of China in 1912; when Chiang Kai-shek
(1887–1975) ruled the country (1927–1949); and when Deng Xiaoping
(1904–1997), governing what by then had been rechristened the
People’s Republic of China, launched his policies of kaifeng and gaige
(openness and reform) just a few years after the death of Mao Zedong
(1893–1976). 
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One reason for my decision to focus here on long-term historical
patterns in commentary on China is that while I disagree with some ar-
guments in Mann’s The China Fantasy—differences I will not spell out
here, as they can be found in my World Policy Journal review of his
book—I think he was right on target about one thing: we will be “bom-
barded” between now and the end of the 2008 Olympics by variations
of “the same clichéd phrases” and “standard China graphics” that are
always trotted out to refer to or represent the world’s most populous
country when it is in the global spotlight (Mann 2007).1 We have, in
fact, already undergone such a bombardment. It began when the IOC
announced in 2001 that Beijing would host the 2008 Games. Indeed
almost a decade before, in the early 1990s, the ‹rst Olympic-related vol-
leys in this bombardment were ‹red during the raging debates over
whether the 2000 Games should be held in China.
Before trying to place into long-term perspective the resurrection in
coverage of the Olympics of old “clichéd phrases” and familiar “im-
ages,” which present China as either trapped in age-old patterns or
rapidly leaving all tradition behind (Mann provides an amusing list of
visuals we can expect to see during the television broadcast of the
Games),2 let us look quickly at some examples in the Western discourse
on the Olympics of historical analogies, historical allusions, and vi-
sions of China having reached or about to reach a historic turning
point. In doing so, it will be useful (for heuristic purposes) to divide up
commentators into what might be called “pessimistic” and “opti-
mistic” camps (keeping in mind that many commentators walk a line
between the two positions or alternate between taking a pessimistic or
optimistic view of where China is heading). In the pessimistic camp are
those who are doubtful that the 2008 Olympics will have any positive
effect for China or for the world. They were in 2001 and remain to this
day critical of the IOC decision to award the Games to Beijing. In the
optimistic camp, meanwhile, are those who have been and remain
hopeful about what the event will or at least might accomplish.
As we will see, each group turns at times to history to buttress their
stance. But the analogies and allusions they favor differ markedly, with
the best example perhaps being the way in which optimists prefer to
think of Beijing 2008 as more analogous to Seoul 1988 (an Olympics
that helped democratize an authoritarian society) than to Berlin 1936.
And though both groups sometimes suggest that 2008 may be seen by
later generations as having marked a historical “turning point” for
China and the world, the pessimists imagine it as a turn for the worse
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(signaling full international acceptance of a brutal regime), not for the
better (continuing China on the road to openness and freedom).
History and the Pessimists
Since the 1989 massacre . . . the People’s Republic of China has
thumbed its nose at world opinion of its degraded human rights prac-
tices. . . .
Now the international community—or that segment of it repre-
sented by the International Olympic Committee—has administered
some long-overdue discipline to China’s dictators.
Beijing will not host the Olympic Games in 2000. In a surprise
move, the IOC chose Sydney, Australia, as the site of those games.
This year, Congress passed a resolution opposing Beijing’s bid. “I do
not believe we should allow the Chinese government a huge propa-
ganda victory when it routinely tortures [and] severely restricts free-
dom of assembly and expression,” said U.S. Senator—and Olympic bas-
ketball gold medalist—Bill Bradley (D-N.J.).
Not everyone saw it that way. Giving the games to China would
“in›uence a change in behavior,” remarked IOC board member Dick
Pound. Some people have short memories. Moscow had the games in
1980, but spent almost the rest of the decade engaging in butchery in
Afghanistan. Berlin hosted the 1936 Olympics, three years before Hitler
made war on the world and initiated the Final Solution.
Den [sic] Xiaoping and his gang are just as merciless. (Boston Herald
1993) 
As we saw in the ‹rst quote used to open this chapter, the two main
ways that critics of the IOC’s decision to award China the 2008 Games
have brought history to bear on the issue are via analogies to the 1936
Games and allusions to Chinese repression in 1989 (Independent 2001;
Houston Chronicle 2001).3As the long excerpt from the Boston Herald ed-
itorial just provided illustrates, these two kinds of uses of history be-
long to a tradition that predates 2001—for analogies to the Games that
Hitler hosted and allusions to 1989 were common in the Western press
while China made its failed bid almost a decade earlier to host the 2000
Games.4 The Berlin 1936 analogy and backward looks to Tiananmen
have been and continue to be a mainstay in pessimistic commentaries
on China’s current condition and future prospects, put forward by
people who argued before 2001 that the IOC should not let the Beijing
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regime host the Games and have since then criticized the IOC’s deci-
sion on 2008.
Commentators in this camp tend to stress certain basic points. They
emphasize the degree to which the PRC has failed to move forward in
speci‹c areas (particularly the protection of human rights). They are
doubtful about the prospects of meaningful transformation coming
soon if the country is left to its own devices (and if the CCP retains con-
trol). And they have been skeptical of any suggestion that the Olympics
might have a positive impact on China (some think it could even be
harmful, either because of the way it will affect the lives of ordinary
Chinese or because of the international legitimacy having the Games
held in its capital city will give the current regime).
It is important to note that new wrinkles have continually been
added to this by now well-established approaches, and we should ex-
pect still other ones to be added by the time the Games take place. One
example of a recent novelty within a general framework of continuity
is that the Berlin 1936 analogy is now (as I write this in June 2007) of-
ten reinforced by references to Chinese complicity in the Darfur geno-
cide (Farrow and Farrow 2007; Chu 2007). When efforts were made to
tie Beijing 2008 to Berlin 1936 prior to 2007, this typically tapped into
the tradition (alluded to earlier) of equating Communist leaders to Fas-
cist ones. This tradition was given a new boost as recently as 2005, with
the publication of Jung Chang and Fred Halliday’s biography, Mao: The
Unknown Story, which some scholars (myself included) criticized as sen-
sationalistic and sloppy but which received a great deal of positive me-
dia attention and became a bestseller in several countries. Chang and
Halliday (2005) link the Chinese Chairman to the German Fuehrer at
several points, and they claim that as long as a giant portrait of this
bloodthirsty Nazi-like tyrant continues to stand above Tiananmen
Square, the PRC cannot be said to have really changed.5 Now, however,
a more speci‹c Holocaust referent has been added to the Berlin 1936
analogy via the use Mia Farrow and others have made of the “Genocide
Olympics” phrase.6
Another shift over time has been that those critical of the decision to
award the 2008 Games to China have begun to put more emphasis on
speci‹c things that have been done in and to Beijing to prepare the me-
tropolis for the Games. The destruction of old neighborhoods, forced
relocations of residents, and the tough measures taken to keep the cen-
tral districts free of beggars and migrant workers when foreign ob-
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servers come to town, for instance, are often now cited as evidence that
the regime did not deserve to get the nod in 2001 (Yardley 2007; Sheri-
dan 2007; New Zealand Herald 2007; Gu 2007). Still, the basic thrust of
pessimistic commentary remains much as it was when the IOC made
its decision to grant Beijing the 2008 Games (and before that debated
whether to allow China to host the 2000 ones), with the Berlin 1936
analogy in particular playing a central emotional part, conjuring up
discrediting memories of a time the world community gave legitimacy
to an abhorrent regime.
History and the Optimists
The question of human rights will be an important factor in deciding
the site of the 2000 Olympics, International Olympic Committee Pres-
ident Juan Antonio Samaranch said yesterday. . . .
“Human rights is important. . . . To have the Games in a country also
is quite important, if you study what happened in 1988, for example,”
Samaranch said. “Maybe the Olympic Games in Seoul pushed the
change in this country quicker.” (Washington Post 1993)7
I think Beijing’s hosting of the 2008 Olympics Games could be a great
opportunity to help promote democracy and openness in China. If
there is [a] democratic movement in China at that time, would the Bei-
jing authorities dare to strike it down by force at a time when the
world’s spotlight is ‹xed ‹rmly on it? . . .
Student movements in South Korea used the 1988 Seoul Olympics as
a chance—coupled with international pressure—to push for a demo-
cratic government.
If Korea can do it, why can’t China? (Wang Dan 2003)
On the other side, meanwhile, as indicated in the preceding quota-
tions, there have for years been and continue to be those who stress the
Olympics’ potential either to start China off, or help it to continue, in
a positive direction—and here, too, history is invoked. When optimists
turn to international history, their favorite point of reference since the
early 1990s has been and continues to be 1988, the year that the Games
were held in Seoul, the capital city of an authoritarian state that had
just begun to become more democratic and would soon afterward
move decisively in that direction.8 Optimists sometimes pair this with
a nod to China’s own past, occasionally even invoking the same year,
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1989, that ‹gures so prominently in texts calling for a boycott of the
2008 Games. Thus we see some commentators suggesting, as Wang
Dan did in his 2003 Taipei Times interview, that there is the potential
for a revival down the road of the sort of democratic activism that fu-
eled the inspiring Tiananmen protests, and that the global coverage of
the Olympics could aid this process. Other optimists bring history into
play in a different fashion, as noted in one of the quotes used to open
this chapter. Namely, they stress, as IOC President Rogge did in 2006,
how far the PRC has come in recent years in terms of opening to the
world and modernizing the economy. They emphasize in particular the
historical distance that China has traveled since the era of Mao Zedong
(1949–76) and even that of Deng Xiaoping (1978–97).9
The Seoul analogy is sometimes paired with looks backward to other
past Olympics. Some optimists, for example, remind readers of what
happened as a result of the Moscow 1980 Olympics. Even though we
have seen an example already of this analogy being used in a negative
fashion (in the previous quote that referred to Soviet repression con-
tinuing after 1980), those Moscow Games have sometimes been given
credit for starting the chain of events that ended in 1991. The Olympics
are said to have helped bring about the demise of the Soviet Union,
since through the Games, despite the American boycott, the Russian
people were brought into close contact with far more foreign visitors
and generally received far more information about foreign lands than
they had for decades. This led them to draw comparisons between their
government and their country’s stage of economic development and
those of other lands that were very un›attering for Moscow. In addi-
tion, as noted earlier, optimists sometimes point to the 1964 Tokyo
Games. They do so not to suggest that hosting the Olympics pushed
Japan onto a new path, but rather that it served as an appropriate
recognition of how far that country had come in recent decades;
China, optimists suggest, has made similar progress.10
Looking Backward
Even though many different kinds of positions are staked out in the
media discourse on China and the Olympics, it is striking how preva-
lent the two stances just sketched out have been and continue to be in
rhetorical clashes linked to the 2008 Games. It is also interesting that
the clash of viewpoints outlined here, which will doubtless persist
through the summer of 2008 (albeit with new wrinkles added over
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time), is not just one in which references to history have played and
will continue to play important roles, but also one in which echoes of
past debates about China can easily be heard.
We have already seen that the early twenty-‹rst century debate was
pre‹gured, rhetorical move for rhetorical move, by the late twentieth
century one surrounding Beijing’s failed attempt to get the nod for the
2000 Olympics. Then, too, some international commentators insisted
that China’s regime was too brutal to be allowed to host the Olympics,
especially in light of its then-recent crushing of peaceful student-led
demonstrations in 1989. Then, too, there were those who thought that
allowing China to host the Games would push the country in the right
direction, making it more likely that it would follow the path to
democracy that had recently been taken in countries such as South Ko-
rea that had shed their authoritarian ways.11 And so on.
There are, of course, speci‹c ways that the 1990s differ from the pres-
ent, as China’s stage of development and role in world affairs was not
the same then as it is now—and this had an effect on the discourse of
the time. For example, the fact that China is now seen as a rising eco-
nomic power has added novel dimensions to commentaries on the
2008 Olympics as opposed to the bid for the 2000 Games, as has the
fact that it is seen as a country with increasing in›uence in Latin Amer-
ica and Africa. Prior to 2001, the tendency was still to present China as
a developing country with ambitions of becoming a world power, and
to ask whether its achieving that goal was something that was worri-
some or welcome and would be helped or hindered by hosting the
Games. In the 1990s, there were more doubts raised about the regime’s
ability to create a modern urban infrastructure of the kind that the
Olympics needs, whereas recently the focus has been on the social costs
of the creation of that kind of infrastructure. Still, it makes sense to
think of the debates of the 1990s as a dress rehearsal of sorts or prequel
to the contemporary debate.
It is not just echoes of that relatively recent debate, though, that can
be heard in the early twentieth-century arguments about China focus-
ing on the Games, for James Mann is correct when he refers to “stereo-
types about China that have accumulated over hundreds of years”
coming into play. In the pages that follow, I will focus on two such
“stereotypes,” one of them a comforting sort of stereotype, the other of
a more menacing type, and each of them misleading in its own way. I
will refer to them as stereotypes that feed the “American China Dream”
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and the “American China Nightmare”—the intertwined fantasies in-
voked in this chapter’s title.12
To understand fully the story of the 2008 Olympics, as it is told by
and told to international audiences and Americans in particular, it is
important to appreciate the role that these two fantasies have played
and continue to play. They are fantasies that can be traced back to
many starting points, but one of the most plausible is the Boxer Rebel-
lion of 1899–1901. This was a complex series of events but it is remem-
bered mostly now for two things. In the United States, what is remem-
bered is that insurgents (whom Westerners called “Boxers,” due to their
use of martial arts techniques) killed Chinese Christians and mission-
aries and then laid siege to Beijing’s Legation Quarter for 55 days in the
summer of 1900, before foreign troops marched in to free the hostages.
In China, while these actions are remembered, so too is something else:
after the siege was lifted, foreign troops (marching under the ›ags of
eight nations) looted Chinese national treasures, wreaked havoc on the
Chinese countryside, and imposed an enormous indemnity on the
Chinese state. What is perhaps most important about the Boxer Rebel-
lion for our purposes here, and what makes 1900 a ‹tting point of ref-
erence, is that the siege of the Legation Quarter was one of the ‹rst
events (perhaps the very ‹rst event) that put China in something that
deserves to be called the global media spotlight, thanks to the fact that,
because of the marvels of telegraphy (the breakthrough “new” medium
of communication of an earlier day) and undersea cables, it was fol-
lowed in many parts of the world in something very close to real time.
What is intriguing about moving forward from the Boxer Rebellion
to the present is that even though the China of today is in many re-
gards a very different country than it was in 1900, the groundwork for
the interplay of dream and nightmare in coverage of contemporary sto-
ries about China, including the Olympic one, was laid in the violence
of that time. The coverage of China in 1900, a year when the American
press romanticized the Chinese Christian martyrs slain by Boxers as
paragons of virtue, while painting the Boxers as inhumanly savage, was
unusual in its intensity. Still, this would not be the last time that Amer-
ican ideas about China would be colored by a love-hate relationship
de‹ned by visions of conversion and savagery. Both positive and nega-
tive images already in circulation before 1900, but given added power
by the events of that year, have continued to shape American ideas
about the world’s most populous land.
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The Dream and the Nightmare De‹ned
It is time now to ›esh out these comments on the Boxers and provide
a brief summary and backward look at the evolution of what I have la-
beled the American China Dream and the American China Nightmare,
since their in›uence on coverage of the Olympics can only make sense
if we know more about what they are and how they arose. In a nutshell,
the Dream has always been and still is predicated on a vision of the
Chinese as people who want to embrace our ways and who live in a
land poised on the brink of shedding vestiges of worrisome old ways.
The Nightmare is predicated on a contrasting vision of the Chinese as
people who are helping to keep in power or have become the unwilling
victims of a vicious state that threatens all we hold dear. 
It would be a mistake to argue that, just because both the Dream and
Nightmare have been in play for more than a century, there has never
been and is not now anything new under the sun where American
ideas about China are concerned. This is because, as already indicated,
there are always shifts taking place within an enduring general frame-
work de‹ned by the poles of the two fantasies. The details of both the
American China Dream and the American China Nightmare have con-
tinually changed in subtle but sometimes very important ways from
period to period, just as they are currently shifting again, as China is
being seen as an economic threat (a novelty, at least in modern times),
a country capable of competing with Western countries and Japan for a
position as a great economic power. This means that versions of the
American China Dream and American China Nightmare that took for
granted the “backward” nature of the Chinese nation are being re-
tooled for an era characterized by high growth rates and rocket
launches in the PRC.
Another kind of shift, which is not unprecedented but has some
novel features, has to do with the relative power of the Dream and the
Nightmare. There have been particularly optimistic moments when the
Dream predominated (e.g., midway through the 1989 protests), and
pessimistic ones when the Nightmare held sway (e.g., just after 1989’s
June 4 massacre). There have also periodically been ambiguous points
in time when elements of each fantasy were fully in play, and the
Dream and Nightmare jostled for supremacy. These third types of mo-
ment are, not surprisingly, the most interesting to analyze, and it is in
one of these that we currently ‹nd ourselves.
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One of the interesting features of these moments of ambiguity is
that they enable us to see how much the American China Dream and
American China Nightmare have in common. They also add new shad-
ings to each fantasy. History suggests that such new shadings are espe-
cially likely to come when any one of the following things happens:
unexpected events suddenly put China in the global spotlight (as was
the case when the Boxers laid siege to the foreign legations in Beijing);
orchestrated media events take place (e.g., Nixon’s ‹rst trip to China in
the 1970s and Deng Xiaoping’s ‹rst trip to the United States in the
1980s); or international phenomena not directly tied to China occur
that make Americans particularly hopeful or fearful about a different
distant country, thereby indirectly minimizing hopes and fears associ-
ated with the Chinese (e.g., the China Nightmare almost disappeared
completely in the wake of Pearl Harbor).
The six-year period bracketed by the quotes with which I began has
been one that has added new shadings to both old visions. This is not
surprising, for not only were updated versions of both the Dream and
the Nightmare in play throughout, but all three types of fantasy-alter-
ing developments occurred. In April 2001, for example, the “spy plane
incident” (the collision of American and Chinese military jets that led
to mutual recriminations and a brief period when U.S. servicemen were
held on the PRC island where their craft had made an unapproved
emergency landing) was an unexpected event that breathed new life
into the old Nightmare. In October 2006 (when North Korea carried
out a nuclear test and Beijing worked to rein in that neighboring Com-
munist state), an unexpected international political development cast
China in a positive light. And during those years, media events held in
China, such as the APEC Summit that brought Bush to Shanghai in Oc-
tober 2001, made their mark.
We can also expect the near future to be a fascinating one to watch
insofar as the two fantasies are concerned. Leaving aside the always
present possibility of unexpected international events that bring China
and the United States closer together or push us further apart, modern
Olympics involve orchestrated media events (such as the opening and
closing ceremonies) and are often accompanied by unexpected dramas
of an inspiring or tragic nature, with the multiple 1936 victories of Jesse
Owens that undermined Hitler’s goal of showcasing Aryan greatness
falling into the former category, and the tragic violence of the Munich
Games, into the latter. 
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Scratches on Our Minds
One of the best places to begin a discussion of the long-term evolution
of the American China Dream and American China Nightmare is with
a book that was published in 1958 (exactly ‹ve decades before the Bei-
jing Games), yet remains eerily relevant. It is called Scratches on Our
Minds: American Views of China and India, and its author, Harold R.
Isaacs, worked as a journalist in China before World War II and then
went on to have a second career teaching political science at MIT and
writing books on various subjects.13 Scratches on Our Minds was based
on extended interviews with a variety of in›uential Americans (jour-
nalists, politicians, business leaders, etc.), all of whom Isaacs asked dur-
ing the interviews (conducted in the early to mid-1950s) to describe
their ideas about China and India, and also to re›ect upon the read-
ings, movies, and experiences (stories told by relatives, travel, interac-
tions with people from the two countries and so forth) that helped
shape these ideas.
The treatment of India in Scratches on Our Minds has had some im-
pact, but it is the book’s treatment of China that has tended to get the
most attention.14 And it is the book’s compelling vision of the peculiar
love-hate relationship between America and China that was responsi-
ble for the appearance of two updated editions of the book, published
at notable junctures in U.S.-Chinese relations. A second edition ap-
peared in 1972, around the time of Nixon’s famous meeting with Mao,
while a third appeared in 1980, just after Deng had introduced reforms
that promised to open the PRC up to international in›uences.
Notably, while Isaacs wrote new prefaces for the second and third
editions of Scratches on Our Minds, in which he presented interesting
new information about recent trends in American thinking about
China (e.g., Nixon’s meeting with Mao would add new twists to old
motifs), he insisted that the basic framework of the 1958 edition had
not been made obsolete by developments of the 1960s and 1970s. In
the preface to the 1972 edition, for example, he summarizes his vision
of America’s peculiar mixture of passionate concern with and ambiva-
lence toward China, and the tendency of Americans to alternately ro-
manticize and vilify the Chinese, as follows: 
Down through time, from Marco Polo to Mao Tse-tung [Mao Zedong],
the Chinese have appeared to us as superior people and inferior people,
outrageous heathen and attractive humanists, wisely benevolent sages
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and deviously cunning villains, thrifty and honorable men and sly and
corrupt cheats, heroically enduring stoics and cruel and sadistic mur-
derers, masses of hardworking persevering people and masses of
antlike creatures indifferent to human life, comic opera soldiers and
formidable warriors. (Isaacs 1980, xxi)
Isaacs then goes on to quote at length from a “key passage” in the
‹rst edition. This passage begins by referring to the way that, through-
out “the long history of our associations with China,” “two sets of im-
ages,” one strongly positive and the other strongly negative, continu-
ally “rise and fall, move in and out of the center of people’s minds over
time, never wholly displacing each other, always co-existing, each
ready to emerge at the fresh call of circumstance, always new, yet in-
stantly garbed in all the words and pictures of a much-written litera-
ture.” It ends by summarizing American feelings about the Chinese as
having “ranged between sympathy and rejection, parental benevo-
lence and parental exasperation, affection and hostility, love and a fear
close to hate” (xxi–xxii). In his 1980 preface, he stresses that, while
much has changed, “our assorted positive and negative images and
feelings about the Chinese ›icker in and out of the immediate scene
and many of both kinds remain in view together” (xvii).
Scratches on Our Minds does not take a straightforward chronological
approach to the subject of the formation of American images of China,
but it does ›ag key moments in the past that helped to solidify or
breathed new life into a positive or negative idea about the Chinese.
The rise of the Boxers and the appearance of the Fu Manchu books and
‹lms soon after that, for example, are cited as developments of the
early 1900s that contributed greatly to American fears of China. And
the publication of Pearl Buck’s The Good Earth and that novel’s subse-
quent transformation into a popular Hollywood ‹lm, meanwhile, are
linked to the circulation of a much less threatening sense of the Chi-
nese in the 1930s.
What comes across most strongly in Scratches on Our Minds, though,
is the sense of the interplay, at each stage of the twentieth century, of
strongly charged positive and negative ideas about China and its
people. Isaacs sees this as contrasting with the more dispassionate
views that Americans often had of people of other distant lands, in-
cluding India. It also sets American visions of China off in an impor-
tant way from the Western visions of the Middle East criticized in Ed-
ward Saïd’s in›uential and controversial study of that topic, Orientalism
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(1979). Some of the forms that negative American images of China have
taken can be ‹t into Saïd’s framework. The same cannot be said, how-
ever, of the recurring American positive fantasies about China, which
are tinged with admiration and present the United States and China as
being destined to become, and on the brink of becoming, close friends. 
The China-Japan Seesaw Effect
Isaacs adds an intriguing twist to the story of American images of
China in a section of the preface to his 1972 edition that brings the Jap-
anese into the story. He presents data taken from Gallup polls to sug-
gest that, while American ideas about China and Japan have each fol-
lowed a distinctive trajectory, there is also, at times, a strong inverse
correlation between our images of the people of the two countries. To
put it crudely—more crudely than he does—it sometimes seems that
when one country’s people are admired, those of the other are dis-
trusted, and vice versa.
The obvious case in point is that American stereotypes of the Japa-
nese during World War II were nearly identical to American stereotypes
of the Chinese during the Korean War.15 In each case, it was not only
that the alleged cruelty of the people in the enemy country was
stressed, but also that much was made of their alleged tendency toward
conformity. The rise and fall of other traits (being considered “hard-
working,” “brave,” “honest,” etc.) has not ›ip-›opped quite as neatly,
but with those too, Isaacs argues, the question of whether they are
most aptly applied to the Chinese or to the Japanese has shifted from
decade to decade, due in large part to changes in international politics.
T. Christopher Jespersen, in a book that is particularly good at showing
how Song Meiling (Madame Chiang Kai-shek) came to embody the
American China Dream, makes a similar point about this China-Japan
seesaw pattern in American Images of China, 1931–1949 (1996). And
Sheila K. Johnson’s lively and insightful 1988 book, The Japanese
through American Eyes, sheds light on the same phenomenon (what she
calls the “Migrating Asian Stereotype”) as well.
To simplify things greatly, we can draw upon the material Isaacs, Jes-
persen, Johnson, and others present to paint the following picture of
American ideas about China from around 1900 through around 1980,
and the relationship of these to ideas about Japan: 
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1. The Boxer period—China was feared or despised (though positive
images of the Chinese were kept alive by hagiographic accounts of
Chinese Christian converts who died at the hands of the Boxers),
while Japan was admired due to its rapid modernization.
2. The 1910s–20s—hope for China rose, especially around 1912, with
Sun Yat-sen inaugurated as the ‹rst president of the new Chinese
Republic, though doubt lingered as to whether it could modernize
effectively, while Japan was still largely admired, but starting to be
feared as a potential competitor.
3. The 1930s–40s—negative images of Japan as populated by savage
conformists predominated, while China was seen as either a victim
deserving sympathy or a brave ally in the ‹ght against tyranny.
4. The 1950s–60s—a reversal of the 1930s–40s situation, with Japan
admired for its ability to bounce back economically from its World
War II defeat and apparent readiness to embrace American ways,
while China became again a source of fear, imagined as a land of
automatons in thrall to a brutal dictator allied to the Soviets.
5. The 1970s—another reversal begins, with the Chinese now seen as
people who, under the surface, are much more like us than we had
imagined, and concerns about Japanese economic competition be-
ginning to rise.
1980 Onward: Ricochet Effects 
and Mixed Emotions
Americans always seem to be busy clearing up misconceptions about
China. In an attempt to get beyond one set of misunderstandings,
however, they often create new ones to take their place. They substi-
tute today’s “truth” for yesterday’s myth, only to discover that today’s
“reality” becomes tomorrow’s illusion. This is why American attitudes
towards China have undergone the regular cycles of romanticism and
cynicism so well described twenty-‹ve years ago in Harold Isaacs’ clas-
sic, Scratches on Our Minds. (Harding 1982, 934).
The story of American images of China from the end of the 1970s
through the present is a complex one that can only be told in a very
sketchy fashion here. It was a period during which orchestrated media
events often played a central role in reinforcing or adding new dimen-
sions to the American China Dream or the American China Nightmare.
For example, in the ‹rst half of the 1980s, when Deng Xiaoping
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donned a cowboy hat during his visit to the United States, after Amer-
ican newspaper stories stressed his pragmatic approach to economic
and political issues and his love of playing bridge, he became perhaps
the most powerful high-ranking embodiment of the Dream since the
days in the 1930s and 1940s when Wellesley-educated Song Meiling
was routinely celebrated in the pages of Time magazine. The new twist
here, though, was the idea that Deng was a Communist leader who, at
heart, was not really so different from the pioneering capitalists whom
Americans credit with having made our country great. And throughout
the last two decades, periodic trips to China by American presidents
have been orchestrated media events that have given new twists to the
Dream in particular.
It has not only been orchestrated media events, however, that have
been signi‹cant image shapers in recent years, for unplanned occur-
rences have also put China in the spotlight and resurrected or gave new
shadings to old positive and negative fantasies late in the last century
and during the ‹rst years of this new one. The events of 1989, in par-
ticular, showed the ability of unexpected developments to alter Ameri-
can perceptions of the Chinese (for the better) and their leaders (for the
worse). We should also remember that the events of 1989 came on the
heels of not just a burst of positive publicity about China’s leaders (due
to things such as Deng’s celebrated trip to the United States), but also a
decade of Japan bashing (that, via the seesaw effect, helped keep im-
ages of the PRC relatively positive). The Tiananmen crisis thus had a
curious effect, with the American China Dream retaining its hold but
going underground in a sense, as hopes for the country were relocated
from the leadership to the dissidents, and fantasies of a complete U.S.-
China reconciliation placed in an imagined post-CCP future rather
than a Deng-led CCP present. 
Big Bad China and the Good Chinese
The 1990s and ‹rst years of the twenty-‹rst century also saw pendulum
swings, which added new twists to but did not fundamentally under-
mine the basic pattern that Isaacs described.16 Once again, orchestrated
media events (such as Clinton’s 1998 visit to China) played a role. And
so, too, did unplanned developments (such as NATO bombs hitting the
Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, triggering protests in the PRC,
and the con›ict that developed during the “spy plane” incident of
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April 2001). In general, this period saw hopes for China placed not in
the leadership but in the people of the country (the “Good Chinese” of
this subsection’s title)—both dissidents and, increasingly, less explicitly
political groups whose members seemed bent on embracing Western
lifestyles (eating hamburgers, going bowling, listening to Western pop
music, etc.).
This divide was not absolute, however, as the Chinese people were
sometimes seen as dangerous, if only because they could still be mobi-
lized by the regime. The anti-NATO protests in 1999 were thus pre-
sented in the U.S. press as both a sign that the government could still
get people out onto the streets, and, in the most extreme commen-
taries, a sign that the mentality of the Boxers had never been com-
pletely vanquished. American fear and denigration of Japan, which
peaked in the 1980s, waned during the 1990s, and talk of a potential
“China Threat” (thought of sometimes in military terms and some-
times in economic ones) began—and at times continues.17
Looking Forward: What to Expect in 2008
How does this historical tour prepare us for analyzing the Western and
particularly American commentaries on China and its 2008 Olympics?
One thing worth remembering is that the Games themselves often in-
volve both planned and unplanned elements (choreographed opening
ceremonies, but also unexpected things—not just who wins or loses,
but things like the 1968 Black Power salute). No matter how tightly
controlled the Games are, unexpected things will occur either on the
streets of Beijing, in the announcers’ booth, or in crowds, and these
compete with internationally acclaimed ‹lm director Zhang Yimou’s
choreographed displays when it comes to media attention. Patterns of
framing are persistent. Some themes are emphasized in the media
whether or not unexpected events take place. For example, if protests
against the regime occur during the Games (or at other times), these
will be taken by some commentators to be additional proof that the
Communist Party is a repressive organization. But if there are no
protests, this will likely be cited by some commentators as evidence of
just how repressive the Communist Party is. 
In other words, given both the continued relevance of the patterns
that Isaacs described ‹ve decades ago and recent developments in ideas
about China (e.g., only in the last few years has the idea of the PRC be-
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ing more of an economic and diplomatic threat become more pro-
nounced than the idea of it being a potential military threat), future
narratives will have the very solid markings of the past. We are likely,
for example, to see an ongoing division between stories that look at in-
dividual Chinese (in this case mostly athletes) through the lens of the
American China Dream, and stories that look at the Chinese state (and
representatives of it such as the police) through the lens of the Ameri-
can China Nightmare. The way that Yao Ming has been treated gives us
a preview of how the “Big Bad China and the Good Chinese” story line
can work in the world of sports.
Yao Ming as an individual is often the focus of reports that play up
the similarities between the American and Chinese spirit. He is treated
as a person who has been able to move easily across national borders,
adopting some elements of the American lifestyle, while remaining tied
to China culturally and to some degree politically (such as by continu-
ing to play for the PRC national team). These positive reports compete,
however, with tales of Yao Ming the product, a manufactured sports
star created by a soulless Chinese state (bred from birth to be a super-
athlete, the product of a state-arranged marriage between two basket-
ball players, etc.).18
History also suggests that we need to be aware that, if stories of the
2008 Olympics spin in an unexpected direction, this may have at least
as much to do with changes in the international arena as with changes
in China itself. In just the last couple of years we have seen coverage of
the PRC affected greatly, but in opposite ways, by two international
crises: that relating to Darfur, which as noted earlier added a new twist
to the Nightmare, and that relating to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions,
which added a new twist to the recurring Dream motif of Beijing repre-
senting a relatively benign version of Communism, and gave us yet an-
other example of the “migrating Asian stereotype,” as Pyongyang has
come to represent what Tokyo represented during World War II and
Beijing represented during the Korean War.
NOTES
1. For my critique of his representation of how China specialists tend to
think and write about the PRC, see Wasserstrom 2007b. 
2. Mann’s list includes everything from shots of mountains shrouded in
mist and of the Great Wall to images of Chinese youths carrying cell phones.
See Mann 2007, 90.
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3. These are 2 of the 121 articles that came up on November 8, 2006,
when I ran a Lexis-Nexis database search for pieces in “major papers” from
the period January 1, 2001–December 31, 2001, in which the terms China and
Olympics and Hitler and 2008 all appeared. These articles were among the
many generated by that search that endorsed the value of the Berlin-Beijing
parallel (often bringing Tiananmen as an example of the regime’s deeply
problematic record on human rights), but a smaller number brought up the
parallel in order to debunk or at least question it. See, for example, Sullivan
2001.
4. For an illustrative piece from the 1990s, which refers to how common
talk of the Berlin analogy and invocations of 1989 had become during the
lead-up to the announcement about the 2000 Games, see Todd 1993.
5. Critical reviews that suggest the need to approach the book with a de-
gree of skepticism include Davin 2005; Wasserstrom 2005; and Nathan 2005.
6. Here is a summary of this position: “Concern over [atrocities in] Dar-
fur . . . prompted actress Mia Farrow to pressure director Steven Spielberg, an
artistic adviser on the opening ceremony of the Games.
‘Does Mr. Spielberg really want to go down in history as the Leni
Riefenstahl of the Beijing Games?’ Farrow asked in a commentary last
month in The Wall Street Journal, referring to the German director
who presented the 1936 Berlin Olympics as a triumph for Adolf Hitler.
Spielberg promptly wrote to President Hu Jintao, urging Beijing to use
its in›uence to stop the genocide in Sudan.” (Fan 2007)
7. For a similar reference to the relevance of Seoul, see also Toronto Star
1993 and New York Times 1993.
8. See, for example, New Zealand Herald 2001, which I discovered via the
Lexis-Nexis search described in note 3, in which the Tokyo and Seoul as well
as Berlin analogies are discussed; Moscow parallels are mentioned in Sullivan
2001.
9. See, for example, the Guardian 2007.
10. For more on analogies to past Olympics, see Wasserstrom 2002, and
for an interesting discussion of the relevance of the Seoul and Moscow analo-
gies for Olympic planners in Beijing, see Liu 2007.
11. See, for an early use of the Seoul analogy, New York Times 1993, and for
an early claim that the right analogy for Beijing hosting the Games was not
Seoul 1988 (or Moscow 1980) but Berlin 1936, see the Independent 1993—an
article that leads with a reference back to the massacre of 1989.
12. This terminology is original, I think, but was inspired by two very dif-
ferent works: Madsen 1995 and Starr 1973, a series of books that includes Starr
1990. Here I will focus on speci‹cally American images of China, which of-
ten overlap with but sometimes diverge from the images of China in play in
other parts of the West. Readers interested in Western notions about China
more generally would be well served by turning to Spence 1999 and two
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books by Colin Mackerras (2000a and 2000b), one a survey and the other a
collection of translations.
13. All of my citations will be to the 1980 edition of the book, the third,
which comes with three prefaces by Isaacs, written to accompany the book’s
original 1958 publication and 1972 and 1980 reissues.
14. For a fascinating discussion of Scratches on Our Minds, by a writer who
specializes in U.S. relations with South Asia and pays roughly equal attention
to what Isaacs had to say about China and India, see Rotter 1996. Rotter is
both critical of some of the methods that Isaacs used (e.g., many of the
people Isaacs interviewed were friends, very few were women, no effort was
made to be scienti‹c in his sampling, etc.) and appreciative of many of the
basic conclusions put forward in the book. Rotter also provides interesting
details about what Isaacs did prior to writing Scratches on Our Minds.
15. The classic study of American ideas about the Japanese during World
War II remains Dower 1987; see also Johnson 1988.
16. This section draws heavily from my chapter, “Big Bad China and the
Good Chinese: An American Fairytale” (Wasserstrom 2000); see also, for fur-
ther relevant background to American views of China in the 1990s, other
chapters in that same volume. Throughout this chapter, I have drawn inspi-
ration from Geremie Barmé’s gem of a foreword to that volume, in which he
argues that, for the Western press, China stories are too often, in effect, writ-
ten before they happen, with only the details needing to be ‹lled in at the
last minute.
17. For details on U.S.-China relations during this period, see Shirk 2007;
issues addressed in the preceding paragraphs are also discussed at greater
length in Wasserstrom 2007a.
18. See the following books and the stories linked to each that appeared
in the American press when they were published: Ming with Bucher 2004;
Larmer 2005. In general, stories building upon material in the former publi-
cation emphasized themes associated with the Dream, while those building
upon material in the latter emphasized themes associated with the Night-
mare.
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The Fragility of 
Asian National Identity in the 
Olympic Games
Sandra Collins
But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed nor Birth
When two strong men stand face to face. (Rudyard Kipling, 1895)
Kipling’s twain between the “East” and the “West” of the nineteenth
century continues to haunt our modern global imagination. Nowhere
is the difference between the two made more visible than in the narra-
tives of Asian national identity that are produced for the Olympic
Games.1 These narratives begin with the bids to host the Olympics,
continue through both written texts (of pamphlets, media booklets,
of‹cial receptions and Web sites) and performative texts (of Interna-
tional Olympic Committee [IOC] receptions, marketing videos, and
commercial endorsements), are broadcasted during the Olympic
Games themselves, and linger long after the Olympic event is over. The
common trope of the East-West dichotomy has been evoked in numer-
ous Asian Olympiads precisely because it is a familiar and expected nar-
rative. In the twenty-‹rst century, the Olympic Games may be the 
single biggest event for “the production of national culture for interna-
tional consumption” (Brownell 1995, 314), and our global ubiquitous
media continues to exploit this divide for pro‹t.2 Asian cities vying to
host the Olympic Games have enthusiastically employed this rhetoric
of difference in their bidding campaigns. What may prove surprising is
not that this twain continues, but that it retains any cultural resonance
for an increasingly commodi‹ed Olympic experience in our vastly
shrinking globe.
What is unique for Asian Olympic hosts—beginning with the Tokyo
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bid to host the 1940 Games and continuing with the 1964 Tokyo, the
1988 Seoul, the 1998 Nagano Winter and the upcoming 2008 Beijing
Olympics—are the lingering anxieties of participating in the Western
hegemony of the Olympic Games. Other Olympic host cities have not
carried the burden of representing their cultural heritage as unchang-
ing to the extent that Asian hosts do.3 While most Western Olympic
host cities underscore their modernity and development to promote
themselves as world-class cities, Asian host cities distinguish them-
selves in their deliberate evocation of their modern hybridity: the co-ex-
istence of modern development with ancient cultural traditions. Asian
Olympic hosts display this hybridity as a syncretism of cutting
edge–modern technological industry anchored in the rich cultural his-
tories and exotic civilizations of the East.
Why Asian Olympic hosts intentionally celebrate their cultural her-
itage and modernity as conjoined can only be understood within the
historical framework of global capitalism and modern Asian nation-
states. Tokyo, Seoul, and Nagano each de‹ned and, in the case of Bei-
jing, are de‹ning their national identity as the unique embodiment of
a timeless national culture replete with modern attributes. For the late-
developing industrial nations of Japan, Korea, and China, showcasing
the idea of a modern hybridity in the Olympic Games functions as a
symbolic means of demonstrating that modernization does not equal
Westernization.4 That is to say, Asian nations are capable of modern-
ization, evidenced by their winning of Olympic bids, but retain distinct
and traditional national cultures. By fusing their unique traditional
culture with their present modern development, Asian Olympic hosts
con‹rm not only that modernization and globalization are not neces-
sarily universal, but also that the forces of modern and global develop-
ment have different in›ections in Asia. In the narratives of Asian
Olympic hosts, the modernity of Asian host nations is not a mirror
re›ection of the modern development of the West but rather a self-con-
scious remaking of nineteenth century Orientalist discourse.5 Asian
Olympic hosts turn the earlier assessment of Orientalists—that the Ori-
ent was frozen and could not evolve—on its head: Asian Olympic
hosts’ self-orientalism showcases how their cultural traditions exist
conterminously with their modernity.
When Japan, Korea, and China host the Olympics, their “Eastern”
civilizations are grafted onto the developmental path established and
monopolized by Western powers as a result of the rapid expansion of
Western colonialism of the ninteenth century.6 But a boundary contin-
Precedent s and Perspectives
186
ues to function: because relevant sites of global authority (whether the
International Olympic Committee or the WTO) continue to be domi-
nated by the West (Chow 1991), the discourses of Asian Olympics reveal
the underlying power structures of the encounter between the East and
the West. The representational strategies of syncretism and hybridity,
which is often a form of self-orientalism, has proven successful for
Asian hosts precisely because modernization is often equated with the
West. Rather than argue that Asian modernities are different from
those of the West, Asian Olympic hosts deliberately construct the di-
chotomy between the West and East as the normative of Asia entering
the IOC world stage.7 Here, Asian national cultures are being repre-
sented as being at the center of the desired synthesis between the East
and the West: the ancient civilization and culture of the orient/Asia/
East symbolically positions Asian Olympic hosts as being nearly as
modernized (industrialized, capitalized, or globalized) as the omnipo-
tent West. Beijing 2008 has proven to be particularly interesting, be-
cause, as the fear of China looms large in the Western imagination,
China’s “Two System” government has represented the 2008 Olympic
Games throughout its preparation process as a new iteration of the fu-
sion of the East and the West.8 With the arrival of “China’s Century,”
Beijing has achieved a level of economic power that previous Asian
hosts never enjoyed; and, as the West fears the balance of global power
tipping toward China and the East, the Beijing Olympic organizers
have also begun to employ different rhetorical strategies to represent
China’s synthesis of the old and new.
Despite their differences, Asian Olympic host cities adopt similar
strategies in showcasing their national identity as a modern hybrid
within the context of the Olympic Games. And although the historical
contexts vary, these Asian candidates are similar in their timing of join-
ing the larger world system dominated by the West. As such, discursive
strategies of representing the Asian Olympic candidates’ national cul-
tural identity manifest as the harmonious blending of ancient tradi-
tions and modern attributes, of fusing the schism between the East and
West, implying that all Asian nations peacefully enter the world system
monopolized by the West, the dominant power by which Asia has had
to de‹ne its own modern experience.9 The hybrid form suspends Asian
national identity safely in between the premodern (Orient) and the
modern (West). As China’s socioeconomic development continues, the
Beijing Olympic organizers will continue to play with the established
image of the traditional self-orientalized hybrid Asian nation. This is
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precisely why the fear of the New China resonates so strongly as Amer-
ica watches its trade de‹cit with New China grow exponentially every
year.
These discursive strategies were ‹rst articulated in the 1930s, when
Japan bid for the 1940 Olympics. As the ‹rst Asian industrialized
power, Japan sought to commemorate its 2,600th national birthday in
1940 with the Olympic Games. During the bidding process, the Japa-
nese offered the alluring image of Japan as a unique embodiment of
Eastern tradition and Western modernity, and argued that a Tokyo
Olympics would truly universalize the Olympic movement.10 The 1940
Tokyo Games were seen as a spectacular ideological production, de-
signed by the Japanese state speci‹cally to challenge the Western pow-
ers’ con›ation of Western with universal values. The success of the
Tokyo bid lay in the fact that Japan was, at the time, the only Eastern
(or non-Western) industrial, independent nation state. Japan’s eco-
nomic success offered a counter to Western modernity and develop-
ment, and thus suggested that the modernity espoused by the West was
not necessarily universal.
The historical narrative of Asian Olympic hosts could follow the nor-
mative arc of modernization and development, and the impulse is to
characterize 1964 Tokyo, 1988 Seoul and the upcoming 2008 Beijing
Games as examples of how Asian nations entered the world arena as
successful beacons of globalization. The 1964 Tokyo Olympics were a
stunning spectacle of Japan’s normalization and its re-entry into the
world system under the careful tutelage of America as the ‹rst Asian,
industrialized, capitalist, and democratic nation. The Seoul 1998
Olympics continued Tokyo’s Olympic legacy in Asia by showcasing the
economic and technological achievements of Korea to the world
(Manzenreiter and Horne 2002).11 Awarded to the then largely un-
known military state, the 1988 Seoul Games exhibited the permanent
reform of Korea as a more democratic and industrial capital nation-
state (Ahn 2002). As for Beijing 2008, the predominant theme antici-
pated by the existing narrative appears to be that of China’s successful
entrance into—and not dominance of—the world system. In order to
address the West’s continuing concerns of (among other things) the
rapid pace of China’s economic growth, the Beijing Organizing Com-
mittee of the Olympic Games (BOCOG) has repeatedly chosen themes
that emphasize harmony with the existing world system. This may
change as the Beijing Olympics unfold.12 When bidding for the
Olympics, the Beijing Olympic Bid Committee (BOBICO) ‹rst lauded
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“New Beijing, New Olympics” (xin Beijing, xin aoyun) as Beijing’s
Olympic slogan. Under the IOC’s concern that this could be inter-
preted as an effort by China to change the Olympics into something
“new,” however, the Bid Committee switched the slogan to “New Bei-
jing, Great Olympics” (Forney 2001).
In contrast to this normative narrative of modernization for Asian
Olympic hosts, however, lie the failed 1940 Tokyo and the 1998 Nagano
Games. Japan canceled the 1940 Games only to embark on a brutal im-
perialist campaign to ostensibly liberate Asia from the West, and Japan
hosted the 1998 Winter Games at the height of its economic collapse
after winning the right to host the Games in 1991, just as signs that the
Japanese economy was in trouble were emerging. These two Asian
Olympiads, “aberrant” in their deviation from the typical narrative of
positive development typically employed by Asian Olympic hosts, sug-
gest that the self-orientalizing/mythologizing constellation of Asian
national identity in the Olympic Games is ultimately a fragile and sym-
bolic form of resistance to the West.
Narratives of Dislocation (I): 
The Canceled 1940 Tokyo Games
The process of constructing Asian national identities within the con-
text of the Olympic Games is an inherently fragile process that must
not only negotiate established sport and political channels of Olympic,
city, and national of‹cials, but also, navigate the global media commu-
nication complex of corporations, media of‹cials, and spectators. By
restoring the “missing Olympics” of the terminated 1940 Tokyo Games
to the historical narrative of Asian Olympiads, the continued draw of
Asian Olympic nations as a modern hybrid may be better grasped
(Collins forthcoming).
Well aware of the western bias against Asian nations during Tokyo’s
bid for the 1940 Olympics, Japanese of‹cials proposed to commemo-
rate the 2,600th anniversary of the founding of the nation. Although
the 1940 Tokyo Games were tied to the ideological production of 1930s
Japan that promoted the mythical notion of a Japanese national polity
(kokutai) as based on the unchanging relationship between the Japa-
nese emperor and the Japanese people, the Olympics were also consid-
ered a forum for Japanese diplomacy in an era of increasing interna-
tional isolation. Throughout the bidding and later the planning
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processes for the 1940 Games, Tokyo’s discursive strategy focused on
two key tactics: emphasizing that in order for the Olympic Games to be
truly universal, they would also need to be held in the East, and repre-
senting the national culture of Japan as the unique blending of a dis-
tinct “Eastern” cultural heritage with “Western” forms of moderniza-
tion and industrialization.13 Photographs were used to display how
Japan’s ancient, oriental civilization coexisted with new forms of mod-
ern Westernization. Emphasizing the key role of visuality, Tokyo/Japan
was often referred to as the “rare montage of the old/new and
East/West” by those Japanese involved in promoting the Tokyo bid do-
mestically and abroad. Similarly, 1930s Tokyo was often described as “a
modern city . . . a metropolis in Western fashion against the panorama
of an age-old civilization” (Tokyo Municipal Of‹ce 1934, iii). Images of
geisha and samurai were often presented to the West as sensational ex-
amples of Japan’s self-orientalism. Japanese ideologues guided Western
readers on how to see the ancient forms of Japanese culture in modern
Japan; Tokyo was hailed as the unique embodiment of “the harmo-
nious blending” of the two great cultures of the East and the West
(Olympic Organizing Committee for the XIIth Olympiad Tokyo 1938,
22). However, Japanese national culture was represented as existing
outside of time—and more amaranthine—compared to the West so
that the idioms of cultural contact between “Japan-East-Traditional”
and “World-West-Modern” implied a certain incommensurability.14
Although the speci‹c dynamics of the harmonious blending were
never de‹ned—and remained a somewhat ambiguous encounter be-
tween the East and West when the Japanese government canceled the
Tokyo Games in 1938—this idea functioned as a signi‹cant example of
Japan’s singular ability to successfully modernize while simultaneously
retaining its unique cultural and imperial destiny.15 However, in spite
of calling for the spread of Olympism and peace throughout the Ori-
ent, and lauding the Tokyo Games’ ability to improve relations be-
tween the East and West, the 1940 Tokyo Games were ultimately a form
of self-aggrandizement by the Japanese state. Japanese bid of‹cials
viewed Japan as uniquely positioned to host the Olympics as the pre-
mier colonial and military power of the Orient. After winning the right
to host the Olympics, Tokyo Olympic Of‹cials debated for two years
over how best to import the Western rituals of the Olympics to Japan as
well as how best to package Japanese culture for the world. Ultimately,
the Japanese national government canceled the Games in 1938 because
of the protracted war between Japan and China. Just as imperialist
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Japan once boasted of its unique economic and military might, the
colossal growth of its economy now positions modern China as the
premier threat to the established global trade network long dominated
by the West.
Normative Narrative (I): Tokyo 1964
Despite Japan’s path into what many American historians of modern-
ization theory label as the “dark valley” years, Japan emerged from
World War II as the benefactor of America’s aggressive campaign for
containing Asian communism.16 With the advent of the Korean War in
1952, the United States actively helped establish Japan as a model
democratic and industrial power. The Tokyo Olympics were seen as the
symbol of Japan’s successful re-entry into the international order as a
normalized industrial power. Japan’s avowed goal in hosting the 1964
Games was “to show the world that Japan is not just a country of
cherry blossoms and geishas. The object was to demonstrate that Japan
had been rebuilt after the war and that the country was willing to con-
nect itself to the western world” (Lechenperg 1964, 137–38). Repentant
of its fascist and imperial past, democratic Japan now wanted to graft
its Asian civilization onto the course of Western civilization. Tokyo’s
bid, supported by IOC president and American Avery Brundage, was
easily won, and in the of‹cial program for the 1964 Games, Tokyo was
hailed as the “ideal site for holding the ‹rst Olympic Games to be held
in Asia, for it can be said that she serves as a meeting-point of the East
and the West” (Organizing Committee for the Games of the XVIII
Olympiad 1966, 20). The success of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics made
these Games the model to which subsequent Asian Olympic candidates
aspired, and thus it is this Olympics that inaugurated the contempo-
rary normative narrative of Asian Olympiads.
The planning of the Games began in 1959, and the face of the city of
Tokyo would be changed in what was called “one of the most ambi-
tious urban construction projects of the twentieth century, a ‹ve-year,
24-hour-a-day effort” (Slater 2004, 166). More than $2.8 billion was
spent on building the Olympic infrastructure which was in fact mod-
ernizing the urbanscape of postwar Tokyo itself: the Tokaido bullet
train, two new subways, a monorail from Haneda airport, new metro-
politan highways and expressways, sewer and water lines, hotels, a
broadcasting center and communication facilities. The National Diet
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passed a measure (Law No. 138 of June 8, 1961) that gave legal support
to the State’s involvement in hosting the Games (Organizing Commit-
tee for the Games of the XVIII Olympiad 1966, 39). The Organizing
Committee’s of‹cial headquarters was located at the Akasaka Detached
Palace, once the residence of the Japanese Meiji emperor who modern-
ized Japan. The then Showa emperor of postwar Japan, His Majesty Hi-
rohito, agreed to act as the royal patron for the Games. Both motions
symbolized the importance of the event to Japan’s solemn nation (Or-
ganizing Committee for the Games of the XVIII Olympiad 1966, 39).
When the Games began, the “Japanese atmosphere” in the opening
ceremony was decisively understated: the playing of the national an-
them kimigayo, the large taiko drums for the Olympic Campanology
and Hymn, the presence of the Japanese emperor, and the use of “atom
boy” to light the Olympic Cauldron were the only true signs of Japa-
nese difference. There were no elaborate cultural performances show-
casing Japanese traditional dance, arts or theatre; these were con‹ned
to the Arts Exhibit held at various venues in Tokyo (Organizing Com-
mittee for the Games of the XVIII Olympiad 1966, 270). During the
opening ceremony, Mayuzumi Toshio composed “Olympic Campanol-
ogy”—a blend of modern Japanese technology and ancient cultural tra-
ditions, incorporating electronic sounds with recordings of temple
bells in the nationally important shrines from the cities of Nara, Kyoto,
and Nikko (Slater 2004, 169).17 The music was played as the Japanese
emperor Showa took his seat in the Royal Box as “the symbols of the
soul of the Japanese people, being transmitted to the world” (Organiz-
ing Committee for the Games of the XVIII Olympiad 1966, 231). After
the emperor declared the Games open, the ‹nal Olympic torch runner,
Yoshinori Sakai, who was born in Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, the day
of the atomic bombing, arrived in the stadium and lit the sacred
Olympic Fire, referencing Japan’s status as the world’s ‹rst atomic vic-
tim. Jet planes from the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force formed ‹ve
Olympic colored circles in the Tokyo sky, as a reminder of the military
might that Japan still possessed. In addition, the 1964 Olympics fea-
tured a color telecast of peaceful Japan’s “distinctive culture” exem-
pli‹ed by the kimono-clad women giving Olympic medals to winning
athletes.
For the Japanese, the 1964 Games were a reminder that the country
had successfully sutured the wounds of World War II and its imperial-
ist past and gotten back on the “correct” path of Western modernity of
democracy and industrialization. For the IOC, the Games were a sign
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that “The Olympic Movement . . . has now bridged every ocean and the
Olympic Games at last are here in the orient proving that they belong
to the entire world” (IOC 1998). After decades of U.S. Supreme Com-
mander of Allied Powers (SCAP) censorship it is not surprising that
both the opening and closing ceremonies did not display any tradi-
tional or feudal forms of Japan’s national culture, as were expressed
during the 1998 Nagano Games, perhaps demonstrating that Japan in
the 1960s had not yet put enough distance between its past and its
present.
Despite the Tokyo Games’ success, Yashiro Yukio, a commissioner
for the Protection of Cultural Properties, lamented in 1965 that Japan
suffered from a poor reputation abroad due “to a still-thriving Orien-
talism (orientarizumu) born of nineteenth-century exoticism of ‘Madam
Butter›y. . . .’ (Aso 2002, 18). Parallel with the U.S. (SCAP) occupation’s
scrutiny of Japanese feudalistic traditions that were deemed the source
of its imperialist aggression (such as martial arts and notions of a sacred
and divine emperor), the Japanese were trying to de‹ne and promote
their own cultural traditions. Recalling the earlier 1930s hybrid moder-
nity, Japan’s modern identity in the postwar era was again likened to
the unique combination of a timeless and thus authentic traditional
culture that survived amidst the progression of Japan’s modernization:
“Present day visitors to Japan are interested to ‹nd that the old and the
new, the traditional and the progressive, are active side by side, and are
in good accord mutually in this country” (Aso 2002, 30). Japan suc-
ceeded in accomplishing what it had set out to do some twenty years
earlier: to reveal to the world its national strength and power in a dis-
tinctively Japanese fashion.
Normative Narratives (II): 1988 Seoul
Raising suspicions that he was seeking the Nobel Peace Prize, IOC pres-
ident Juan Antonio Samaranch was a keen supporter of hosting the
Olympics in Asia again, and his close relationship with the IOC mem-
ber in Korea, Kim Taek-soo, helped Seoul secure the 1988 Games. The
Seoul bid was launched in 1981 by the then president of the Republic of
Korea, General Chun Doo Hwan, to help promote several economic
and political goals. Economically, the substantial growth of the Korean
industrial economy (1975 GNP for South Korea was $44.3 billion; 1980
GNP was $63.1 million; Manheim 1990, 281) legitimized South Korea’s
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ability, as a newly modernizing nation, to host the Olympics. The gov-
ernment believed that hosting the Olympics would help to promote its
›edgling automotive and electronics industries internationally insofar
as it would announce South Korea’s successful entry into the world sys-
tem. Politically, the Seoul bid was designed to cultivate domestic ap-
proval from the Korean people, who distrusted governmental author-
ity, as well as “[expand] its relations with Communist bloc countries”
(Seoul Olympic Organizing Committee [SLOOC] 1989, 34; Manheim
1990, 282).
The more than ‹fty-member Seoul delegation used the division of
Korea along the thirty-eighth parallel to convince other IOC delegates
of the validity of Seoul’s candidacy: “The logic focused on the justness
of an Olympiad in Seoul . . . an Olympiad in a divided country would
be helpful to solidifying peace there” (SLOOC 1989, 39). In keeping
with Tokyo’s success in showcasing a hybrid Asia that was both tradi-
tional and modern, Seoul organizers claimed that the elaborately con-
structed display hall of Seoul’s candidacy “effectively displayed the
time-honored culture and spectacular development of Korea . . .”
(SLOOC 1989, 40; Manheim 1990, 283). In keeping with the character-
istic gendered subservience of Orientalism, Korean Air stewardesses
and former Miss Koreas in “elegant traditional Korean costumes grace-
fully served visitors” (SLOOC 1989, 40). The Seoul bid campaigners also
invoked Tokyo’s earlier appeal as a universalizing force: “Considering
the Olympic principle of universality . . . it is important to share the
hosting role among nations and thus spread the Olympic Movement
throughout the world. . . .” (SLOOC 1989, 42). The “unique cultural
heritage and characteristics” of Seoul and the fact that South Korea had
not previously hosted the Olympics helped to cement Seoul’s attrac-
tiveness.
When the Games were awarded to Seoul in 1981, Seoul Olympic or-
ganizers were determined to match Japan’s success but in a “distinc-
tively Korean manner,” by displaying Korea’s cultural heritage as dis-
tinct not only from the West but from other Asian nations as well
(Larson and Park 1993, 151–55, 162, 169). The 1987 change in the na-
tional government of Korea, however, led to a reassessment of the
Seoul Olympics by the Korean government; the IOC remained largely
unconcerned by the shift in governmental leadership. Korean presi-
dent Chun Doo Hwan recon‹rmed the priority of the Seoul Games to
the nation by remarking, “The 1988 Seoul Olympics . . . will be a golden
opportunity for national prosperity, thereby placing the country on the
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road towards becoming an advanced country” (Larson and Park 1993,
162, 169). The IOC was relieved that the second Olympic Games to be
held in Asia would continue as scheduled. IOC spokesperson Michele
Verdier proclaimed, “The Games have been awarded to Seoul, and
there is absolutely no change in our position.” The only condition that
would change the IOC’s view would be an “act of war” (Reed 1987, 1).
The Republic of Korea spent well over $3 billion in preparations for
the 1988 Games (Reed 1987). In the most watched of all Olympic broad-
casts to date, an estimated one billion international viewers watched
the Han River boat parade inaugurate the opening ceremony (Larson
and Park 1993, 153). Korean national culture was evoked in the ornate
choreographed scenes of the opening ceremony, with traditional mu-
sic, dress, folklore, and dance orchestrated along modern technological
lines. The theme of the ceremony was “Toward One World, Beyond All
Barriers,” which broadcasters suggested to viewers meant moving be-
yond the barrier or the cultural gap between the East and the West (Lar-
son and Park 1993, 159, 207–8). Recapitulating the fusion of old and
new, the broadcast of the cultural ceremonies made references to Ko-
rea’s “5,000 year history” along with South Korea’s move toward
democracy, modernization, and Westernization (Larson and Park 1993,
212–14). The arcane reference to 5,000 years was a self-conscious at-
tempt by South Korean pundits to emphasize that their culture was dis-
tinct from other Asian cultures, of China and Japan, boasting 3,000
and 2,600 years of history, respectively.
The distinctiveness of traditional Korean culture was emphasized in
other ways during the 1988 Games as well. SLOOC contracted with
Polygram for $2.5 million to have the Korean vocal group Koreana sing
the Olympic theme song, a song designed to have as much “Korean im-
agery as possible” (Larson and Park 1993, 108). The result, “Hand-in-
Hand,” became a top ten song on the pop charts in seventeen countries
and the most popular Olympic theme song in history. The Seoul
Olympic mascot, Hodori, recalled the familiar ‹gure of the tiger from
Korean legends and folk art (Larson and Park 1993, 106). All women act-
ing in an of‹cial Olympic capacity as hostesses were out‹tted in tradi-
tional Korean dresses; the medal bearer escorts wore the wonsam, the
ceremonial robe of ancient Korean queens, and the medal bearers
themselves wore hanbok, the traditional Korean dress (SLOOC 1989,
144–45).
As a media event in the sense of the term developed by Katz and
Dayan, the Seoul Olympics was a strategic opportunity for South Korea
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to represent its national identity, which had hitherto remained largely
unknown to a global audience (Larson and Park 1993, 238; Jaffe and
Nebenzahl 1993, 445). The opening ceremony was a striking example
of Korea’s self-exoticization for the bene‹t of the foreign gaze. The
opening ceremony visualized the “Korean culture characterized . . . in
the form of the indigenous dances, sounds and colors” and the Seoul
Olympic organizers helped to cement Korea’s national hybridity by
stating that the event was a “remarkable artistic creation which married
the traditional Korean culture and the contemporary senses” (SLOOC
1989, 390). The national identity of South Korea was showcased as a
modern hybrid that fused its 5,000-year old traditions with a modern
democratic and industrial state. Seoul Organizers devoted tremendous
resources to showcasing “the originality of Korean culture,” utilizing
some 13,625 people in ‹fteen cultural performance numbers during the
unprecedented three-hour-long televised event (SLOOC 1989, 391). The
traditional cultural performance of “Greeting the Sun” alone lasted
twenty minutes and involved more than 3,300 Korean performers and
four different dances and musical events. The Olympic gold medalist
Sohn Kee-chung, who competed in the 1936 Japanese delegation to
Berlin, brought the Olympic torch into the stadium, a moment loaded
with political symbolism insofar as it featured a contemporary Korea,
independent of its colonial past (SLOOC 1989, 406). In Korea’s efforts
to position itself as a successful (yet traditional) nation within the
Western trajectory of modernization and industrialization, it did not
address the traumatic division between North and South Korea. For a
domestic audience, however, the opening ceremonies’ complementary
and glorious national narrative of a uni‹ed, healed, unchanging cul-
ture attempted to soothe the painful political boundaries formed by
student protests, military coups, and the division with North Korea.
Despite the Demilitarized Zone that separated North from South Korea,
the opening ceremony constantly underscored the timeless and shared
culture of a “Korea” that existed before modern political boundaries
and simultaneously highlighted the modern technological advances
made by South Korea.
The Seoul Olympics helped solidify the notion that the televised
Olympic Games function not only as a media event in and of itself, but
also as a point of reference for other discursive events (Larson and Park
1993, 48). Throughout the long years of Olympic planning, the fact
that the national identity of the Olympic host will be communicated
through global media is taken into account. The construction of this
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identity involves the dual processes of broadcasters creating the media
message and audiences receiving these messages and their separate and
often divergent interpretations. Another communicative layer beyond
sender and receiver involves the global transcultural communication
systems of the IOC, National Olympic Committees, and Olympic Cor-
porate Sponsors (Larson and Park 1993, 48).
The media event, however, involved more than just the Olympic or-
ganizers. Local Korean culture was often not elucidated for the Ameri-
can (or global) viewing audience during the numerous cultural per-
formances. In fact, Korean national identity was often simply essen-
tialized as “unique” and as possessing a “5,000 year heritage,” demar-
cating Korean civilization as distinct from Japan and China (Larson
and Park 1993, 35). NBC, which had the U.S. broadcasting rights, fre-
quently offered political analyses of contemporary South Korea along-
side images of traditional culture. As such, the broadcasters offered lit-
tle explanation of the encounter between the East and West, and
focused on the sensational and troubling aspects of contemporary
South Korean society. NBC detailed the recent political history of the
nation as a former Japanese colony, the violence of student riots and
the military dictatorship, the tumultuous relations with North Korea
and the aftermath of the 1952 Korean War, as well as the black market,
mistreatment of Amerasian (half-American and Korean) children, and
the status of women (Larson and Park 1993, 224). Koreans were able to
view NBC broadcasts aired on the U.S. Armed Forces network, and
South Koreans, outraged at the nation’s portrayal on an American net-
work, staged public protests that resulted in NBC spokesman Kevin
Monaghan delivering a public apology on Korean television (Larson
and Park 1993, 224).
Narratives of Dislocation (II): 
1998 Nagano Winter Olympic Games
The 1998 Nagano Winter Olympics emerged as an outlier to the histor-
ical narrative of the Asian Olympiads. For Japan in the 1980s hosting
an Asian Olympiad was not a condition of entering the established
Western world system since the yen and stock market were already very
strong. Rather, the key impetus behind Nagano’s bid was developing
the infrastructure for local tourism for the Seibu Development Corpo-
ration by showcasing the 1980s Japanese discourses on Japan’s national
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uniqueness, which have come to be labeled as nihonjinron (translated as
discourses on “Japaneseness”). Nagano won the right to host the Win-
ter Olympic Games in 1991 just as signs that the Japanese economy
might be in trouble were beginning to emerge. Despite repeated budget
cuts, the operating expenses for the Games were estimated to be $792
million, an overwhelming ‹gure for this small regional municipality.18
For the organizers of the Nagano Games, however, the timely invest-
ment in hotels, stadiums, and transportation for the required Olympic
infrastructure was to transform the Nagano region, home of the “Japa-
nese Alps,” into an attractive tourist destination.
The opening ceremony strategically emphasized Nagano as a re-
gional attraction. Award-winning Keita Asari, chief producer for the
opening and closing ceremonies, was chosen because of his intercul-
tural ›uency as evidenced by his success in adapting foreign Broadway
musicals for Japanese audiences. The goal of the opening ceremony was
to unite the world through the use of the latest technology while em-
phasizing traditional images of Nagano and Japan. Asari commented
that he intentionally emphasized traditional Japanese culture in the
opening ceremony:
The Olympics are not something that should be completely done in a
Western style. Opening ceremonies should embrace the (host) coun-
try’s culture and tradition. The cooperation between the sumo
wrestlers and the rendition of the onbashira-tate festival are examples of
unique Japanese culture. We can make it appealing to the international
audience. (Kyodo News Wire, October 29, 1997).
The sounds of the bells ringing from Nagano’s Zenkoji Temple, which
marked the beginning of the 1998 Games, represented a much more
traditional approach than the 1964 Tokyo Games’ use of the electronic
recording of temple bells. Next, the local culture of Nagano prefecture
was showcased when 1,000 Nagano residents participated in the erec-
tion of sacred Shinto pillars of the Suwa Taisha Shrine. Asari staged an
elaborate dohyo-iri, the ring entering ritual of sumo wrestlers during the
opening ceremony. Led by the 6′8′′, 500-pound Akebono, the ‹rst for-
eign-born sumo Grand Champion (yokozuna) of Japan (Akebono be-
came a Japanese citizen in 1996), the large and nearly naked sumo
wrestlers wore kesho-mawashi (decorated ceremonial aprons). Akebono
alone, as a Japanese citizen, performed the dohyo-iri to drive away evil
spirits and purify the venue for the Olympic athletes.19 For Asari,
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“There is nothing that feels more like ‘Japanese culture’ than a sumo
wrestler. When everyone sees the wrestlers assembled, they will be left
with the strong impression that they have truly visited (seen) Japan”
(Kyodo News Wire, December 26, 1997). Ito Midori, Japanese ice-skat-
ing gold medalist, was elaborately dressed in a ceremonial kimono and
lifted into the air on a platform to light the Olympic cauldron.
Asari did not just seek to portray Japan’s uniqueness. The “Western-
ers,” Asari revealed, “see the Japanese as a peculiar people. I want to
show (also) that Japanese people have sensitivities that are similar to
those people in other places in the world through the chorus of the Ode
to Joy” (Kyodo News Wire, October 29, 1997). World famous conductor
Seiji Ozawa led a worldwide chorus of Beethoven’s Ode to Joy for the
‹nale of the pageant that featured ‹ve choral groups from Beijing,
Berlin, Cape Town, New York, and Sydney singing together via a satel-
lite linkup as Ozawa conducted the orchestra from the Nagano Prefec-
tural Cultural Hall. “The signi‹cance lies in the fact that people from
all over the world will sing the same song at the same time,” the Boston
Symphony Conductor Ozawa mused (Kyodo News Wire, December 25,
1997). For the global viewing audience, however, the carefully orches-
trated “Ode to Joy” also served as a postmodern Olympic performance
at a different register: that of displaying an interconnected world based
on transnational telecommunication and computerized information
networks (Smith 1990, 75).
Despite Asari’s best intentions, however, the CBS broadcast often de-
liberately interrupted the narrative and theatrical ›ow of the opening
ceremony. As the Japan Expert for the CBS Research Team, I had an in-
teresting view of the decisions made by the CBS Producers for the
Nagano Games. Jim Nance and other broadcasters often mistakenly re-
ferred to Zenkoji Temple, looming in the background of each CBS
broadcast, as the “spiritual and cultural center of Japan,” even though
Japanese would probably refer to Ise as the spiritual center and Kyoto as
the cultural center of Japan. The use of traditional images and rituals to
represent Japan—or any Olympic host city—is of course not new. What
was surprising was the extent to which the visual nature of television
determined what aspects of Japanese tradition were selected both to be
broadcast by CBS and to be showcased during the Olympic Cere-
monies. CBS producers admitted that they liked these traditional im-
ages of Japan rather than shots of “modernity” because they were so
aesthetically appealing and so consistent with America’s imagined fan-
tasy of an exotic and unchanging Japan. Even the executive producer
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of the ceremonies, Asari, confessed that he created the ceremonies by
imagining how the scenes would be represented by both the close-up
shots and long pans of the television camera. For the spectacle of
Nagano, what became “tradition” for Japan were those visual elements
that could be best captured by the television lens and that best refer-
enced the familiar trope of an unchanging cultural aesthetic: the ki-
mono of Midori Ito, the colorful silk sashes against the naked bodies of
the sumo wrestlers, and the majestic Zenkoji Temple. The desired ori-
entalism of Japan by CBS producers was enthusiastically satis‹ed by the
complicitous images of Japanese unchanging traditional culture as or-
chestrated by Asari.
The use of traditional national images by the global media under-
scores the complex process of the Olympics as a media event. Sensa-
tional and stunning images were excavated from the treasure troves of
the Japanese past and selected for their ability to be successfully staged
as “Japanese tradition,” which then determined what kind of “Japan”
viewers and spectators were encouraged to celebrate. Local cultural
practices were removed by Asari from their speci‹c Nagano regional
contexts, inserted into the opening ceremony, and then aestheticized
for the Olympic viewing audience as nostalgic reminders of the ancient
traces that remain in modern Japan. The Nagano Games showcased the
ascent of what Joseph Nye (2004) has characterized as Japanese soft
power: the worldwide demand not only for traditional Japanese art but
for its modern forms of popular culture as well. Perhaps for the pro-
ducers of the Olympic Ceremonies and CBS, “Japan” represents a visu-
ally stunning symbol of modern hybridity itself: the unchanging tradi-
tional culture of a nation can be found in the pockets of one of the
world’s leading exponents of technology and modernity.
Coda: Locating 2008 Beijing Olympics
By analyzing the discourses that emerged from the bidding and plan-
ning process for the Beijing 2008 Games against this backdrop of these
other Asian Olympic Games, it is possible to discern the image of China
that is being projected thus far. In some respects, the Beijing Games ‹t
within the normative narrative of showcasing the successful entry of a
developing Asian nation into the globalized world. During the bidding
process, BOBICO adopted the 1930s Japanese and subsequent Asian
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Olympiad strategies of positioning the Asian candidate as a modern hy-
brid and as a vehicle by which the Olympic Movement is diversi‹ed.
In competition with the ‹nal round candidate cities of Toronto,
Paris, Istanbul, and Osaka, Beijing accentuated its cultural traditions as
an ancient, Oriental city. BOBICO of‹cials stated that displaying the
ancient culture of China was a key element to the Beijing bid, which
the Mayor of Beijing, Liu Qi, also af‹rmed by stating that the long,
3,000 year history of Beijing would provide a truly remarkable specta-
cle (People’s Daily 2001). One Beijing journalist professed, “Beijing [is]
more appealing to others because we have such a long history; we have
something you have never seen, something very native, something
very Oriental” (Haugen 2005, 223). In the Beijing candidature video for
the IOC, famed Chinese director Zhang Yimou, who was also con-
tracted to help produce the opening ceremony with Steven Spielberg,
presented the Great Wall as a monument “to the survival of a vibrant
culture that has been able to combine the greatness of the past with
ever-changing economic, social and technological advances of the
present” (Haugen 2005, 219). Given Zhang’s expertise with visually ap-
pealing depictions of Chinese culture—his ‹lm’s “orientalist” and ex-
otic representations of “China’s antiquated, folkloric and superstitious
cultural past” have attracted a global audience (Liu 1998, 166; Chow
2007)—one can only imagine a continuation of such self-exoticization.
Mimicking earlier Asian Olympiads as the harmonious blending of
the East and West, the Beijing Olympics were also hailed as bringing
“the East and West together” (China Daily 2001). The oriental heritage
of Beijing “gives the city a strong and rich culture, which can make the
2008 Olympics unique” (China Daily 2001). Beijing’s “otherness” is of-
ten presented visually through the traditional forms of culture that po-
sition China as simultaneously unchanging and modern. As a rapidly
developing nation, Chinese bid of‹cials were eager to stress how China
wanted to enter the community of Olympic hosts and the promise of
progress that would follow. Although Haugen contends that the
Olympics will be a catalyst for Beijing to transcend its differences with
the West by mimicry, China scholar Liu counters that China will em-
bark on an alternative path of development (Haugen 2005, 225; Liu
1998, 182). Another Chinese scholar, Xin Xu, takes a more centrist po-
sition, claiming that “[T]he People’s Republic of China (PRC) is deter-
mined to turn this sporting mega-event into the celebration of a Chi-
nese renaissance and the harmonization of world civilizations . . .”
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precisely because state policy and Beijing Olympic themes highlight
“efforts to rede‹ne China’s political identity in line with traditional
and universal values of greater appeal” (Xu 2006, 90, 97).
The Beijing bid, Haugen notes, detailed China’s “faith in a glorious
past, combined with images of a great future” and recalled the “restora-
tion nationalism” promoted by of‹cial Chinese discourse in the 1990s
(Haugen 2005, 222). As Japan confronted the threat of Western colo-
nialization, the Japanese nation state also formulated a “renaissance
discourse” by which Japan called upon its ancient past in order to mod-
ernize without Westernizing for the good of the nation’s future (Oguma
2002, 334). As the countdown to the Beijing Olympics nears and the
repercussions of the exponentially expanding Chinese economy grow
transparent, it will not be surprising if China ultimately de‹nes its
own, distinctly Chinese, path. China has evaded any appeal to univer-
sal human rights by the West, including those concerning China’s on-
going involvement in Darfur, acknowledgment of the independence of
Tibet or Taiwan, or the role of a critical and independent press. In the
end, the universalism espoused by the West is tainted by the history of
the declaration of human rights as a power construct developed by the
West for the globe. As China’s economic power grows its con‹dence in
de‹ning its own path will also.
Other texts on the Beijing Olympics offer insight into the develop-
ing national narrative. During the closing ceremony of the 2004
Athens Olympic Games, the Chinese created a twenty-minute perfor-
mance to de‹ne the country’s national culture. Despite the brutal re-
pression of tradition that occurred during the Cultural Revolution only
decades before, the ‹lm resurrected this traditional culture, pristine
and unscathed by its earlier destruction. The ceremony opened with a
Chinese instrumental ensemble’s rendition of the folk song “Mo-li-hua”
(Jasmine Flower) infused with a modern techno beat that then slowed
to an unaccompanied version of the song sung by a child. Attempting
to mask the vast developmental unevenness and ethnic differences
within China, symbolic erasures of difference within China have
emerged in BOCOG’s plan: one of the ‹ve Olympic mascots is the Ti-
betan antelope, which can be interpreted as an attempt to subsume a
separate Tibetan culture into the dominant Han culture and erase the
ongoing political con›ict. There are plans for the Olympic Torch relay
to traverse the historic Silk Road, including the Northwestern province
of Xinjiang, a region of ethnic, religious, and political contestation.
Tensions have also emerged over Beijing’s proposed inclusion of Tai-
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wan in the Torch relay route. Taiwan reacted negatively to this an-
nouncement and declared that Taiwan was not consulted with
BOCOG’s proposal. The National Council on Physical Fitness and
Sports issued a public statement protesting being included as “Taipei
China”:
China will most certainly publicize the transfer of the torch from Tai-
wan to Hong Kong as being from “Taipei China” to “Hong Kong
China” and “Macau China” and then onward to other cities in China.
This is an attempt by China to engineer the relay route so that Chi-
nese Taipei is included in China’s domestic relay route, thereby obvi-
ously undermining our sovereign status. We resolutely reject this. We
therefore take this opportunity to declare to the IOC and the Beijing
Organizing Committee our rejection of the relay route arrangement.
(Taiwan Government Information Of‹ce Web site, April 27, 2007; em-
phasis added).
Tsai Chen-wei, chairman of Taiwan’s Olympic Committee, also voiced
his criticism that the relay route is “an attempt to downgrade our sov-
ereignty” (BBC 2007). It would seem that the PRC is pushing a political
agenda that regards Taiwan as the PRC’s “foremost and vital national
interest” (Xu 2006, 102). BOCOG also announced that the ›ame relay
would pass from Mount Everest through Tibet, seen by some critics as
the IOC’s approval of China’s military occupation of the region (Whe-
lan 2007). IOC president Jacques Rogge announced at the unveiling
ceremony that “the Beijing Torch Relay will, as its theme says, be a
‘Journey of Harmony,’ bringing friendship and respect to people of dif-
ferent nationalities, races and creeds” (BOCOG 2007). If the symbolic
erasure of Taiwan and Tibet’s national difference in the Torch Relay is
any indicator of what China deems as a “harmonious” celebration of
Chinese renaissance, many should take notice of how the New China’s
national identity will be projected as the Beijing Olympics plays out to
a global audience.
The Beijing Olympics is shaping up to be the most sensational hy-
brid to date; Beijing is being marketed as a “dynamic modern metrop-
olis with 3,000 years of cultural treasures woven into the urban tapes-
try” (BOCOG Web site). As for the East-West encounter, IOC member
He Zhenliang reiterated the familiar theme concretized by 1930s Japan:
In 2008, it will be the ‹rst time for the Olympic Games to be celebrated
in China, one of the birthplaces of Oriental Civilization. It will also be
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an exceptional opportunity for the Olympic Movement to enrich itself
with the Oriental Culture, thus enhancing the multicultural nature of
the Olympic Movement and contributing to the exchange and sym-
biosis of the Oriental and Western cultures. (BOCOG 2006, 6).
The preceding discourse is subtly different from previous strategies
adopted by Asian Olympic hosts: unlike previous hosts who were under
the tutelage of America, Beijing is con‹dent that the Olympic Move-
ment will also adopt aspects of China’s Oriental culture. Beijing’s opti-
mism is perhaps warranted given its exponential growth and contin-
ued unhindered development.
China represents a new challenge to the established balance of
power in the current global (read: Western dominated) economy. The
United States has maintained a strong military presence in both Japan
and Korea since the 1950s. When Japan and Korea hosted the
Olympics, Japan and Korea were ‹rmly under America’s dominance,
but China, while operating within a global system of interdependence,
is more independent from America (Harootunian 1993). The world sys-
tem remains unsure as to how much China will attempt to accommo-
date itself to the established global order. Depending on how the “Two
System” government of China evolves, China threatens to change the
arc of development characterized by Western global capitalism. The po-
tential of global capitalism has always contained elements of struggle,
as Richard Sennett aptly reminds us in his discussion of Max Weber’s
trenchant analysis of the military rationality inherent in capitalism it-
self (Sennett 2006). Whether Samuel Huntington’s predicted clash be-
tween Eastern and Western civilizations emerges or whether China
forges a new reconciliation point between the East and the West re-
mains to be seen. The ›ow of global capital toward New China is, as
Walter Mignolo observed, the signi‹cant crossing of the colonial dif-
ference of the East/the Orient from the West (2002, 179). The new glob-
alism of rising China will undoubtedly rework this colonial difference
but how it will do so is uncertain. What is certain, however, is that the
Beijing Olympics will be historically signi‹cant not only in providing a
platform for the New China’s national cultural identity but also for ac-
tively engaging with the IOC to rework the paradigm of Olympic polit-
ical communication that has been dominated thus far by the West. In
this sense, the Olympics must be seen within the heritage of de‹ning
Asian national identity extending from Tokyo in 1940 to Tokyo in
1964, to Seoul, Nagano and beyond.
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NOTES
1. For further reading of the signi‹cance of sports and the Olympic
Games for nation-states, see Brownell 1995; Maguire 1999; and Roche 2000.
2. See Hobsbawm 1983; see also Huntington 2003 for the clash of world
civilizations.
3. As Haugen has recently pointed out, these terms (Asia, Orient, and
East) are used interchangeably to describe an imagined area that references
nineteenth century’s Orientalist discourse. For further reading, see Saïd 1994
and Young 1990.
4. The seminal collection of essays, Postmodernism and Japan (ed.
Miyoshi and Harootunian 1989) addresses this issue, especially Naoki Sakai’s
work “Modernity and Its Critique: The Problem of Universalism and Particu-
larism.”
5. Immanuel Wallerstein (1990) asserts that the central tenet of Orien-
talist discourse was that only the civilizations of the West had evolved into
modernity. Edward Saïd also discusses the role of how the West institution-
alized various discourses of the difference between the East and the West as a
form of Orientalism (Saïd [1978] 1994, 2–3).
6. Although Samuel Huntington (2003) refers to the post–Cold War
break as pitting the West against the rest, he separates Japan from other Asian
nations. This separate status of Japan mirrors the treatment Japan received by
the political agenda of American modernization theory to posit Japan as a
separate and successful example of non-Western, noncommunist, demo-
cratic, and capitalist nation in the immediate post–World War II era. Also see
Bradshaw and Wallace 1996, especially 96–101.
7. H. D. Harootunian (2000) has written about how various intellectuals
in 1930s Japan self-consciously attempted to view modernity as not a West-
ern monopoly.
8. The “Two System” style of government refers to how China is cur-
rently de‹ning its modern nation-state. In 1992, under Deng Xiao Ping,
China changed its constitution and de‹ned itself to be a “socialist society in-
tent on creating a social market economy with Chinese characteristics”
(Collins 2002, 135). Ong comments that the reference to a uni‹ed “Chinese-
ness” is an attempt to elicit support from the Chinese people by the Chinese
state as it imposes speci‹c reforms to bene‹t the state (Ong and Nonini 1997,
173).
9. For other readings on de‹ning Asian modernity vis-à-vis the West, see
Chow 1991 and 2007; Ivy 1995; and Miyoshi and Harootunian 1989 and 1993.
10. The history of the 1940 Tokyo Olympics is detailed in the forthcom-
ing The 1940 Tokyo Games: The Missing Olympics: Japan, the Asian Olympics
and the Olympic Movement (Collins forthcoming).
11. Jeffrey Wasserstrom (2002, 126) warns against using 1988 Seoul as an
analogy to 2008 Beijing.
12. The bidding slogan for Beijing 2008, “New Beijing, Great Olympics,”
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was retired when Beijing won the right to host the Games in 2001. The cur-
rent BOCOG slogan, “One World, One Dream,” is meant to emphasize the
common and shared dream by the world of the Olympics, although some
may speculate that the Chinese characters for “one” could be also read as
“the same” leading one to conclude that it is “The Same World (i.e., China’s),
The Same (i.e., China’s) Dream.”
13. The most typical example is the 1933 booklet produced by the Tokyo
Municipal Of‹ce, Tokyo: Sports Center of the Orient, which outlined speci‹c
features of the Tokyo bid and presented numerous black and white pho-
tographs of Tokyo and Japan. See Collins forthcoming.
14. This interpretation is similar to Wolfgang Iser’s notion of “dual cod-
ing” in which categories of same/different are constructed and mutually con-
stituted.
15. My upcoming book, The 1940 Tokyo Games: The Missing Olympics, de-
tails this history especially in chapter 2.
16. Post–World War II American historians, typi‹ed by the work of E. O.
Reischauer and A. W. Craig (1978), labeled Japan’s 1930s militarism as an
aberration to its overall successful path of Westernization and modernization
in order to support the United States’ political agenda of stopping the spread
of communism in the East.
17. Nara was the ‹rst permanent imperial capital of Japan, established in
710. The imperial capital was later moved to Heian (today’s Kyoto) in 794,
where it remained for several centuries. Nikko is the location of one of the
most lavishly decorated shrines and the national mausoleum to Tokugawa
Shogunate, established in 1617.
18. Atsuji Tajima states that the debt structure of the Nagano Games left
the Nagano municipality with an average debt of $45,000 per household.
For further reading, see Tajima 2004.
19. Akebono was born in 1969 in Oahu, Hawaii, as Chad Rowan. He be-
came a Japanese citizen in 1996 and retired from sumo in 2001. For further
reading, see Panek 2006.
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Journalism and the 
Beijing Olympics
Liminality with Chinese Characteristics
Briar Smith
On December 1, 2006, Beijing released a signi‹cant declaration con-
cerning foreign media professionals traveling to China to report on the
2008 Beijing Olympics. Ostensibly keeping promises to the Interna-
tional Olympic Committee (IOC) that it would allow journalists to re-
port on the Games in a free media environment, Beijing announced
that it would temporarily relax restrictions on foreign reporters in
China from January 1, 2007, until October 17, 2008. This development
was part of a long discourse concerning the impact of the Beijing
Olympics on ideas of freedom of speech and journalistic practices. In
the several years before 2008, a formulaic approach to discussing
“emerging China,” in which debates about China, human rights and
particularly freedom of expression have been central, established itself.
In keeping with this discourse, one frequently asked question con-
cerned how China would respond to thousands of foreign journalists
on its soil, especially in light of the promises it had made in its Olympic
bid and afterward to allow unrestricted reporting during the Games.
The relaxed foreign press reporting guidelines issued in preparation for
the 2008 Beijing Olympics can be seen as part of a conversation be-
tween China, the IOC, the Beijing Organzing Committee of the
Olympic Games (BOCOG) and global civil society groups.
In this chapter, I argue that although China’s desire to nurture a
more positive international image and present a con‹dent and benev-
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olent China is the impetus behind these new regulations, their imple-
mentation is problematic, both for China itself as it struggles to nego-
tiate its continued need for media control, and for foreign journalists in
China as they operate within this unstable new climate. I also illustrate
the ways in which the temporary nature and uneven application of the
regulations mitigates China’s presentation of itself as a full participant
in the globalized, “modern” world.
Background
When China narrowly lost its 1993 bid to host the 2000 Summer
Olympics by two votes, its record on human rights violations was often
cited as a reason. Four years later, China was the clear favorite, trounc-
ing second-place Toronto, but again, it was criticized for its human
rights abuses (and an Olympic history rife with doping scandals)
(Gamesbids.com). The International Olympic Committee (IOC) Evalu-
ation Commission and its members were ultimately reassured by many
elements of the government-driven bid, by the depth and breadth of
public support within China, and by China’s ability to provide the IOC
with a viable balance between public and private ‹nancing (Polum-
baum 2003). China’s proclamation of its ability to meet the signi‹cant
environmental challenges and “leave a unique legacy to China and to
sport” (BOCOG 2001) illustrated the nation’s sensitivity to the implica-
tions the Olympics might have for China’s geopolitical position and
economic security. Still the human rights issues were haunting, espe-
cially those concerning freedom of the press.
Despite Beijing’s infrastructural overtures of friendliness and sophis-
tication, China’s successful bid has been a lightning rod for speculation
about the ability of an authoritarian country to host an Olympic Games
in line with the IOC’s charter, which, among other things, “seeks to cre-
ate a way of life based on the joy found in effort, the educational value
of good example and respect for universal fundamental ethical prin-
ciples” (IOC 2007). China’s dismal human rights record, as well as its
historically dismissive attitude toward press freedom, attracted interna-
tional press attention as the media debated the capacity of the Olympics
to provide a positive legacy in a country like China. With a history of in-
creasing controls and reversing hard-won liberties in response to con-
troversies and politically damaging events, (i.e., Tiananmen), a ten-
dency colloquially referred to as the “two steps forward, one step back”
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policy,1 the Olympics could ameliorate human rights conditions, in-
cluding press freedoms, or encourage China to tighten its ‹st further if
Beijing deems the results of its foray into increased press freedom threat-
ening or damaging in any way. Beijing is acutely aware that the world’s
eyes are closely watching its every move and its national image in the
foreign press has become of paramount importance. BOCOG has even
commissioned university research to assess the foreign media’s coverage
of the Beijing Olympics. Although they were hoping otherwise, an
analysis of foreign media reports on the Atlanta, Sydney, Athens, and
Beijing Olympics revealed that in contrast to coverage of the other three
Games, most articles on the Beijing Olympics were concerned with po-
litical issues instead of less sensitive topics like economics, preparations,
and sport. In a particularly revealing statement about China’s concep-
tions of state involvement in the media, the report suggests that “Bei-
jing should adapt a more integrated strategy to promote the city image
and [have more opened policy] in communicating with western media
in order to be more active and in›uential in transferring her interna-
tional image in the world” (Dong 2006).2
As soon as the Games were awarded to China, the question of how
China’s tight media environment and restrictions on foreign journal-
ists would be handled when the estimated 20,000 foreign media pro-
fessionals descend on the Middle Kingdom generated intense specula-
tion (Armitage 2005). International media organizations have not been
comfortable with China’s commitment to ensuring journalists’ ability
to freely cover the Games. BOCOG has been aware of the IOC’s expec-
tations that the media, particularly U.S. and European organizations
with large budgets and consuming audiences, have unfettered access to
report on the Olympics, since media-related enterprises make up a
signi‹cant portion of IOC revenue. In their 2001 bid, Chinese of‹cials
gave assurances of “complete media access for all journalists in 2008”
(Committee to Protect Journalists [CPJ] 2006b), but what the govern-
ment meant by “complete media access” and its relation to journalistic
practices on the ground was left unde‹ned for almost six years until its
December announcement.
China’s Media System
In order to understand the regulatory alterations, it is important to
have some grasp of the extraordinarily complicated Chinese media con-
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text in which the regulations are to be operationalized and the system
by which the PRC manages foreign media presence within its borders.
China’s domestic media system, itself, is chaotic in concept. It is too
simple to think of it as wholly a system under unitary state and Party
control; at the same time, steps toward privatization, decentralization,
and technological adaptation run in directions that often seem incon-
sistent. A typical account addressed by media critics for a Western audi-
ence might describe it as the “propagandist/commercial model” of jour-
nalism (Zhao 1998, 151), or a form of “authoritarian liberalism—a
combination of economic liberalism and political illiberalism” (Hemel-
ryk Donald et al. 2002, 5). The hybrid form of governance constituting
the Chinese media scene means that it cannot be reduced to either the
Party principle or market forces. Departing from the policy of directly
funding or subsidizing the media without regard for economic viability,
economic reforms and decentralization in the 1990s meant rapid com-
mercialization for news organizations and an expectation that they be-
come mostly, if not completely, ‹nancially independent from govern-
ment resources even while independent ownership is prohibited.
Commercialization resulted in rapid diversi‹cation and a reorientation
toward the consumer market, relevant content, broadened scope of
coverage, and developments in watchdog reporting. The shift to a mar-
ket economy has led to a large variety of players who ‹nd and diffuse
information, some not within the traditional concept of press. The rise
in defamation cases is an indicator that there are more critical reports in
areas such as the environment or business and these may increase as
part of an effort to show enhanced attention to quality of production.
Still, efforts to protect consumer interests are undermined by corrup-
tion and increasingly powerful private corporations that go so far as to
threaten and physically rough up journalists for reports that might
jeopardize their bottom line. Although the media have gained more
freedom in less political areas, the Party still seeks to retain editorial and
political control over the news media; the goal that “the power of the
Party may not be threatened in the least remains unchanged, or even
strengthened in the context of commercialization” (Zhao 1998, 151).
Journalists obviously face threats apart from private interests within
China; China has had the dubious honor of being the leading incarcer-
ator of journalists since 1999 (CPJ 2007)3 and reports of journalists fac-
ing harassment, abuse, and detention are well documented by press
watchdog groups. As is true in many contexts, journalists and editors
frequently engage in self-censorship to avoid offenses. The relocation
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and demotion of editors is not uncommon and they can be held re-
sponsible for their employees’ reporting on controversial issues, such as
news of infectious diseases, Party corruption, protests, and disasters.4
PRC journalists often have a different conceptualization of their pro-
fession from those of journalists in more liberal political contexts,
though the gulf may be narrowing. The Chinese media tend to be pa-
triotic toward the state, receptive to patronage from superiors and ad-
vertisers (in many cases turning into outright bribery and corruption)
and “paternalistic and elitist in self-expression . . . Journalists are both
integrated into the system as part of the cultural elite and treated as
part of an ideological instrument” (Lee 2001, 247). Zhou He quali‹es
the evolution of Chinese media and journalists as a more complicated
movement away from acting as simple mouthpieces of the Party and
toward a more nuanced role between the political-economic “tug-of-
war,” frequently promoting and legitimating the Party in what he calls
“Party Publicity Inc” (He 2000). Important developments have oc-
curred in pushing the boundaries of “free speech” in recent years, both
because of shifts in policy, market competition, and the sheer amount
of publications as the result of commercialization and diversi‹cation,
which makes wholesale monitoring much less possible.5 However, even
while geared toward catering to market demands, avoiding of‹cial vio-
lations remains paramount in maintaining the viability of any news or-
ganization. As Chin-Chuan Lee has put it, “the Western bourgeois-lib-
eral concept of ‘neutral journalism’—let alone the development of an
oppositional culture to the state—is of‹cially rejected” (Lee 2001, 247).
Foreign journalists are a signi‹cant source of anxiety for image-con-
scious China. Sensitive to criticism and wary about its citizenry’s access
to foreign reports, China has sought, in the past, to curtail access to
news that is produced by non-Chinese nationals and has not been in-
ternally vetted. With the 1990s economic reforms, increased foreign
trade, and the opening of the stock market have necessitated improved
access to ‹nancial reporting by Chinese business organizations and
government departments. Foreign news services such as Dow Jones and
Reuters have established a pro‹table presence in China’s ‹nancial news
environment, selling up-to-the-minute ‹nancial data to banks and in-
vestment ‹rms. Xinhua, the PRC’s of‹cial press agency, retains at least
symbolic oversight of these companies to ‹lter sensitive content that
might jeopardize national interests. The imperative to retain a monop-
oly in the information market also prohibits Chinese companies from
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setting up joint media ventures with foreign ownership. The Internet
has, of course, immensely complicated this task.
Foreign journalists operating within China have been required to
follow what could be considered a draconian set of regulations. Applic-
able to resident foreign correspondents, short-term correspondents,
and the permanent of‹ces that employ foreign journalists, any jour-
nalist entering China must submit an application to the Information
Department of the Foreign Ministry in Beijing or the equivalent of‹ce
if they are stationed in any other province and must show up in person
to receive a foreign press permit. Reporters on short-term stays are un-
der the supervision of “host organizations” that are to assist them with
their activities. Article 14 of the “Regulations Concerning Foreign Jour-
nalists,” which is worth quoting at length, is indicative of the circum-
spection with which the PRC approaches foreign journalists:
Article 14: Foreign journalists and permanent of‹ces of foreign news
agencies shall conduct journalistic activities within the scope of busi-
ness as registered or within the mutually agreed plan for news cover-
age. Foreign journalists and permanent of‹ces of foreign news agencies
shall observe journalistic ethics and shall not distort facts, fabricate ru-
mors or carry out news coverage by foul means. Foreign journalists and
permanent of‹ces of foreign news agencies shall not engage in activi-
ties which are incompatible with their status or tasks, or which endan-
ger China’s national security, unity or community and public interests.
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003)
The most physically restrictive of the regulations requires foreign jour-
nalists to submit a written application to the relevant governmental au-
thorities in any province or municipality outside of Beijing in which
the journalist wishes to conduct journalistic activities. This is widely
considered to be a means by which the government monitors foreign
journalists within the country and prevents their sanctioned travel to
parts of China that might result in the publishing of sensitive reports,
such as reports out of Tibet or Xinjiang. Travel approval can take days,
weeks, or possibly years to obtain, placing journalists in the position of
either being too late to cover timely topics in other provinces or travel-
ing without permission. Journalists’ violations are usually overlooked
for routine reports, but if they are caught covering protests, epidemics,
or anything else the government deems un›attering, they risk being ar-
rested, interrogated, and having notes and footage con‹scated. Jour-
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nalists are also required to seek permission for interviews in Beijing and
are discouraged from conducting street interviews, and there have been
incidents of interviewees being beaten or arrested for talking to foreign
journalists (McLaughlin 2006–7). Even sanctioned interviews often in-
volve the presence of an of‹cial, further dampening the environment
in which journalists operate. The often ill-de‹ned and ambiguous reg-
ulations can have the effect of curtailing independent reporting, and
tactics like roughing up correspondents, aggressively monitoring and
tailing correspondents “surprise, anger and frustrate visiting journalists
from the United States and other free-press countries” (McLaughlin
2006–7).
Adding to the doubts that Beijing cared to at least present the sem-
blance of a press-friendly environment to the world, China announced
in September of 2006 that it would impose broad new restrictions on
the distribution of foreign news within China. These restrictions would
have positioned Xinhua to act as the “de facto gatekeeper” (Kahn
2006) for foreign news reports, photographs, and economic data leav-
ing China and to act as the middleman between foreign news providers
and their clients. Following complaints by powerful news agencies like
Reuters and Bloomberg, the plan was soon scrapped. In June 2006, Bei-
jing announced plans to impose ‹nes on domestic and foreign jour-
nalists who reported on sudden events, such as riots, disease outbreaks,
or natural disasters without authorization.6 Combined with increased
censorship of Web sites, blogs, relocation or ‹ring of editors and jour-
nalist arrests in previous months, these steps were interpreted through
the lens of the impending Olympics and Beijing’s desire to increase me-
dia control prior to the Olympics, regardless of world or IOC opinion
(Watts 2006).
Announcement of New Regulations
For a number of months, the negative press attention garnered by the
backward trajectory didn’t appear to bother the PRC but its December
2006 announcement came in the wake of vigorous criticism and advo-
cacy by groups like Reporters Without Borders, Amnesty International,
the CPJ, Foreign Correspondents Club of China (FCCC), and even the
European Union. The Wall Street Journal described the changes as
“re›ecting pressure by the IOC and human-rights groups for China to
provide an atmosphere of greater freedom and openness for the
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Olympics, as well as the Chinese government’s desire to be seen as an
increasingly powerful, but benevolent global power” (Fong 2006). Pos-
sibly hoping that promoting a more comfortable operating environ-
ment for foreign reporters would positively in›uence reporting on
China during the Games (and beyond), the Foreign Ministry held a
press conference to declare that the restrictions on foreign journalists
covering the Olympic Games and “related matters” would be relaxed
temporarily, for the time period beginning January 1, 2007, and expir-
ing October 17, 2008, which encompasses the lead-up to the Games
and a couple of months after they end. The most notable article in the
regulations allows media professionals to travel within China without
prior approval, as long as they have an Olympic Identity and Accredi-
tation Card. Another article states that “to interview organizations or
individuals in China, foreign journalists need only to obtain their prior
consent” (BBC Monitoring Asia Paci‹c 2006). The regulations permit for-
eign news organizations to hire Chinese citizens to assist them in their
reporting activities, as long as they are hired through organizations
that provide services to foreign nationals. Aware that journalists will
not limit their coverage to sports, the Foreign Ministry is broadly inter-
preting the new rules and Spokesman Liu Jianchao predicted that the
media “will also cover politics, science, technology, and the economy.
The ‘related matters’ . . . actually expands the areas on which foreign
journalists can report” (Taipei Times 2006). However, Liu warned that
authorities would still have the authority to intervene, “especially dur-
ing emergencies, protests, and other incidents that suddenly arise,” re-
vealing the degree to which the government is fearful of spontaneity
and free access to cover events. Allowing travel to Tibet and Xinjiang
was also ambiguously de‹ned, with the caveat that some control for se-
curity reasons was possible. He also acknowledged that implementa-
tion would not be friction-free and that foreign journalists must still
comply with Chinese law, evidencing China’s ambivalence toward
wholesale commitment to these relaxations. Adding more reservations
about the success of implementing the rules outside of Beijing, vice-
minister of the State Council Information Of‹ce, Wang Guoqing, said
that he was “not quite optimistic about their implementation outside
of major cities” (China Daily 2007) and that he wouldn’t be surprised if
reporters encountered some dif‹culties in obtaining news.
However, there have been several encouraging signs that Beijing is
honoring the spirit of its recent foray into a more liberal handling of
the press. Explained as part of a policy shift toward “serving the media”
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instead of managing it, Vice-Minister Wang stated that there are “a
hundred advantages and not a single disadvantage” in dealing with the
press in a forthright and friendly manner, adding that “besides inform-
ing the public, the media act as a watchdog of government activities.”
Although it appears he was only talking about the foreign press at the
time, it is rare to hear this kind of rhetoric coming from the main gov-
ernmental information of‹ce.7 A specially designed master’s program
in Media Management was instituted at the University of Bedfordshire
in the United Kingdom with the help of Beijing’s municipal govern-
ment. Equal parts coursework and projects, there are journalist guest
lectures and site visits to UK media organizations. Wanting to be pre-
pared for the onslaught of foreign media and their foreign expecta-
tions, the students, made up of Chinese government and media work-
ers, are learning how to be more effective communication partners
during the Olympics. Commenting that Beijing’s feedback has been
positive and without complaints about “liberal democratic values,” one
lecturer said, “We are just here planting the seeds. It’s brave of the Chi-
nese government and brave of the university—it is widening participa-
tion . . . and giving the students ideas, techniques and skills they oth-
erwise wouldn’t have access to” (Corbyn 2007).
In another effort toward transparency, the National People’s Con-
gress (NPC) and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
(CPPCC), both held annually in March, allowed overseas journalists to
directly contact and interview lawmakers and political advisors after
they ‹lled out an online journalist registration. Past regulations man-
dated that journalists contact the “Two Sessions” Press Center, who
would then contact the committee members on their behalf. For the
‹rst time in more than 50 years, the Two Sessions Center released the
names, addresses, and background information of all NPC delegation
members and deputies on its Web site and translated the work reports
into six languages (BBC Monitoring Asia Paci‹c 2007). In late January
2007, Reporters Without Borders was allowed to visit China for the ‹rst
time, and government of‹cials told the group they might be ready to
reconsider the situation of journalists and Internet users who are being
held in prison, more than a little ironically adding, “China hopes to see
comprehensive, objective and fair assessment of its development and
human rights conditions” (Press Trust of India 2007).
However, since the new rules took effect on January 1, 2007, many
incidents concerning foreign journalists seem to contradict Beijing’s
creation of “an enabling environment for foreign journalists” (Hutzler
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2006), and a continuing con‹ning atmosphere for the domestic media
has dampened enthusiasm for China’s “courageous” new policy. Per-
haps not surprisingly, a recent special report released by CPJ and a sur-
vey conducted by the FCCC evaluate China’s pledges to the interna-
tional community concerning press freedoms for the Olympics and
‹nd ultimately that the PRC is failing on many fronts. The FCCC re-
ported that 40 percent of foreign correspondents working in China
have experienced some form of interference, such as source intimida-
tion, detention, and even violence since the rules took effect. Refract-
ing the ‹ndings through the prism of the Olympics and its entail-
ments, FCCC President Melinda Liu cautioned, “A nation where
citizens who speak to foreign correspondents face threats, reprisals, and
even bodily harm does not live up to the world’s expectations of an
Olympic host” (FCCC 2007). According to the CPJ report, one of the
most serious problems is treatment of domestic journalists who are
subject to the “full force” of domestic censorship and are still bound by
restrictions on their travel and reporting practices in other provinces
(CPJ 2007). Further complications arise for the Chinese nationals who
are hired to assist foreign media professionals and press organizations
with interviews, translations, and other services that help overcome
the tremendous language barrier in China. It remains unclear what
protection, if any, will be afforded to Chinese citizens who assist for-
eign journalists with writing anything offensive to the government.
CPJ is concerned about the double standard inherent in the rules and
the post-Olympic implications: “once the closing ceremonies are held
and international attention fades, Chinese journalists will bear the
brunt of of‹cial retribution for reporting any news that the govern-
ment deems unfavorable” (CPJ 2006b). CPJ provides international me-
dia organizations with comprehensive lists of precautions and recom-
mendations on ways to protect themselves, as well as sources and
assistants, from punishment and suspicion while working in China.
Treatment of Chinese nationals remains one of the most problematic
aspects of this regulatory turn, and the report calls on China to aban-
don “archaic systems of media control” and “end violent retribution
meted out by local of‹cials angered by critical reporting” while urging
the IOC to insist that China extend the new press freedoms to domes-
tic journalists (CPJ 2007, 8).
Even with the restrictions lifted on interviewing Chinese citizens,
Chinese authorities have implemented creative mechanisms by which
to further control the ›ow of information. In a fascinating glimpse into
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the PRC’s conception of politics and journalism, when foreign re-
porters attempted to interview Zheng Enchong, a former human rights
lawyer who served three years for illegally providing state secrets
abroad, they were turned away by police. Although he was released last
year, he is serving an extra year of “deprivation of political rights,”
which means he is “not suitable for taking interviews” (Ching 2007)
raising intriguing questions about the right to meet with foreign jour-
nalists as a condition of citizenship, a privilege that has been effectively
denied all citizens under the old policies. Denying interviews based on
deprivation of political rights is also a convenient mechanism by
which of‹cials can circumvent the new interview rules since some citi-
zens can have their “right to be interviewed” revoked. In February
2007, the Central Propaganda Department banned news reporting on
twenty speci‹c issues in order to promote a “conducive atmosphere” in
the lead up to the 17th Chinese Communist Party Congress. Mandates
that only “ethically inspiring” programs be aired during primetime
have also been imposed (Feuilherade 2007).8 The local government in
Shandong province issued a document that urged all departments, or-
ganizations, and of‹cials to “use all measures to downsize the impact of
negative reporting to a minimum level” (BBC Monitoring International
Reports 2007) in preparation for the challenge posed by relaxed media
restrictions. Noting that measures to “block malicious information that
might intensify social con›icts or uneasiness” has been a long-standing
practice by local of‹cials, a Chinese editor warned that reporters can’t
expect full transparency when the specter of negative news endangers
their position (BBC Monitoring International Reports 2007) and provin-
cial authorities (often with the cooperation of local business) often
work together to prevent investigative reporting on potentially embar-
rassing issues.
Although the CPJ and FCCC reports ‹nd that foreign journalists
have had an easier time since the rules were relaxed (FCCC 2007, 1),
travel and interview access is far from unproblematic. One day after the
rules were announced, New York Times Beijing bureau chief Joseph
Kahn and International Herald Tribune’s Roger Cohen were detained and
made to write “confessions” after interviewing a businessman in Hubei
province (CPJ 2006a). While attempting to report on toys with possible
lead contamination, New York Times reporter David Barboza, his trans-
lator, and his photographer were detained by the factory’s private secu-
rity of‹cers, necessitating hours of negotiations before their release. A
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BBC crew was arrested in Hunan province for investigating a rumored
student death in a protest over increased public transportation fares.
Police criticized the reporters for not obtaining permission to visit the
city, and when one journalist explained that new regulations allowed
them to move freely within China, the of‹cer replied, “That is just for
stories linked to the Olympic Games and I don’t think you came here
for the Olympic Games” (Reporters Without Borders 2007). China’s
vast and decentralized bureaucracy presents troublesome challenges for
any consistent application of the new regulations. The regulations out
of Beijing are not necessarily taken seriously at the local level; provin-
cial of‹cials have little retribution to fear from Beijing since any incon-
sistencies can be explained away as accidents or miscommunications.
Second, the regulations are temporary, belying the sincerity that a per-
manent rule change might express.
In order to assess the situation on the ground for a foreign reporter
stationed in China, I contacted Howard French, Shanghai-based senior
reporter for the New York Times.9 As a longtime reporter in China, Mr.
French has spent much of his career operating under the previous press
regulations and said that he had been detained from time to time for
being an unauthorized visitor in another province. Although it has not
happened to him since the relaxations, he said he had not yet fully
tested the new rules. When asked how he interpreted the changes as a
media professional, he answered, “I think it is a positive step, generally
speaking. It will need to be tested thoroughly through real-world expe-
rience, but the authorities should be praised, at least provisionally, for
removing anachronistic controls.” French also stated that the tempo-
rary nature of the rules “struck [him] as the way the Chinese govern-
ment does a great many things. They introduce economic reforms in a
province or two, to see how things go before rolling them out on a
broader, more permanent scale. It is perfectly possible, of course, that
there is no intention to make these changes permanent, and that it is
essentially meant to give political cover during the Olympics.” He ex-
pects the Olympics to present an intense media situation in China,
with “millions of journalists running around China, running the entire
gamut of knowledge and sophistication.” In his opinion, the nature of
the stories written and the degree to which they are seen as affecting
China’s image in the world will largely determine whether the govern-
ment makes the rules permanent.
Regardless of whether or not the new rules are made permanent, the
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PRC’s media climate is still troubling for both foreign and domestic me-
dia alike. With a built-in expiration date, China is truly doing “limi-
nality with Chinese characteristics.” The Olympics represents an im-
portant rite of passage in which new approaches to media freedom,
government transparency, and environmental stewardship could lead
the way to a new, more globally participatory Chinese era. Instead, the
rules are conceived as transitory, allowing China to revert to its previ-
ous policies and behavior if it chooses, eschewing the permanently
transformative element of liminality.10 Conceived as a temporary rap-
prochement with a more liberal press model, it is not necessarily borne
of a self-re›exive or organic progression toward lasting freedom of the
press for foreign or domestic media. Moreover, the dif‹culties journal-
ists encounter on the ground and the government’s hesitancy to put its
full muscle behind the new regulations is indicative of the awkward
and ill-conceived notion of sudden, wholesale importation of a “West-
ern” model of journalism into a non-Western context that is ill-
equipped to accommodate the model.
The discontinuity of journalists’ experiences speaks to the rather
clumsy and half-hearted institution of the regulations as well as the
heavy hand of provincial authorities who have no real reason to take
Beijing seriously. Possibly just a gesture of compliance to the IOC and a
consequence of pressure from global civil society groups, the foreign
media rule changes are often described in terms of other Olympic in-
frastructural improvements designed to comfort and impress tourists.
Even while remaking itself in the image of a responsible and ascendant
nation, Beijing seems unaware that while its efforts are an important
step, they might do even more damage to its international image. A
temporary and domestically hypocritical press policy rei‹es China as
an authoritarian “other.” If liberal press freedoms and transparency are
endemic to the type of globally in›uential, politically stable, “‹rst-
world” nations in which China is asserting its membership, the double
standard of disallowing their own journalists from engaging in the
practices that they bestow on foreign journalists belies China’s self-pre-
sentation as a con‹dent nation.11
Following a well-practiced strategy of neijing-waisong (internally tight
and externally loose), China can be comfortable with allowing foreign
journalists to report freely during this period only as long as it retains (or
retains the illusion of retaining) a domestic grip on information.
Whether it is by curtailing permissible reporting in the internally
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in›uential domestic press, ‹ring and jailing journalists and dissidents,
or maintaining a purposefully ambiguous and uneven application of the
new regulations, it is clear that the desire to establish the presentation of
a respectable, open, and responsible nation in time for the Olympics is
not a seamless task. Countering the skepticism that China can fully
commit to and maintain an environment in which international media
organizations feel unencumbered in their journalistic activities cannot
be achieved simply through lip service and grandiloquent press confer-
ences. It necessitates a pervasive examination of habituated behavior
and attitudes toward both domestic and foreign media, and a home-
grown, sustainable approach to increased press freedoms.
NOTES
1. This phrase was discussed by the students in a class taught at Beijing
University as part of the Penn-in-Beijing 2007 Summer School, which was
comprised of both Chinese and American students.
2. Dong’s presentation at a July 2006 symposium, “Global Olympiad,
Chinese Media,” held in Beijing, was an interesting window into the way in
which media research is conducted in China. Her report suggests that the
way China’s national image is portrayed will improve as the result of Bei-
jing’s interceding strategies with respect to Western media.
3. According to this report, twenty-nine journalists are currently in jail
because of their work, held on vague “antistate” charges.
4. In discussing media freedom at Beijing University in the summer of
2006, a student told me the following story. A newspaper had published an
article that concerned the Uighurs, an ethnic Muslim minority within
China. The report contained a description of the reason that Muslims do not
eat pork, which was criticized later by Uighurs for its inaccuracy and offen-
sive tone. The editor of the newspaper was ‹red almost immediately for al-
lowing the article to be printed. This anecdote underscores both how
terri‹ed China is of its Muslim minorities and the ease with which editors’
careers are terminated.
5. According to 1999 statistics in Gunaratne’s volume Handbook of the
Media in Asia, there were some 2,000 newspapers in China, not to mention
magazines and other industry publications, which can only have increased
since then. What remains truly off limits, however, is questioning the legiti-
macy of the CCP and/or promoting political regime change.
6. This proposed law was rewritten in the summer of 2007 to remove the
‹nes for journalists, but still bars reporting on whatever the government
classi‹es as “false information.” See People’s Daily Online 2007.
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7. Vice-Minister Wang also commented that part of the ideological and
practical shift toward serving the media has included the development of a
“reporter’s assistance project,” which is a compilation of information about
people and places they may want to cover. Each region is responsible for
coming up with a general handbook and pamphlets for reporters with infor-
mation about projects that might be of interest to journalists. It also requires
the foreign affairs of‹ces at the provincial level or local level to ease the way
for foreign journalists when they come to town. This idea of regionally pro-
duced pamphlets and compilations of people and places of interest is indica-
tive to me of China’s complete inability to understand how absurd this ap-
pears. Their idea of not managing the press entails a new “helpful” and
“friendly” management by way of not-so-subtle nudges to cover certain top-
ics and interview certain people (and steer clear of others). This is also em-
blematic of the way China conceptualizes the press as operating at the behest
of governmental suggestions and in›uences instead of providing indepen-
dent coverage and independent research. This approach was echoed at last
summer’s Olympic conference in Beijing when the head of BOCOG’s media
affairs of‹ce outlined its future plans for handling the media when it came to
report on the Olympics. He said that information packets on all the athletes
would be made in advance, minimizing the need to conduct interviews; a
plush new media center was being created with everything they would need
at their ‹ngertips; and transportation would be provided for journalists,
along with suggested restaurants and hotels. The international participants
at the conference were listening to his description with barely concealed
shock and cynicism at the implications while he appeared extremely earnest
and pleased with the “progressive” plan.
8. This includes a ban on foreign-produced cartoons during prime time
and a crackdown on “vulgar” reality shows.
9. All quotes in this section are from personal communication with
Howard French.
10. The subtitle of this chapter, “Liminality with Chinese Characteris-
tics,” is meant to be a play on the term Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,
which is the term used to describe the PRC’s economic reforms in the 1980s,
encompassing a mixed form of private and public ownership competing
within a market environment, creating a system that is in essence identical
to capitalism but where the state dominates large parts of the economy and
it is pointedly not called capitalism.
11. I do not mean to argue here that a free press is necessary in a “‹rst-
world” nation, although I’m sure the argument can be and has been made. I
only mean to say that China wants to present itself on par with countries like
the United States, Australia, Europe, and so on, where other successful
Olympics have been held and in which a positive image of the host nation
was sustained. These countries all have variations of an independent press,
which is sometimes synonymous with politically in›uential, modern nations.
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Staging the 2008 Olympics is heady stuff for the modern descendants
of the Middle Kingdom. Though its emperor once possessed a divine
mandate to rule “All Under Heaven,” China’s international role has
been far more circumscribed during the last century and a half. Now
the Chinese believe their luck has changed. Playing host to the largest
of all modern peacetime extravaganzas perfectly suits the current Chi-
nese political imagination, succinctly if not subtly expressed in the Bei-
jing Olympic slogan, “One World, One Dream.” Through the magic of
media, the 2008 Games will certainly reach all under heaven, a scale
the Chinese have embraced by sending an Olympic ›ag to orbit the
earth for ‹ve days in 2005 aboard China’s second manned space mis-
sion, Shengzhou VI (Zhao 2005).
The image of the world as China’s sphere of in›uence could be seen
in talk about the Olympic torch relay, the most ambitious ever. The
“Journey of Harmony” would, according to Beijing Organizing Com-
mittee of the Olympic Games (BOCOG) head Liu Qi, be the most terri-
torially extensive ever, crossing 85,000 miles and ‹ve continents, trac-
ing the ancient Silk Road and ascending Mt. Everest (nailing down
China’s claim to Tibet), before reaching the capital (Channel NewsAsia
2007). When state television broadcast “Rise of the Great Nations,” pre-
senting the histories of nine world-dominating modern nations in-
cluding the United States, the Netherlands, and England (Beijingmike
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2007), there was scant need for the series to name China as the coming
tenth to ascend to greatness for its domestic audience. Many citizens
are said to believe their leaders have a secret strategy that will make this
century China’s. Meanwhile, visually lush programs about the history
of ancient China are endlessly recycled on the West-directed English-
language channel.
Architecture has long been at the heart of Chinese statecraft, so it is
no surprise that built form has a special role to play in the XXIX
Olympiad. The character of Olympic public space is part of the effort to
change the subject from protests about China’s human rights record,
its role in Darfur, its labor practices, and the lingering memory of the
1989 massacres of protesters in the streets near Tiananmen Square by
giving expression to “the ‹rm belief of a great nation, with a long his-
tory of 5,000 years and on its way to modernization, that it is commit-
ted to peaceful development, harmonious society and people’s happi-
ness,” as the BOCOG Web site insists (BOCOG 2005). Always just
offstage, the past is a resource for reinventing not only the Maoist
legacy recent leaders have been at pains to go beyond, but less savory
elements of the current regime as well.
Taken as a whole, Olympic construction, emblematized in Olympic
Green and its venues, is the latest in a series of contemporary public
works projects including the Tibet-Qinghai railway (the world’s high-
est) and the Three Gorges Dam (the world’s largest) that form a stately
procession forward from the Great Wall, the Forbidden City, and
Tiananmen Square, all of which will greet Olympic visitors in newly re-
stored splendor. The massive coordination of people and resources that
produced each of these works in times past hints of a historically pre-
ordained sweep to the “harmonious society” invoked by Hu Jintao as a
national goal. As well, it de›ects concern for the several millions who
have borne the brunt of Olympic development directly, either as labor-
ers without rights or protection, or citizens who have lost homes and
livelihoods in this latest wave of urban redevelopment (Watts 2005).
The harmonious society also appeals to newly resurrected Confucian
values of respect for authority and stability. Maligned during the
Maoist era, this most venerable of Chinese political traditions has
reemerged as an invented tradition for legitimizing the considerable
domestic social burdens created by a rising China.1
According to the social theorist Henri Lefebvre every society pro-
duces its characteristic material spaces (1991). Lefebvre posits a trialec-
tic of contending and contradictory forces that can go some way to
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plumb the multiple material layers of the current Olympic drama,
though any such framework for such sociospatial complexity must be
suggestive at best. Lefebvre’s ‹rst layer is the space conceived by rulers,
architects, planners, and bureaucrats. It expresses what Amos Rapoport
has called designers’ values (1982). This of‹cially authorized spatial
imagination of Beijing 2008 seeks to project, above all, the image of a
sophisticated modern country open to a world that will be enthusiasti-
cally receptive in its turn. For this purpose, Olympic planning and exe-
cution have been shared out among the State Council, the Beijing Mu-
nicipal Government, the Beijing Olympic Organizing Committee, the
Chinese Olympic Committee, the International Olympic Committee,
and a collaborating army of sponsors, developers, architects, and con-
struction crews. The same could not be said for many of the people
most directly affected by it. Still, Olympic goals occupy a prominent
place in the 10th and 11th Five-Year Plans and all supporting texts ad-
dressing the development of speci‹c spaces and projects. These goals
are publicly articulated on BOCOG’s Web site, which offers of‹cial
commentary on Olympic preparation and will be the authorized site
for the festival itself.
Lefebvre’s second layer emerges as those whose lives unfold in the ef-
fort to bring “conceived” space to life struggle to shape it to their own
symbolic and material uses. Here are manifest all the desires and pas-
sions of users’ values of reception, resistance, accommodation, and re-
vision. Debates about the character of particular uses and structures,
struggles over building and implementation decisions, and responses to
their impact on urban life occur here. In Beijing such debates have gen-
erated new vocabularies and rhetorical resources for surrogate discus-
sions about the political future of China itself. Concrete practices of
construction and use, the third layer of the Lefebvrian trialectic, tack
back and forth between of‹cially “conceived” and vernacularly “lived”
levels to produce actualized structures and spaces that in the present
case will contain the activities of athletes, of‹cials, and luminaries, and
will anchor the large and animated crowds without which no Games
can be considered successful. The realized spaces and the communities
(including the crowds!) that are thus created will continue to modify
their new spaces when the Games are done. Brie›y sketched, this is how
space for Lefebvre is the unending work of a whole society, an oeuvre.
Meanwhile, the Chinese have of‹cially and informally embraced
the Games as a moment of national history. Newspaper coverage of the
bidding process riveted public attention while posters and slogans ap-
“All Under Heaven”
231
peared everywhere in the run-up to the announcement of the 2008
Olympic host city. When word came, Beijingers pulled out the stops for
a dazzling “›ag-waving, horn-honking, music-jamming, ‹recracker-ex-
ploding” party. Millions of citizens have since been enthusiastic partic-
ipants in Olympic preparation, though not everyone has been equally
swept up. There have also been protests, riots, and the occasional sui-
cide. Organized resistance to the sharp elbows of planners has come
from improvised and shifting alliances of artists, intellectuals, and pro-
fessionals. Whatever their views, all Beijingers have picked their way
through the dizzying pace of small and large changes and their after-
shocks in the dramatic transformations under way.
The ongoing demolition of what remains of the old, often dilapi-
dated republican city re›ects the regime’s desire to remove every obsta-
cle to China’s modernizing vision of itself and to make Beijing a con-
temporary showcase. The urban renewal of Beijing has been a project
of every regime since the collapse of the Qing dynasty.2 The period of
post-1978 reforms has engendered especially great social strains. Citi-
zens have endured intense urbanization, growing inequalities between
the wealthy and ordinary workers, the displacement and impoverish-
ment of agrarian peasants by industrialization, and massive environ-
mental degradation. To contain the resulting pressures for accountabil-
ity and democratization simmering just beneath the surface, there are
strong pressures to vindicate the post-Mao direction of Deng Xiaoping
and his market-oriented successors with an iconic Olympic success.
Since 1960 host cities have counted on the Games to jump start lag-
ging urban economies (Hanwen and Pitts 2006; Owen 2005). Beijing’s
economic miracle needs no fanning. Government ‹gures recorded
more than 12 percent growth in 2006 (Economist.com 2007a). By meld-
ing globalization, local needs, and cultural tradition the regime hopes
to transform Beijing from a major regional city to a full-›edged world
capital on a par with Singapore, Tokyo, and Hong Kong. That effort
stands behind the of‹cial presentation of the Games as a “Green, High-
tech, Olympics for the People.” Mindful of international anxiety about
the pace of China’s development for resource competition and the en-
vironmental pollution (China produces 17 percent of global carbon
emissions, second only to the United States’ 22 percent) (Economist.com
2007b), the “Green” Olympics aims to present China as an ethically
and technologically responsible environmental steward. The “High-
tech” Olympics will promote a China possessed of ‹rst-world commu-
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nications, transportation, and building technologies. For the “People’s”
Olympics, China hopes to demonstrate a level of domestic and ethnic
enthusiasm that will impress visitors and its own populace. To accom-
plish all this, the Chinese claim to be spending in the range of $30 to
$40 billion, up from $14 billion for Sydney, the previous record (Econ-
omist.com 2007a).
Olympic Challenges
For a country whose economy is not as large or sturdy as those of ‹rst-
tier industrial nations, this is a high stakes, risky undertaking. Olympic
deadlines, however, are certain. For a month in 2008 a city of 15 mil-
lion permanent residents and 4 million from elsewhere in the country
will receive more than 2.5 million visitors, among them some 17,600
athletes and of‹cials and at least as many members of the press. For the
Games to succeed, Beijingers know that this in›ux must be greeted
with seamlessly functioning communications and transportation infra-
structure, comfortable and plentiful accommodation, ample food and
water, clean enough air and streets, a courteous and able service popu-
lation, and a level of public order that is effective without being threat-
ening to tourists, some of whom may have more than sports on their
minds—all under the acute observation of foreign journalists.
Since 2001 herds of bulldozers, cranes, and scaffolds have chewed up
huge swathes of the city in order to raise hundreds of multi story build-
ings generated by Olympic planning. New maps of the city have been
issued every three months (Harris 2006). By 2008 there will be a total
of 800 hotels with 130,000 rooms compared to 458 hotels with 84,812
rooms in 2005 (Owen 2005, 13–14). Thirty-one sports venues are man-
dated for Beijing and six more for the host cities of Qingdao, Hong
Kong, Tianjin, Shanghai, Shenyan, and Qinhuangdao. Sixteen of these
will be completely new; all but three will be upgraded. Some $3.6 bil-
lion is earmarked to crisscross Beijing with ‹ber optic cable for infor-
mation and telecommunications infrastructure. Olympic Green, the
main venue of the Games, will have full access to broadband, Wi-Fi,
and networking technology (Ness 2002).
Beijing has undertaken dramatic new transportation initiatives. Ex-
isting satellite airports have been renovated. A new $1.9 billion termi-
nal designed by Norman Foster in the shape of a ›ying dragon, the
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totem animal of Beijing, will make Tianjin International Airport the
world’s largest at a million square meters. Three new ring roads have
been built along with new interurban rail links to surrounding cities.
On tap for 2008 are 1,000 kilometers of new highways and 84 kilome-
ters of new train lines (Harris 2006). Eight new subway lines will stretch
across the city, including two special lines connecting the airport with
Olympic Green. Beijing’s original two lines have been renovated for au-
tomated ticketing.
Olympic construction has made a signi‹cant contribution to
China’s double-digit economic growth. In 2004 the Economist reported
that national spending on construction was 16 percent of GDP, growing
8 to 9 percent annually, just behind America and Japan. China con-
sumes more than half the world’s cement production, a bit more than
a third of its steel, a bit less than a third of its coal. It is second only to
the United States in consuming wood and petroleum. It builds an aver-
age 2 billion square meters of ›oor space annually, roughly half the
world’s total. Twenty to thirty billion more are planned by 2015 (Jakes
2006).
In 2006 Beijing hosted an Olympic dress rehearsal in which thirty-
‹ve leaders of developing nations came to the China-Africa Forum
while 810,000 police, public of‹cials, and retired party members di-
rected traf‹c and kept public order. Out of town vehicles were banned;
government workers stowed their car keys and walked or biked to work.
When an IOC inspection team visited Beijing in 1993, police sweeps re-
moved street children, the unemployed, beggars, and street vendors
from view (Broudehoux 2004, 198). Similar measures to cosmeticize
public space are doubtless in place for the 2008 Games. In 2006
of‹cials were forced to deny rumors that a million migrant laborers
would be expelled from the capital before the Games, and the mentally
ill con‹ned to hospitals (Economist.com 2006). Public plans to create
frictionless space for visitors include selective traf‹c bans, sending
workers away from the city on well-timed vacations, and energetic
campaigns against spitting, smoking, line-jumping, and foul language.
Classes to teach tourist-friendly English to police, taxi drivers, and or-
dinary citizens are in full swing (Marquand 2004).
Less publicly visible, but logistically critical, are adequate water sup-
plies for Olympic visitors, hotels, and the new greenbelts springing up
all around the city. Deep in a seven-year drought, Beijing’s average per
capita water availability is 300 cubic meters annually, far below the
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1,000 cubic meter international benchmark (Xinhua 2006c). The city’s
current maximum daily consumption of 2.42 million cubic meters will
swell to 2.7 million during the Games. To meet this demand the mu-
nicipal government plans to divert 400 million additional cubic meters
from reservoirs in neighboring agricultural provinces. This is a point of
regional contention since these areas also suffer from water shortages
as a result of drought, population increase, and industrial overuse
(Hornby 2006).
Organizers have vowed to make Beijing’s air as clean as Paris’s by the
beginning of the Games. Such an achievement seems unlikely. Prosper-
ity, geography, and coal make Beijing one of the most polluted cities in
the world. Lung-damaging nitrogen dioxide and sulfur emissions spew
from a disproportionate number of coal-burning power plants and fac-
tories across China, much of which ends up in the north, where Beijing
is (Sheridan 2006). Fierce dust storms from the Gobi Desert blow into
the city, blinding traf‹c and delaying ›ights. Three and a half million
cars are expected to clog city streets by 2008. A pall of dust from 24-
hours-a-day, year-in and year-out construction hovers over the city.
Not only residents and tourists are at risk, but alarmingly, marathoners
who will run along streets where particulate levels exceed U.S. safety
standards three and four times (Li 2006; Watts 2005). To scrub the air,
Beijing has invested $5.4 billion (Owen 2005; Ness 2002). More than
100 of the worst-polluting textile, pharmaceutical and chemical facto-
ries have relocated beyond the city, among them two major polluters,
the Capital Iron & Steel group and the Chemical Industry Area (Xinhua
2006b). Other factories and construction sites will halt work or follow
reduced schedules weeks before the Games. Furnaces of less than 20
tons, including a number of home furnaces, are being converted to
clean fuels. In addition to imposing new emission standards on auto-
mobiles, 90 percent of the city’s 20,000-odd public buses and 70 per-
cent of its 67,000 taxis will convert to natural gas (Xinhua 2006b). Dur-
ing the Games clouds will be seeded to induce rain, and roads sprayed
daily to dampen down particulate matter. The planned installation of
8,000 public toilets for the Games (USA Commercial Service 2004) will
require 4,700 new restrooms and the demolition of 2,800 hutong-alley
public toilets (Marquand 2004). Four hundred miles of sewage pipes
will be renovated or added to city streets (Watts 2006) to treat 90 per-
cent of Beijing’s sewage in modern plants by 2010, compared to 60 per-




Nearly half of Beijing’s competition venues are sited on Olympic
Green, the purpose-built 2,800-acre park where the major festival
venues will be located. The Green sprawls in a rough T-shape across the
fourth and ‹fth ring roads in Chaoyang district. Additional venues are
spread out among eight universities in the Haidan district of northwest
Beijing; the so-called Northern Scenic Area of Shunyi district and the
Ming dynasty tombs; and the Western Community area in Shijingshan
district. The dominant Western aesthetics of these spectacular struc-
tures with which the Chinese mean to present themselves to the world
has sparked a contentious civic debate. The most passionate controver-
sies involve the National Grand Theater, which occupies politically
charged real estate just off Tiananmen Square, and the new China Cen-
tral Television (CCTV) headquarters that will launch its new institu-
tional home by broadcasting the Games from start to ‹nish. Though
neither building is of‹cially an Olympic venue, both occupy a promi-
nent role in the campaign to display a glamorous urban face to inter-
national visitors. The National Grand Theater is intended to showcase
the high culture of Beijing, and the close association of CCTV with the
Games signals the regime’s focus on China’s image for the duration.
The National Grand Theater
The National Grand Theater is a giant silver ellipsoid dome set on an
arti‹cial square pool and entered through an underwater tunnel. As
Beijing’s preeminent performance venue, it will be home to a 2,416-seat
opera house, a 2,017-seat concert hall and a 1,040-seat theater. At night
its semitransparent skin will offer a glimpse of the performances within
it, staging a very public spectacle for passersby (Rjorr 2006). The theater
stands just off Chang An Avenue, west of the Great Hall of the People
in Tiananmen Square. It is a dramatic stylistic departure from the sa-
cred architectural legacy next to it.
The theater began as Zhou Enlai’s dream of completing Mao Ze-
dong’s legacy of Ten Great Buildings around Tiananmen Square. Di-
verting economic resources to build it was politically out of the ques-
tion during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.
Subsequent Party in‹ghting about what kind of monument was most
suitable for the space caused more delay, a debate that grew sharper af-
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ter the 1989 democracy protests made the regime wary of drawing
people to Tiananmen Square. While interest in stimulating an active
arts culture or creating a distinguished modern cityscape like that of
long-time rival Shanghai was slow in coming to this city of ceremonial
and administrative tradition, the rivalry with Shanghai ultimately
moved the project forward. After Shanghai renovated its centrally lo-
cated People’s Square in the 1990s, adding the Urban Exhibition Hall,
the National Museum, and the Grand Theater to general architectural
and urban planning acclaim, the National Grand Theater was reimag-
ined as a prestigious Beijing icon able to stand tall next to both Shang-
hai’s Grand Theater, an elegant modernist structure by the French ar-
chitect Jean-Marie Charpentier, and the Sydney Opera House, a galling
reminder of Beijing’s failed 2000 Olympic bid.
The National Theater was designated as the most important cultural
project in the 10th Five-Year Plan. Because of, or in spite of, this fact,
‹ve rounds of domestic competition failed to produce a design accept-
able to the State Council. International architects were solicited and, af-
ter a hasty show of public consultation, the Council settled on Paul An-
dreu, designer of the Pudong International Airport and the innovative
Charles de Gaulle Airport (Volume 5 n.d.). Andreu had also been the
‹nishing architect for the Grande Arche in Paris following the death 
of Johann Otto von Spreckelsen, its original architect. Modern and
gracefully monumental, the arch is an homage to the nearby Arc de 
Triomphe. If the Chinese had hoped for something as historically sen-
sitive, this was not what they got. Andreu’s selection, widely reported
abroad, was not announced at home for nearly a year. This was appar-
ently to avoid embarrassing the ‹ftieth anniversary celebration of the
founding of the PRC with the news that after forty years of delibera-
tion, a Westerner had been chosen to erect a resolutely futurist land-
mark in hallowed Chinese national space.3
When the plan for the giant glass and titanium egg and arti‹cial lake
‹nally surfaced, forty-nine members of the Chinese Academy of Sci-
ence and Academy of Engineering petitioned Jiang Zemin demanding
a reversal. They were followed by 109 Chinese architects denouncing
its aggressively avant-garde appearance and “illogical” interior (China
Daily 2004). Critics charged that the $536 million cost—more than the
Sydney Opera House, four times the Lincoln Center in a country with
one quarter the GDP of the United States—would raise ticket prices to
a level only the most privileged could afford (China Youth Daily 2004).
Also of concern was the symbolism (and maintenance costs) of a large
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pool in a city of scarce water resources. Of‹cial descriptions of the de-
sign—sparkling drop of water, silver tear, pearl and eggshell—did battle
with popular insults: theater as alien egg, big tomb, boiled egg, French
opera house, ›ying saucer. Xiao Mo, an architectural historian from 
Tsinghua University, memorably charged that the red desert dust con-
stantly blowing through Beijing would give the dome the look of
“dried dung” (Kahn 2004). In an unprecedented move, even the state-
sponsored China Daily sided with the project’s opponents. Several con-
struction halts and the unrelated collapse of an Andreu-designed ter-
minal at Charles de Gaulle ‹nally provided face-saving safety reasons
to scale back the project and trim its cost by $200 million.
Despite its avant-garde style, the theater does gesture strategically to
tradition. Building and lake together evoke the square earth and round
heaven of ancient Chinese cosmology. An earth-red masonry wall at
the theater entrance echoes the color of the walls of the Forbidden City.
The 46-meter height of the building exactly matches the elevation of
the nearby Hall of the People, thus respectfully observing the ancient
imperial taboo forbidding any structure to stand taller than the footrest
of the Emperor’s Throne.
CCTV
In imperial China the only exceptions to this taboo were the royal Bell
and Drum Towers, visible at every point as the tallest structures in the
ancient city. From these public monuments issued the loudest commu-
nal noise as well, clanging and beating as the city gates were locked
each night and unlocked at dawn. In a society where commoners were
forbidden to behold their rulers, imperial power daily penetrated do-
mestic life by imposing dominion over space and time. Something of
this ancient role is reprised by a new skyline topper, the 750 foot (230
meter) headquarters of the CCTV broadcasting system, ceaselessly
beaming the presence of the twenty-‹rst century state into domestic
space. Though not the tallest structure in Beijing, it is by any cultural
measure the loudest. Designed by Rem Koolhaas for the Of‹ce of Met-
ropolitan Architecture, the trapezoidal square-looped building occu-
pies its own 10-hectare site at the heart of a new Central Business Dis-
trict east of the Forbidden City. The ‹rst of 300 planned towers
planned for the CBD, the CCTV “Twisted Donut” consists of two verti-
cal sections leaning toward one another at 60-degree angles and bent at
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right angles into horizontal connectors at top and bottom to form a
continuous Möbius-strip loop. The architect has mischievously sug-
gested that the irregular patterning visible on the structure’s face traces
the forces traveling through it. This, says a reviewer,
raises the question of why a Chinese media conglomerate would want
to express the structural forces of its building. The juxtaposition of the
fully glazed, hence transparent, building surface with an irregular grid
would seem to symbolically reveal the hidden institutional power
struggle in a large state-owned organization. It is safe to assume that
the Chinese authorities do not interpret this symbolism as a general
cry for independent journalism, otherwise the project would not have
received the green light. (Horsley n.d.)
With a straight face Koolhaas also argues that his colossal edi‹ce does
not point to the sky and so is not a skyscraper but an “earthbound
structure” (Leonard 2004). Regardless, it houses the complete appara-
tus of the state system—administration, news, broadcasting, program
production, and studios. More than 10,000 employees will circulate
through the continuously communicating, self-contained site com-
plete with its own hotel, shopping, and parking facilities.
Critics have been harsh. Ian Buruma (2002) has deplored the un-
seemly tussle among Western “starchitects” for the privilege of erecting
a temple to state information control:
There is nothing reprehensible about building an opera house in Bei-
jing, or indeed a hotel, a hospital, a university or even a corporate
headquarters. But state television is something else. CCTV is the voice
of the party, the centre of state propaganda, the organ which tells a bil-
lion people what to think.
Having warmed up, Buruma piles on the criticism:
[I]t is true that architects are often drawn to power. Le Corbusier tried
to interest the Vichy regime and Stalin in his projects. Philip Johnson
was a bit of an amateur black-shirt. Before leaving Germany, Walter
Gropius and Mies van der Rohe were too close to the Nazis. One can
see why. To build on a grand scale you need authority and a lot of
money. And architects with a utopian bent, who dream of transform-
ing not just skylines but the way we live, are natural suckers for totali-
tarianism. And, indeed, suckers for capitalist excess.
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In a similar vein Spanish critic Luis Fernández-Galiano (2003) writes
that the tower conveys “the communicatory ambition of China’s total-
itarian capitalism and its determination to adapt to the symbolic codes
of western economies.” Koolhaas’s response is that the ‹nal answer on
China’s future is not in. Offering his own communicative take on the
tower, he likens its appearance to that other imperial message medium
of choice, ancient calligraphy (Leonard 2004).
Nor has the tower escaped criticism for its $750 million price tag. Wu
Liangyong, cofounder of the architecture department at Tsinghua Uni-
versity and a director of early feasibility studies for a number of
Olympic venues, publicly deplored the tower’s original $5 billion yuan
($603 million) estimate as outrageously extravagant, writing: “I’m not
against novel ideas, or unconventional or unorthodox designs, as that
is what the art needs . . . But we cannot put aside engineering and struc-
ture, we cannot overlook our culture, or the cost. China is not rich
enough not to care about 5 billion yuan” (People’s Daily Online 2004).
The partly completed tower has been the focus of grassroots dissent
as well. The demolition of a nail house standing in the way of site con-
struction in April 2007 became an emblematic story of local resistance
to the tower in particular and the ruthless pace of urban redevelopment
in China generally (Reuters 2007). In China a “nail” is a stubborn 
troublemaker who refuses to be ›attened. A nail house is the last house
left standing on a tract marked for demolition because its owners refuse
compensation from developers and hold out against eviction orders by
the courts. Several nail houses across China have brought national and
international publicity to street protests, several suicides, and other
desperate efforts by local residents with few legal remedies and no say
in the fate of their homes and neighborhoods in spite of energetic ef-
forts by the regime to block press coverage.
Olympic Green Venues
Set down in the heart of the city, both the National Grand Theater and
the CCTV tower provide highly visible targets for vigorous civic debate
around of‹cially “conceived” and vernacularly “lived” space. By con-
trast, Olympic Green has been largely shielded from public view by the
high construction fence that surrounds the site. The ‹nal look of the
Green will remain something of a mystery until the opening of the
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Games, and there is reason to believe it will differ in important details
from the layout presented in the winning master plan by Sasaki Land-
scape Architects of Boston. Three parcels comprise the Green. North-
ernmost is Forest Park, a squarish 1,680-acre plot three times the size of
Manhattan’s Central Park but likewise intended to reduce urban heat
and noise with vast expanses of green. The abutting second parcel, the
1,000-acre (405 hectare) Central Area drops vertically toward the
fourth ring road along the imperial spine of old Beijing. Here are
celebrity venues for the major athletic contests and ceremonies, and
open areas for containing Olympic crowds. To the south and east of the
Central Area is the third parcel, the site and stadium complex of the
1990 Asian Games, the ‹rst mega sporting event in China. More mod-
estly sized than Forest Park, this parcel is formally integrated by an axis
running northwest from the Asian Games stadium through the Central
Area.
The entire Green is tethered by a seventeen-mile (twenty-four km)
path that extends the north-south boulevard running through the
Central Area of the Green to the north gate of the Imperial City and be-
yond to the enormous new train station connecting Beijing to the rest
of China. The design, which features trees and grand esplanades, is the
work of Albert Speer, Jr., and has been compared to the axis envisioned
for Adolf Hitler’s Berlin by Speer’s father. Speer demurs, calling his
boulevard “a philosophical and religious axis. . . . We transformed the
Chinese character zhong, which means middle, into an axis surrounded
by an ecological garden” (Bernstein 2003). He adds, “This is not an axis
representing power. It’s an axis that looks back to two and a half thou-
sand years of Chinese history.” Maybe. But zhong invokes Zhongguo, the
name of the kingdom that claimed as its rightful domain “all under
heaven,” which meant, roughly, the center of the civilized world for
most of those two and a half millennia. No Chinese citizen would miss
the allusion.
National Stadium
The glamorous showpiece of the built Olympics is the National Sta-
dium. This dazzling confection will be the setting for the Steven Spiel-
berg–choreographed opening and closing ceremonies and all major
track and ‹eld competitions and football ‹nals. The 91,000-seat sta-
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dium is the biggest commission ever undertaken by Jacques Herzog and
Pierre de Meuron, of Tate Modern and de Young Museum fame, who
have aspired to make it “the most visible icon in contemporary China.”
Their original structure was a daring structural response to the problem
of concealing the retractable all-weather roof insisted on by the Chi-
nese. Its solution was an arrangement of mutually supporting curved
steel rods crisscrossing in apparently random fashion to create a huge
basketlike structure that appears visually weightless. In the words of the
competition document (Bejing Municipal Commission of Urban Plan-
ning n.d.):
The stadium is conceived as a large collective vessel, which makes a dis-
tinctive and unmistakable impression both when it is seen from a 
distance and from close up. It meets all the functional and technical re-
quirements of an Olympic National Stadium, but without communi-
cating the insistent sameness of technocratic architecture dominated
by large spans and digital screens. The spatial effect of the stadium is
novel and radical and yet simple and of an almost archaic immediacy.
At the same time the gray outside, red inside color scheme paid tribute
to Chinese building tradition by repeating the color scheme of an ar-
chetypal Beijing courtyard. The roof that occasioned the original de-
sign problem was eventually discarded, partly in response to a report by
the Chinese Academies of Science critical of the stadium’s “outlandish
visual effects” and questioning its seismic safety, and partly to an across
the board cost-cutting order imposed on all Olympic-related construc-
tion in 2004 (Marquand 2004).4 The look of the stadium improved, a
number of construction and maintenance headaches were eliminated,
and $37 to $40 million was saved.
Hoping to kick-start the popular naming tradition that is a sign of
beloved Chinese buildings, the architects strategically compared the
look of the stadium to the crackled glaze of a ceramic vase and the lat-
tices in a Ming window in their original proposal. What caught the
judges’ fancy, however, was the Swiss team’s casually offered analogy of
the steel rods to the delicate twigs of a bird’s nest, and the plastic mem-
branes stuf‹ng the openings to the grass and leaves that pack a nest. In-
stantly, the stadium became the Bird’s Nest, auspiciously conjuring up
the edible nest of the cave swift, the main ingredient of a prized Chi-
nese delicacy associated with ritual feasting.
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The stadium is self-consciously green, housing a natural air ventila-
tion system central to its much-trumpeted sustainable design (Rjorr
2006). A spacious ambulatory between the outer structure and the inte-
rior bowl contains a hotel, a shopping mall, and public areas meant to
be open at all times. “What we think is the strength of this project is the
space in between, the concourse, which is to be ‹lled with life” in a con-
tinuous pageant. Even in Beijing’s sometimes harsh climate, observes de
Meuron, “the people use . . . public space—to dance, to play cards”
(Lubow 2006), a prescient nod to the motivating nonpolitical atmo-
sphere of Olympic Green that appears to be its larger national purpose.
Water Cube
Across from the Stadium is the other celebrity building on the Green.
The $100 million 7.8-acre National Aquatic Swimming Centre by the
Australian ‹rm PTK has been nicknamed the “Water Cube” for its blue
skin of irregularly patterned water bubbles. With a ›oor space of 70,000
square meters, it contains ‹ve pools; has room for 17,000 spectators;
and will host swimming, diving, synchronized swimming, and water-
polo ‹nals. Its rectangular frame is a network of slender steel pipes
linked by 12,000 load-bearing nodes that distribute the building’s
weight. Filling in the exterior cell-like geometry that articulates its
shimmering skin are 100,000 square meters of a Te›on-like membrane
eight one-thousandths of an inch thick that are state of the art in
strength and energy ef‹ciency. The architects claim these panels will let
in more light and heat than glass while slashing total energy costs by 30
percent and daytime lighting costs by half (Xinhua 2006b). Green engi-
neering also extends to the reuse of double-‹ltered, backwashed pool
water, and rainwater collected in subterranean tanks to ‹ll the pools.
The architects have taken pains to impose meaning on form by pub-
licly linking the pipe and node structural geometry to natural systems
like crystals and molecules. They point to water as an ancient symbol
of tranquility and happiness and connect the bubblelike clusters of the
outer skin to the circular heavens and the shape of the building to the
square earth of ancient Chinese universe.
Discontent and Disgruntlement
Embedded bows to traditional cosmology aside, the assertive Western
look and feel of the most visible Olympic structures has been a contin-
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uing source of civic grumbling. Forced to accept the program of the
Games as a showcase of Occidental sport, dependent on Western media
to frame the festival for much of the global audience, many Chinese ex-
pected that the major landmarks of Olympic built form, visual stage
sets for media images of the Games, would certify their Chinese, or at
least Asian, character. Instead, a celebrity stable of foreign superstars
has made embarrassingly apparent the lack of a distinctive Chinese in-
terpretation of modern architecture for the country’s coming out party
in its emblematic new national space.
There are certainly enthusiasts, many young and hip, who have em-
braced the cultural mixing of China and the West (Becker 2004). The
syrupy of‹cial line puts the best face on it. In stilted English, the
People’s Daily calls Olympic Green “the cream of urban architectural
construction and urban planning of Beijing in the history of architec-
tural art at all times in all countries.” Describing a promotional
marathon race from the Forbidden City to the National Stadium
(doubtless meant to stir local enthusiasm and downplay poor air qual-
ity), it continues: “One is Oriental and the other Occidental, wholly
modern. It is another integration of ancient oriental culture with mod-
ern Olympic Games sports and a spectacular scene of harmony of Chi-
nese with Western cultures” (People’s Daily 2001).
Forests of gleaming skyscrapers designed by Western architects seem
to reprise on a grand scale the multistory buildings erected by Western
legations at the end of the nineteenth century. In the next century the
New Culture Movement embraced Western modernism as the model
for reconstructing Chinese society on the ruins of dynastic tradition.
Then, too, Western adventurers stood ready to exploit the transition
(Dong 2003, 30–31). Today China is “the largest construction site in the
world” for Western architects in search of new frontiers. As Business
Week (Bell 2007) puts it:
Beijing, in particular, is a city of eggs awaiting a clutch of architectural
omelettes, with whole districts razed for redevelopment. And why not?
From a western perspective, China represents a colossal opportunity,
the physical manifestation of architectural ideas that, until now, had
only found their expression in elaborate computer-generated imagery
or in small, bespoke projects.
Absent a prominent coterie of Chinese architects to steer the building
boom that followed the Deng reforms, many observers regard every
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new Western-style building as a loss of Chinese identity. It does not
help that substandard building quality and aesthetic banality have of-
ten come along for the ride. “On the one hand, you have these two 
projects—CCTV, which could only be built in China, and the stadium,”
Pierre de Meuron has written, “and you have on the other hand thou-
sands of uninteresting projects, like mushrooms” (quoted in Lubow
2006).
Architectural critic Deyan Sudjic (2005) echoes themes widely
voiced in and outside China: “Cars move around disconnected clumps
of newly completed towers,” and “entire new districts appear arbitrar-
ily as if from nowhere.” He adds:
A city that, until 1990, had no central business district, and little need
of it, now has a cluster of glass towers that look like rejects from Singa-
pore or Rotterdam. And these, in turn, are now being replaced and
overshadowed by a new crop of taller, slicker towers, “the product of
the international caravan of architectural gunslingers that has arrived
in town to take part in this construction free-‹re zone.”
Chinese intellectuals, activists, and architectural professionals have not
been hesitant to broadcast similar conclusions. As early as 1999 Wu
Liangyong used the annual congress of the Union of International Ar-
chitects to denounce Western theories of architecture as inapplicable to
China’s changing and complex environment (Li 2000). Wu called for
developing countries to explore their own paths “according to their
conditions, rather than copying models of industrialized nations.”
“The foreign moon is not always better than the moon in China,” sec-
onds Ma Guoxin, chief architect for the Beijing Architectural Design
Institute (Gluckman 2001).
Returning to Beijing after a year in Europe, journalist Lin Gu de-
scribed his feeling of disorientation. “This city is increasingly unrecog-
nizable, and it feels alien, all this avant-garde architecture,” he writes.
“Many people in Beijing have been brainwashed to think big build-
ings—however ugly—are modern” (Gluckman 2004). “‘Overstate-
ment’ is now the main approach in design, bold form the main char-
acter,” writes architect Li Xiaodong (2000, 402). Feng Jicai, an activist
working to save the slender remnants of republican Beijing, observes,
“In the 1960s and 70s, we destroyed our culture angrily. In the 1980s to
now, we’re destroying our culture happily” (Meyer 2003). Looking back
on a century of unthinking modernization lately kicked into high gear,
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Kongjian Yu, founder and dean of the Graduate School of Landscape
Architecture at Beijing University, and a principal of the ‹rst private
landscape design ‹rm in China, ventures this pessimistic diagnosis
(LAND Online 2006):
[O]ur cities are now becoming the same. Why? Because we neglected
the natural environment, we neglected the cultural heritage, and we
destroyed too much. We destroyed the everyday living structures, even
people’s houses. Things have not been designated as historical sites,
and they are all gone; they have all been destroyed. Millions of square
meters have been destroyed in every city. And it is the natural land-
scape and the cultural heritage that make a city different from others.
So, when we wiped out all of this cultural heritage and these vernacu-
lar landscapes, and when we didn’t respect the natural landforms, the
natural water systems, the natural vegetation, the whole city became
man-made with no meaning or form. Sometimes it looks like you’ve
just dumped an American city in the middle of China.
The dilemma of a culture that cannot return to the past but has not
seized its own architectural path to the future is captured by I. M. Pei,
who has sought to establish a Chinese interpretation of modern archi-
tecture informed by its own tradition:
Chinese architecture is at a dead end, totally. There is no way for them
to go. Chinese architects will agree with me on that . . . The days of the
temples and the palaces are not only economically out of reach but ide-
ologically unacceptable to them. They’ve tried the Russian way, and
they hate those buildings. They are trying to take the Western way. I
am afraid that will be equally unacceptable. (Li 2000, 393)
In the 1980s Pei, who was born in China, championed a “new vernacu-
larism” featuring the modest white walls and gray tiles of traditional de-
motic style. Admired by many academics and intellectuals, it nonethe-
less proved too nostalgic, too delicate, and too technologically backward
to prevail against the ambitions of China’s modern developers.
Mao’s Ghost
China’s lack of an identi‹able modern architecture goes back, as so
much does, to the trauma of the Cultural Revolution. Nor is it of small
Theaters of Representation
246
consequence that China’s ancient building traditions had persisted
nearly unchanged up to the fall of the Qing. In the wake of that col-
lapse, energies long compressed by imperial enclosure were suddenly
drawn out into newly revealed spaces animated by nationalist enthusi-
asm (Dong 2003, 82). Partly in response to the public park movement
gathering steam in Japan and the West, imperial gardens, hunting
grounds, and ceremonial sites were opened to vibrant experiments in
public life and politics including mass rallies organized by republican
activists to express their democratic aspirations (Padua 2006, 33). In
time the T-shaped intersection in front of Tiananmen gate became so
associated with nationalist and antigovernment protest that Tianan-
men Gate was the only conceivable place from which Mao, standing
atop it, could declare the birth of the People’s Republic. Here, too, the
lingering imperial association was propitious since the Chinese charac-
ters for Tiananmen may be rendered as “receiving the mandate from
Heaven and stabilizing the kingdom.”
As it turned out, Mao wielded architecture as ruthlessly as any em-
peror. His monumentally expanded Tiananmen Square was larger than
either Moscow’s Red Square or Mexico City’s Zocaló, a vast revolution-
ary plain without walls or gates, the traditional markers of Chinese cos-
mological and social order. Though Tiananmen visibly rebuked the
closed power of the Forbidden City, Mao shamelessly traded on its
deeply embedded psychological authority by annexing the square as a
kind of giant imperial forecourt. Every architectural gesture associated
with Tiananmen was carefully calculated, beginning with the widening
of Chang An Avenue into a major traf‹c artery. Slashing through the
ancient inviolable north-south axis, the boulevard severed the walled
city from the socialist square, signaling the triumph of socialism over
the past and creating a grand promenade for displays of socialist mili-
tary power. Even before the founding of the PRC, Mao had dreamed of
a Monument to the People’s Heroes at the center of Tiananmen. Its
chief designer wrote, “We . . . recognized that the axis of the present
Square is no longer the past Imperial Path. The importance of the Mon-
ument will be most effectively accentuated by this central position”
(Wu H. 2005, 25). To a later critic the Monument constituted “a revo-
lutionary-proletarian obscenity in the middle of the sacred way” (Leys
1977, 54).
Clearing a ‹fty-acre open space at the dense heart of a traditional ur-
ban patchwork of endlessly articulated walls within walls was no small
undertaking. Ancient city ramparts and blocks of tiled-roof courtyard
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houses that had formed the city’s elegant aesthetic since the Ming dy-
nasty were leveled. To celebrate the PRC’s ‹rst decade, Ten Great Build-
ings devoted to government and commemorative purposes went up
during a ten-month, twenty-four-hour-a-day building frenzy around
the borders of Tiananmen and along Chang An Avenue. Their severe
Soviet monumentalism implemented with technical help from
Moscow was another break with traditional form (though not a com-
plete one—the symmetry, horizontality, and serial columns of socialist
neoclassicism recall features of traditional Chinese style) and trum-
peted a new antifeudal aesthetic. Their stolid gaze framed the specta-
cles of mass assent that came to be the legitimizing ritual of twentieth
century state power.
During the Cultural Revolution, architects suspected of bourgeois
tendencies were unable to publish or get approval for their designs. Ac-
cess to all foreign architectural texts was strictly forbidden, and train-
ing programs started in the republican era were shut down. Not a sin-
gle architect was trained for a decade. Many that had been working
were sent to the countryside, factories, and the army for reeducation
(Liu 2003, 45). Beijing’s growth was brought to a halt, the better to re-
vitalize the countryside as the privileged space of social renewal. By
such means the sustained and patient cultivation necessary to the evo-
lution of any architectural art was deliberately destroyed, another casu-
alty of the Cultural Revolution.
When Deng Xiaoping’s Four Great Modernizations shifted resources
back to the cities there were, therefore, few practitioners to implement
the new program of of‹ce complexes, hotels, and skyscrapers (Bezlova
2003). Visiting Western architects and the creation of training oppor-
tunities abroad for Chinese architectural students were called on to ‹ll
the gap as the profession struggled to reconstitute itself. Aspiring Chi-
nese designers looked to Western postmodern styles with little under-
standing of their ironist mannerism. The result was a hybrid kitsch of
decorative Western-style detail appliquéd on Soviet-style grandiosity.5
Recoiling from this incoherent mimeticism, the mayor of Beijing
brie›y required every new tower block to sport a Chinese-style pagoda
roof, which were popularly labeled “watermelon rinds.”
The 1989 democracy protests marked still another turning point in
the regime’s relation to space. By effectively seizing Tiananmen Square
the June Fourth Protesters challenged state power at its physical and
symbolic core. Refusing to play the acquiescent and submissive role de-
manded of Chinese citizens, they dared the state to reclaim its own
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space. It did so with a horri‹c display of force in the surrounding streets
that deeply damaged its standing at home and abroad. De‹ned for cen-
turies by their unquestioned control of space, China’s rulers found that
monumental space was no longer sacrosanct in a television age, but po-
litically ambiguous and highly vulnerable.
Olympic Green as a Successor to Tiananmen
This brings us to Olympic Green as a monumental successor, or per-
haps an antidote, to Tiananmen Square. According to the Confucian
understanding that what is superior is northernmost to what is inferior,
the Green’s northern extension of the fourteenth century imperial axis
of earthly and cosmic order “leads” it to completion in the twenty-‹rst.
There is also talk of the Green as a “second capital” to relieve pressure
on the dense, untidy jumble of central Beijing (People’s Daily 2001). If
the Green is the new living room of the people, Tiananmen Square
looks more like the relic of a completed phase of Chinese history. With-
out overtly rejecting Mao, such a shift at least dislodges him. The ges-
ture is in‹nitely more subtle than Tiananmen’s drastic refocus of pub-
lic representation away from the Forbidden City.
Open and unwalled Tiananmen was an epochally new kind of Chi-
nese political space where masses of citizens could gather as the corpo-
rate body of the nation to af‹rm the socialist state. In an extraordinary
departure, Forest Park and the Central Area are of‹cially imagined as
glitzy leisure spaces for public pleasures. The of‹cial vision of post-
Olympic commercial, exhibition, sports, and entertainment spaces on
the Green and elsewhere paints a civic portrait of obedient consumers
attuned more to immediate grati‹cation than politics. In Lefebvrian
terms the Green is a wholly new conceived space, a cagey gamble by a
new generation of rulers who are betting that stripping national space
of overt political content will diffuse its potential for “lived” protest.
They are likely encouraged by nearly two decades of public response to
commercial malls and nighttime strips (Wu H. 2005, 22).
In imperial China the boisterous and varied street life of commoners
was crowded into festivals and markets conducted in the narrow hu-
tongs between traditional siheyuan walls. Cathedrals, stadia, open
squares, and other public gathering spaces familiar to the West were
unknown since the only great open spaces were royal playgrounds.
Lesser parks, temple and monastic gardens, and private scholar gardens
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were reserved for the gentry. Mary Padua (2006, 31) ‹nds key elements
of classical Chinese garden style in the scholar’s garden:
Private scholar gardens represented high culture and were designed for
and by the literati—in this case, retired government of‹cials—as places
for contemplation. Garden design was in›uenced by Taoism and the
yin-yang principles of harmony, where the garden contained the
essence of the world with all things standing in proper relationship to
each other. Mountains (arti‹cial rockery) represented yang, the active
stimulating force, while still water was intended to induce tranquility,
representing yin, the passive principle that stands for darkness and
mystery.
The winning master plan of Sasaki Associates for Forest Park alludes to
many of these features. Its three-dimensional representation of Kunlun
Mountain, a legendary axis mundi connecting Heaven and Earth and
the source of the four great rivers of China, references the mythical ori-
gin of Chinese civilization. The 277-acre (1,122 hectare) Dragon Lake
situated at the foot of the Sasaki Kunlun is in the shape of Ying Lung,
the Responding Dragon of water, wealth, and good luck in Chinese
lore, its long curving tail sweeping the length of the Central Area be-
low. A peach tree ›ower forest edging Dragon Lake symbolizes immor-
tality and references the idyllic society created by Tong dynasty poet
Tao Qian, the cultural hero credited with inventing Chinese poetic tra-
dition. Tao’s wilderness cosmology corresponds with the emergence of
the landscape shan shui school of Chinese classical painting that may
have originated in poetic illustration. Tao Qian is associated with the
spiritual re‹nement of a broadly civilized life (Hinton 2002).6 Addi-
tional references to a grand conception of tradition in the Sasaski plan
depict the boulevard descending down the axial spine of the Central
Area as serially segmented into thousand-meter plazas, each celebrat-
ing the achievements of a millennium of Chinese history.
One looks in vain to the of‹cial Web site that tracks the construction
progress of the Green for any mention of all this. It brie›y explains that
Forest Park is divided into north and south parcels by the ‹fth ring
road. It describes the northern portion as a forest of 800,000 newly
planted trees. The south is described as a sculpted landform of hills,
wetlands, meadows and upland forests of pine and deciduous trees.
The whole is touted as a model ecology of indigenously biodiverse
plants and animals in a sustainable natural habitat. But Kunlun Moun-
tain and Dragon Lake have now become Main Mountain and Olympic
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Lake and have migrated to the southern half of the park below the ‹fth
ring road where they are said to display the art of the contemporary
Chinese garden. The landscaped layers of classical mythology have dis-
appeared. There is not a mention of thousand-year plazas. It appears
that any whiff of feudal traditionalism has been decisively rejected for
a resolutely depthless modernism.
In its simpli‹ed surfaces the apparent evolution of Forest Park away
from the complexity of the Sasaki master plan also speaks to the expe-
riences of a number of Western architects. Their tale is an opposite iter-
ation of that told by Chinese architects about the ›ow of design con-
tracts to their better organized, more glamorous Western counterparts.
In this alternate tale, Western designers are lavishly courted and pur-
sued by Chinese developers anxious to dangle Western experience and
exposure before skeptical investors. Once a design is awarded, however,
government overseers have the power to demand severe cost cutbacks
if money gets tight. Already working, they claim, for 20 to 30 percent
of what they could expect to charge outside China (Gluckman 2001),
Western designers of record have found themselves forced aside in fa-
vor of their less pricey Chinese partners, with whom all foreign design-
ers are paired by law, who are quick to discard Western-contributed as-
pects of an original design for less costly alternatives. Facing
corruption, construction delays, and endless bureaucratic meddling,
many Western architects have been unable to break even (Lubow
2006). Sasaki principal Dennis Pieprz has commented, for example,
that the $68.7 million ceiling ultimately imposed on Forest Park was
too slender to justify the continued participation of his ‹rm (author,
phone interview, December 28, 2006).
Public Space as a Casualty Then and Now
Under Mao, Beijingers lived mostly in decentralized, self-suf‹cient
work unit enclaves to which they were legally tethered for housing,
employment, and essential social services. No large public space, mass
transportation system, or even a central business district was allowed to
disturb the close pattern of walled compounds that encompassed what
remained of the republican city. This inherited urban fabric, which has
been the sustained target of modernizing efforts since the beginning of
the twentieth century, has given way to industrialization, market re-
form, and growing demands for living space in the post-Mao period.
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Regime claims for the positive bene‹ts of this transformation notwith-
standing, the quality of travel within the city and space for exercise,
play, and beauty have declined sharply for most citizens, swallowed up
by endless constellations of glass of‹ce towers and gated enclaves
whose scale broadcasts a lofty indifference to the texture of public life
and whose security personnel manifest contempt for ordinary citizens.
A once diverse urban texture has steadily mutated into an aesthetically
and socially homogenized cityscape.7 Neighborhoods in which ex-
tended families lived for centuries in close-knit community networks
have been lost. In 2005 the Geneva-based Centre on Housing Rights
and Evictions (COHRE) claimed to have veri‹ed 400,000 cases of
forcible relocations of city residents as far as 25 to 60 km (16 to 37 miles)
from familiar communities and social networks (COHRE 2005).
While arguing for the necessity of bringing modern sanitation and
safe physical surroundings to acres of dilapidated neighborhoods,
of‹cial statistics concede that roughly 40 percent of the approximately
3,700 hutongs recorded in the 1980s have now disappeared. In re-
sponse, critics like Richard Ingersoll (2003) have articulated a strong
oppositional rhetoric:
With the increased pace of development for the Olympic Games, the
tightly woven hutongs, narrow alleys that serve the single-story his-
toric courtyard houses surrounding the core of the Forbidden City and
the Tian Tan temples, face imminent demolition or gentri‹cation. The
former will eradicate the memory of architectural form, while the lat-
ter will undermine the local class mix that gives these neighborhoods
their vitality . . . Right next to the Forbidden City, for example . . . bull-
dozers are demolishing everything in sight, scooping out a huge hole
in the ground for a multilevel shopping mall. When one realizes that
the tens of thousands of people who participated in the demonstra-
tions that led to the 1989 massacre ‹ltered through the ancient capil-
laries of the hutongs to ‹ll Tiananmen Square, this form of urban lo-
botomy does not seem so casual.
The hutongs are the only places left in Beijing that have architectural
density and urban vitality. Otherwise, the cityscape—restructured dur-
ing the past 20 years on a concentric web of ring roads, 10-lane high-
ways, and hundreds of elevated interchanges—is dotted with countless
new 15- to 30-story condominiums and of‹ce towers. Intense land-
scaping succeeds to some extent in mitigating the disturbing lapses in
scale, style, and color of these new buildings. Armies of gardeners, it
seems, have groomed every intersection and highway viaduct.
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The district set aside for the “Olympic Green” will be no exception to
this program of agoraphobic vegetation, replacing urban fabric with
more easily maintained public spaces.
The use of public funds to transform the deteriorating compounds of
the proletariat into leisure enclaves for the rich and the disintegration
of the “urban public goods regime” remain contentious issues (Solinger
1995). In light of the government’s modest compensation awards
(30,000 lawsuits were ‹led in protest to municipal authorities in 2004)
(Lin 2004), many citizens cannot afford the commodity estates that are
replacing their old compounds and have been forced to seek housing
on the periphery of the city. Critics argue that the privatization of the
housing market has created an income-segregated cityscape that has
further impoverished public life (Li and Yi 2007). Beyond the city, the
industrialization of agriculture and the denial of resources to rural areas
have driven nearly 200 million workers and peasants to cities such as
Beijing in search of jobs and better lives. These ›oating workers have
no access to state-subsidized goods, services, and opportunities avail-
able to legal residents and no entitlement to shelter or medical care.
Many lack adequate food. A large number have joined the construction
army of the building boom with its punishing working conditions and
lack of legal protections. What will happen when these jobs decline is
anyone’s guess (Liu 2003, 46). Prostitution, homelessness, and petty
crime are rising along with tensions between city residents and migrant
workers.
Among those who have challenged the emergent spatial order of the
regime, some have strategically used it to express their dissatisfaction.
They include Zhang Dali, an artist from Harbin, an industrial city
northeast of Beijing. Lacking a Beijing danwei (work unit) or hukou (liv-
ing permit), he and other “›oating” artists occupy an artists’ colony
near the ruins of the Summer Palace gardens, burned to the ground
during the Boxer Rebellion and preserved as a testament to Western ra-
pacity. Since 1995 Zhang has painted more than 2,000 images of his
bald pro‹le on freeways, condemned buildings and crumbling walls in
the city (Wu H. 2000). He writes, “I go on these walls to enter their life.
I open a dialogue with people. I assault them with the knowledge that
this city is changing. I don’t care if you take part or don’t take part, you
have to look at me” (Broudehoux 2004, 221). Though hundreds of city
workers erased his images in advance of celebrations for the handover
of Hong Kong in 1997, the government has not otherwise pursued him.
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His mode of public engagement has enlisted positive press coverage,
and admiring followers have marked new buildings they deem particu-
larly offensive (Broudehoux 2004, 220–25). It remains to be seen how
this Lefebvrian “lived” space will be tolerated for the Olympics. “De-
stroying Beijing,” an artist’s photograph from Zhang’s “Dialogue Se-
ries,” is here described by Wu Hung:
It depicts a large stylized portrait of a man’s head chiseled into a bro-
ken wall. However, there is a hole in the wall that allows the viewer to
peer through the man’s head and see the Imperial Palace and the
Palace Museum in the distance. . . .
The Imperial Palace is an obvious representation of tradition and the
broken wall represents modernity. Tradition, situated in the dimly
veiled distance, is in the process of being covered over—forgotten, but
in the course of the destruction of memory China must experience an
inchoate and broken modernity—broken and incomplete from its very
beginning . . . We know that Chinese tradition will remain even after
the wall has been completed. But once the hole has been repaired, this
tradition will be forever unseen and forgotten. (Zhao and Bell 2005,
498)
Conclusion
From the perspective of the regime, the mission of the 2008 Olympics
is to show an ambitious, con‹dent China standing tall among the
world’s advanced global powers. The stars of this outsized national mo-
ment are the grand and gaudy Olympic Green and its companion
spaces, which for sixteen days in August 2008 will offer a spectacular
visual backdrop for international attention. The newest model of the
national patrimony is a carefully designed space that lacks both an ob-
vious center and an explicit political focus. Grand state ceremonies will
not take place here. The crowds that visit it will encounter super-sized
distractions: splendid architecture, forested groves, shopping, eating,
and elite sports spectatorship. The regime is banking on the scale of the
Green, which dwarfs Tiananmen, to render it impervious to political
appropriation. It is fortuitously segregated from ordinary communities
of work and politics. Its extravagant entertainments and tended land-
scapes have little to offer the poorest and most disenfranchised resi-
dents of Beijing, who mostly live at the southern edge of the city, from
which the Green is not readily accessible except by systems of transport
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that lend themselves to state control should the need arise. The regime
nonetheless confronts a nascent civil society that has creatively used
resistance to the ongoing redevelopment of Beijing, on which the
Games have conferred urgency and purpose, to fashion vibrant new
networks of association and modes of discourse with a political color-
ing that may ‹nd other uses after the Games.
The message of the Green is that twenty-‹rst century public life in
China is a colorful, bustling affair, a green escape, a frictionless territory
of upscale consumption and leisure. Its function is less to provide a set-
ting where citizens may gather freely than to assemble and display the
harmonious society idealized by the regime, in which consumption
equates with culture to trump history, and islands of imperial and re-
publican nostalgia survive if they are pleasing to a domestic and inter-
national elite.
Unlike Tiananmen, the visual space of Olympic Green does not be-
long unquestionably to the state, but it does not quite belong to the
people, either. Like Tiananmen it is a triumphalist space that reposi-
tions authoritative public representation but speaks most clearly of
commodity consumption. It argues that a national vision of harmony
nestled within a regime of accumulation can overcome whatever prob-
lems arise from the forces that have created it. What Chinese citizens
will make of it all when the Games are done, and how to address the
growing tensions of postreform urban life gathering in the shadow of
Ozymandias, is a continuing story.
NOTES
1. See D. Bell 2007.
2. See, for example, Dong 2003 and Wu H. 2005.
3. Ironically, Andreu’s design did address itself to high Chinese building
tradition with bridges that provided a ceremonial entry and simple spatial
and ‹gural arrangements. See Liu 2003.
4. See also Hawthorne 2004.
5. This comment was attributed to Rem Koolhaas (2000), who, according
to Wolf (2000), informed “students, who spend years in school and then
more years in grueling apprenticeships, that, in China, 40-story buildings are
designed on Macintoshes in less than a week. In the context of this hyperde-
velopment, the traditional architectural values—composition, aesthetics,
balance—are irrelevant.” 2000.
6. See also Yang 2005, 43–45.
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From Athens to Beijing
The Closing Ceremony and 
Olympic Television Broadcast Narratives
Christopher Kennett and 
Miquel de Moragas
It is a characteristic of Olympics broadcasts throughout the world that
national distribution systems have a major impact on how narratives
are communicated and received. Much of what is written—in this book
and elsewhere—deals with efforts by host cities and nations, the Inter-
national Olympic Committee (IOC), and sponsors to manage the story
by scripting and thus affecting what gets transmitted. There are key
moments in the course of Olympic rituals when narratives emerge and
global impressions are formed, and these are particularly interesting
from the perspective of the producer and transmitter. In this chapter,
we continue a long research effort by the Centre d’Estudis Olímpics to
study modes of transmission and how they relate to intended narra-
tives. We analyze the broadcast, in ‹ve countries, of the closing cere-
mony in Athens, with its “handover” to Beijing.
The closing ceremony and its components form an integral part of
the Olympic Games process and contain unique ritual and symbolic
value (MacAloon 1989). Central to this ceremony is the handing of the
Olympic ›ag from the mayor of the current host city to the president
of the IOC, who then passes it onto the mayor of the next city to host
the Olympic Games. This is the precise moment that a new Olympiad
begins.
During the closing ceremony of the Athens 2004 Games, the mayor
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of Athens, Dora Bakoyyanis, passed the Olympic Flag to mayor of Bei-
jing Wang Qishan, signifying the closing of Greece’s Olympiad and the
beginning of China’s. In a stylized and elaborately produced produc-
tion, Beijing stepped onto the global stage and presented itself to inter-
national television audiences through a combination of a sixty-second
video and eight minutes of cultural displays. Within the context of
complex regional and international geopolitical relations, this ritual
handover and cultural display meant far more than the beginning of
the Chinese Olympiad. It was meant to reaf‹rm the emergence of
China as an economic, political, and sporting world power (Xu 2006;
Ren 2002).
The representation by international television broadcasters of Bei-
jing’s presentation as Olympic host is an interesting object of study for
several reasons. The structure of the closing ceremony meant that Chi-
nese culture was framed within the wider Olympic context, combining
universal messages of Olympism with those of national culture. The
broadcast commentators were faced with the challenge of interpreting
Chinese cultural displays for their respective national audiences. The
handover moment also provided an opportunity to comment on Bei-
jing as an Olympic host and for comparisons to be made with other
host cities.
A comparative content analysis of ‹ve international broadcasters,
including NBC (United States), CBC (Canada), TVE (Spain), Televisa
(Mexico), and Eurosport (broadcast in English in Europe), was under-
taken for this segment in order to identify how Beijing as host city and
Chinese national culture were represented in this context, and what
type of narratives were adopted by broadcasters. This limited analysis
provides an insight into the complexities of controlling the Olympic
narratives. Our focus is on the brief moments of global transmission in
Athens in 2004, but from them we gain insight into how the opening
ceremony of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games may be broadcast inter-
nationally and the substantial differences and similarities that exist be-
tween national broadcasts.
As China approaches a key moment in its long history, the con-
struction and communication of a desirable identity through the inter-
national media will play an important role in determining the recep-
tion of the Games by the international community. For the pre-Games
period, salient features of Beijing as an Olympic host can be observed
through its architecture; through the of‹cial symbols of the Beijing Or-
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ganizing Committee of the Olympic Games (BOCOG); and, as we
claim, through its cultural presentation during the Athens 2004 clos-
ing ceremony.
The Olympic Ceremony as 
an International Stage
The Olympic opening and closing ceremonies are signature opportuni-
ties for nations to appear favorably on an international stage. Moragas
et al. (1995) focused on the athletes’ parade during the opening cere-
mony of Barcelona 1992 to provide an extensive analysis of the presen-
tation of nations by international broadcasters in the context of
Olympic rituals and protocol. For some nations, marching into the
Olympic stadium can be a de‹ning moment of recognition for a people
as the sports arena is transformed into a political arena where the state
of international relations and modern nationhood are debated
(MacAloon 1989; Brownell 1995). The main conclusions of this analysis
were that the broadcasts tended to lack analytical content, focused on
the national interests of the broadcaster, and in practice were “not con-
ducive to intercultural learning and understanding” (Moragas et al.
1995, 143). The commentaries of the broadcasters served to reproduce
standardized representations of national identity and, more often, na-
tional stereotypes.
As the athletes parade into the stadium behind their national ›ags,
sometimes in traditional dress, national broadcasters ‹nd themselves
in the position of commenting not only on the sporting merits of the
respective teams, but also on political and cultural issues. The abstract
idea of “our” nation is partly constructed through international com-
parison with “other” nations, which generally occurs through the in-
terpretations of sports broadcasters.
Many of these broadcasters ‹nd themselves outside their commen-
tary comfort zone of sport, and the national lens through which they
view the proceedings produces a mix of reactions as the different na-
tions of the world parade past them. This involves responses that range
from a combination of reverence and respect for nations that are
identi‹ed as relatively similar in terms of cultural heritage to “our” na-
tion, to trivialization and misrepresentation of national cultures that
are viewed as very different or are little known internationally. In some
cases “no representation” occurs as national broadcasters ignore na-
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tional identities, which happened in the case of Barcelona 1992 when
the Chinese state broadcaster did not recognize the representation of
Catalan national identity and chose to focus only on the nation-state
of Spain in its coverage (Moragas et al. 1995).
While the handover to Beijing occurred in a different context and
involved a longer, more complex construction and representation of
cultural identity, the limitations and dangers of misrepresentation by
national broadcasters were evident. One consequence that we explore
in this chapter is increasing effort by the host to establish a presenta-
tion in which the risk of missed translation, altered emphasis, or ig-
noring of signi‹cant themes is signi‹cantly reduced. In short, the clos-
ing ceremony of the preceding Games becomes part of a long-term
communication strategy to present the desired identity of the new
host.
Planning and Constructing 
Olympic Host Identity
The Olympic Games of Barcelona 1992, Sydney 2000, and Athens 2004
highlight the attempts made by Olympic Games Organizing Commit-
tees to construct positive identities and break with commonly held
stereotypes. Moragas et al. (1995) identi‹ed the steps undertaken by
COOB 1992 in the development of host identity, and which subsequent
hosts have replicated:
1. Select a geographical reference for the host. In reality, the idea of a host
identity is actually a combination of multiple identities that must
be negotiated and represented. While the identity of the host city
is central, the Games are generally celebrated in a wider region or
throughout an entire country. In some cases different nations exist
within the nation-state, which also may require representation
(e.g., Catalonia in the case of Barcelona ’92; England, Scotland,
Wales, Northern Ireland for London 2012).
2. De‹ne a desired “character” for the host that is realistic but promotes
the host’s most positive features. This involves a combination of tra-
ditional cultural heritage with contemporary reality and a vision of
the future. Combining past, present, and future provides depth to
the constructed identity as well as the dynamic notion of change,
which is linked to the celebration of the Games and the change
this brings.
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3. Choose appropriate symbolic representations of the desired character.
The selection and design of symbolic representations of the desired
character for the host has become part of the complex process of
establishing a look for an Olympic Games. Typical symbols include
an emblem, mascot(s), pictograms, color schemes, etc. In addition,
emblematic geographic and urban features that symbolize the host
may also be used (e.g., the Sydney Harbour Bridge).
4. Develop an approach for dissemination of the host identity locally and
internationally. The communication strategies adopted by Olympic
Organizing Committees have become increasingly complex and
wide reaching. Locally, publicity and media campaigns aim to fos-
ter popular support and cement political consensus around the
staging of the Games. Internationally, this may include advertising
campaigns, media, and public relations activities and strategic co-
operation with sponsors and other organizations such as tourist
authorities.
5. Create opening and closing ceremonies that represent the host culture in
an accessible and appealing way to international audiences. The inter-
national broadcasts of the ceremony present the interplay between
two communications processes. The Organizing Committee has a
desired cultural message that it encodes through cultural displays
typically involving combinations of sport, dance, music, dress, his-
toric enactments, myth and legend, geographic features etc., and
the ceremonies are used as a medium. Television acts as a sec-
ondary medium that ‹lters the ceremony, determining camera an-
gles, editing sequences and providing commentary that reinter-
prets the contents and transforms them into a media spectacle for
their national audiences. What emanates is an instantaneously ar-
bitrated version of the encoded presentation as reproduced or al-
tered or neglected by the rights-holding broadcaster.
The desire to communicate a rich traditional heritage combined
with a modern contemporary image is central to the Beijing 2008
Olympic Games project and was pre‹gured in the closing ceremony. At
the time of writing, Beijing had moved through all but the last of the
‹ve stages of the identity construction process described previously.
The geographic reference point for the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games is
the city itself, but also China as a nation. The de‹nition of the “desired
character” for the host and its symbolic representation has been un-
dertaken through typical Olympic image construction activities. This
process has involved constructing national and local cultural messages
that can be understood by international audiences. For as Dayan and
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Katz (1992) have observed, while the nation is central in the Olympic
Games, the Olympic host’s ability to construct its image requires that
celebrations of nationhood combine with a commitment to interna-
tionalism as well.
Narrating the Olympics
The methodology adopted for this limited study closely follows the
work of Moragas et al. (1995) in their international research project
Television in the Olympics. The object of this study was much narrower,
focusing on the handover of the Olympic ›ag to Beijing and its pre-
sentation as the new host city of the Games. A limited sample of ‹ve in-
ternational broadcasters were selected to provide diversity in terms of
the narrative styles adopted and the cultural interpretations under-
taken. This sample provides an indication of the similarities and differ-
ences between national broadcast representations of the same phe-
nomenon.
Semantic ‹elds were established to provide systematic comparison
between the broadcast segments, and included the representation of:
Olympism and universal values; evaluation of the host; the initial pre-
sentation of Beijing as host city; and the interpretation of Chinese cul-
tural displays.
The comparative model adopted is based on the integral role that
commentators play as primary narrators and interpreters of an event.
Not only the content of what is said, but also differing verbal styles,
re›ect the disparate roles of commentators with respect to their audi-
ence. As observed in Television and the Olympics, the narrative approach
a commentator employs directly in›uences how an audience perceives
what is being displayed visually, and these differences can be used to
compare how broadcasters around the world portray international
events and the effect this may have on local audiences. All of the
broadcasts were transcribed and interpreted by the researchers using se-
mantic ‹elds that enabled direct comparison.
The results of the research were compared with three narrative ap-
proaches identi‹ed by Moragas et al. (1995)—history, celebration, and
entertainment—underscoring the fact that most broadcasts employ a
combination of the three, or shift in style and tone during different
segments. It is important to emphasize that the broadcasts do not di-
rectly represent their country or culture, but because commentators are
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“chosen” and therefore accepted by their respective national culture,
their commentary can offer valuable insights into more general cul-
tural tendencies.
The historical approach views the ceremonies as part of a historical
cycle, as a unique event taking place at a speci‹c moment in history.
The narrative focuses largely on the importance of Olympic tradition,
the symbolic nature of events and rituals, and the transcendent, uni-
versal values that sport provides. The commentator adopts the role of
an observer: their tone and language suggest that an exceptional, unfor-
gettable event is taking place, and that they are lucky to be there as a
mere observer of history. Thus, they intervene only to introduce or
highlight the importance of events taking place; their solemn, formal
style and rare verbal intercession evoke a sense of personal awe, which
in turn implies a certain respect for the tradition of the Olympics.
The celebration narrative presents the ceremony as a lively party or
festival. The style adopted is less transcendent and more informal; nev-
ertheless commentators continue to pay attention to cultural
signi‹cance. Broadcasters derive their emotion from “the party of
youth, the festival of humanity” inside the stadium. Music and dance
become a common language, and the exuberant, superlative tone uti-
lized during art, music, and dance segments re›ects an intercultural
connection. In order to convey the excitement and happiness taking
place inside the stadium, the commentator becomes a participant;
through their enthusiastic tone, they encourage viewers themselves to
take part in this unique celebration.
The entertainment approach pays less attention to culture,
Olympic ritual, and mythology. Commentators, whose job is to amuse
local audiences, react to what visually unfolds in the stadium, mirror-
ing the improvisational way in which a sports broadcaster calls a live
game. In this manner, sport, not the opening or closing ceremonies, be-
comes the central spectacle of the Olympics. Commentators tend to de-
scribe images that audiences can see themselves, without delving far
into their cultural depth or meaning. This approach tends to be char-
acteristic of highly competitive broadcast markets, where stations must
attract maximum audience or maintain their reputation as the “best.”
The commentator plays the role of an insider, presenting the spectacle
as “full of surprises” for the audience. Their status as an informed ex-
pert, who already knows the events about to take place and hence is
never overawed, implies a position of omniscience.
Also characteristic of entertainment presentations is the element of
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triviality. Commentators tend to distort basic cultural elements and rit-
ual meanings through their intended humorous or entertaining com-
ments, often coming at the expense of others. Triviality is not neces-
sarily synonymous with the informality characteristic of many
“celebration” broadcasts, but demonstrates a fundamental lack of con-
sideration for certain cultural acts or countries.
In addition, the amount of commentary as well as the narrative’s
depth and focus can reveal other disparities between broadcasts. The
length of commentaries, including duration and amount of comments
made, varies considerably and has signi‹cant implications for local au-
diences. In general, the more “historical” a broadcast, the less talk there
is; vice versa, the more entertaining broadcasts tend to be ‹lled with
talk. Despite the abundant commentary, not many entertainment
broadcasters make analyses with respect to cultural anthropology, or
elucidate the signi‹cance of cultural elements. In this manner, exces-
sive description becomes a way to conceal the inability to interpret cul-
ture. Hence the observation of “richness of description, poverty of in-
terpretation” emerges, in which commentators present a litany of
seemingly irrelevant facts in order to maintain an active commentary
when they otherwise do not know what to say.
The systematic comparison of the different broadcasts’ content
within the context of the existing theoretical framework enabled the
researchers to draw some initial conclusions regarding the presentation
of Beijing and Chinese culture that may affect the interpretation of the
desired identity of the host.
A key part of the mediation process by the television broadcasters
occurs with the aid of the of‹cial ceremony media guide. The guide is
prepared by the Organizing Committee of the Games in collaboration
with the IOC and is designed to provide broadcasters with a basic in-
sight into the structure and contents of the opening and closing cere-
monies. The 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games marked a watershed
moment in the establishment of the opening and closing ceremonies
as mediated performances. The heightened cultural complexity and
symbolic value of the ceremonies in Seoul 1988 and Barcelona 1992 in-
creased the need for more developed materials for broadcasters. The
media guide has become an essential tool for both the Organizing
Committee and the broadcasters, as the former attempts to inform and
to some extent control the contents of the broadcasts, while the latter
often rely on the guide in the construction of their narratives.
This document remains a closely guarded secret so as to avoid leak-
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ing of the contents, and is only available shortly before the ceremony
itself, which provides some challenges in the preparation of the com-
mentary for the broadcast team. Due to the fact that broadcasters from
around the world quote directly from it, the preparation of the guide is
a key part of the communication process for the host nation and is an
opportunity to in›uence the interpretation of cultural displays.
The Olympic Flag Handover Ceremony and
the Presentation of Beijing as Host City
In order to understand the results of our study of the closing ceremony
and its representation of Beijing and Chinese culture by international
television broadcasters, it is necessary to provide a more extensive de-
scription of events during the handover of the Olympic ›ag in Athens
and the of‹cial presentation of Beijing as host city.
The handover of the Olympic ›ag from host city to new host city is
a central element of the closing ceremony of the Games and is charac-
terized by its ritualistic signi‹cance. In more recent times, under the
presidency of Juan Antonio Samaranch, the handover became perhaps
the most eagerly awaited moment of the proceedings, as Samaranch de-
clared the Games in question to be “the best ever.” This moment of
judgment was interpreted as the seal of approval for the host city and
con‹rmation of its success in staging the world’s largest sporting event.
Controversially, these magic words were not spoken in the closing cer-
emony of Atlanta 1996, but were used at Sydney 2000. The new presi-
dent, Jacques Rogge, has subsequently ended this practice, stating that
the Olympic Games is a sporting contest between nations, not between
host cities.
The structure of this section of the ceremony forms part of IOC pro-
tocol and involved the entrance to the stadium of the mayor of Athens,
carrying the Olympic ›ag, together with the mayor of Beijing. The
mayor of Athens then presented the ›ag to the President of the IOC
who passed the ›ag to the mayor of Beijing and waved it to the ap-
plause of the crowd. The president of the IOC then declared the Athens
Games closed in accordance with the Olympic Charter: “I declare the
Games of the XXVIII Olympiad closed and in accordance with tradi-




These are the only words spoken live in the stadium during the
twenty minutes of handover and the presentation of Beijing. The cam-
eras then cut to the giant video screen in the stadium, where a sixty sec-
ond ‹lm of Beijing and its preparations for the Games was shown. The
video was directed by the internationally renowned ‹lm director
Zhang Yimou and contained sequences of traditional and modern Chi-
nese culture underpinned with the central message that Beijing wel-
comes the world to celebrate the Olympic Games in 2008. The video
was the centerpiece of the presentation of Beijing and functioned as an
advertising spot for the city that was broadcast live around the world,
constituting an unprecedented opportunity to communicate carefully
constructed messages about Beijing and the Chinese culture to an in-
ternational audience. The images moved ›uidly between traditional
and modern Chinese cultural heritage, which was represented by im-
ages of the Chinese opera, the Great Wall of China, temples, traditional
dance, and dragon costumes. This was combined with images of mod-
ern Beijing’s skyscrapers and new cultural spaces. These elements pro-
vided a backdrop for the people of Beijing, who were the protagonists
of the video. People of all ages appeared, many playing sports, from
teenagers with an NBA-style basketball look to a businessman in a suit
hurdling bicycles. All of them were smiling and welcoming the world
to Beijing.
The cultural display continued into the stadium as the video linked
almost seamlessly into a modern dance involving fourteen young Chi-
nese women wearing contemporary dresses and carrying traditional in-
struments, which culminated in a solo performance of a traditional
red-streamer dance. The red-streamer dance provided a link to the Bei-
jing 2008 logo, representing “dancing Beijing” as a symbol with its
roots in ancient Chinese civilization but with a modern day applica-
tion that represents change and the opening up of the city to become
an international meeting point of cultures (BOCOG 2005).
While the dancing took place, stilt walkers entered the stadium car-
rying large red lanterns and moved around the athletes gathered on the
track. Lanterns are a relatively easily identi‹able Chinese symbol that
form part of traditional culture and are used during certain festivals,
adding to the sense of celebration for the Olympiad that had just begun.
This was followed by more dancing, this time combining elements
of tai-chi, which again would be potentially recognized by an interna-
tional audience, and the traditional martial art of Wushu. A group of
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children then entered the stage to perform Beijing Opera in traditional
dress and masks.
The ‹nal part of the presentation of Beijing was the emergence of a
young girl from the center of a giant red lantern who sang “Jasmine,” a
Chinese folk song whose lyrics talk of blossoming ›owers and welcom-
ing friends and families. Two banners were then unfurled to reveal a
message of welcome to the world to come to Beijing in 2008 to cele-
brate the Olympic Games.
This ended the nine minutes that Beijing had to communicate to the
world. The combination of tradition and contemporary Chinese cul-
ture and references to Zhang’s ‹lms (e.g., the use of lanterns) appealed
to Western audiences, but some critics viewed this as predictable and
were looking for content that would surprise international and Chinese
spectators (Zhang 2006). Zhang would have to rely on the world’s na-
tional television broadcasters to interpret the contents accurately and
comprehensively, and from a Chinese perspective, positively.
How would the broadcasters interpret the subtle yet complex mix of
traditional and modern Chinese culture, the humanistic dimension of
the “people’s Games,” the open messages of welcome to the world and
their signi‹cance in the wider political and economic context of inter-
national relations? Had they done their preparation for this moment
and carefully considered how to frame the presentation of one of the
world’s historically most in›uential national cultures? Our study sug-
gests some answers to this question and, in so doing, offers a sense of
the dif‹culties that Beijing (or other organizing committees) will face
in producing a story for the world.
International Television Olympic Broadcast
Narratives: Representing Beijing 
and Chinese Culture
The analysis of the selected television broadcasts of the handover to
Beijing and the new host city’s presentation is structured thematically.
The handing over of the ›ag from Athens to Beijing occurred amid
highly regulated Olympic protocol providing the broadcasters the op-
portunity to commentate on the universal messages of Olympism,
re›ect on the success of Athens as a host city, and look toward 2008
and anticipate the coming Games in Beijing.
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Olympism and Universal Values
The commentators from CBC, Televisa, and to a lesser extent NBC
made reference to the universal messages of Olympism following on
from the IOC president’s speech. NBC and Televisa commentators
highlighted the importance of Jacques Rogge’s message to respect oth-
ers, referring also to the doping issue and the need to promote clean
sport in almost identical words. The CBC broadcasters entered into
more depth related to the importance of the athletes, Olympic values,
and education:
[Jacques Rogge wants the athletes] to promote the message of the
Games, to promote respect for others, promote clean sport and that’s
what I believe. Every one of these athletes would go home and schools
will want them out to speak to their schools and they’ll be able to ex-
press the message of what the Games represent. (CBC)
This was combined by an emphasis on tradition, with both NBC and
CBC referring to the history of the Olympic ›ag and the latter going on
to discuss the IOC Athletes’ Commission and its role.
Televisa, Eurosport and CBC all commented on the use of the phrase
“the best Games ever.” The Mexican commentators focused on the is-
sues of judging the host city and the fact that president Rogge did not
follow the tradition of his predecessor in using “the best ever” phrase
but instead had called them the “unforgettable” Games, at which point
a co-commentator highlighted the case of Atlanta not being recognized
by president Samaranch for “obvious reasons,” which were not ex-
plained.
The Eurosport commentators picked up on the same issue and then
began casting personalized judgments that continued throughout the
segment analyzed. There was also some confusion between the IOC
presidencies of Rogge and Samaranch, with the former being given
credit for closing the Sydney 2000 Games:
He didn’t say they were the best games ever as he has done, did do in
Sydney, and for me that was about right. Sydney was the best ever, but
this ran a very close second. (Eurosport)
On TVE, there was no discussion of universal values or Olympism dur-
ing this segment, and the Spanish commentators adopted a celebratory
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narrative (Moragas et al. 1995). The entrance of the mayors was met
with “Here you have them!” which was followed by a somewhat
overexcited description of the events as they occurred on the viewers’
screens and the exclamation that the handover was about to take place:
C21 This is the big moment!
C12 The Athens Games are gone!
C2 Goodbye Athens! Hello Beijing!
(TVE)
Moreover, the TVE commentators had problems with the pronuncia-
tion of both Greek and Chinese names, which was made light of as part
of what seemed to be a private joke made public:
[Mayors enter]
C1 Come on Maria [co-commentator] start to practice. What’s his
name?
C2 Wan Kim San [written phonetically] and next to him, the mayor
of Athens, Dora Vayonakis, Vakoyannis, excuse me, Dora Vaco,
Vacoyannis . . .
(TVE)
By way of contrast, the Mexican commentators adopted a much more
formal discourse, showing great respect for the mayor of Athens in par-
ticular and providing historic factual information about the city and
the Greek ›ag. As in the case of CBC, the fact that the mayor of Athens
was a woman was also emphasized.
While the speech of Jacques Rogge and the Olympic rituals pro-
voked general re›ection on the values of sport and challenges for the
future, the handing over of the ›ag led into an evaluation of Athens as
a host city.
Evaluating the Host
It is interesting to note that the presentation of the “new” host of the
Games takes place in the shadow of the “old” host. How the “new”
host city steps out of that shadow and into the limelight of the inter-
national stage constitute key communication challenges.
It is logical that the handover of the host role should produce mo-
ments of re›ection, or in some cases judgment, among the broadcast-
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ers. These comments can be in›uential in the opinion forming process,
despite their subjectivity. For example, one of the comments made by
NBC during the handover noted that Greece had “got it together for
2004”:
For all the concerns about the readiness and the organization and se-
curity of Greece, these Games ran as smoothly as anyone could have
asked. (NBC)
The Eurosport commentators chose to explain their personal experi-
ences of the “village atmosphere” in Athens from what could be inter-
preted as a position of superiority, being pleasantly surprised by local
population and in particular with security levels:
C2 People were being extremely friendly, it’s remarkable how many of
them actually speak English.
C2 There has been as you said Simon, a solid presence in terms of se-
curity . . . it’s not been in your face . . .
C1 I felt safe and I haven’t been hassled. (Eurosport)
The areas of evaluation for Athens were their preparedness to stage
the Games and security, but the sensation created was that this had
been achieved against the odds and that question marks perhaps still
existed with regards to the hosts’ organizational capabilities. The issue
of readiness provided a natural point of comparison with Beijing and
the state of preparations for 2008.
The Initial Presentation of Beijing as 
Olympic Host City
As the ›ag was handed to the mayor of Beijing, the ‹rst comments were
made about the new host city and its national culture. NBC, TVE, Tele-
visa and Eurosport commentators all made comments on the Chinese
capital’s readiness to host the Games. The consensus was that Beijing
was well ahead of schedule in preparing for the Olympics, with the
Televisa commentators joking that the venues would be ready before
2006, when Germany was to host the 2006 FIFA World Cup. The argu-
ment was that, by contrast to the Greeks, the Chinese were somehow
overprepared as hosts and this ‹t with an image of a country that was
developing so rapidly:
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An impressive push by the Chinese, not only in sports, but also in gen-
eral. Its growth in recent years has stood out. The Games are going to
be everything you could hope to bring together: the latest technology
and also the thousands of years of Chinese history. (Televisa)
TVE commentators focused on the importance of hosting the Olympic
Games for China and the opportunity for the country to present itself
to the world and demonstrate its organizational capacity. China was
portrayed as a country that had changed dramatically in recent times.
This idea was also expressed by the CBC commentators who identi‹ed
the 2008 Olympic Games as the “awakening of Asia,” using the words
of President Rogge to refer to China perhaps as a sleeping giant that was
stepping into the international limelight.
The other main area of interest for the commentators was China’s
sporting potential. NBC stated that China had “tremendous” Games
and detailed their medal tally for Athens. CBC stated that China’s per-
formance at Athens had been “wonderful,” their medals totals were
“staggering,” and with their largest contingent ever they were “on a
mission” for 2008. This mission was likened to Canada’s quest to top
the medals table in Vancouver 2010 for the Winter Games and high-
lighted the importance of the hosts’ sporting performance on home
soil.
The Interpretation of Chinese Cultural Displays
The completion of the handover was followed immediately by Zhang
Yimou’s sixty-second video, which introduced the cultural display in
the stadium. This video was central to the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games
communication process and the construction of a desired identity for
the hosts.
It was therefore surprising to discover that NBC, as exclusive broad-
caster of the Olympic Games in the United States, cut to an advertising
break during the entirety of the Zhang video. The opportunity was
missed to reach the audience of the world’s largest economy and driv-
ing force behind globalizing processes. This demonstrated how the rep-
resentation of the Olympic Games was subject to local editorial deci-
sion-making processes that were beyond the control of the organizers
of the Games.
Meanwhile, after making a hash of pronouncing his name several
times, TVE focused on the prestigious career of Zhang and his contem-
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porary cultural relevance in international cinema. The Eurosport com-
mentators talked throughout the video, highlighting that the contents
were designed to show how China wanted to be seen by the world, be-
fore returning to re›ections on their experiences of the transport sys-
tem and Greek salads in Athens.
The interpretation of the Chinese cultural displays that followed the
video could be described as a challenging experience for some of the
broadcast commentators. Heavy use of the of‹cial media guide was
made as the broadcasters struggled to provide commentary and analy-
sis on the mix of traditional and contemporary Chinese culture on
show.
The NBC commentators were perhaps the best example of this strug-
gle as they fumbled through a highly descriptive narrative that was in-
terrupted by occasional cultural insights and more frequent sports ref-
erences. The lantern was identi‹ed by the main commentator as:
uhhh, a very familiar object. The Chinese embroider lanterns in cele-
brations of big occasions, and that would certainly be the case here
four years from now. (NBC).
The co-commentator tried to embellish upon this, providing an expla-
nation direct from the media guide about the use of the lanterns to dec-
orate homes for festivals or the approaching of dignitaries, which es-
tablished a pattern of commentary that continued throughout the
section.
Indeed, the relative lack of preparation on the part of the NBC com-
mentators became increasingly evident and resulted at times in the
trivialization and simpli‹cation of the cultural displays. The perform-
ers were described as “costumed characters that roll into the stadium”
combining with the female dancers carrying traditional instruments
that created a “different feel than what we saw at the top of the evening
with the way the Greeks go about it” (NBC). The “going about it”
would appear to be performing a traditional national custom to inform
an international audience about the changing cultural reality of a soci-
ety.
As the cultural display unfolded the NBC commentators did like-
wise, but added little in terms of accurate or incisive analysis of the
spectacle. Moragas et al. (1995) highlighted the fact that the ceremonies
tended to be commented upon by sports broadcasters, which affected
the representation of the cultural contents. The comments of NBC
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were an example of the “sporti‹cation” of the cultural displays. The
red-streamer dance was observed as follows:
C1 looks like she could do well in a rhythmic gymnos [gymnastic]
competition . . .
C2 Classical Chinese dance, accompanied by classical Chinese music
[13 second pause]. Some pretty good gymnastics too! (NBC)
Both TVE and Televisa described the dancing as “folkloric” with an em-
phasis on tradition but recognition that “China is also very interna-
tional,” which was also commented upon by NBC. The TVE commen-
tators were the only ones to identify the martial arts display and even
commented on the relevance of Zen Buddhism.
During the cultural contents the Mexican commentators chose to
re›ect again on the changes in Chinese society since they came out
from behind the Great Wall of China and “opened their doors” (Tele-
visa). China was identi‹ed as an important global economic driving
force “that also produces Olympic sportsmen and women” (Televisa).
The image of China was again framed in the light of its economic
progress and work ethic, emphasizing its productivity in manufactur-
ing terms.
The representation of the Beijing opera by NBC could be described
as “carnivalesque” as the commentators seemed to be amused by the
performers who were depicted as entertainers in fancy dress:
C1 looks like they know how to party too!
C1 They’re dressed for it . . . you know who gets best costume tonight
(NBC).
These comments trivialized the performance, as events were de-
scribed in their own cultural terms that the broadcasters perhaps felt
that the audience would understand. The aim seemed to be to entertain
the viewers rather than inform or challenge them in any way.
During the opera segment and the concluding Jasmine song, per-
formed by a young girl, commentators from NBC, TVE, and Eurosport
made frequent use of the of‹cial media guide. This often involved read-
ing directly from it, or making literal translations. While this provided
some continuity between the broadcasts, it created uncomfortable mo-
ments that did not ‹t with the narratives of some of the commentators.
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For example, the NBC co-commentator suddenly used an extract al-
most direct from the media guide, which was contrasted by the main
commentator’s mix of nostalgia and basic description:
C2 The song talks about how the Jasmine blooms in Beijing, to wel-
come friends from around the world to our home. The beautiful
Jasmine, fragrant and beautiful, aromatic and clean.
C1 And how could you not want to be there in Beijing after that pre-
cious little girl on top of the illuminated red lantern? (NBC)
The Eurosport commentators meanwhile had slightly mixed up the
martial arts display and the Beijing opera and began reading from the
media guide at the wrong time. The performance of the “dance group”
was evaluated as simply “terri‹c,” and the commentators moved on to
comments about the Jasmine song before it even began. The British Eu-
rosport presenters ended their commentary with yet more personal
re›ections, this time with a distinctly national focus (considering this
is Eurosport) on the how the people from “back home” would travel to
China:
C2 It will be a huge adventure for so many back home who actually
got on planes and got here [Athens]. Well, they won’t be able to
do that on a quick, short-haul ›ight, it may take a bit more
planning, but I think it could be really special. (Eurosport)
This is followed by a relatively long comment on the superiority of
British fans at the Athens games and a nostalgic description of how
“our ›ag looked terri‹c last night. Certainly stands out” (Eurosport).
After nine minutes of highly planned and expertly executed cultural
displays, the broadcasters shifted their gazes toward the cauldron
where the Olympic ›ame was extinguished as the ‹nal Olympic ritual
of the night. The Beijing Olympiad had begun, and the experience of
standing on the Olympic stage as hosts in front of the world’s media
would be an important learning experience in preparation for the
of‹cial opening ceremony.
Findings
The comparative analysis reveals certain common themes could be
identi‹ed in relation to the representation of Beijing as the next
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Olympic host, such as the recognition of China as an emerging sport-
ing superpower and the focus on Beijing’s readiness to host the Games.
In this sense, while the evaluation of Athens was generally positive but
not entirely convincing, Beijing stepped out of Athens’s shadow with
positive strides. There was consensus that Beijing will be ready not only
to host the Games, but to potentially top the medals table.
The cultural analysis undertaken in this study reveals a diversity of
narratives, which reinforces the ‹ndings of Moragas et al. (1995), high-
lighting multiple representations of the host rather than a coherent de-
sired identity.
The different narrative styles adopted by the broadcasters produced
diverse representations of Beijing and Chinese culture as the new
Olympic host took center stage. The NBC broadcast was characterized
by its entertainment narrative, dealing awkwardly with the cultural
contents and preferring instead to remain in the comfort zone of
sports. The commentators made light of the cultural displays, likening
the performers to gymnasts or costumed party characters that enter-
tained the crowds.
The Spanish commentators on TVE adopted a more celebratory nar-
rative, adopting the role of observers at a festival. The tone of the com-
ments aimed to provoke excitement and emotion among the viewers,
providing grandiose introductions to the displays. In-depth cultural
analysis is lost in the process of celebrating the moment: the end of one
Olympiad and the beginning of another.
Similar but different historic narratives were adopted by the Mexi-
can commentators at Televisa and their Canadian counterparts on
CBC. The Televisa broadcast was characterized by reverence for both
Olympic traditions and the ‹gures of authority such as the mayor of
Athens and the president of the IOC. Beijing and Chinese cultural her-
itage were also represented with respect, with one of the commentators
referring to China as a “great civilization.” The CBC commentators also
adopted a more formal approach, signaling the historic signi‹cance of
China hosting the Games, but they interestingly chose to provide very
little commentary on the cultural display. This left the viewers to inter-
pret events for themselves.
Indeed, it is interesting to consider brie›y what was not said in the
commentaries of the selected broadcasts. For example, Communism
was not mentioned, and no overtly Communist symbols were included
in the cultural displays. Zhang’s video clearly focused on China’s tradi-
tional cultural heritage combined with contemporary, international
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messages. There were also no re›ections on criticisms of the IOC’s de-
cision to award the Games to the People’s Republic of China. The “two
China’s” issue, which has formed part of the Olympic political history,
was also not mentioned. The broadcasts were therefore noncontrover-
sial and largely apolitical.
Eurosport was dif‹cult to classify using the narrative framework
adopted in this study. The broadcast was not nation-speci‹c and
spanned several countries, yet the commentators adopted a more
overtly national stance than any of the other broadcasters analyzed.
This arguably inappropriate use of the national lens to interpret pro-
ceedings was combined with a series of personal evaluations of the
broadcasters’ experiences in Athens. Beijing was left at the margin of
the broadcast and was referred to partially and inaccurately.
Indeed, in terms of the implications for the international broadcast of
the Beijing 2008 ceremonies, the issues of most concern to the cere-
mony organizers were perhaps the inaccuracies in several of the broad-
casts, the examples of ›ippancy and super‹cial descriptions, and the
awkward use of the media guide as a safety net.
While it would neither be possible nor desirable to standardize the
broadcasts of the ceremonies, if the organizers of the 2008 Olympic
Games want the constructed cultural identities of Beijing and China,
both traditional and contemporary, to be represented accurately and
comprehensively, there is considerable work to be done in media rela-
tions terms to inform and educate international broadcasters. For ex-
ample, developments in online and multimedia technologies could be
used to provide broadcasters with more support in the buildup to the
Games to allow more in-depth preparation of the cultural content that
is to be included in the ceremonies, without reducing the surprise fac-
tor that is necessary in the creation and communication of the specta-
cle. While it is the broadcasters’ right to determine the interpretation
and representation of ceremonies’ contents, they also have the respon-
sibility to inform audiences. As demonstrated in this chapter, some-
times the broadcasters appeared in certain cases to stray from the mes-
sage that was being communicated through the ceremonies, which at
times resulted in the trivialization of host culture.
The digitalization of Olympic broadcasts through digital television
and Internet may provide an important opportunity in some societies
for the representation of Olympic traditions and rituals, as well as the
representation of nations. Interactive services may provide the oppor-
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tunity for viewers in some countries to choose camera angles and com-
mentary (narrative) styles, and to access additional information on
Olympic history, rituals, and the host’s cultural displays.
Indeed, the opportunity for viewers to obtain more information
may enable some of the gaps in coverage to be ‹lled. The decision of
NBC to cut to a commercial break during Zhang’s video demonstrates
the importance of commercial content over cultural, but also a missed
opportunity for viewers. This could be overcome with replay options
and edited highlights content, combined for example with the option
of more informed cultural analysis. Interactive television, while alter-
ing the “live” experience, could provide viewers with a more personal-
ized experience and the possibility to construct their own narrative.
Conclusions
Only a small minority of the audience will experience the Beijing 2008
Olympic mega-event in person, while the masses will have to rely on
the mediated product that is constructed and communicated through
the media (Dayan and Katz 1992; Roche 2000).
The mass global appeal of this event means it will be a gauge of so-
cietal changes and globalizing processes, contributing, to a limited ex-
tent, to a greater understanding of globalization in both “basic” and
more “complex” ways (Roche 2006).
In terms of ideas of “basic” globalization, time-space compression
may occur around the celebration of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games.
As the world looks to one place at the same time, people will be
brought together from diverse cultures around a single event. This will
be reinforced by the communication of the universal values of Olymp-
ism and its system of rituals and symbols that promote notions of
peace, understanding, and unity.
These processes will occur within the wider sports media cultural
complex and the interdependent relationships that exist between the
International Olympic Committee, the media (in particular NBC as
U.S. broadcast rights holder), and the sponsors (global and local) that
together provide the majority of funding to stage the Games (Rowe
2003). In commercial terms, the Beijing 2008 Olympics are poised to be
the most commercially lucrative Games in history, largely as a result of
the increasing speed of globalizing processes, while simultaneously
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contributing to the acceleration of global economic, social, and cul-
tural exchange.
However, to what extent these exchanges are equal is questionable.
Critics of the Games in cultural terms have highlighted the dispropor-
tional in›uence of U.S. and Western European economic power within
the Olympic media cultural complex through NBC’s contribution to
broadcast revenue and long-term multinational sponsors such as Coca-
Cola and McDonald’s. These developments have furthered the “West-
ernization” of the Olympic Movement, contributing to the
“Disney‹cation” of the Olympic spectacle (Tomlinson 2004).
The presentation of Beijing as host city during the Athens 2004 clos-
ing ceremony highlighted the challenge facing Zhang Yimou as he at-
tempts to please both Chinese and international audiences through the
construction of cultural contents of the opening ceremony. As he codes
the messages that will construct a desired identity for Beijing and
China, the decoding and reinterpretation will occur through the ‹lter
of multiple national broadcasts within the context of the Olympic me-
dia cultural complex.
The broadcast of the opening ceremony in 2008 will generate indi-
vidual and collective memories, affecting attitudes and perceptions of
China and its people. Judgments will be cast, heroes and villains cre-
ated, and history “made” as an Olympic discourse is constructed, com-
municated, consumed, and reproduced.
Through the national television broadcasts, the Beijing 2008
Olympic Games as a global media event will be subject to local inter-
pretations. What Roche (2006) identi‹ed as a more “complex” under-
standing of globalization can complement the “basic” interpretation of
globalization. This complexity is derived from the differentiation that
exists between the national broadcasts and the existence of agency in
the interpretation of events. The results of this limited study reinforce
the importance of these interpretations and the need to research the
complex and diverse narratives constructed in broadcasting the
Olympics.
The risk of misinterpretation and misrepresentation of the cultural
contents of the ceremonies and desired host identity from the Orga-
nizing Committee’s point of view is high. The of‹cial ceremony media
guide has become a key tool, and according to this research it forms a
fundamental part of broadcast narratives. Despite this, some national
broadcasts were still not conducive to intercultural understanding and
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involved frequent inaccuracies and sometimes trivialization of the host
for the sake of entertainment.
The challenge for the Games organizers was how to create a balance
between accurately informing broadcasters about the ceremony con-
tents and in›uencing their interpretation in order to homogenize the
message comments. This situation is made more complex as certain
broadcasters have increased the number of their own cameras in the
stadium, increasing the diversity of the visual images received in differ-
ent countries around the world, and marginalizing the international
broadcast signal produced by the Organizing Committee. Through on-
line broadcasting, hypertext and developments in mobile technologies
in the digital era, new technologies will have an increasing role to play
in informing broadcasters and audiences about the contents of the cer-
emonies and their cultural and historic context.
The Beijing 2008 Olympic Games are perhaps the most eagerly
awaited mega-event of recent times. While the Games will probably
become, albeit temporarily, the most watched sports event in history,
they are being staged in a country that has experienced exponential
economic, social, and cultural change over the past three decades.
While “East met West” at the Olympic Games in Tokyo 1964 and Seoul
1988, the staging of the Games as part of the “opening” of China to
globalizing forces is particularly symbolic and will involve a more com-
plex challenge for those broadcasters that are willing to rise to it.
NOTES
1. C2 denotes the co-commentator.
2. C1 denotes the main commentator.
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New Technologies, New Narratives
Lee Humphreys and 
Christopher J. Finlay
Media events and communication technology are inexorably tied.
The success of a media event relies on communication technology as a
means of connecting the audience to a live event. For, as Dayan and
Katz write: “the power of these events lies, ‹rst of all, in the rare real-
ization of the full potential of electronic media technology” (1992, 15).
The broadcasting of the same message to geographically dispersed au-
dience members not only connects the audience to the event but also
connects audience member to audience member. Audience member
awareness of technology-enabled copresence at a mass scale has the po-
tential to galvanize the audience (Dayan and Katz 1992), and endow
the event with a grandeur and importance that local events and smaller
media broadcasts cannot achieve. Such shared experiences contribute
to the power of media events to unite nation-states and, as examples
such as Live 8 and Live Earth1 have demonstrated, to unite, albeit
ephemerally, populations across the globe. The Olympic Games unify
the audience both within nation-states, as athletes compete for na-
tional glory and recognition, and globally, as audiences share in the ex-
perience of watching sports competitions and ceremonies, as well as
learning about the culture, politics, and heritage of Olympic host cities.
Media events, much like expos in the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries, should be understood not only as being facilitated by
technology, but as crucial opportunities for institutions and nations to
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utilize new communication technologies and technological formats
(Roche 2000) to alter their place in the world or their own and others’
perceptions of it. Historically, media events have also provided an im-
petus for technological development as event organizers, sponsors, and
broadcasters established deadlines or provided other incentives for ac-
complishment. This trend can clearly be seen in the Beijing Olympics.
In negotiations with the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the
Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (BOCOG) com-
mitted to produce 3G mobile technology for the 2008 Olympics. Es-
tablished communication technology yields a slightly different pattern
as the media event provides the opportunity for greater implementa-
tion or diffusion. Beijing appears to conform to this trend as well. Lu
Xuewu (2007), associate president of the Communication University of
China, has explained that broadcasting key events in the 2008 Beijing
Olympics in high de‹nition is expected to spark greater demand for
HDTV both within China and internationally.
Like other Olympics before it, the 2008 Beijing Games has created a
narrative surrounding the event that emphasizes progressive technol-
ogy. BOCOG has put a special emphasis on technology via the devel-
opment of the “High-Tech Olympics” theme. “High-Tech Olympics,”
“Green Olympics,” and “People’s Olympics” form the three core
themes of the Games. Technology has been a central component of the
Beijing Games since the bid was ‹rst constructed: in early Beijing 2008
Olympic Games Bidding Committee (BOBICO) promotional material,
such as the Beijing Olympic bid ‹lms, technology and other elements
associated with hypermodernity are presented alongside a mythic or
traditional Chinese culture (Haugen 2005). Hogan (2003) found a sim-
ilar pattern in her analysis of the Japanese Winter Olympics in Nagano.
She suggests that the introduction of a traditional/technology binary
was an important component of the discursive formation of a narrative
constructed for global consumption. This binary seems particularly im-
portant for Asian Olympic hosts, as Atsushi Tajima (2004) and Haugen
and Collins (in this volume) suggest. These countries use the universal
narrative of technology to conform to the globalizing and homogeniz-
ing Olympic discourse of progress and peace, while simultaneously in-
cluding a ›are of multicultural color via self-orientalizing representa-
tions of the past.
In this chapter, we focus on the “universalizing narrative of technol-
ogy” component of this binary by exploring aspects of the High-Tech
Beijing Games. This is not just about speci‹c advances in communica-
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tions hardware and software; the High-Tech performance should also
be understood as a platform for constructing a new discourse about
Chinese technology, and via this new technology discourse, a new dis-
course about China itself. The Beijing Olympics has the potential to
send crucial messages to domestic and international audiences about
China’s ability to be both a technological pioneer and a producer of re-
liable technology, and to transform the perception of China from a
low-cost industrial support system for the global information economy
to a major player. And, though it may not have been planned that way,
this sector offers an important means of rede‹ning what it means for
something to be Made in China.
Via two case studies, we examine the complexities and challenges of
constructing and maintaining a consistent High-Tech narrative with
the ability to reform the image of China’s technological prowess in the
global imagination. In the ‹rst case study, we explore the ascension of
Lenovo to Olympic TOP sponsor status. Lenovo is one of the top per-
sonal computer manufacturers in the world, and the largest in the Asia-
Paci‹c region. The company was founded in 1984 by a group of eleven
engineers in Beijing. The former English name of the company was the
Legend Group Ltd. and New Technology Developer Incorporated. In
2005, Lenovo’s purchase of IBM’s PC division transformed the com-
pany into a major international personal computer manufacturer.
“Lenovo” is a portmanteau of “Le-” (from Legend) and “novo,” pseudo-
Latin for “new.” Since 2005 the company has been working hard to es-
tablish its global image and to reinforce its leadership within China.
As the ‹rst Chinese company in the IOC’s The Olympic Partner
(TOP) sponsorship program, Lenovo, though it continues to struggle
with poor brand name recognition outside of China (Norton 2007; Li
and Yu 2007), is poised to become a global household name in personal
and business computing. As Olympic TOP sponsor, Lenovo has pledged
to provide equipment and technical support for “virtually every aspect
of the management of the Games” (Lenovo 2007). The director of
Olympic Sponsorship in Lenovo’s Brand Communications Depart-
ment, Xie Long, has directly linked (2006) success of the 2008 Games
to successful performance of Lenovo equipment in their implementa-
tion. The fate of Lenovo, whose motto is “New World, New Thinking,”
is intricately linked to the fate of China as a global technology leader.
If the Lenovo campaign and, more importantly, the Games manage-
ment, succeeds—and this is the Dream—it could usher in a new way of
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thinking about China’s ability to lead on the global stage. Failure will
only add to the existing Made in China narrative that positions China
as “the global economy’s low cost manufacturer” (Loo and Davies
2006, 198).
Similarly, the second case study, which analyzes the impetus behind
China’s 3G commitment to the IOC, ‹nds that the ability to deliver
this technology on time has become a way to measure Chinese inno-
vation and success. This is a narrative about the ability to launch and
implement a new system. When Beijing won the bid, China Mobile
Communications Corp. (China Mobile), the country’s largest mobile
operator, suggested that it would be possible to watch live video cover-
age of the Games on its properly equipped mobile phones, and would
radically change the way consumers could access information about
restaurants, shopping, and sightseeing. Athletes and staff would also
use 3G technology to access information related to the Games. Here—
as with the question of whether Beijing will meet air-quality stan-
dards—the story is one of nail-biting anticipation: will China meet its
aspirations or not?
As both case studies show, Beijing’s High-Tech Games may author
new narratives about China’s role as a global innovator and economic
power. However, these nascent Created in China (Su 2007) narratives,
part of an overall Brand China emphasizing intellectual and techno-
logical leadership over cheap mass production, are delicate and could
easily be destroyed if evidence is found that discredits or challenges
them via the construction of technology-enabled counternarratives.
The Beijing Olympics represents a major gamble for China’s techno-
logical and political reputation. The goals that have been set are tough
and, as the Lenovo and 3G stories unfold, the path to success continues
to be tenuous.
Historical Perspective on the Olympics and
New Technology
The twentieth century Olympics have been characterized by a modern
discourse of technological innovation. They have provided the host
country with an opportunity to prove itself to the world as a modern
force in a global event. This occurs not only through the host country’s
athletes, but also through the facilities and technology the local orga-
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nizing committee uses to host the event. Communication technology’s
role in the Games is increasingly central because of the importance of
audience for ‹nancial as well as reputational reasons. Innovative com-
munication technology is used frequently by the host country both to
increase the sense of the host’s prowess as an innovator and to spread
news about Olympic events to the audience at the Games and to a
larger broadcast audience.
There are established examples of Olympic host cities associating
their country with modernity and progress by using new communica-
tion technology to extend the Olympic audience. Through IOC
archival data, we learn that the Amsterdam Games of 1928 used state-
of-the-art telephone and telegraph systems for immediate transmission
of Olympic news (Netherlands Olympic Committee 1928). The Los An-
geles Olympics of 1932 used radio broadcasting extensively to distrib-
ute news about the Games: “The capacity of radio to enable a mass na-
tionwide listening audience to imagine that they are present at a
dramatic and important ‘live’ event received an early demonstration in
the USA through the broadcasts of the 1932 Los Angeles Games” (Roche
2000, 162). And in 1936, Germany experimented with local television
transmission of the competition “to transmit pictures of the competi-
tion to a paying audience around the city” (Senn 1999, 60). In each of
these examples, communication technology was used to create a
greater sense of immediacy; extend the Olympic message to an ever-
larger audience; and demonstrate the technological capacity, excel-
lence, and modernity of the host city and country.
At the same time, broadcasting dramatically shifted the role of the
Olympic audience: “Television provided the crucial complement to the
Olympics, adding to the scale and intensity of their dramatic appeal”
(Roche 2000, 159). The 1948 Olympics in London, the ‹rst Summer
Games to be held after Berlin, heavily relied on broadcasting to create
a global presence. A 1948 IOC report about communications technol-
ogy suggests a tone that reverberates through to Beijing:
The XIV Olympiad was the greatest sporting festival that had ever been
staged and the progress and results of the 136 Olympic events were of
interest to millions of people throughout the world. As only a small
number out of those millions was able to be at the Games in person, ra-
dio had to provide the rest with the nearest equivalent to front row
seats whenever and wherever anything exciting was happening. Thus,
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the listeners of ‹ve continents found themselves at Wembley as the
competitors of 59 nations marched into the Stadium in brilliant sun-
shine on the opening day and, thereafter, as record after record was
broken, they were able to share in the suspense of each event while it
was actually taking place. In fact, they were often better off than the
spectator, because he could be in only one place at once, whereas the
radio listener could visit half-a-dozen venues in as many minutes and
could travel from Empress Hall to Torbay at the turn of a single knob.
(The Organising Committee for the XIV Olympiad 1948, 114)
The radio listeners of the 1930s and 1940s, who could “visit” many
more events in a day than a spectator who attended the Olympic
Games, were the ‹rst signs of an Olympic mass media audience that
could eventually be sold to sponsors for millions and millions of dol-
lars. In the 1960s, television coverage of the Games became integral to
the Olympics as a mega media event (Roche 2000), and the mass me-
dia audience became essential to the ‹nancial and cultural success of
the Olympic Games.
Beijing 2008: The Techno-Narrative
We have already suggested the important association between techno-
logical innovation and the Beijing Olympics. BOCOG anticipates that
the Olympics will burnish the idea of what it means to be Made in
China in the high-tech sphere. With an estimated audience of 4 billion
(Lenovo 2007), the Beijing Olympics is expected to provide an oppor-
tunity for China to show off its best and brightest technological ad-
vancements to the rest of the world. The Olympics is about China as
technological innovator, with the 2008 Games furnishing an impetus
to develop and innovate information technology to showcase at the
event: “The Beijing 2008 Olympic Games will symbolize and spur on
the city’s commitment to technological advancement and environ-
mental protection for the future bene‹t of the Chinese people”
(BOCOG n.d., 5). Consistent with its claim of inclusion and service to
the world, BOCOG explained that technological development in
preparation for the Games would bene‹t not only the Chinese, and not
only those who come to visit the Games. Like previous organizing com-
mittees, it perceived the Olympics as an opportunity to project the host
country’s technological advancements onto a world stage.
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Case Study I: The Lenovo Sponsorship
Lenovo’s sponsorship and the Beijing Games High-Tech theme are in-
terrelated because they give China a way to demonstrate and reinforce
its technological advancements at the same time: the Lenovo sponsor-
ship highlights China’s information technology, while the High-Tech
theme redirects attention to the Lenovo technology created for and
used during the Beijing Games. In 2004, Lenovo secured international
sponsorship rights to the Beijing Olympics “for an estimated $65 mil-
lion to $80 million” (Spencer and Fowler, 2007). The securing of the
2008 sponsorship rights allowed Lenovo to enter the IOC’s exclusive
TOP sponsor program. The program, which was initiated by the IOC in
1985, grants TOP partners exclusive worldwide marketing rights to
both the Summer and Winter Games. Partners in this exclusive club in-
clude global brands such as Coca-Cola, Kodak, McDonald’s, Panasonic,
General Electric, Samsung, Visa, and Johnson & Johnson (IOC 2007).
Lenovo’s participation in this program marks the ‹rst time that a
Chinese company has been a TOP sponsor (Liu 2007b). This ascension
is an important step for Lenovo, as a company, and Lenovo, as a repre-
sentative of China (Legend Group Holdings, “controlled by the Chi-
nese government, owns a majority stake in Lenovo” [Lower 2007]).
Lenovo, then, must be understood as both an emerging global brand
and as an important representative of the Chinese government. Thus,
Lenovo’s messaging can be understood as messaging from China as
well.
While TOP partner status confers signi‹cant privileges, it is also an
extraordinary responsibility. The pressure to construct successful and
mature campaigns that will resonate with both a global and a domestic
Chinese audience is immense. If Lenovo’s Olympic sports marketing
fails to adequately capture the world’s imagination, the rami‹cations of
such a failure will only be emphasized via comparison with other IOC
TOP sponsors, with signi‹cantly more expertise in marketing on a
global scale.
Lenovo’s dif‹culties working with the established IBM brand iden-
tity since 2005 indicate that the computer manufacturer is still strug-
gling to master global marketing. In 2005, Lenovo acquired IBM’s per-
sonal computing sector for approximately $1.75 billion (Lower 2007).
The terms of the acquisition allow Lenovo to use IBM’s logo on estab-
lished product lines, such as Thinkpad and Thinkcentre, for a period of
‹ve years (Lower 2007). In effect, the deal created a ‹ve-year period
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during which Lenovo could focus on branding and product integration
before the IBM logo rights become off-limits. Despite this branding
agreement, Lenovo has primarily featured the Lenovo brand rather
than the IBM brand in recent years. Today, Lenovo is seeking to build
brand recognition outside of China and to maintain sales within
China. Although it is among the top PC manufacturers in the world,
Lenovo has thus far failed to connect with the important North Amer-
ican market and is, in fact, facing a declining market share in this re-
gion (Spencer and Fowler 2007). Lenovo is the dominant player in
China, with more than 30 percent market share, but Dell and Hewlett
Packard are strong competitors, and together “already boast an 18%
share in China” (Kleinman 2007, 6). In March 2007, Dell introduced an
inexpensive PC in China that was intended to directly challenge
Lenovo, whose success in China was largely due to the sales of inex-
pensive computers (Lower 2007). Dell’s recent move has only added to
a growing perception among ‹nancial analysts that Lenovo is facing se-
rious challenges in its own domestic market (Norton 2007).
To fend off declining domestic brand loyalty and establish global
brand awareness, Lenovo has committed signi‹cant resources to spon-
sorship of sporting events, including the Olympics, the National Bas-
ketball Association (NBA), and Formula One. Philippe Davy, the head
of Lenovo’s Worldwide Sponsorship and Alliance Division, has de-
scribed Lenovo’s sports sponsorship efforts as the company’s “broad-
band solution” (Norton 2007, D1). The broadband solution refers to
the ability of sports sponsorship to: (a) allow long-term exposure be-
cause the brand name is a constant across a season or throughout a
global event, as opposed to a short television or radio spot; (b) allow for
more cooperative advertising opportunities with other sponsors as
sporting events have multiple sponsors; and (c) reach a wide demo-
graphic, from “C-level [corporate level] of‹cers to consumers,” as
Lenovo (2007) suggests.
Olympic sponsorship, unlike that of the NBA and Formula One, al-
lows Lenovo to reach a diverse global audience. While the NBA spon-
sorship was primarily designed to promote much-needed brand aware-
ness in North America, the Beijing Olympic campaign was designed
with a multiplicity of audiences in mind, a signi‹cant portion of which
are already aware of the Lenovo brand. Thus, the $150 million Olympic
campaign is being structured to showcase the technology’s ability in
real time via the donation of Lenovo equipment for use by event orga-
nizers during the Games (Liu 2007a). This is a risky yet important ven-
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ture that attempts to solidify brand trust as opposed to creating brand
awareness. If Lenovo equipment is used successfully in the facilitation
of the Games, it will demonstrate Lenovo’s technological prowess and
dependability, adding credence to both Lenovo and the Created in
China narrative.
Lenovo used the same brand trust-building strategy at the 2006
Winter Olympics in Torino in what could be seen as a trial run for the
2008 Games. Lenovo considers its Torino marketing strategy a success
because the Lenovo equipment operated error-free, thus promoting
Lenovo as a powerful Created in China alternative to other computer
manufacturers (Xie 2006). Although Torino was a triumph, Lenovo ac-
knowledges that the Beijing Games represent a far more strenuous test
of their products. The Torino Games hosted 2,508 athletes in 84 events
at 15 competition sites; the Beijing Games are expected to host 10,000
athletes in 302 events at 39 competition sites (Lenovo 2007). Lenovo
states that the “equipment and services provided during the two weeks
of the Games are equivalent to that needed for any Fortune 500 com-
pany” (Lenovo 2007). The technological infrastructure demands of the
Olympic Games, daunting in and of themselves, will be tested in front
of a much larger global audience than in the 2006 Winter Games.
Whereas only 80 nations participated in Torino, 201 nations are ex-
pected to participate in Beijing, and the number of accredited journal-
ists is expected to double, from 10,000 in Torino to 20,000 in Beijing
(Lenovo 2007).
Like other multinational corporations, Lenovo must pursue dual
strategies. To develop its identity as an “international” corporation, its
connection with China must be delicately de‹ned. Within China, and
its huge market, the strategy is quite different. The company must
touch a personal nerve, making its success relate to the ambition of in-
dividuals who see themselves as part of a collective and advancing so-
cial whole. It is important to note that Lenovo’s Beijing 2008 promo-
tional activities extend beyond the two-week event itself. Domestic
promotional activities seek to extend brand awareness from technolog-
ically advanced cosmopolitan cities such as Beijing and Shanghai to
the rest of China. If the international narrative uses the idea of Created
in China, the domestic message may be something like “Lenovo: part
of China’s global advancement and continued aspiration.”
Through associations with state media and state of‹cials, Lenovo
has created what it calls the “500 Days of Lenovo Advertising” (Lenovo
2007). On March 27, 2007, Lenovo began airing daily twenty-‹ve-sec-
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ond spots on CCTV channels in advance of CCTV 1’s primetime news
program and during daytime viewing hours on CCTV 5, China’s most
popular sports channel (Lenovo 2007). Lenovo has produced “eight
sets of commercials [that] feature different phases of the Olympic
Games, including preparation of venues, Opening Ceremonies, test
events, etc.” (Lenovo 2007). These commercials also act as short public
information campaigns, thus linking the Lenovo brand to state-con-
trolled news about Beijing’s preparations for the Olympics.
Perhaps more interestingly, the domestic campaign also includes a
1,000 town “road show” with the goal of rural outreach. These rural
outreach events include full-day events with athletes, government
of‹cials, and Lenovo spokespersons, and the donation of personal
computers to schools with the goal of giving the “‹rst PC experience to
thousands of Chinese” (Lenovo 2007). Lenovo suggests that through
this initiative it has “brought [the] Olympic Games to cities outside Bei-
jing” (Lenovo 2007). The linking of the Lenovo brand to the national
Olympic experience makes Lenovo a key player in promulgating the
notion that the Beijing Games are China’s moment as opposed to Bei-
jing’s moment. Thus, at the domestic level, the Created in China nar-
rative legitimizes Lenovo for millions of rural Chinese by exposing the
company to them for the ‹rst time with the government and the gov-
ernment’s Olympic goals as a key partner. Further, Lenovo’s road show
strengthens Chinese national pride and challenges regional disparities
and discontent by uniting the Olympics with the nation and the na-
tion with the intoxicating effects of modern technologies. In these road
shows the nation-state legitimizes Lenovo just as Lenovo legitimizes
the nation-state. Finally, as Lenovo’s intensive domestic Olympics ad-
vertising campaign indicates, the success of Lenovo is as much about
the faith of Chinese citizens in their own technology brands as it is
about global impressions of Chinese technology products.
The complexity of Lenovo’s task—and its relationship to the narra-
tive for China and the Games—can be seen in much of the publicity it
generates. China Daily reported, “For Lenovo, it will be important to
build emotional ties. The ‹rm wants to impress upon its customers and
dealers that it is global, innovative and offers high performance prod-
ucts” (Li and Yu 2007, 3). In a company press release, Lenovo represen-
tative Philippe Davy stated, “Created in China, headquartered in the
United States and with employees worldwide, Lenovo is both a symbol
of 21st century business and the Olympic desire to build international
understanding” (Lenovo 2005). Indeed, an international event would
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seem the ideal place to promote Lenovo as a company that has an “in-
ternational executive team” and “headquarters in Beijing, Singapore
and Raleigh, NC” (Lenovo 2007). At the same time, Olympic sponsor-
ship material has focused on Lenovo’s identity as a Chinese company
attempting to enter the global market and has not framed Lenovo as a
multinational corporation that, despite its Chinese roots and ties, has a
head of‹ce in the United States. In the lead-up to the Beijing Olympics,
Lenovo is attempting to present itself as both a Chinese company and
as a global company. The two categories are not mutually exclusive. But
Lenovo’s choice of messaging has implications for the Created in China
narrative and Brand China. If Lenovo, the global company with Chi-
nese roots and an American head of‹ce, is the most prominent inter-
national public face, then the Created in China narrative loses much of
its impact. In fact, one could argue that this version of Lenovo would
conform more to the Made in China narrative where China is the sup-
port mechanism for the innovations that take place in the American
head of‹ce. If, on the other hand, Lenovo, the Chinese company with
global aspirations and global of‹ces, is the most prominent interna-
tional public face, then the Created in China narrative is strengthened
as Chinese ingenuity and quality is shown to have created a global de-
mand that must be met by the construction of multinational bases of
operation.
One clue to the thematic direction of the company’s promotional
intentions can be discerned via a brief analysis of how Lenovo’s design
for the Beijing Olympic Torch was presented to the global public. The
unveiling of this torch—an aluminum torch resembling a scroll of pa-
per—garnered international media attention, and suggests that Lenovo
intends to package itself for international audiences at least partly as a
Chinese company. A BOCOG press release stated: “The design of the
Torch takes advantage of Chinese artistic heritage and technological
expertise” (2007). As China Daily reported in their story about the
torch, “paper is one of the four great inventions in ancient China that
was spread to the rest of the world along the ancient Silk Road” (Lei
2007, 15). Thus, the torch represents China’s history of technological
advancements and innovations. The construction of the torch empha-
sizes Lenovo’s ties to science in China. While the outside of the torch
was designed by Lenovo, the internal ›ame system was designed by the
China Aerospace Science and Industry Group. Maintaining a constant
›ame is particularly important because the Olympic torch route is in-
tended to include the scaling of the highest mountain in the world,
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Mount Qomolangma (or Mt. Everest) in Tibet. To scale the mountain
successfully, the torch will have to withstand low air temperatures,
high wind, and low air pressure (Lei 2007). The torch nicely represents
a triad of the techno-narrative simultaneously symbolizing the histori-
cal inventiveness of China through the scroll design, the current inven-
tiveness of China through the Lenovo-created design, and the future in-
ventiveness of China through the unprecedented burning mechanism.
Lenovo’s association with the torch must also be understood as a na-
tional project, again highlighting Lenovo as a Chinese company.
Through its explicit cooperation with national scienti‹c organizations
and its implicit support of China’s planned torch route through Tibet
by helping construct a device precisely for this purpose, Lenovo is sig-
naling to the world its clear association with the Chinese government
and its prerogatives. The torch route through Tibet has been subject to
substantial international criticism, and Lenovo’s close association with
the torch opens the possibility for the company to be subjected to crit-
icisms related to China’s tenuous relationship with the Tibetan people.
This linkage between Lenovo and the Chinese government opens the
possibility for the promotion of a new Created in China narrative; at
the same time, it makes the company vulnerable to international criti-
cism directed at China’s political agenda. The Lenovo-spearheaded Cre-
ated in China narrative is ultimately a fragile narrative that is depen-
dent not only on the technology that Lenovo manufactures, but also
on the policies that the Chinese government pursues.
Loo and Davies argue that “the nation brand is an overarching con-
cept with a single positioning that straddles the entire range of outputs
a nation has” (2006, 202). In the spring and summer of 2007, concerns
about Chinese quality control in products ranging from pet food to
toothpaste and toys dominated international media coverage of China.
Following Loo and Davies’s logic, toothpaste may actually prove to be
mightier than technology. This is to say that despite Lenovo’s broad-
band advertising strategy and the importance of becoming China’s ‹rst
TOP sponsor, the company, if understood by international audiences as
Chinese, must today also contend with a reinvigorated Made in China
narrative that highlights poor workmanship; poor quality; and, now,
potential danger. If, as we have argued, the fate of Lenovo’s Olympic
campaign plays an important role in determining China’s image as a
player in the global information and technology economy, then it can
also be said that China’s reputation plays an equally important role in
determining Lenovo’s fate.
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Case Study II: Mobile Initiatives
Mobile technology initiatives are an important component of Beijing’s
progressive techno-narrative of Created in China. China is one of the
fastest growing mobile phone markets in the world. Currently, there
are more than 400 million mobile phone users in China, and this num-
ber is increasing by 5 million users a month (Bremner 2006; Chandler
2007). The largest mobile phone provider is China Mobile, which is
controlled by the Ministry of Information Industry. Originally spun off
from China Telecom in 2000, China Mobile has since signed up more
than 300 million mobile phone subscribers (Roberts 2006); the com-
pany’s closest competitor, China Unicom, has more than 100 million
mobile subscribers. In 2006, China Mobile’s ad spending increased 57
percent to 4 billion yuan in preparation for the Beijing Olympics 
(Yeung 2007). Third generation mobile (3G) services, including high-
speed data and broadband Internet services for mobile devices, are an
important technological development within China as well as globally,
and are an important component of the country’s successful modern-
ization and international integration. Such mobile services have been
projected to increase mobile revenues in China from $10 billion in
2006 to $28.8 billion in 2010 (Roberts 2007).
The report that Beijing submitted to the IOC as part of its bid for the
2008 Olympics described Beijing as characterized by “the rapid devel-
opment and application of leading edge technologies, such as IT”
(BOCOG n.d., 3). It boasted that mobile 3G services would be available
well before the Games (BOCOG n.d., 85). Xin Xu argues that “the
award to host the Olympiad has certainly set the new impetus for
China’s modernization drive and international integration” (2006, 91).
But in mid-2007, with testing of platforms and standards still under
way—and no clear end in sight—the narrative implications have
changed: Will China be able to ful‹ll these technological aspirations
and permit and achieve the infrastructure for a meaningful advance in
the way people receive and experience the Olympic Games?
There have been several technological and bureaucratic hurdles to
China’s successful development of 3G services. The Chinese Ministry of
Information Industry is a key decision maker, but there have been in-
puts from the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission (SASAC), which oversees China’s state-owned companies.
Also involved in restructuring of the sector are the National Develop-
ment and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Science and Technol-
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ogy, and the State Administration of Radio Film and Television. One
question, one narrative outcome, is how China deals administratively
with these aspects of technological change.
There is no worldwide standard platform for 3G. The European and
Japanese 3G standard is W-CDMA (wideband-code division multiple
access), whereas the U.S. 3G standard is CDMA2000. In late October
2006, the Chinese State Administration for Radio Film and Television
announced that the national 3G standard would be TD-SCDMA (these
initials stand for “time division synchronous code division multiple ac-
cess,” though that hardly makes the standard more understandable).
“The TD-SCDMA standard has received the full blessing of the Chinese
government and it will surely play a critical role in mobile communi-
cation development in China as well as in the world” (Chen et al. 2002,
48).
The initial choice of TD-SCDMA over W-CDMA and CDMA2000 as
the national standard in China seemed an important decision because
TD-SCDMA was developed by researchers and telecommunications in-
dustry leaders in China. China is not only competing at the Olympics
for gold medals but is also competing with other technological stan-
dards for global market dominance. The decision to choose a Chinese-
developed standard “re›ect[s] government efforts to control core tech-
nologies by using domestic rather than international standards”
(Yeung 2006, 15). By choosing TD-SCDMA ‹rst, the homegrown tech-
nology was given an additional six months of testing in China. In ad-
dition, much of the core intellectual property of TD-SCDMA is owned
by Chinese companies, which means that the licensing fees for China
to use this standard will be signi‹cantly lower than they would be for
competing standards developed outside of China (Bremner 2006). If
TD-SCDMA were to be successful, China and its industries would not
only bene‹t ‹nancially, but the country’s reputation as a world leader
in information technology would also improve. “The implications of
[China’s] TD-SCDMA technologies to other countries will be far be-
yond technical signi‹cance. The success of TD-SCDMA from proposal
to operational system will bring China into the world club, which used
to be limited to the Western powers only” (Chen et al. 2002, 59). The
Olympic Games are, in this sense, a world stage on which to showcase
TD-SCDMA and China’s technological prowess.
As of a year before the Games, the commitment to 3G and mobile
service remained an unsettled question. Industry leaders insist that TD-
SCDMA will be ready in time for the 2008 Games. The deputy director
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of TD-SCDMA at the largest equipment vendor for TD-SCDMA said,
“TD-SCDMA will play a critical role during the Olympics and the net-
works will absolutely be up and running before the Olympics” (Busi-
nessWeek.com 2007). Meanwhile, others, including the Chinese govern-
ment and BOCOG, appear to have realized that the homegrown 3G
mobile platform might not be serviceable in time for the Games. The
question then became whether it was more important singly to ad-
vance the underlying China-developed technology or to demonstrate
commitment to having mobile services ready. Jiang Xiaoyu, the execu-
tive vice president of BOCOG, indicated that China may “have to go
back to the IOC to discuss its pledge to have a third generation mobile
phone network available in time for the games” (Economist 2007). In a
step to encourage further opportunity for 3G development in time for
the Games, the Ministry of Information Industry announced in mid-
May 2007 that it would place the two other international 3G standards
alongside TD-SCDMA as choices for 3G in China. According to the
ministry, mobile phone operators in China would be allowed to choose
from all three technologies.
This decision to diversify China’s acceptable 3G platforms is impor-
tant for two reasons. First, it increases the chances that 3G services may
actually be available during the 2008 Olympic Games. While the mo-
bile services may not be as robust as originally intended, opening its 3G
standards will most likely allow China to offer at least limited 3G ser-
vices during the Games as promised. Second, the decision to include
W-CDMA and CDMA2000 as 3G choices allows China to proclaim it-
self “technologically neutral” in regard to 3G. It is not a coincidence
that this announcement was made less than a week before “high-level
Chinese delegates visited the US for talks on long-term bilateral issues”
(Poon 2007, 30). Internationally, China wants to project an image of
fairness in regulating the potentially highly lucrative mobile 3G market
in China. Allowing the three 3G platforms not only helps to ensure
technological robustness during the Olympics, but can be seen as a pos-
itive gesture from China in the information technology global market-
place. Of course, it is important to keep in mind that state-run China
Mobile will most likely be the primary service provider of any 3G ser-
vices during the Olympics. Thus while China may open its standards
for 3G services to include W-CDMA and CDMA2000, the Ministry of
Information Industry is ensuring its control over the rollout and devel-
opment of any mobile services.
In addition to the technological challenges of 3G, administrative,
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political, and economic issues in China have also provided hurdles to
mobile initiatives. Once a mobile 3G platform is developed and tested,
the Chinese government must decide which mobile phone carriers can
provide 3G services in China. China has been reluctant to issue 3G mo-
bile licenses to providers because of a potential major restructuring of
the telecommunications industry, which would integrate landline and
mobile phone services and determine which operators would receive
3G licenses in China. However, any industry restructuring is im-
mensely complicated, as three competing regulatory agencies must ap-
prove any changes (Economist 2007). Thus, despite allowing the other
international 3G standards to operate in China, by not issuing 3G li-
censes China continues to inhibit efforts that would allow them to of-
fer 3G services during the 2008 Games. When visitors from around the
world come to Beijing for the Olympics, they will likely rely on Chinese
mobile services. If China can prove its technological superiority during
the Olympics then its technological standards may be adopted else-
where throughout the world.
In addition, mobile technologies, including 3G and mobile TV ini-
tiatives, are important to the success of the 2008 Games because mo-
bile technology provides an additional channel through which specta-
tors can follow the events of the Games. While modern media events
were originally viewed on the television at home (Dayan and Katz
1992), digital technology increasingly displaces the home as the site of
spectatorship for the Olympics and other media events. Advanced mo-
bile technology like 3G and mobile TV encourages the watching of
events from wherever the viewer may be. Increased accessibility to
Olympic coverage may encourage continuity in viewing and con-
tribute to viewer attachment and investment in the success of the
2008 Games. NBC’s multimodal approach for the 2006 Torino
Games—with Olympic content made readily available on the Internet
or through podcasts—allowed it to reach a broader audience. “ ‘We
found that the more content we make available, the more buzz we cre-
ate,’ said Gary Zenkel, president of NBC Olympics. ‘There’s an audi-
ence for the consumption of media that’s super-strong in front of the
TV and also strong when people are not. We have to make sure our
content is made available to people wherever they are’” (Levingston
2006, D05). If people are no longer sitting in front of their televisions
to watch the Olympics, broadcasters and Olympic media planners of
the Beijing Games must develop new ways to reach an ever more mo-
bile audience.
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Mobile Sousveillance and Potential
Counternarratives
While coverage of the 2008 Olympics through mobile technology may
encourage viewership and reinforce the techno-narrative of the Games,
the interactive nature of mobile technology also threatens the control
of the of‹cial narratives surrounding the Beijing Games. Advance-
ments in camera and video on mobile phones make users not only con-
sumers of mobile content, but producers as well. Such technological
advancements open up the possibility of counternarratives by noncor-
porate or nonstate institutions. The new producers may have very dif-
ferent incentives and priorities than Chinese authorities. And because
mobile phones are highly accessible and portable, they may be able to
record events and situations that were previously obscured from public
scrutiny. Information technology also opens up possibilities for differ-
ent kinds of surveillance. Typically surveillance is the monitoring of
those with less power by those with more power—the use of informa-
tion technology by bureaucratic and state institutions to monitor the
behavior of individuals. However, Mann, Nolan, and Wellman (2003)
suggest that ubiquitous information technology can allow for individ-
uals to observe those in authority. Mann et al. refer to this inverse sur-
veillance as “sousveillance,” from the French meaning to watch from
below.
The power of sousveillance lies not just in the ability to record the
behavior of those in authority, but also in the ability to present this be-
havior back to those in authority so as to confront them with their
recorded actions, a process Mann (1998) refers to as “re›ectionism.”
This is partly done through the dissemination of the recorded act to
mass media outlets. Probably the most famous example of sousveil-
lance in the United States is the video of the police assault on Rodney
King. The power of the video was not that it captured the events un-
folding but that it was presented back to the public and to authorities
and called on them to account for their abusive tactics.
More recently there have been examples of mobile devices con-
tributing to the sousveillance of corporate and state institutions. Be-
cause mobile devices are almost always available to large numbers of
people, there are recorded events and situations in which authority
‹gures exert highly disputed examples of power or force over those less
powerful. For example, in November 2006 a UCLA student refused to
show his student identi‹cation to campus police at the library and was
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subsequently stunned with a Taser gun. Several nearby students caught
this exchange with their camera phones and posted it to the Internet.
This resulted in a lawsuit and an investigation of campus police prac-
tices (LA Times Staff 2007).
The power of mobile devices to expose the behavior of authority is
recognized within China as a matter of state concern. Chinese author-
ities have at times inhibited uses of mobile technology so as to impede
the dissemination of information by average citizens. For example, on
March 28, 2007, six workers died while building an underground rail-
way connecting Beijing to the Olympic Village. The tunnel they were
working on collapsed on top of them, and it took several days to re-
cover the bodies of the victims. The Daily Telegraph reported:
The state-run construction company responsible for the work was so
concerned to keep details secret it locked workers inside the construc-
tion site and con‹scated their mobile phones while attempting its own
rescue work. Eventually, one man who had managed to keep hold of
his phone crept away and called a relative who works for the police.
(Spencer 2007, 17)
Beginning in 2005 global news media started to use camera phone
recordings by citizens who had captured newsworthy events that the
of‹cial media could or did not record. Notable examples include the
London bombings in July 2005, the coup in Thailand in September
2006, the hanging of Saddam Hussein in December 2006, and the Vir-
ginia Tech shootings in April 2007. The potential ubiquity of mobile
phones at the Beijing Games increases opportunities for both athletes
and spectators to record events and occurrences to which of‹cial press
may not have access.
Already, mobile technology in conjunction with the Internet and
blogs have proved a mobilizing communication tool for activists and
citizens in China. For example, a text message campaign was used to
raise awareness and ‹ght the construction of a chemical factory in the
seaside city of Xiamen (Cody 2007). Demonstrations were held, and
demonstrators sent text messages and photos about the event to blog-
gers throughout China who then posted them on their Web blogs.
Thus real-time accounts from the demonstrators and citizen journalists
circumvented censorship by the government and could be read
throughout the country. Chinese authorities postponed construction
of the factory to conduct a review of the environmental impact (Cody
New Technologies, New Narratives
301
2007). The sousveillance enabled by mobile technology is changing the
›ow of information among citizens in China and indicating the
fragility of the Chinese authorities’ of‹cial narratives and their control
over them. Although the mobile phone–enabled examples of sousveil-
lance in China have only garnered minor international attention so far,
mobile services are expected to be heavily promoted leading up to and
during the 2008 Olympics, encouraging many athletes and tourists to
have mobile phones on hand throughout the Games. When the
world’s eye is on Beijing during the 2008 Games, such sousveillance in-
cidences may quickly become global news, tarnishing the positive
techno-narrative that BOCOG and China have worked so hard to pre-
serve.
Conclusion
The techno-narrative surrounding the 2008 Beijing Olympics is a
means through which to foster an association between China and
modern technological innovations, while at the same time suggesting
that such a relationship has always been there. The High-Tech theme of
the Beijing Olympics, the Lenovo sponsorship, and the mobile initia-
tives each represent a different but complementary facet of this techno-
narrative. Central to this High-Tech theme is a Created in China narra-
tive, which can be seen in both the Lenovo and 3G examples. In both
cases, the Chinese government is involved in attempting to control the
information technology preparation and branding for the Olympics as
a means of protecting the potential fragility of this narrative.
While the High-Tech theme of the Olympics may connote Chinese
technological progressivism and innovation, the increased adoption
and prevalence of advanced information technology, including mobile
technology, may provide opportunities for such a narrative to be hi-
jacked and for counternarratives to emerge. Camera and video mobile
phones provide a means of sousveillance through which everyday citi-
zens can monitor, record, and disseminate of‹cial acts and behaviors of
abuse or negligence. No doubt Western media, if their early framing is
an indication, will be hungry for Olympic scandals involving the ath-
letes, the events, or the host city and country during the 2008 Games.
The ubiquity of mobile phones suggests that practically all of the
Olympics including the main stage, side stage, and backstage activities
will be captured and recorded one way or another; however, which
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backstage activities get disseminated remains to be seen. Similarly, as a
TOP sponsor and provider of information technology for the Games,
Lenovo will be closely scrutinized as being both of China, for China,
and for the world. The Chinese authorities will certainly try to control
the discourse throughout the Olympic Games, in part by focusing on
the High-Tech theme, but recent news coverage suggests that coun-
ternarratives can leak into the mainstream press with the help of the
information technology itself.
Future research should explore the successes and failures of China to
use the 2008 Olympic Games as a stage on which to demonstrate its
shift from an economy producing inexpensive goods to a sophisticated
information economy and one where Created in China and Made in
China gain respect. By harnessing the Olympic discourse of progress,
the Beijing Olympics will try to construct itself as a High-Tech
Olympics. The computing services by Lenovo and the mobile services
promoted for the Games contribute to this techno-narrative. The ‹nal
year leading up to the 2008 Olympics emerges as a critical time for
China to negotiate the tensions between internal regulatory struggles
and the desire to project an international image of a technologically
progressive country.
NOTE
1. Live 8 was a series of free concerts held on July 2, 2005, in the G8 coun-
tries and South Africa to raise awareness of poverty. Live Earth was a series of
concerts held on July 7, 2007, around the world (at least one concert was held
on each of the seven continents) to raise awareness of climate change.
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Globalization and Cultural Diversi‹cation 
of the Olympic Movement
Hai Ren
Homogenization
When the 2008 Olympics were awarded to Beijing, there was some
hope that a trend toward homogenization, in terms of Western sport
culture, would be altered. Because the sports events are the central aes-
thetic of the Games, what sports are included, how they are presented,
and how they are honored sends a powerful message to the world. In
this chapter, I will describe an example of the cultural tensions in-
volved in the selection process by focusing on a debate over the inclu-
sion of the traditional Chinese sport of Wushu.
What do I mean, in this context, by “homogenization?” In order to
understand this, I want ‹rst to place this phenomenon in the context
of globalization—a process of integrating not just the economy but cul-
ture, technology, and governance (UNDP 1999). Globalization involves
more than the ›ow of money and commodities; it encompasses the
growing interdependence of the world’s people as well. Globalization is
obviously one of the most important historical processes that human
beings have ever encountered. And in the mega-trend toward global-
ization, the Olympic Movement has been a very active pioneer.
Homogenization in the Olympics means stressing Western sports
cultures and, in doing so, leveling local sports cultural differences. Here
are some points to keep in mind:
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• The sport events in the Olympic Games have been dominated by
Western-oriented ones: among the 28 sports and 301 events only
very few events, including Judo and Tae Kwon Do, have non-West-
ern roots. 
• There is lower participation in the Olympic Games from developing
countries. Some 10,960 athletes were accredited for the 2000 Syd-
ney Games, with 10,651 of these athletes actually competing.
Nearly half of the athletes were from European National Olympic
Committees (NOCs), as table 1 shows.
• Though some measures have been taken to promote and increase
the participation of developing countries in the Olympic Move-
ment, the gains so far seem to be mainly symbolic. Seventy-one
NOCs had ‹ve or fewer athletes compete (International Olympic
Committee [IOC] 2001a) in the 2000 Games; the British Virgin Is-
lands had only one participant. These countries and athletes are in
the international spotlight for just a few minutes, as the TV camera
passes over them during the opening ceremony; the few athletes




TABLE 1. Participation Figures of Sydney Olympics by Continent
Continent Men Women Total Percentage of Total
Europe 3,325 1,950 5,275 49.5
America 1,211 798 2,009 18.9
Asia 1,006 678 1,684 15.8
Africa 592 277 869 8.2
Oceania 448 366 814 7.6
Total 6,582 4,069 10,651 100.0
Source: IOC, Highlights of the Week 6, February 5–11, 2001.
TABLE 2. Host Cities of Summer Olympic Games
I 1896 Athens XVII 1960 Rome, Italy
II 1900 Paris, France XVIII 1964 Tokyo, Japan
III 1904 St. Louis, United States XIX 1968 Mexico City, Mexico
IV 1908 London, England XX 1972 Munich, Germany
V 1912 Stockholm, Sweden XXI 1976 Montreal, Canada
VII 1920 Antwerp, Belgium XXII 1980 Moscow, USSR
VIII 1924 Paris, France XXIII 1984 Los Angeles, United States
IX 1928 Amsterdam, Netherlands XXIV 1988 Seoul, Korea
X 1932 Los Angeles, United States XXV 1992 Barcelona, Spain
XI 1936 Berlin, Germany XXVI 1996 Atlanta, United States
XIV 1948 London, England XXVII 2000 Sydney, Australia
XV 1952 Helsinki, Finland XXVIII 2004 Athens, Greece
XVI 1956 Melbourne, Australia XXIX 2008 Beijing, China
• For a variety of reasons, the Olympic Games have been held less fre-
quently in cities with non-Western cultural traditions, which limits
the scope for broadening the sports that are included.
• The decision-making circle is dominated by European ‹gures.
Among the current 111 IOC members 46 percent are from European
and North American countries.
• The European dominance is so powerful that even the young
Olympic athletes have been strongly in›uenced as indicated by the
election of the IOC Athletes’ Commission during the Sydney
Games, in September 2000. A total of 5,216 athletes (47.3 percent of
those participating in the Games) took part in the elections. Of 44
candidates (Africa 5, America 6, Asia 9, Europe 22, and Oceania 2),
eight athletes (North America 2, Europe 5, and Oceania 1) were
elected and none of them belong to developing countries from
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. (IOC 2000) 
Olympic cultural homogenization disseminates and reinforces the
message that modernity entails a rejection of cultural traditions and
ethnic sports, and conformity with the dominant sports of the West.
The more popular the Olympic Movement gets, the more intense the
pressure against these indigenous sports becomes. And, cultural diver-
sity, one of the essential factors of the Olympic ideal, has been threat-
ened as a result. In the long term view, this is a cause for great concern.
While it may be obvious that the Olympic Movement should incor-
porate more cultural elements from traditional sports—thus resisting
homogenization—this is not however easily accomplished. The con-
troversies involved with Wushu’s application to become an Olympic
sport in 2008 provide a good case study.
Wushu, also known as Gongfu or Chinese martial arts, is an interna-
tionally known traditional Chinese sport that has been blended with
Chinese philosophical ideas and various theories of traditional medi-
cine during its long historical development. The modern form of
Wushu is composed of two disciplines: Taolu (routines) and Sanshou
(sparring). Taolu consists of a series of routine movements involving
martial art patterns; the players are judged and given points according
to standard rules similar to those in gymnastics. Sanshou is a combat
sport of free ‹ghting, guided by special regulations. When the IOC
granted Beijing the right to host the 2008 Olympic Games on July 13,
2001, many Chinese and Wushu fans believed that the inclusion of
Wushu in the Olympic Games was secured. They anticipated that their
beloved sport would march easily into the Olympics, following in the
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footsteps of Judo from Japan (introduced in the 1964 Tokyo Games)
and Tae Kwon Do from Korea (introduced in the 1988 Seoul Games).1
On December 29, 2001—just a few months after Beijing’s successful
bid—Li Zhijian, president of the International Wushu Federation
(IWUF), sent a letter to IOC president Jacques Rogge, applying to in-
clude Wushu in the Olympic Games. The letter stated, “Wushu (the
martial arts) derived in various martial arts of ancient times in China
and based on deep East cultural heritage, endowed with unique values
for both contest and ‹tness and has spread over the world in the past
century, attractive to people in different cultural backgrounds.” Thus,
“to include Wushu into the Olympics will enrich the Olympic Move-
ment and bring honor to the Olympic spirit” (enorth.com.cn 2001).
Despite the IWUF’s efforts to persuade the IOC, and the support of
international organizations and individuals, including a letter written
to the IOC president by a group of U.S. athletes, business executives,
and elected of‹cials (2008 Trip: Our Support n.d.), Wushu did not suc-
ceed in joining the ranks of the of‹cial program of the Games.
The size of the Olympics is another possible obstacle to Wushu’s
success. See table 3.
When Jacques Rogge succeeded Juan Antonio Samaranch as presi-
dent of the IOC in 2001, he immediately began cutting down the
Games’ scale. In February 2002, Rogge described the current scale of
the Games as “a threat to their quality.” An Olympic Programme Com-
mission was tasked with “identifying ways of reducing the cost and size
of the Games” (IOC 2002a).
Six months later, the Commission issued a report recommending
that Wushu not be admitted to the 2008 Beijing Games, claiming that
“statistics reviewed on federation af‹liation, nations competing in ma-
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TABLE 3. Growth of the Olympic Games
Host City Year Sports Events Athletes (accredited)
Moscow 1980 21 203 5,283
Los Angeles 1984 21 221 6,802
Seoul 1988 23 237 8,473
Barcelona 1992 25 257 9,368
Atlanta 1996 26 271 10,630
Sydney 2000 28 300 10,960
Athens 2004 28 301 10,500
Source: IOC, Review of the Olympic Programme and the Recommendations on
the Programme of the Games of the XXIX Olympiad, Beijing 2008, Report by the
Commission Chairman, Franco Carraro, IOC Executive Board, August 2002.
jor events and broadcast and press coverage of major events for most
requested sports did not indicate a higher level of global participation
and interest than sports currently in the Programme, and therefore
could not be considered to bring additional value.” The sports recom-
mended by the Commission for consideration for admission to the
Games were golf and rugby 7s. The Commission also suggested exclud-
ing baseball, softball, and modern pentathlon from the current
Olympic program (IOC 2002b). But Wushu’s hopes were still alive. At
the end of August, the IOC Executive Board decided not to admit roller
sports, polo, sur‹ng, bridge, chess, air sports, billiards, boules, dance
sport, bowling, racquetball, water skiing, squash, and underwater
sports, but stated that the request from the International Wushu Feder-
ation (IWUF) would be further studied (IOC 2002c).
Following further study, IWUF’s application was rejected. The IOC
president, on his October 2005 visit to the Formula One race of the
Chinese Grand Prix in Shanghai, said, “We are not introducing wushu
into the Olympic program. It will not be an exhibition. Not at all”
(China.org.cn 2005). IWUF still did not give up its effort to make
Wushu a part of the Olympics, of‹cially recognized or not. In Decem-
ber 2005, at the 8th IWUF Wushu Congress in Hanoi, the IWUF presi-
dent stated, “This work has been full of challenges and dif‹culties, in-
cluding the barrier from the Olympic Charter. However, we had
opportunities to discuss this issue with the IOC several times. Recently
we invited Dr. Jacques Rogge, the President of the International
Olympic Committee to attend the Opening Ceremony of the 10th Na-
tional Games of China. We discussed this issue again and have reached
a common consensus. The IOC will allow us to organize an interna-
tional wushu event during the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, but this
event is not one of the 28 of‹cial Olympic sports, it is not a demon-
stration event, either. It will be the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games
Wushu Tournament. I am con‹dent in having the opportunity to stage
an excellent Wushu performance in 2008. We would keep in touch
with the IOC and continue to do our utmost for the bright future of
Wushu movement” (IWUF 2005).
Denis Oswald, a member of the IOC Executive Board, explained the
reason for the rejection of Wushu in a May 2007 interview by the Chi-
nese media. According to him Wushu is not popular enough to become
an Olympic sport as people in most countries of the world do not prac-
tice it. Chen Guorong, deputy director of the Wushu Administration
Center of China, disagrees; she says that “since the establishment of
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the International Wushu Federation (IWUF) in 1991 (in Beijing), alto-
gether 112 associations of martial arts from ‹ve continents have joined
in. You can say that IWUF is quali‹ed as a large-scale international
sports organization” (Xinhua 2007). Based on these ‹gures, shown in
table 4, Wushu comfortably meets the Olympic Charter criteria for a
sport to be included in the program of the Olympic Games, namely
that “only sports widely practised by men in at least seventy-‹ve coun-
tries and on four continents, and by women in at least forty countries
and on three continents, may be included in the programme of the
Games of the Olympiad” (IOC 2004).
Then what is the real reason for Wushu being rejected? The Olympic
Program Commission states that Wushu’s disquali‹cation is because it
“could not be considered to bring additional value” to the Olympic
Games. However, given the recent trend toward homogenization of
Western sport culture and the leveling of local sport culture, discussed
earlier in this chapter, the Olympic Movement needs such cultural di-
versi‹cation in order to ful‹ll its noble goals. This is exactly the “addi-
tional value” that Wushu and other in›uential non-Western sports may
contribute to the Movement. The “additional value” may have different
meanings when approached from different angles. In the global per-
spective, to take other cultural elements will surely bring a great deal of
bene‹t to the development of Olympic Games in the long run.
The controversies around Wushu’s case also let us reconsider the
roles the Olympic Games play. Are the Olympic Games a bridge to con-
nect various cultures in the world together through sports? Or are the
Games merely entertainment, such as the World Cup? Will they inten-
sify already dominant cultural forms and further marginalize the
weaker ones? Or will they help prevent a distinct cultural heritage from
fading away, so as to maintain a culturally rich and balanced human
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TABLE 4. International Wushu
Federation: National and Territorial
Member Federations







Source: Data from IWUF Web site.
society? It is interesting to recall that in 2001 the IOC Evaluation Com-
mission predicted that a “unique legacy” would be left after the Beijing
Games (IOC 2001b). Though this legacy will not be apparent until the
Games are over, Wushu’s fate so far has not contributed to the realiza-
tion of this goal.
Functions of Cultural Diversi‹cation
Why should we emphasize the importance of cultural diversity in the
Olympic Movement? Some people may say it is because diversi‹ed cul-
tural patterns would make the Olympics more attractive. This is true,
but there are much deeper reasons, related to the fundamental prin-
ciples and purpose of the Olympic Movement. The IOC has made it
clear that the Olympics are not merely an ordinary sporting event. As
the Olympic Charter indicates, the Olympic Movement aims at much
higher goals:
The goal of the Olympic Movement is to contribute to building a
peaceful and better world by educating youth through sport practiced
without discrimination of any kind and in the Olympic spirit, which
requires mutual understanding with a spirit of friendship, solidarity
and fair play. (IOC 2004)
The Olympic Movement sets itself an important role as a world
peacemaker. It is exactly this noble goal that has made the Movement
so valuable. It is not easy, however, for people with different social and
cultural backgrounds to live together harmoniously and with respect
for each other. The precondition of world peace is international under-
standing, to which the Olympic Movement is trying to contribute by
acting as an agency to bridge the gap between different regions and to
facilitate intercultural communication.
In today’s world, with ethnic and cultural con›icts playing a con-
spicuous role in regional and global tensions, intercultural communi-
cation is especially important. Globalization has tightened the interre-
lationships between different cultural regions, but has also permitted
an unprecedented assertion of individual identity. The self-awareness
and pride that comes from cultural identity is an essential part of em-
powering communities to take charge of their own destinies. It is for
these reasons that respect for the culture and identity of peoples is an
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important element in any viable approach to people-centered develop-
ment (World Bank 1999).
Intercultural understanding today plays an important role in world
peace. However, one of the great dif‹culties for international under-
standing is the lack of proper tools for cross-cultural communication
because of the political, economic, and linguistic variety and differ-
ences around the world. Here, the traditional sports of various parts of
the world offer a much-needed solution. To explain what I mean by
this, I want now to consider some of these sports’ unique characteris-
tics:
1. Traditional Cultural Value Carriers
Traditional sports, as the result of cultural accumulation in a nation,
embody the basic cultural elements that have guided a nation for thou-
sands of years and still signi‹cantly in›uence the lives of citizens. For
instance, Chinese Tai Chi not only re›ects Chinese social values, such
as self-control and benevolence, but is also imbued with cardinal Chi-
nese philosophical ideas such as Yin and Yang; Qi (vital energy); Wu
Xing (‹ve basic elements: metal, wood, water, ‹re, and earth); Ba Gua
(eight diagrams: Qian—the symbol of heaven, Kun—the symbol of
earth, Zhun—the symbol of water, Li—the symbol of ‹re, Zhen—the
symbol of thunder, Gen—the symbol of mountain, Xun—the symbol of
wind, and Dui—the symbol of pond). The same is true for other in-
digenous sport activities around the world, like Yoga for the people in
India. Traditional sports are like great containers ‹lled with abundant
and important cultural elements. The richness of the cultural messages
is often beyond our imagination.
2. Good Communication Tools
A magni‹cent feature of traditional sports is their communication
value: they are body languages, allowing the expression of cultural
meanings through a set of physical movements. Traditional sports,
through their integration of diverse philosophical thoughts, can be re-
garded as physical symbols for those complex conceptual ideas that are
often dif‹cult for people outside a particular culture to understand. In
other words, traditional sports are the simpli‹ed, intuitive, and com-
prehensive explanation for a nation’s thoughts and deep feelings.
Those abstract concepts are such an integral and natural part of the
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physical activity that learners inevitably experience those ideas in the
course of doing the exercises. Therefore, to study and learn a nation’s
traditional sports is to acquire a deep knowledge about the nation. Tai
Chi and Yoga provide short-cuts to complex Chinese and Indian
philosophies, and serve to facilitate the transmission of cross-cultural
messages.
3. Most Popular Cultural Forms
In general, traditional sports are the popular cultural forms recognized
and shared by a majority of the people of a nation. There is perhaps no
other convenient way to know the ordinary people of a nation, on a
large scale, than by investigating their forms of play and sporting ac-
tivities. Traditional sports thus provide the proper means for ordinary
peoples to know each other better.
Moreover, as Pierre de Coubertin indicated in 1929, the direct goal of
the Olympics is to draw more ordinary persons to mass sport participa-
tion: “For a hundred to engage in physical culture, ‹fty must engage in
sport. For ‹fty to engage in sport, twenty must specialize. For twenty to
specialize ‹ve must be capable of astonishing feats” (Coubertin 1967).
Diversi‹ed sport forms would be more attractive to ordinary people
with various cultural backgrounds.
In addition, to keep the Olympic Movement culturally diversi‹ed,
people must have an opportunity to show the appeal of various pat-
terns of national cultures, thereby setting them on equal terms. Such a
solid cultural base would make it possible to appreciate each other in a
more rational way.
4. Resources to Enrich the Olympic Movement
Historical evidence has shown that the development of a cultural form
depends on its interaction and exchanges with other cultures. The
more resources it gets the faster and healthier progress it makes. Taking
the Olympics as an example, the fundamental reason for its successful
initiation lies in its bridging the barriers that separate, say, English
sports from the gymastics practiced on the European continent. Now as
the Movement has become globalized, it needs abundant new cultural
resources to enrich itself for further development. Obviously, multicul-
tural forms have the ability to meet the new demand of the Olympics
and nourish the Movement with fresh cultural resources. The natural
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environment has taught us serious lessons about how the extinction of
a given species diminishes future possibilities. The same is now true of
the world of sports. When all traditional sports are gone, the Olympic
Movement will be without a signi‹cant future. In other words, main-
taining a diversi‹ed and balanced cultural ecology is necessary to the
sustainable development of the Olympic Movement in the twenty-‹rst
century.
To summarize, the universality of the Olympic Movement can only
be achieved through cultural diversity. Globalization and diversi‹-
cation are dialectically related to each other. Cultural diversi‹cation
means to introduce different sport cultural forms to the Olympic
Movement in order to balance the negative impacts resulting from
globalization. However, it should be noticed that the diversi‹ed cul-
tural forms that need to be introduced into the Olympic Movement are
not the out-of-date and isolated patterns. They have to be mutually re-
spectful instead of critical of each other, open instead of isolated, com-
municable instead of incommunicable. In a word, they should be di-
versi‹ed but all harmoniously presented.
5. Role of Developing Countries in Olympic
Cultural Diversi‹cation
There is much to be done in order to achieve Olympic cultural diver-
sity, not least of which is including more non-Western sports; doing
this will turn the Games into a magni‹cent multicultural celebration.
But the most important task is to reconsider the role and status of the
developing countries in the Olympic Movement. Developing countries
are vital to the future of the Olympic Movement: 61 percent of the
world’s territory—and 79 percent of its population—belong to develop-
ing countries, and these areas have a rich cultural heritage. For in-
stance, of the thirty-four countries with a rich multilingual tradition
(i.e., more than ‹fty languages in daily use), two thirds are found
among the developing countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, South-East
Asia, and Oceania. Sub-Saharan Africa alone is home to fourteen of
these countries. There is also great treasure in the sport cultures of the
developing world.
Looking at the current Olympic Movement, we see that the devel-
oping countries have kept quite a low pro‹le, and this has reinforced
an image of them as passive bene‹ciaries who must depend on the gen-
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erosity of others. Until now, most discussions about promoting the
Olympic Movement in the developing countries have been mainly fo-
cused on their less developed economic conditions, and consequently,
the Olympics is typically viewed as providing bene‹t to these countries,
particularly in economic terms, rather than as a potential bene‹ciary of
the sports cultures in these countries. Promotion efforts have primarily
focused on the economic aspect in the sense to help them to accept the
Western oriented sport culture, while their own sport cultures have
been neglected. It is rare for people to think how the Olympic Move-
ment could bene‹t from the great sport cultures of these countries be-
cause the stereotyped Olympic model has been deeply stamped on our
minds.
The issue of developing countries, and how to include them, pre-
sents a big challenge for the Olympic Movement in the twenty-‹rst
century. How to let the Movement take deep root in these countries is
a question that demands creative new thinking, such as that of Cou-
bertin nearly a century ago. The developing countries inherited a bril-
liant sport heritage from the preindustrial era, but their traditional
sports need to be modernized in order to make them understandable
and applicable for intercultural communication. At the same time, the
universally respected Olympic ideas should be localized in their ex-
pressing patterns, operational forms, and participating approaches.
In this way, universality and diversity may coexist harmoniously
within the Olympic Movement; and globalization and diversi‹cation
may complement each other in ways that will ensure a prosperous fu-
ture for the Movement.
Conclusion
Spurred by globalization, the Olympic Movement has experienced fast
growth during the last several decades, diffusing modern Western
sports and their social values to every corner of the world. Cultural ho-
mogenization in many areas has caused social displacement—a lack of
continuity with traditions and perspectives that gave life meaning, and
producing, for many, a feeling of dislocation and alienation. Some so-
cieties have reacted by turning inward, toward isolationism and exclu-
sion. Alerted by the trend, the World Bank has insisted that for devel-
opment “to be inclusive and sustainable, it must nurture the diversity
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of belief systems and traditions that enhance people’s self-images and
give them con‹dence to act in their own interests while respecting and
supporting the traditions of other groups” (World Bank 1999).
The momentum of cultural homogenization that has built up
within the Movement is not only threatening non-Western sport cul-
tures but also making it dif‹cult for the Movement to reach its ambi-
tious goals of contributing to “building a peaceful and better world.” To
address this, it is crucial for the Olympic Movement to take more tradi-
tional cultural elements from various parts of the world, especially
from the developing countries, to ensure cultural diversi‹cation. Obvi-
ously it is not easy to integrate different sport cultural forms in the
Olympic Movement in general and the Olympic Games in particular, as
the case of Wushu has indicated. Pierre de Coubertin, the founder of
the Olympic Movement, referred to the Olympic Games as a great sym-
bol that ought to be as colorful as the diversi‹ed cultures we have in-
herited. This idea is clearly expressed in the report of the IOC 2000
Commission for Olympic reform in 1999: “In the Olympic Movement,
valuing ‘universality’ should never mean demanding standardized
modernization or cultural homogenization, much less Europeanization
or Westernization. Proper Olympic education seeks to explore and to
celebrate cultural diversity in the Olympic Movement” (IOC 1999b).
NOTE
1. Tae Kwon Do started as a demonstration sport at the 1988 Seoul Games
and became an of‹cial Olympic sport in the 2000 Sydney Games.
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“We Are the Media”
Nonaccredited Media and 
Citizen Journalists at the Olympic Games
Andy Miah, Beatriz García, and 
Tian Zhihui
Narratives about the Olympics arise largely from the stories ‹led by
the mass of journalists—press and broadcasters—who attend the
Games and spew forth accounts of what occurs on and off the compe-
tition ground. Who those journalists are, what they do, how they are
channeled through the Olympics world—each has implications for
what is represented and what the billions around the globe see and
read. As such, the issue of de‹ning who is a journalist, what rights they
have, and how they are served and managed is crucial, since it will play
an important role in determining control of the platform. Yet it is in-
creasingly understood that the concept of “the journalist” has changed
and, with it, the management tasks of the Olympics and its host cities.
Our newly expanded concept of the journalist has nevertheless resulted
in more than increased demand for media guidance, information, and
facilities. It will likely have important implications for what is covered
and how. In this chapter, we look at the processes of change in jour-
nalism, using the accreditation process at the Olympics as a lens. We
also examine the challenges and opportunities this presents to the con-
struction of narrative(s) about and the management of the Games.
Since the 1980s, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has es-
tablished guidelines that determine who is accredited as an Olympic
journalist. To be an accredited journalist in this context enables privi-
leged access to Games venues and the exclusive right to report the
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of‹cial competitions. However, new technologies and new sources of
supply have highlighted the need for new institutions and new proto-
cols. From the Sydney 2000 Games, nonaccredited journalists have be-
come a signi‹cant component of the Games’ journalistic community.
And increasingly elaborate arrangements have been developed for the
management of this group at both Summer and Winter Games. These
arrangements take the form of specially constructed enterprises, which
have come to be called Nonaccredited Media Centers. The term nonac-
credited refers to journalists who do receive recognition—an accredita-
tion of sorts from the established center, so they are not simply unac-
credited or completely external to the Olympic organizational
framework. However, such journalists do not have an of‹cial IOC ac-
creditation and cannot access of‹cial venues as journalists or cover the
sport competitions. This term is most commonly used by the people
who organize facilities for such journalists, so it also coheres with the
self-characterization of this community. By studying the origins, func-
tions, and development of the Nonaccredited Media Centers, we can
gain insight into the shifting world of journalism and how it puts ad-
ditional narratives into play.
The emergence of nonaccredited journalists highlights the chal-
lenges arising from shifts in traditional journalism since, in the absence
of IOC guidelines, the criteria for de‹ning a journalist are more ›uid. In
the context of the Olympics, these shifts have given rise to at least
three categories of journalist. The most obvious is the Olympic jour-
nalist who would be labeled “accredited,” namely those to whom the
relevant authorities have given certain rights to cover the Games. A sec-
ond category would be journalists, traditionally professionalized, who
cannot, because of limitations and contractual rights, be included in
the full complement of entitlements for those who are accredited but
who will be present at the Games and in›uence mainstream narratives.
A third category, closer to the technological and supply side exposition,
are those who self-characterize as journalists; this group has a more ten-
uous relationship to mainstream media, but through blogs and similar
devices, may have a greater impact on public understanding of what
the Olympics mean and why. At the Torino 2006 Olympic Winter
Games, these Web-based journalists were a strong presence at the
Nonaccredited Media Center. This was the ‹rst occasion in Olympic
history where low-budget journalistic operations could broadcast in an
effective manner through the Internet (e.g., the audio-visual ‹le-share
Web site, YouTube, came online around the end of 2005). Torino
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demonstrated the challenge posed by such journalists, given the capac-
ity to publish multimedia content through diverse online platforms.
Together, the combination of an increased number of journalists who
are not accredited to the main facilities and the emergence of new me-
dia suggests that the established mechanisms of media representation
at the Olympic Games are being reconstituted.
This chapter is based on research that draws on ethnographic, docu-
mentation, and interview data collected at the Nonaccredited Media
Centers at four consecutive Olympic Games: Sydney 2000, Salt Lake
City 2002, Athens 2004, and Torino 2006. The research entailed par-
ticipant observations, archiving of materials, and interviews of key
management personnel at all of these centers. At each of the Games,
except for Salt Lake City, we were present at least three days before the
opening ceremony of the Olympics. Our analysis of Nonaccredited Me-
dia Centers is also based on documents and interviews with of‹cials
af‹liated with and working within the Beijing Organizing Committee
of the Olympic Games (BOCOG), which we used to ascertain the extent
of planning for nonaccredited media two years before the 2008 Games.
In this context, the chapter will undertake three main tasks. First, we
will discuss the emergence of much more varied and variously regulated
media at the Olympics, offering evidence from the last four Olympic
Games and contextualizing it with reference to the broader media
framework of the Games. These details help to develop an understand-
ing of the Nonaccredited Media Center’s character, function, and out-
comes. Second, we consider the immediate context of the Beijing
Olympic Games, particularly how its new media landscape might look,
given its particular cultural and political circumstances. Finally, we dis-
cuss how the notion of nonaccredited media ‹ts within broader discus-
sions about new media studies and the challenges posed by the repro-
fessionalization of journalism via the rise of the citizen journalist.1
The Nonaccredited Media Centers (NAMC)
Media Structures at the Olympics
The of‹cial media structures at the Olympic Games are the result of a
combination of operational and ‹nancial need. Ever since the Games’
‹nancial crisis of the 1970s and the subsequent restructuring of the
Olympic Movement in the 1980s as a commercially viable enterprise,2
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the IOC has treated the media as a crucial Games stakeholder and a key
member of what is termed the “Olympic Family,”3 which includes in-
ternational sport federations, the athletes, team of‹cials, sponsors, and
IOC guests. To secure full coverage of the extremely diverse and con-
centrated range of Olympic activity during the sixteen days of compe-
tition, the host city is required to provide members of the media state-
of-the-art working venues (the Main Press Center and the International
Broadcasting Center—sometimes described together as the Main Media
Center—as well as Venue Media Centers within each of the sport com-
petition venues); a fully equipped Media Village providing meals and
accommodation; transport to all of‹cial Olympic venues coordinated
with the times of competition; and an extensive network of informa-
tion points with the latest updates on all sports events and competitor
backgrounds.
To control the number of media with access to such facilities, the
IOC has set a strict accreditation process following similar patterns to
that established for the rest of the Olympic Family (IOC 2004, Rule 55).
For press writers and photographers, the IOC has set a maximum quota
of 5,600 places per Games since Sydney 2000; numbers are allocated
per country, with priority to the “main media organizations” (IOC
2006a), which are determined by respective National Olympic Com-
mittees. Broadcasting organizations, as the main funders of the
Olympic Movement (providing up to 53 percent of all Olympic revenue
sources, while sponsors provide up to 36 percent), are treated differ-
ently. Because “Television is the engine that has driven the growth of
the Olympic Movement” (IOC 2007),4 broadcasters are not only treated
as accredited media, but also as “Olympic right-holders” with access to
the core Olympic properties, such as the rings. The IOC states that
“rights are only sold to broadcasters who can guarantee the broadest
coverage throughout their respective countries free of charge” (IOC
2007), and they are offered in exclusivity to one broadcaster per geo-
graphical area. This means that in any one country, there is only one
approved of‹cial broadcaster and no competing TV channels can offer
images of of‹cial Olympic events. Broadcast organizations are allocated
a set number of accreditations according to the level of funding sup-
port. In the period 2004 to 2008, the total number is approximately
14,400 individual accreditations to include presenters and producers as
well as technical staff.5
The Main Press Center and the International Broadcasting Center
operate in different ways, the latter being one of the most inaccessible
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Olympic venues, as it holds the strictly protected “moving image” feed
of all sport competitions, currently valued at $1.7 billion and available
exclusively to right holders. Nevertheless, they share a series of charac-
teristics as the main of‹cial accredited media venues: access to each re-
quires full accreditation under strictly limited quotas (requests are
made directly to the IOC), and they can only provide information re-
lated to of‹cial Olympic events, which essentially comprise the
Olympic Torch Relay, the Opening Ceremony, each of the of‹cial sport-
ing competitions taking place during the sixteen days of the Games,
and the Closing Ceremony. Olympic broadcast right holders have ac-
cess to all Main Press Center facilities, while the press and photo-
graphic media cannot enter the International Broadcast Center. Non
rights holding broadcasters may be entitled to apply for accreditation
at the Main Press Center to access and distribute text-based informa-
tion about of‹cial events, but, as in the case of the press, they cannot
gain access to the International Broadcast Center or any moving im-
ages. This stipulation also encompasses the distribution of such images
in an online environment (IOC 2006b).
The Olympic Charter speci‹es the IOC’s commitment to protecting
the media coverage of the Games as well as the technical regulations
imposed on journalists for this purpose (IOC 2004, Rule 51). In partic-
ular, it identi‹es the objective of the IOC as to maximize media cover-
age and for such coverage to “promote the principles and values of
Olympism” (IOC 2004, Bye-Law 1). In so doing, the IOC asserts its au-
thority on the media’s governance at each Games. Moreover, the host
city is bound by these requirements as an integral part of its contract
with the IOC. By extension, the IOC also asserts its exclusive rights by
stipulating that
Only those persons accredited as media may act as journalists, reporters
or in any other media capacity. . . . Under no circumstances, through-
out the duration of the Olympic Games, may any athlete, coach,
of‹cial, press attaché or any other accredited participant act as a jour-
nalist or in any other media capacity. (IOC 2004, Article 51, Bye-Law 3)
It is worth mentioning other ways of regulating what images are trans-
mitted to those in the host city and the world as well. Host govern-
ments, at the behest of the IOC, often institute legislation to govern
the protection of the Olympic identity. For example, for the London
2012 Olympic Games, the British Government instituted an “Olympic
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Bill” (House of Commons 2005). These stipulations reveal that the IOC
considers the Games to be its core property, not that of the host city,
which is borrowing the association. This indicates aspects of a division
in directing the narrative—between the IOC, which is setting the con-
ditions of the stage, and the host city, which is facilitating its orches-
tration. The Olympic Charter offers further details. Speci‹cally, Rule 53
notes that
. . . 2 No form of advertising or other publicity shall be allowed in and
above the stadia, venues and other competition areas which are con-
sidered as part of the Olympic sites. . . .
3 No kind of demonstration or political, religious or racial propa-
ganda is permitted in any Olympic sites, venues or other areas. (IOC
2004, 101)
The effects of such guidelines are clearly visible in the stadia, where
spectators, athletes, and of‹cials are prohibited from doing or wearing
anything that might act contrary to this rule. Furthermore, areas of
IOC regulation continue to expand. For instance, during recent
Olympics, all billboard space within the city center and areas sur-
rounding the Olympic venues was offered to Olympic sponsors or else
left empty to avoid ambush marketing. In this sense, the entire city is
construed as and becomes an “Olympic site.”
To understand the full implications of this situation, it is important
to note the nature of delivery structures within the Olympic Games.
The city authorities are in charge of establishing an Organizing Com-
mittee that will deliver the Games according to IOC regulations, but
with funding and support from local, regional, and national govern-
ment agencies. The IOC delimits what is “owned” by the Olympic
Movement—thus granting privileged access to members of the
Olympic Family—during the period of the Games. Yet, local authorities
have also attempted to protect ownership of other spaces that may use
the Games as a platform to promote activities other than the of‹cial
Olympic program and parts of the Olympic program not set as priority
by the IOC. The latter include the Cultural Olympiad6 and education
activities, which tend to focus on the representation of local and na-
tional identities. The establishment of Nonaccredited Media Centers
could be described as one of the most paradigmatic examples of such
attempts at protecting ownership by the local hosts of platforms out-
side the obligations of the Host City Contract and IOC regulations.
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Dealing with the New Journalistic Masses: From
Sydney 2000 to Torino 2006
Following the establishment of strict Olympic media regulations in the
1980s, the ‹rst organized attempt at coping with the large number of
journalists outside the of‹cial accredited list is found at the Barcelona
1992 Games. The Barcelona City Council recognized the importance of
using the Games as a platform for promoting the city and region. It re-
alized that it was fundamental to nourish and attract the attention of
media writers from non–Olympic rights holding organizations that
would not have access to the sporting venues. As such, it supported the
creation of a center within the Barcelona “Welcome Operation,” called
the Barcelona Press Service. This center was organized in collaboration
with the Autonomous University of Barcelona and focused its services
on the specialist press and scholars interested in the history of
Barcelona and Catalonia, and in particular the Catalan cultural iden-
tity. This experience was highly regarded by local authorities and
served as the basis for intervention by subsequent Olympic host cities.
However, the Barcelona center lacked visibility and relied on very lim-
ited technical and ‹nancial resources. By the Sydney 2000 Olympic
Games, the commitment to such centers had been upgraded consider-
ably. Local authorities raised the priority in terms of expenditure and
care in catering to a far wider band of individuals engaged in journalis-
tic activity. And these individuals were encouraged to promote
non–sports related stories as a top priority.
In Sydney, the main facility to welcome the broad range of journalistic
actors, accredited and nonaccredited, the Sydney Media Center, was situ-
ated in the fashionable city center area of Darling Harbour. This Center
was the result of a collaboration between the Commonwealth Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Australian Tourism Commission,
Tourism New South Wales, the Department of State and Regional Devel-
opment, and the Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority. These organiza-
tions aimed to enhance the city and regional economic development via
the promotion of its leisure and business tourism offerings. Interestingly,
the Sydney Media Center was also formed out of concerns that the At-
lanta 1996 Games suffered by not providing for nonaccredited journalists.
As was discussed in an Australian parliamentary debate on the subject:
As Atlanta found to its cost, if . . . journalists are not looked after by be-
ing given good facilities from which to operate, if they are not pro-
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vided with assistance in delivering interesting stories, the result is a del-
uge of media coverage critical of the city itself and critical of the
Olympics preparations. We were absolutely determined that this would
not happen in Sydney. (Legislative Assembly 2000, 9070)
As such, the establishment of the Sydney Media Center was both an at-
tempt to promote local causes and a way to ensure that journalists with
no access to the accredited venues had access to other facilities, and
stories. It was a facility-based way of encouraging a broader sense of
what constituted the Olympics narrative and supplementing the work
of the Main Press Center and the International Broadcasting Center,
which were run for the exclusive bene‹t of the “accredited journalists.”
Located at the border of the harbor, the Center provided shooting lo-
cations for broadcasters and a spacious bar-restaurant in addition to the
common provision of working and communication facilities, informa-
tion stands, press releases, daily keynotes, press brie‹ngs, promotional
events, and conferences. Some days prior to the start of the Games in
September 2000, the center had registered more than 3,000 media rep-
resentatives.7 By the conclusion of the Games, 5,000 journalists had
been accepted at the Media Center (Legislative Council 2000, 9274).
The venue hosted various high-pro‹le events, including athletes’ pan-
els and press conferences with key ‹gures from the Opening Ceremony.
In Salt Lake City, provision for the ever broader and technologically
diverse nonaccredited media was distributed between two different
centers, each of which had different purposes and was overseen by dif-
ferent organizations. The Utah Media Center, the direct successor of
the Barcelona innovation, was located in close proximity to the of‹cial
Main Media Center in the heart of the city. It was an initiative of the
Utah Travel Council with the support of the Chamber of Commerce
and Visitors and Conventions Bureau in Salt Lake City. A second hub—
the Park City Media Center—was created at the initiative of the Cham-
ber of Commerce and was located in Park City, home of one of the
most popular ski resorts in the area and a central point to access a wide
range of Olympic competition venues. The Utah Media Center was the
largest of the two, and, as in the case of Sydney, it hosted high pro‹le
events such as the only press conference by Rudolph Giuliani, the
mayor of New York City, who discussed the situation in the United
States in the aftermath of 9/11.
In Athens, the main nonaccredited center was located in the
Zappeion Center, directly next to the city’s main square, Syntagma.
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The Zappeion Press Center was established in a building that had his-
toric value for both the city and the Olympic Movement, as it was the
headquarters of the ‹rst Modern Olympic Games in 1896. As evidence
of the growing relevance of this effort by host cities to go beyond the
IOC-approved journalist corps, this Center was far greater in size and
political signi‹cance than previous versions. The day after the Opening
Ceremony, the Zappeion Press Center hosted the formal signing of the
Olympic Truce “wall,”8 which brought heads of state, royalty, and IOC
dignitaries to the same press venue. Notably, this took place outside of
the normal, expected security requirements of Olympic venues and
among the nonaccredited journalists. The Zappeion Center also hosted
a number of other important events, such as a presentation for the Mel-
bourne 2006 Commonwealth Games and the presentation of the Cul-
tural Olympiad, which tends to lack media visibility. Each day, there
were press brie‹ngs by the Ministries of Public Order, Sports, and Cul-
ture, and opportunities for journalists to meet athlete celebrities, in-
cluding Cathy Freeman, the Australian Aboriginal athlete who lit the
Olympic cauldron in the Sydney 2000 Games, and the city mayor.
Winter and Summer Olympic hosts always look toward their respec-
tive predecessors, and comparing Torino 2006 with Salt Lake City 2002
shows a further increase of provision for the nonaccredited media. The
Torino Piemonte Media Center offered unprecedented facilities for
journalists, including a vast and richly endowed press room with large-
screen projections of athletic events, wireless computing, and gourmet
regional cuisine. By 2006, the advance of technology and the social
context of reporting had so altered that it is reasonable to suggest that
Torino was the ‹rst post-Web 2.0 media center. It had a strong repre-
sentation from online authors and journalists, often, if loosely, de-
scribed as bloggers. By this time, a number of bloggers had established
enough publishing credibility for the organizers to look beyond tradi-
tional print and broadcast journalists in determining what efforts
should be made to embrace them in of‹cial and quasi-of‹cial venues.
The range of bloggers included local as well as overseas writers, many
from Vancouver, the next Winter Olympic host city and one at the
forefront of new media development.
The Emergence of the Nonaccredited Media Center
In the previous section, we traced a phenomenon that has had a formal
name since the Sydney 2000 Olympics: that is, the Nonaccredited 
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Media Center. Over the years, some common features have emerged to
distinguish these centers. First, they are physically and structurally sepa-
rate from the major accredited media venues, the Main Press Center and
the International Broadcasting Center. In addition, the arrangements for
nonaccredited journalists tend to be established by the local host city
council and af‹liated authorities, rather than the Olympic Organizing
Committee. Because of this, the focus of these centers has generally been
on the promotion of the local cultural milieu, with an emphasis on
tourism and business opportunities, rather than sports (though fre-
quently, screens displaying competitions are focal points for the jour-
nalists within the Nonaccredited Media Centers). Also, due to their
greater ›exibility in the acceptance of users, the nonaccredited centers
attract a much wider range of journalists, many of whom are not associ-
ated with mainstream media groups. However, these venues are not
speci‹cally designed to serve as what has often been called “alternative”
or independent media centers (Lenskyj 2002; Neilson 2002), which, as
noted by Lenskyj, may facilitate “the organization of (publicly adver-
tised) Olympic-related protest events” (166) and which are “organized
by a diverse collective of media activists” (167). While the Nonaccredited
Media Centers may include individuals with an overtly anti-Olympic in-
formation bent, they are far from being established for that purpose.
Following the success of Sydney, the term Nonaccredited Media Center
(NAMC) was adopted in Athens, Torino, and Beijing. Despite having
been developed outside the of‹cial Olympic regulations, the NAMCs
have structures and functions that reveal signi‹cant commonalities
with the form—and thus suggest the potential for a con›ict of roles to
emerge between them. These commonalities become clear when exam-
ining their respective journalist demographics; the characteristics of lo-
cation, facilities, and stories; and the evolution of an ever-closer rela-
tionship with the host city Olympic Organizing Committee.
Journalist Demographics
In contrast to accredited journalists, most of whom represent main-
stream media groups, individuals and companies registered at the
NAMCs represent a wide variety of organizations, including small out-
lets such as specialist culture and trade magazines, and community radio
stations and independent activist groups, who may have a speci‹c
agenda to uncover the most controversial issues emerging during Games
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time. Furthermore, those at the Nonaccredited Media Center are neither
regularly accredited in their own countries nor always professionally
trained. Thus, they bring a variety of agendas, demands, experience, and
interests to these centers. Those who use these facilities include
• Of‹cial IOC accredited journalists who ‹nd the location, facilities,
and environment more convenient or ‹nd the NAMC program of
events to be newsworthy.
• Journalists from IOC-accredited media organizations who do not
have their own accreditation to the Main Press Center or Interna-
tional Broadcast Center, due to the limited quotas.
• Journalists from mainstream media organizations who do not have
of‹cial Olympic accreditations.
• Specialist and freelance writers.
• Nonprofessional journalists who have their own publishing outlet.
• Online publishers whose work in online platforms is inseparable
from their personal online pro‹le as creative practitioners.
• Nonprofessional “citizen” journalists interested in exploring and
portraying alternative impressions of the Games. 
Typically, the ‹rst four types can be characterized as professional jour-
nalists; in the ‹nal three categories, far fewer have the marks of profes-
sionalism. The last two categories are growing in numbers quite
signi‹cantly: in Torino, video bloggers (vloggers) were plentiful for the
‹rst time. Notably, an increasing number of journalists from Categories
1 and 2 are using the nonaccredited facilities, working within the same
environment as journalists from Categories 3–7, who were originally
the targeted users.9 The wide variety of individual backgrounds, and
the unique situation of all of these journalists sharing the same facili-
ties and attending the same conferences over a concentrated period of
time, offers unexpected opportunities for personal interaction that can
lead to quite unusual proceedings. The agenda of a meeting may be
radically transformed simply because the interests of the minor press
are different; these interactions also raise the possibility of the minor
press’s capability to in›uence and transform the agenda of established,
mainstream journalists.
Location, Facilities, and Stories
The NAMC tends to be located in a space that is conducive to the city’s
interest in promoting locally rooted messages. The venue is typically a
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city center surrounded by relevant cultural attractions and political in-
stitutions. In contrast, the accredited centers are located at the main
Olympic park area, which is usually outside the city center in new pur-
pose-built facilities. Further, the NAMC tends to emphasize hospitality
as much as media information. It is a facility in which those who un-
derwrite it—local and regional authorities as well as corporations—are
cajoling as much as hosting, trying to extend the ‹eld of vision rather
than simply provide access. As a result, the NAMC retains a strong lo-
cal character, which contrasts sharply with the standardized framework
of the Main Press Center and the International Broadcasting Center,
where facilities present almost identical features from one Games edi-
tion to the next and where stories typically exclude any social, cultural,
and political aspects of the local host.
Relationship with “Of‹cial” Olympic Structures
The NAMC has no of‹cial link to the accredited centers but is increas-
ingly being used to ensure representation of the host city Organizing
Committee in non–sporting related issues such as cultural, educational,
and environmental matters. For example, one feature that has been inte-
gral to the NAMC since Sydney 2000 is a Cultural Olympiad or Olympic
Arts Festival press of‹ce. This presence is a re›ection of the impression
that cultural information is marginalized at the Main Media Centers.
The nonaccredited centers have also become hosts of high pro‹le
Olympic-related events, such as the Olympic Truce in Athens, and are
sites for information about popular Olympic features such as the
Medals Plaza during the Winter Games and the LiveSites!—large
screens in the open air broadcasting sport as well as concerts and pro-
viding free live entertainment. None of these would feature promi-
nently at the accredited media venues. Furthermore, the NAMC has be-
come a hub for of‹cial information about Olympic transportation and
environmental guidelines.
The increasing level of partnership between these semiof‹cial or
unof‹cial centers and entire departments or programs within the local
Olympic Organizing Committee reveals a trend toward the increasing
centrality of the NAMC as a provider of information and media access
to relevant dimensions of the Games that are, however, not yet consid-
ered a media priority for the IOC. While part of this division has to do
with the differing interests of the media—the assumption that local
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culture and street celebrations are meaningful primarily to local media,
whereas elite sport is of global interest—it is also explained through
sponsorship structures, which presently do not fund the majority of
cultural (nonsport) activities (García 2001).
New Trends, New Media
As demonstrated by the experience in Torino, there are increasing
numbers of online journalists present at the Olympics, which presents
new opportunities for the NAMC. Some of the fundamental distinc-
tions of Olympic journalism are disrupted by new media, notably the
distinction between broadcasters and print media. The collapsing of
boundaries is also indicative of the mixed role of new media publishers:
they are producers, users, and audiences. Moreover, the process of edi-
torial control is diminished or, at least, replaced by a user-generated
agenda, whereby the successful impact of stories is enabled by the syn-
dication of material by the user community.
The IOC has sought to control who can report on the Olympics, but
this is increasingly dif‹cult given the emergence of a new community of
citizen journalists. So far, athletes and coaches have been forbidden
from blogging—or undertaking any practice that could be construed as
journalism—during the Olympic fortnight. Regardless of whether this
ban on such activities is an unreasonable infringement on the players’
rights of self-expression, it is dif‹cult to foresee how such rules can be
enforced effectively given the breadth of online publishing that cur-
rently exists. Additionally, on-site spectators with high speci‹cation
telephone cameras are also likely to share ‹rsthand and timely pictures
and videos transmitted immediately to their personal blogs and the like.
In many cases, this could present a competitive challenge to the fee-
paying broadcasters in the struggle for audiences, or at least offer some
alternative insight. The impact of new technologies will have to be a
particularly prominent issue for China at the Beijing 2008 Games, as it
is a country that is considerably advanced in the area of new media in-
novation, but also imposes speci‹c restrictions on journalistic freedom
that are now being contested within the context of the Olympic Games.
The New Media of and in Beijing 2008 
Characterizing the subject of new media in the context of China is a
multilayered task. First, one can discuss the rise of digital media tech-
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nologies, as instances of new media proper, in scholarly terms. This
would encompass the development of online publishing platforms by
established media companies or the emergence of new organizations
that are increasingly occupying a stronghold in the dissemination of
information and enabling new spaces of communication. A good ex-
ample of this is the recent emergence of MySpace China (Barboza
2007). However, this category also encompasses discussions over cen-
sorship surrounding the presence of, say, YouTube or Google in China.
Second, one could speak about the expectant discourse of greater West-
ern media freedom in China as an indication of its new media popula-
tion. In this regard, the Beijing Olympic Games can be discussed as a
mechanism through which this transformation will take place. Third,
one must consider the emergence of new media as the disruption of
traditional categories of media professions, as with the rise of citizen
journalists and the syndication of information via Web 2.0 software.
Among these three categories of new media, there is considerable over-
lap. Already, one can notice how the emergence of on-site amateur
photographers is challenging the role of the photojournalist. Thus, the
sourcing of images through photo sharing platforms such as ›ickr.com,
using Creative Commons licenses, is evidence of this challenge, partic-
ularly when such nonprofessionals are on-site with unrivaled access to
a story. Nevertheless, this separation of new media debates in China
will enable some distinct points to be made in the context of China
generally and the Beijing Olympics speci‹cally.
Beijing’s Nonaccredited Olympic Media
Realizing the role the NAMC will play in promoting the historical, cul-
tural, and social elements of Beijing to the world, Beijing’s “Service
Guide for Foreign Media Coverage of the Beijing Olympic Games and
the Preparatory Period” (BOCOG 2007) takes into account provision
for the nonaccredited media. In this document, as well as in personal
interviews throughout July 2006, the Beijing Organizing Committee of
the Olympic Games expressed its intention to host a Nonaccredited
Media Center that would accommodate more than 10,000 journalists,
including representatives from the more than 2,000 newspapers that
exist in China, along with other international media. While this is an
interesting development, its implications are not clearly positive. In-
creased visibility and integration with of‹cial structures could lead the
NAMC to implement tighter restrictions on access and narrow the
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range of participants it hosts. In short, one might suppose that this in-
tegration within BOCOG is indicative of an attempt to control and re-
strain the nonaccredited media. However, it might also enable greater
and wider journalistic coverage. In support of the positive interpreta-
tion of this development, one might cite an interview with Wang Hui,
vice-director of BOCOG’s media and communications department.
Wang emphasized the diversity of media coverage during the
Olympics, “as media are concerned not only about who won a gold
medal and set a world record during the Olympics, but also about the
Olympics hosting country’s landscape, the hosting city’s characteris-
tics, local people’s lives, how they participate in the Olympics”
(China.com.cn 2006).
The Beijing Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games suggested
that there was some expectation that the NAMC would host profes-
sional journalists who did not happen to have access to the Main Press
Center and the International Broadcasting Center. In an interview at
the Beijing Olympic Media Center, which currently operates as the
main point of contact with the press, one journalist from the China
Post newspaper indicated that the nonaccredited journalists should be
professional journalists and have quali‹cations that would authenti-
cate an application to the NAMC. Yet, as we have suggested in reference
to Torino, and given the rise of online usage in China (China Internet
Network Information Center 2007), it is unlikely that many of these
nonaccredited journalists will be either “professional” in the widely ac-
cepted sense or in possession of a national press card. Consequently,
while the expectation of the NAMC in Beijing might seem to contradict
our expectation, experience at previous Games suggests that these in-
tentions are common when discussed in advance of the Games. In each
of the cities we have investigated, there was considerably less rigor ap-
plied to applications from journalists during Games time itself, as local
authorities were pressing to attract publicity about non-Olympic-re-
lated causes.
The Beijing Games illustrates a number of other challenges posed by
the development of new media in China. For example, one might have
concerns about China’s capacity to deliver international, online facili-
ties to accommodate the Olympics’ new media needs, such as stream-
ing on accredited broadcasters’ Web sites. In March 2007, the IOC
launched a tender for the sale of the Internet and mobile platform ex-
hibition rights (new media rights) to the Beijing Games, for China’s
mainland territory. This is the ‹rst time that the IOC has separated the
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sale of television transmission rights from Internet and mobile broad-
casting. However, while China endeavors to honor its commitment to
the IOC by abiding by the rules of Olympic media coverage, some of its
own domestic media management laws and regulations have not been
upgraded to meet these commitments. Effective February 2003,
China’s State Administration of Radio Film and Television (SARFT) in-
stituted the Administrative Measures regarding the Broadcasting of Au-
diovisual Programs through the Internet and other Information Net-
works in China, which stipulate that a broadcaster must ‹rst apply for
a “License to Broadcast Audiovisual Programs by Network” before they
can broadcast audiovisual programs through information networks
such as the Internet. However, many Internet content providers, such
as Sina.com, Sohu.com—the appointed Internet content provider for
BOCOG—China Unicom, and QQ, do not have such a “license,” which
means they may not be able to broadcast under this regulation. At the
time of writing, the IOC had not announced the results of the open
tender for the rights to broadcast competitions over the Internet. How-
ever, in a transcript from Sohu.com in the ‹rst quarter of 2007 it indi-
cates that it has no role in the delivery of such content:
Sohu is the exclusive Internet content provider sponsor for the Beijing
2008 of‹cial website, so we are the operator of Beijing2008.com or .cn,
for that matter, and all content on that website is provided by Sohu. 
. . . The new media rights is a separate matter and that is closely tied
into with the TV broadcasting rights, so yes, there was a tender but that
is separate and distinct from the of‹cial website that we operate. So it
is almost like TV broadcasting rights in the eyes of the IOC. The out-
come of the tender will be known probably—it [sic] not during Q2, it
will be early Q3. So it is separate and distinct. (Carol Yu, Sohu co-pres-
ident, chief ‹nancial of‹cer, cited in Seeking Alpha 2007)
For the nonaccredited journalist, the implications of this are unclear.
While it indicates the IOC’s attempt to respond to the potential chal-
lenge of online publishing and a recognition that the national televi-
sion broadcaster is not always best placed to deliver the largest online
audience, domestic laws can inhibit this objective. For China, the
SARFT regulations indicate that there will be considerable barriers to a
non-China-based company delivering such content. Indeed, it is likely
that a number of China-based companies will struggle with the regula-
tions. In any case, China-based bloggers—including those who are ap-
proved to work from the NAMC—could face unknown penalties for
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broadcasting material via the Internet, though this is likely to be of
concern only in the context of moving sports images. In sum, while it
is still unclear what the Chinese Olympic “citizen journalist” might 
entail, the active Chinese blogs, podcasts, vlogs and so forth are a clear
indication of the relevance of such voices in the construction of alter-
native narratives about China. Moreover, in response to such participa-
tion, many mainstream Chinese media companies, such as China Cen-
tral Television (CCTV), are already engaging in new media practices by
adding blogs and podcasting elements to their Web sites.
Discussion: Neither Alternative, 
Marginal, nor Minor
Nonaccredited Media Centers constitute a mixed zone at the Olympics.
They are regulated, but, crucially, they are not of‹cial Olympic venues,
as the absence of the Olympic rings and the word Olympic within the
center’s branding indicates. As such, they are not subject to the much
stricter level of regulation of the Olympic venues. This distinction is
important when considering their role in the creation or de‹nition of
additional narratives. Moreover, it informs our understanding of what
character media coverage of the Games might exhibit. While indepen-
dent or alternative media centers are sometimes explicitly anti-
Olympic, we have been interested in the mixed zones within the
Olympic city. In part, this is because there appear to be opportunities
from within the system to challenge the dominant media structures.
We are not convinced that this has happened through the NAMCs, but
the potential is certainly present. Their more relaxed accreditation
process, the governmental involvement and capacity to gain access for
media to important political and cultural events, and the demograph-
ics of journalists present provides a rich set of circumstances through
which the highly regulated media structures at the Games can be cir-
cumvented.
Furthermore, the NAMC has become an integral part of a host city’s
programming, though its establishment is not a formal requirement
within the IOC Host City contract. Indeed, its existence poses a poten-
tial compromise to a range of stakeholders who ‹nance the Games,
though it offers a major platform on which the host city can stage it-
self. To this extent, its position would appear to favor a degree of invis-
ibility at IOC level. If it were to become too successful at in›uencing TV
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coverage or column space, Olympic media rights holders might ques-
tion its legitimacy and even claim breach of contract. Yet, the local au-
thorities bene‹t considerably from a high-pro‹le NAMC. Indeed, the
host city has no such commitment to the long-term relationship of me-
dia rights holders to the IOC. Rather, the host’s preferred position is to
utilize a NAMC as best it can to ensure an overall, positive long-term
legacy for the city.
The information provided by NAMCs is essentially different from
what is available in the Main Press Center or International Broadcast-
ing Center, but it is not irrelevant in the context of the Games. The
sporting focus of the main Olympic media venues may have limited
the ability of journalists to gather a detailed understanding of the host
community and its potential legacy. Moreover, followers of sporting
events seem increasingly interested in security issues, environmental
policies, and the social acceptance and sustainability of the event. This
makes a case for the provision of information beyond sporting results,
Olympic ritual, and athletes’ biographies, which are the only explicit
media priority for the IOC.
The NAMC as the Institutionalization of 
New (Olympic) Media
There are an important number of distinctions that need unraveling in
the context of the nonaccredited media. First, we might arrive at a
reconceptualization of the Olympic media, which can be broken down
into three general categories: accredited (those at the International
Broadcast Center or Main Press Center), nonaccredited (those at the
NAMC), and unaccredited (those at the Independent or Alternative Me-
dia Centers, as well as those acting as citizen journalists).
Second, it is necessary to consider the range of ways in which each
of these types of journalists contributes to or detracts from the estab-
lished Olympic narratives. While we might describe the accredited fa-
cilities as those that communicate the of‹cial IOC narratives, the
nonaccredited media centers offer an additional, city-oriented narra-
tive, which has the potential to supplement or compete with the cov-
erage of the former. As such, while one might expect that the local Or-
ganizing Committee and the host city should be working toward,
mostly, the same goals as the IOC, in practice, each is competing for
different kinds of (positive) narratives (and different kinds of media at-
tention). While for the IOC, the Olympic Games is an opportunity to
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showcase and reinforce the Olympic brand as a global entity, for the
host city, the Games as a global brand is an opportunity to showcase its
local characteristics.
Third, one of the crucial clari‹cations that must be addressed
throughout this unraveling is the dual process of institutionalization
and destabilization associated with the NAMCs. The NAMCs are agents
of institutionalization insofar as they are attempts to manage journal-
ists who are external to the Olympic accreditation process and who
might, as a result of being unmanaged, negatively portray the
Olympics. However, as a result of this process, the NAMCs also risk
their stability, since their greater visibility can become a con›ict for the
exclusive, rights-holding arrangements set up via the Main Media Cen-
ters. Presently, the NAMC exists because of the lack of concern from
within the Olympic infrastructure to market the city.
Finally, there are two important points to think about in relation to
the emergence of new media in general and the citizen journalist
speci‹cally. Since Torino, new questions have arisen from the growth
of blogging and video blogging as a means of reporting the Games. Ad-
mittedly, one cannot assume that bloggers are politically minded or
even journalistic in their style of reporting. Indeed, in the context of
the Olympics, it is not obvious that “new media” denotes “counterme-
dia,” although it is true that a range of new activists are visible due to
this phenomenon. While there may be an increasing number of vlog-
gers or bloggers at the Games, they will not all be concerned with crit-
icizing them. Many will most likely want simply to celebrate them. Sec-
ond, while we suggest that new media platforms have the potential to
subvert established media channels, old media are increasingly recog-
nizing the need to become new media. A good indication of this is the
purchase of YouTube channels by a number of established broadcasters
around the world. As this trend develops, the distinction between old
and new media—along with new media’s subversive potential—might
similarly disappear, though we anticipate that the Internet will con-
tinue to give rise to resistant structures.
Regardless, we argue that the various complexities of the NAMC will
challenge how media coverage of the Games takes place and thus also
what the Games themselves mean to nations and people. To the extent
that the Olympic Games aspires to be a publicly shared media event,
our proposition has been that the NAMC provides a crucial mechanism
through which a valuable democratization of the media is taking place,
while maintaining the ‹nancial infrastructure upon which the Games
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rely. In some sense, we can describe journalism at the NAMC as a form
of ambush media—a phenomenon that involves in‹ltrating the privi-
leged position of traditional media organizations either within a ‹xed
media event or through new media publishing spaces and, usually, a
combination of the two. Ambush media implies three key processes:
piggyjacking10 on the intellectual property of traditional media to gen-
erate competing publicity, turning the cameras on traditional media in
action and then broadcasting the results, and in‹ltrating spaces that
are reserved for traditional media. There are many ways in which this
latter phenomenon occurs, including the simple act of allowing ac-
credited journalists to enter a non–IOC regulated media space where
they will learn about less visible Olympic activities, such as the
Olympic Truce and non-Olympic but relevant local host-related activi-
ties. However, the NAMC is also a space where nonprofessional jour-
nalists can broadcast and write about the Games, thus providing op-
portunities for a wider range of questions to be asked during the actual
event. In this sense, our title for this chapter, “We Are the Media,”
draws attention to the growing demand for citizen journalism to be
given political recognition from institutions and governments and, im-
portantly, the growing acceptance of this recognition. These changes
have consequences for how society is (dis)ordered via the media and,
indeed, raise questions about whether the notion of a “media event”
(Dayan and Katz 1992) is undermined by these new forms of interroga-
tion.
Conclusion
We began this chapter by asking what stories the nonaccredited media
tell and what role they have in the construction of the Olympic media
event. We have explored the processes through which new kinds of
media have become part of the Olympic infrastructure and highlighted
the tensions this provokes. In comparison to the accredited journalists,
the nonaccredited media are fed different stories, they have different
expectations, and they work for different kinds of media organizations.
Even without knowing much about what is actually published or
broadcast by this community, it is clear that, for such media, the
Olympics is not really a sporting event. Rather, it is a moment of in-
tense formal and informal cultural and political presentations and rep-
resentations.
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When examining the evolution of the NAMC, it is remarkable to see
how the initiative has progressed from a very modest service in
Barcelona whose major asset was the support of a university and whose
focus was the press media, to the large venues of recent Games, which
provide a wide variety of broadcast services under the auspices of gen-
erous tourism boards and other local bodies. The sheer magnitude of
these facilities is also intriguing because of the unique political space
that they occupy within the organizational structure of the Olympic
Games, which is framed by a powerful media mechanism.
We have made a number of claims in this chapter. Our initial
premise was that the NAMC—more than the International Broadcast
Center or the Main Press Center—is the best place to in›uence the lo-
cal and national legacy of the Olympic Games, since it is the key venue
that undertakes domestic political communications during Games
time. To this extent, it provides an essential space for the host city to
orchestrate its narrative, a space that is not offered through the other
media venues. It is also a space where new media communities can ac-
cess structures of governance directly. Yet, we also suggest that the
emergence of online publishing and broadcasting, along with the
growing prominence of the NAMC, threatens this position. Indeed,
one might suggest that these centers might soon die out, before they
have really begun to establish the value of their contribution to the pre-
sentation of an Olympic city. For now, the Nonaccredited Media Cen-
ters are non–Olympic Games time venues where culture, media, and
politics collide in ways that are often left unresolved.
As the Beijing Olympic Games approaches, some clear nuances to
this discussion are evident. These concern the particular position of
media organizations and professions within China during the Games.
We note that the new legislation on greater media freedom is directed
only toward foreign journalists (China Daily 2006). Moreover, Beijing’s
NAMC is being hosted by the Olympic Organizing Committee. Initial
arrangements suggest that the registration process will be strict and
only granted to professional journalists, though this might change dur-
ing Games time. The effect of this might be greater limitations on new
media journalists, many of whom could be dissuaded from using the
NAMC. Equally, China’s burgeoning new media population indicates a
willingness to engage such communities and one would expect this to
shape the NAMC structures before the Games begin.
For the subsequent Olympic cities of Vancouver and London, there
is even greater reason to emphasize the changing technological media
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culture and consider the prospects. During the Torino Games, new me-
dia journalists from Vancouver, looking toward the 2012 Games, con-
sidered the continued necessity of providing a centralized facility for
citizen journalists, given that the increased accessibility of free, pub-
licly available, wireless Internet access somewhat reduces the need for a
physical facility. Our expectation is that its role for citizen journalists
will be determined by the degree to which such individuals see them-
selves as either more citizen or more journalist. However, the notion of
a center—where press conferences, key of‹cials, and press of‹cers are
located—will continue to have value, since the simple presentation of
information will not be suf‹cient to facilitate the sharing of and access
to relevant stories. To this extent, even the strongest claims about vir-
tual societies should not be seen as a replacement for real space inter-
actions. Indeed, one must look toward traditional practices within all
forms of journalism to understand that the journalist’s presence at the
center of an event is a crucial element of its authenticity, originality,
and legacy.
The dif‹culty, we believe, is that these rich and complex social
spaces are unlikely to remain outside of the IOC’s scrutiny, though the
challenge is to convince the IOC that this set of developments can be
valuable. Based on the current model, there is no reason to suppose
that further integration with IOC venues is likely, since sponsorship ne-
gotiations only ensure access to the sports news and venues, which are
not the interest of the NAMC. Indeed, integration could lead to unde-
sirable consequences, as it would overburden already saturated
Olympic media structures. Moreover, it would most likely be overly re-
strictive and, potentially, be a disincentive for prospective Olympic
cities to bid for the Games, as they might ‹nd themselves without the
desired platform to promote themselves. Yet the increasing promi-
nence of the NAMC could be seen as detracting from the value media
organizations purchase when requesting exclusivity on access to infor-
mation. If this becomes the perception—which we emphasize, it
should not—then one could envisage the end of the Nonaccredited
Media Center, as it is currently known.
NOTES
The title of this chapter is from a sticker on the cover of an Apple PowerBook
notebook belonging to a Nonaccredited Media Center journalist at the
Torino 2006 Winter Games. It refers to the Web site by the same name. Re-
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search for this chapter was made possible by the generous support of the
British Academy.
1. We do not claim that journalism is deprofessionalized via new media,
as this would neglect the advanced skills, ethics, and integrity of so-called cit-
izen journalists. Instead, our reprofessionalization refers to the expansion of
journalistic expertise that is achieved by the democratization of technology
and publishing channels.
2. The Montreal 1976 Games bankrupted the city and led to a void in the
number of applications to host subsequent Games. To confront this crisis,
the IOC was forced to revise its core structures and, under the leadership of
its new president, Juan Antonio Samaranch, established a model to protect
the economic viability of the Games. In the 1980s, the Olympic Games were
established as a commercial enterprise with highly regulated protection of its
main brand elements. The commercial model for the Olympics relied on two
main factors: commercial sponsorship—the TOP program—and, more im-
portantly, broadcasting media rights. Broadcast right holders and sponsors
would thus become the main source of funds for the Games and the Olympic
Movement at large, and the protection of their interests one of the main
tasks of the IOC under its Olympic marketing program.
3. The Olympic Family is de‹ned as the group of organizations involved
in promoting the Olympic Movement, which is governed by the IOC. The
main Olympic Family member organizations include: the IOC as top gov-
erning body; International Federations (IFs); National Olympic Committees
(NOCs); respective Organizing Committees for the Olympic Games
(OCOGs); national sport associations and sports clubs; national sport teams
(comprising the athletes and of‹cials invited to attend respective Games);
the main Olympic sponsors (TOP); and Olympic-accredited media, including
the press, photographers, and broadcast right-holding organizations.
4. TV rights revenue for the Beijing Olympic Games is estimated at
$1,707 million, of which 51 percent is retained by the IOC and 49 percent is
directly allocated to the OCOG for the hosting of the Games (IOC 2007).
5. For more on this, see http://www.fouryearstovancouver.com/pb/
wp_7882380d/wp_7882380d.html.
6. The IOC speci‹es that Olympic host cities must organize a program of
cultural activities. Since the Barcelona 1992 Games, these programs have
taken the form of Cultural Olympiads, covering the four years linking the
end of one Winter or Summer Games edition with the next, to present arts
and cultural festivals (see García 2001).
7. Figures about attendance at the NAMCs are presented in various
forms, including overall visitors per day and total number of registered jour-
nalists. The former number is expectedly a much higher ‹gure, which might
account for why a report to the British Government as part of fact-‹nding for
the London 2012 Games indicated that there were 20,000 journalists at the
Sydney Media Center. This might represent the total number of visits from
journalists during the entire Games period to the SMC. However, the total
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number of registered journalists is closer to the 5,000 ‹gure indicated at the
Legislative Council.
8. Olympic Truce is the IOC’s revival of the Ancient Olympic tradition of
Ekexeiria, which involved an agreement between different regions of Greece
to cease con›icts and allow athletes safe passage to Olympia to compete in
the Games. The modern version, revived in 1992, aspires to achieve the ces-
sation of global military actions during the time of the Games. It is perhaps
the most fundamental link between the IOC and the United Nations, which,
every two years, receives a declaration from the IOC president requesting
heads of state to observe the Olympic Truce. The signing of the wall by dig-
nitaries is supposed to indicate support for this Truce, though some would re-
gard it as politically inconsequential.
9. By the end of the ‹rst week of the 2004 Games, the organizers of the
NAMC in Athens claimed that 300 Main Press Center accredited journalists
were regularly using their facilities (Zappeion Center Director, personal in-
terview, Athens 2004).
10. This phrase is borrowed from Elihu Katz, who proposed it in the con-
text of a discussion at the Annenberg School of Communication. The term
was meant to imply a combination of piggybacking and hijacking and, while
meant as a joke, it seems as good a term as any to describe the process. It sat-
isfactorily characterizes the process of capitalizing on the work of of‹cial me-
dia (hijacking), without intending an obvious corruption of that of‹cial jour-
nalism or any speci‹c harm to it, hence piggyjacking.
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American Media’s Ideological Reading of 
China’s Olympic Games
Sonja K. Foss and 
Barbara J. Walkosz
To construct and display itself to its own members and to an external
audience, a culture or nation employs many types of texts—legible
events or objects—including museums, historic homes and districts,
rituals and ceremonies, architecture, shrines, sports events, and artistic
performances. Such texts are purposefully used as symbolic resources
by the community, engaging the past to forge an image that is “pro-
foundly constitutive of identity, community, and moral vision”
(Phillips 2004, 90).
Nowhere is the symbolic function of cultural display more evident
than at the Olympic Games. Host nations use the Games “to emphasize
[their] claims to having a leading status, mission, and destiny in the
world international order and world history” (Roche 2000, 10). Be-
cause the Olympics provides the sponsoring country with the opportu-
nity to highlight its achievements to the world (Beck and Bosshart
2003), the Games act as a “potent cultural resource with real implica-
tions for international relations and the domestic interest of nation
states” (Polumbaum 2003, 57).
The 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing provide an extraordinary oppor-
tunity for China to display its culture, ideology, and values to a global
audience. China has de‹ned its objectives for sponsoring the Games as
being to create “a New Beijing” and to host “a Green Olympics, a High-
Tech Olympics, a People’s Olympics” (Kolatch 2006). The of‹cial theme
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of the Olympic Games, “One World, One Dream,” suggests that China
also seeks to position itself as a member of the global community, where
it can create a “bright future with the rest of the world” (“One World”
2007). China “considers the Olympics to be modern China’s coming-out
party to the rest of the world” (Yardley 2005a, 4), and by “taking on the
Olympics, China committed itself to demonstrating that it is a world-
class power.” Its primary objective now is “to impress the world, by
whatever means necessary” (Lubow 2006, 68).
China’s capacity to accomplish its objectives in hosting the Olympic
Games is not, however, entirely under its control. The construction and
presentation of its activities in advance of the Olympics is mitigated by
media coverage, the primary means by which cultural display is dis-
seminated, particularly to foreigners. The media invite audiences “to
understand the world in certain ways, but not in others” (O’Connor
and Downing 1995, 16) by framing information to “select some aspects of
a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in
such a way as to promote a particular problem de‹nition, causal interpreta-
tion, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item pro-
posed” (Entman 1993, 52). As they reinforce, transform, diminish, or ig-
nore the messages China seeks to communicate about itself to the
world, then, the media offer “preferred social, cultural, political, and
economic meanings” (Danner and Walsh 1999, 64) that easily can be-
come hegemonic in their “symbolic power to map or classify the world
for others” (Hall 1988, 44).
In this chapter, we explore the preferred meaning that is being ad-
vanced by elite American media concerning China’s preparation for
the 2008 Olympic Games. To this end, we employ ideological analysis,
which focuses on patterns of beliefs that determine a group’s interpre-
tations of some aspect(s) of the world and that re›ect a group’s “funda-
mental social, economic, political or cultural interests” (van Dijk 1998,
69). As critics make visible the dominant ideology embedded in a par-
ticular discursive construction, they are able to discover its preferred
reading, what it asks audiences to believe or understand, the arguments
it makes, and the ways of seeing it commends. Equally important, an
ideological analysis can reveal what a discursive construction does not
want audiences to think about or the ways of seeing it asks audiences
to avoid (Foss 2004).
The data for our analysis are the eighty-four articles concerning
China’s preparation for the 2008 Olympics that appeared in the New
York Times and the Wall Street Journal between January 2003, and May
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2007. We selected these newspapers as our data because both are widely
distributed national newspapers, which means that the issues deemed
newsworthy by these newspapers often set the agenda for other Western
media outlets, including television, radio, and other newspapers (Dear-
ing and Rogers 1996). Both are highly respected: the New York Times is
considered the “principal newspaper of record in the United States”
(Merrill 1983, 310), and the Wall Street Journal is viewed as a leading
source of business and ‹nancial news in the United States. Because they
“provide a site and forum for elite discourse, and produce policy and in-
tellectual discourse for elite consumption” (Lee 2002, 345), they consti-
tute elite American media that are likely to be highly in›uential in the
construction of a hegemonic ideology concerning China (Lee 2002).
An understanding of the ideology behind the discursive construc-
tion of China by elite American media is important because of the po-
tential for far-reaching consequences of such a construction. Informed
publics often adopt elite cues in the news and utilize those cues to
structure their perceptions about speci‹c issues (Zaller 1992). The par-
ticular frame used to construct media coverage will affect, for example,
whether China achieves its objectives of impressing the world with the
Games and positioning itself as a legitimate member of the global com-
munity. In addition, the narrative constructed by the media will affect
the perceptions of China by Americans and the larger global commu-
nity, including the nature of outsiders’ interactions with the Chinese,
their views of Chinese products, and their de‹nitions of themselves vis-
à-vis the Chinese.
What we suggest in this chapter is that the elite American media use
China’s cultural displays in advance of the Olympic Games to construct
four ideological spaces—those of de‹nition, equivocation, accumula-
tion, and anticipation. Each of these spaces allows the media to set up a
tension between two options concerning a major exigence, something
the media identify as “waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it
should be” (Bitzer 1968, 6); according to the media construction, each
exigence remains unresolved in the space created. We turn now to an
explication of each space, followed by a discussion of the reassurance
function that we argue these spaces perform for media consumers.
Space of De‹nition
A major space that is being created in the discursive construction of
China by American media is that of de‹nition, which focuses on what
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Beijing and China will be like in the future. The exigence that creates
this space is the tension between the familiarity and comfort of the
West and the uniqueness of Chinese culture. This exigence, the medi-
ated narrative suggests, requires a balance between the desire for China
to be much like Westerners’ home spaces—comfortable and nonthreat-
ening—and the desire to experience and appreciate what makes China
unique. In the space of de‹nition, the key issue, then, is the nature of
the “place consciousness” (Glassberg 1996, 18) that China will create.
China as Western
One of the options in the tension that constitutes the space of de‹ni-
tion is for China to become Western. American media’s coverage of
China’s cultural displays in advance of the Olympics suggests support
for this option in a number of ways. The one that is receiving the most
attention is the “demolition of many of the city’s old ‘hutong’ neigh-
borhoods, the ancient, densely populated enclaves of narrow, winding
streets and crumbling courtyard homes.” The result has been the dislo-
cation of “untold thousands of people, to make room for the thousands
of development projects swallowing the city” (Yardley 2006b).
The demolition is exempli‹ed in stories about the historic neighbor-
hood of Qianmen, “once the domain of Qing Dynasty opera singers
and classical scholars.” One of the last intact hutongs, Qianmen is
“home to teachers, shop owners, migrant workers and other working-
class people.” Because it has fallen into disrepair, however, “many resi-
dents believe that of‹cials do not want the neighborhood to be an eye-
sore at the center of the city during the Olympics.” One story quotes a
resident who analyzes the situation in this way: “This neighborhood is
the face of Beijing to the world. They don’t want foreigners to see this
scarred old face.” As a result, one reporter observers, Qianmen is now
“an eerie picture of destruction. Ancient homes lie in rubble. Scav-
engers squat in alleyways and wait to ransack vacated buildings” (Yard-
ley 2006b).
The presentation of China as part of the West is also evident in cov-
erage of its demolition of archaeological sites. The construction being
done for the Olympics is “uncovering so many antiquities that it might
be considered a golden era for archaeology—except that sites and an-
tiquities are often simply demolished by bulldozers or looted.” The
president of the China Archaeological Society, Xu Pingfang, is quoted
in one story with an explanation for what is happening in China:
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“There are two enemies of antiquity protection. Construction is one.
Thieves are the others. They know what they want, and they destroy
the rest.” The media note that developers and local of‹cials often side-
step rules concerning the treatment of archaeological sites “partly be-
cause surveys and excavations can be time-consuming and create
costly construction delays” (Yardley 2007a). Because archaeological
sites delay the construction of modern cities, the news stories suggest,
they are often destroyed without excavation so that China may more
quickly achieve its goal of Westernization.
The American media’s narrative of China as becoming Western can
be seen as well in their discussion of the “eye-popping physical trans-
formation of China” through its “craze for theatrically expressive
schemes by famous architects.” Acknowledging that Chinese “archi-
tects were not yet up to the challenge, the Chinese had imported the
best the West could offer” to create Western-style buildings. Several fac-
tors are cited as facilitating China’s embrace of Western architecture:
“Cheap labor, at least as much as an unfettered outlook, permits the
›ourishing in China of avant-garde architecture, with its penchant for
original engineering, unorthodox materials and surprising forms.” Not
all the results have been successful, the media note: the “National The-
ater is generally seen as a grotesquely inappropriate building on a
supremely sensitive site.” One story provides an explanation for the
less successful architectural results by quoting Peng Pei Gen, an archi-
tecture professor: “They couldn’t do this in their own country, so they
are taking advantage of the Chinese psychology that European think-
ing is better” (Lubow 2006, 68).
China is also depicted as achieving a Western look because of the
kinds of commercial establishments that are taking the place of historic
neighborhoods—businesses such as “[n]ightclubs, bars and art gal-
leries.” In the area of Houhai, one story reports, “20 or 30 bars all
opened up” in one summer; one of these nightclubs is described in de-
tail as “a lounge with a modern décor and a cool minimalist patio,”
while another is shown as a place where customers come “to dance to
the different D.J.’s and drink cocktails like Chivas Regal with green tea”
(Yang 2005, 7).
Other typically American institutions that are being introduced into
China to make it a more familiar place to Westerners are featured in the
news stories. Articles discuss Super 8 Hotels’ opening of “six franchise
hotels in China, including three in Beijing” (Conlin 2006, 2) as well as
the fact that Ticketmaster “won the exclusive contract to supply tick-
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ets” for the Olympic Games (Silver 2006). Westerners also will recog-
nize the regional airline on which they ›y within China, media cover-
age notes, because of Mesa Air Group’s launch of a regional airline in
China in conjunction with Shenzhen Airlines (“U.S. Carrier” 2006).
The disciplining of Chinese citizens to Westernize the country is also
the subject of coverage by the media. Much attention has been paid to
China’s initiation of a campaign to curb public spitting, “a frequent
practice in Beijing and even more common elsewhere in China. Health
of‹cials, worried about communicable disease, have long tried to curb
public spitting, with limited success, given that many people do not
consider it unacceptable behavior.” The media report that hundreds of
volunteers have joined the group known as the Green Woodpecker Proj-
ect, named for the woodpecker’s practice of picking up worms and
cleaning up the forest. The group members are quoted as saying they
want “to clean up the city the same way,” which they do by carrying
“tissues, which they offer to people as an alternative to spitting on the
ground, and try to convince the offender, usually male, to change his
ways” (Yardley 2007b).
Yet another way in which China is presented as trying to imitate the
West is by cleaning up its English translations: “English translations on
signs are considered fashionable and good advertising, as well as a gra-
cious gesture to foreigners baf›ed by Chinese characters,” but many of
the translations are poorly done. News stories provide examples of poor
translations such as “Racist Park” as the English name for a theme park
about China’s ethnic minorities and “Sexually Inexperienced Chicken”
on menus to describe pullet, a hen less than a year old. The stories ap-
plaud Beijing’s announcement of “new standards and of‹cial transla-
tions that can be used on more than 2,000 different types of signs, as
well as on menus” (Yardley 2007b) and tell of teams of linguists that
will patrol Beijing’s public places to cleanse the city of its “often comi-
cal English translations” (Fong 2007).
China as Unique
Although a key focus of American media coverage of China’s cultural
displays is to portray Beijing as a thoroughly modern city devoid of an
Asian heritage, the constructed narrative also features China’s heritage
and its uniqueness as a culture. Although some archaeological sites are
being demolished, the narrative asserts, others are not. Archaeological
projects, which suggest a reverence for Chinese history, are reported to
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be “under way all over China,” and excavation of archaeological sites is
encouraged in many ways, the articles note. They report that a network
of government antiquity bureaus “has been established throughout the
provinces and major cities. Chinese law also requires that real estate de-
velopers receive approval from the local antiquity bureau before pro-
ceeding with work.” The Olympic site is presented as “an example of
how China’s antiquities protection system should work” in that “orga-
nizers have been careful to work with preservationists.” At the sites for
the main Olympic stadiums, one story reports, archaeological remains
were discovered “tracing back 2,000 years to the Han Dynasty. In all,
archaeologists excavated 700 ancient burial sites and recovered 1,538
artifacts, including porcelain urns and jade jewelry, while collecting
more than 6,000 ancient coins” (Yardley 2007a).
China is also depicted as unique in articles that note the construc-
tion of many new museums designed to showcase key aspects of Chi-
nese culture. Around the country, reporters explain, 1,000 new muse-
ums are planned to feature the history of oil lamps, beer, salt and piped
water, aerospace, typhoons, tree roots, and smoking. The 2,300 muse-
ums that currently exist in China do not compare, news stories note,
with the number of museums in developed nations, “especially with
China’s long history” (Fong 2006b).
There is yet another way in which the media depict China’s embrace
of its heritage in the space of de‹nition, and that is in the discussion of
the Chinese allusions that abound in the most visible buildings being
created for the Olympics. The headquarters of CCTV, the national tele-
vision company, for example, is reported to have been designed to sug-
gest a “calligraphic swoop,” while the “airport terminal bears an un-
missable resemblance” to a dragon, “a beast revered in traditional
Chinese architecture and folklore”; its use of the “imperial colors red
and gold” also is noted in media coverage. The bird’s nest analogy for
the main stadium is described as referencing Chinese culture: “In
China, a bird’s nest is very expensive, something you eat on special oc-
casions” (Lubow 2006, 85).
The tension that creates the space of de‹nition in the media culture
is between transformation of China, and Beijing, in particular, into a
modern, Western space that will be familiar to foreign visitors and the
preservation and highlighting of China’s unique culture. As they do
not resolve and, in fact, reinforce the tension between these two op-
tions, the media suggest that Beijing can be modern and familiar at the




A second space that is created by the American media’s presentation of
China is a space of equivocation, marked by deliberate ambiguity or
evasiveness. This is the space that China’s political leaders are shown to
occupy, and the focus in this space is on human rights issues. The exi-
gence created in the narrative that constructs this space is the tension
between China’s meeting of global human rights standards and the
sovereignty of Chinese of‹cials to run China’s affairs as they choose,
which sometimes means controlling Chinese citizens and foreigners. If
the political leaders resist global demands and standards for human
rights too vigorously, the media observe, they risk losing their place in
the global community; if they acquiesce too much to those demands
and standards, they lose their power within China.
China as a Violator of Human Rights
One of the major human rights issues that creates the tension in the
space of equivocation concerns China’s relationship with Darfur in Su-
dan. The problem is summarized in one article in this way: “China has
been criticized for giving strong ‹nancial and diplomatic backing to
the government of Sudan, which the Bush administration and critics
worldwide say has practiced genocide in its southern Darfur region
while waging a war against secessionists there” (Kahn 2007c). Another
story explains that at least “200,000 people—some say as many as
400,000—mostly non-Arab men, women and children, have died and
2.5 million have been displaced, as government-backed Arab militias
called the janjaweed have attacked the local population” (Cooper
2007).
Only three articles about China’s economic relationship with Sudan
have appeared in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal during
the time period of our analysis, and one features actor Mia Farrow and
her son, Ronan Farrow. An op-ed they coauthored is printed in the Wall
Street Journal, and their explanation of the relationship between China
and Sudan is the most detailed provided in either newspaper: “China is
pouring billions of dollars into Sudan. Beijing purchases an over-
whelming majority of Sudan’s annual oil exports and state-owned
China National Petroleum Corp.—an of‹cial partner of the upcoming
Olympic Games—owns the largest shares in each of Sudan’s two major
oil consortia. The Sudanese government uses as much as 80% of pro-
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ceeds from those sales to fund its brutal Janjaweed proxy militia.” They
also note that China “has used its veto power on the U.N. Security
Council to repeatedly obstruct efforts by the U.S. and the U.K. to intro-
duce peacekeepers to curtail the slaughter” (Farrow and Farrow 2007).
That Darfur and the Olympics could collide in the space of equivo-
cation is depicted primarily through the lens of celebrities’ activities. In
addition to the Farrows, Ira Newble, a professional basketball player
with the Cleveland Cavaliers (Beck 2007), and ‹lm director Steven
Spielberg (Cooper 2007) are cited to create the narrative that “China
must use its in›uence with Sudan’s government to improve the situa-
tion in Darfur or face a possible backlash against its serving as host of
the Games” (Kahn 2007c). Such celebrity protagonists are positioned in
the narrative as threatening to shut down the Olympics by disseminat-
ing labels such as “Genocide Olympics” to describe the Games (Cooper
2007). The response of the Chinese foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, ap-
pears inconsequential in juxtaposition to the star power of the cited
celebrities: “There is a handful of people who are trying to politicize the
Olympic Games. This is against the spirit of the Games” (Kahn 2007c).
China’s restrictions on media access are well known, and coverage of
its continued restrictions contributes to a picture of China as a country
that violates human rights. Chinese journalists “face heavy censor-
ship” (Yardley 2006c), according to an article that cites as its source Re-
porters Without Borders. In its annual report on press freedoms, the
group asserted “that conditions for the news media and for journalists
had deteriorated in China. ‘The press is being forced into self-censor-
ship, the Internet is ‹ltered, and the foreign media very closely
watched.’” The story continues to quote Reporters Without Borders
concerning the status of media restrictions: “Faced with burgeoning
social unrest and journalists who are becoming much less compliant,
the authorities, directed by president Hu Jintao, have been bringing the
media to heel in the name of a ‘harmonious society.’” Stories also cover
the ‹ve-year prison sentence given to a Hong Kong reporter and the
three-year sentence given to a researcher in the Beijing bureau of the
New York Times as examples of efforts to intimidate journalists. In total,
one reporter details, “31 journalists were serving jail terms in China and
. . . the authorities had convicted 52 more people for posting political
views on the Internet” (Kahn 2007b).
Another example of the media’s highlighting of the curtailment of
press freedoms is a story on China’s efforts “to prevent domestic critics
from voicing negative views.” One Chinese couple, Hu Jia and Zeng
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Jinyan, “who have promoted a variety of delicate social and political
causes,” receive particular attention in the news coverage. The police
prevented the couple “from departing from Beijing on a trip to Hong
Kong and several European countries,” where the two “had planned to
call attention to what they described as a neglect of AIDS patients and
to defend other Chinese campaigners for human rights who had been
prosecuted in recent months.” A story reports that the police told the
pair that they “were suspected of ‘endangering national security’ and
would be required to stay in their home under police watch for an
inde‹nite period” (Kahn 2007c).
A similar restriction of information is taking place, the media report,
in the exhibitions housed in China’s new museums. One professor is
cited who “fought Shenzhen city authorities when they wanted to omit
mention of a devastating 1995 chemical-plant explosion from the city’s
history museum he was designing. They eventually took his advice,
though they played down the signi‹cance of the explosion.” Likewise,
in an exhibition in the new Beijing Capital Museum “designed to show
parallels between Beijing and global history,” media coverage notes
that no mention is made “of an 1860 pillaging of the imperial Summer
Palace by British and French troops . . . . Museum head Guo Xiaolin
said the period isn’t mentioned because it is only a small part of
China’s history.” The media point out that some subjects still cannot
be discussed at all: “the 1989 Tiananmen Square killings are still taboo”
(Fong 2006b).
China as an Upholder of Human Rights
At the same time that the media’s presentation of China depicts it as a
violator of human rights, China is also shown to be conforming some-
what to human rights practices. China’s loosening of control of the me-
dia is one such arena that is reported with the note that “Beijing
promised in its bid for the Games that it would . . . open its doors wider,
allowing a freer ›ow of information into and out of the country” (Kahn
2007a). New regulations concerning foreign journalists receive particu-
lar attention in the coverage. The rules, announced by the Foreign Min-
istry, are reported to temporarily “supersede existing restrictions that
require journalists to obtain government approval before traveling or
conducting interviews. Under the new rules, a foreign journalist will
only need to obtain the permission of the person being interviewed”
(Yardley 2006c).
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Further evidence of the theme that China is willing to share rather
than to hoard or restrict information can be seen in coverage of an
agreement of cooperation signed between the United States and China
in June of 2006. The agreement stipulates that each “country will send
delegations of athletes, coaches and administrators to the other to
share information about training and research.” China has signed such
agreements with other countries as well, one article notes. In response
to the agreement with the United States, Peter Ueberroth, chair of the
United States Olympic Committee, is quoted as saying, “This agree-
ment will bene‹t the athletes and coaches of each national Olympic
committee, but it will also bene‹t the Olympic movement and sports”
(Zinser 2006).
Yet another way in which China is constructed as conforming to
global human rights practices is in its transformation concerning Su-
dan. China’s stance toward Sudan changed in April 2007, the media
narrative notes, when a senior Chinese of‹cial, Zhai Jun, recom-
mended that Sudan allow a United Nations peacekeeping force to sup-
port the African Union’s efforts in Sudan: “‘We suggest the Sudan side
show ›exibility and accept the United Nations peacekeepers,’ he
urged.” The press note that he “even went all the way to Darfur and
toured three refugee camps” (Cooper 2007).
In the space of equivocation, the tension that must be negotiated,
according to the media narrative, is between conformity to global re-
quirements for practices concerning human rights and maintenance of
power and sovereignty, even at the expense of violating human rights.
The media construction of China traditionally has featured the latter,
but coverage in advance of the Olympics suggests a nascent effort to
construct a different image of China—one that features some degree of
conformity with human rights practices.
Space of Accumulation
A third space created by the American media regarding China is a space
of accumulation. A primary focus of American media coverage in the
construction of this space is on the economic bene‹ts the Olympics
will bring. This theme is exempli‹ed in a story that notes that the Chi-
nese consider the number eight to be lucky because it rhymes with the
Chinese character for wealth; because the Olympics means the possi-
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bility of wealth for the Chinese, it “is no coincidence that the Summer
Olympics in Beijing will open on 8/8/08 at 8 p.m.” (Yardley 2006a).
The space of accumulation is depicted by the media as an expanding
space available for reaping economic rewards. The stakeholders who
are situated in the space of accumulation are manufacturers with prod-
ucts to sell and marketers who create markets for those goods among
the Chinese and others. But markets can be limited in many ways in
China, and when they are, access to economic wealth through the pro-
duction and marketing of goods is denied or diminished. The exigence
that must be negotiated in this space in the media construction is be-
tween access and denial of access to new markets.
China as Abundant Resources
The theme of accumulation and access to resources is narratively con-
structed in stories that feature massive marketing efforts that accom-
pany the Olympics. “In my 20 years in the Olympics, I have never seen
the level of interest that I am seeing here,” Michael Payne, marketing
director of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), is quoted as
saying (Chang 2003). The Games, the media reported in May 2007, al-
ready “have 55 of‹cial sponsors and suppliers, including Coke, Adidas
AG, Visa International Inc. and Lenovo Group Ltd.—compared to 38 at
the 2004 games in Athens.” More “than $5 billion will be spent on ads
in China featuring Olympic themes, estimates MindShare, WPP Group
PLC’s media-buying agency” (Fowler 2007).
Because of China’s immense market, the Beijing Games are reported
to be drawing “a larger-than-usual ‹eld of corporate competitors”
(Fowler and Lee 2006, B1). The Olympics traditionally have one
“of‹cial brand of credit card, one computer, one wristwatch.” The 2008
Games, however, “already boast three of‹cial beers: Tsingtao, Yanjing
and Budweiser. ‘One beer cannot cover all China,’ says Liu Jun, deputy
director of marketing of the Beijing Organizing Committee, or Bocog.”
China’s large number of beer drinkers and the fragmented market are
cited to justify the “sudsy trifecta,” with each of the beer companies es-
tablishing “a different target audience.” A Tsingtao representative is
quoted to explain the marketing frenzy: “Our point of view is this is the
‹rst time that China will conduct the Olympics. We believe it is a great
thing that many Chinese brands and businesses are able to participate”
(Fowler and Lee 2006).
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Another way in which accumulation is featured in the media’s dis-
cursive construction of China is in the proliferation of stories about
China’s encouragement of its citizens to participate in sports, thereby
creating entirely new (and huge) markets for products. One story, for
example, discusses how the organizers of the Games are trying to shift
local perceptions of bicycling. To most Chinese citizens, “the bike is
transportation—a tool for getting from here to there rather than a
source of healthful exercise or fun. Now, that is beginning to change.”
The Olympics organizers “are trying to raise interest in the sport by
adding a bicycle-motocross (BMX) event to the 2008 Olympics,” at
which riders will race on modi‹ed bikes on a dirt track. Tang Mingxi,
the sales manager at a bicycle manufacturer in China, is quoted to
make the point that, not long ago, “you would never see people on the
street using their bicycles for exercise, but beginning last year, you see
it everywhere. You’ll see—the market for BMX and other specialized bi-
cycles is going to grow. When something is popular here, it catches on
quickly” (Chao 2007).
Another effort reported by the American media to encourage the
Chinese people to participate in new sports and thus to create new
markets for sports equipment is China Central Television’s launch of a
reality show with the theme “‘sports can be for all—even the weedy
and untrained.’ The show aims to pluck someone from the nation’s . . .
population to become an Olympic athlete”—a coxswain to steer the
men’s and women’s teams of rowers in the Olympics—a position that
requires “just a healthy set of lungs and a good sense of direction.” The
search to ‹nd a male and female winner, an article on the new program
suggests, “will draw from parts of ‘Survivor,’ ‘The Apprentice,’ and
‘American Idol’ as organizers seek to make stars of China’s rowers,
whose sport doesn’t have much of a following in that country.” The
story emphasizes as well other ways in which the show will allow ac-
cess to greater resources: “Of course, the new TV reality show could also
draw millions in ad sponsorship for broadcasters” (Fong 2006a).
China as Limited Resources
Although some aspects of the media’s narrative tout China as a bur-
geoning market that will provide greater access to goods and resources
for its citizens, it also contains a theme that suggests that access to
available resources can be limited. One example is the media’s report-
ing on the Chinese government’s stunting of the growth of sports mar-
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keting through a “creaking socialist system of state control over ath-
letic careers.” As a result, it is a “headache for advertisers counting on
Chinese sports heroes to help them grab market share in China’s fast-
growing consumer market.” For advertisers, the narrative continues, se-
curing access to athletes is often dif‹cult because of‹cials want to focus
on training them to win medals. One story tells of China’s top sports
minister, Liu Peng, who “sent ripples through the marketing industry
by suggesting to a Beijing newspaper that in order to keep athletes fo-
cused on training for the 2008 games, he would ban them from ‘social
activities.’ That has been widely interpreted in China,” the media ex-
plain, “to include advertising and public-relations work” (Fowler 2007).
The media’s cautionary note that investing in marketing in China can
be risky also can be seen in the example they cite of diver Tian Liang,
who won gold and bronze medals in Athens in 2004. He “was kicked
off the Chinese national team after appearing in too many commer-
cials” (Fowler and Lee 2006).
That marketers face other problems also is part of the narrative con-
cerning China. As one story explains, “Murky rules make it dif‹cult for
advertisers . . . to work with Chinese athletes. ‘Brands don’t know
where to go or how to do it,’ says Phil de Picciotto, the president of the
athletes and personalities practice at Octagon, a sports-marketing divi-
sion of Interpublic Group of Companies Inc.” As a result, “brands have
had to develop relationships with sports federations,” which handle
athletes’ careers, “to gain access to their stars.” There are no clear rules
“about when and how athletes have to go through their federations or
whether they can use individual agents.” In addition, the media note,
“even scheduling time with some Chinese athletes can take months of
planning.” Sponsors who “pay as much as $1.3 million” to be associ-
ated with famous athletes may not even be allowed access to them “for
ad shoots or appearances at their events.” Just to get such athletes
“once a year for a commercial shoot,” according to one story, “they
need to pony up nearly $2 million” (Fowler 2007).
China’s poor record with intellectual property rights is another po-
tential limitation to access to markets and consumer goods in the me-
dia’s narrative. Some brands are “nervous about ‘ambush marketing’ or
fu ji shi ying xian, in which brands either steal the Olympics logo or
‹nd ways to work Olympic images into their ads” (Fowler and Lee
2006). News stories explain that China is notorious “as a knockoff
haven where poor law enforcement has turned a potentially huge con-
sumer market into a land of 75-cent pirated DVDs and $10 fake Louis
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Vuitton handbags.” If Olympics merchandise is copied, the market for
Olympics goods will be dispersed, and the funds expected to pay for
the Games may not materialize. “‘We have no ‹xed assets,’ says Liu
Yan, deputy director of legal affairs for the Beijing Organizing Commit-
tee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad, which operates under the
Beijing city government and various national government agencies. ‘So
the Olympic logo is the most valuable thing we own’” (Fowler 2005).
In response to the threat of Olympic knockoffs, one story reports,
Olympics of‹cials are reported to have “already shut down some unau-
thorized use of its logo and is considering launching educational cam-
paigns on state TV to inform the public about the phenomenon”
(Fowler and Lee 2006).
In the space of accumulation, according to the elite American me-
dia’s narrative, manufacturers and marketers are presented as seeking to
develop markets and sell goods to a vast market of Chinese and other
consumers. At the same time, efforts to gain access to these markets are
presented as being mitigated by the government’s efforts to rein in and
control such efforts.
Space of Anticipation
A fourth space created by the media about China is a future space—a
space in which the decision will be made about whether China will be
a legitimate and fully participating member of the global community.
This space is developed largely through economic themes and is rooted
in the constructed tension between growth and control or between
China as a strong economic partner and China as an unreliable eco-
nomic partner.
China as a Powerful Economic Partner
A major way in which the media create a space of anticipation is
through discussion of China’s rise as an economic power, which is the
catalyst that forces China into the global community: “In the last 30
years, no major economy in the world has grown at the speed of
China’s, and no other country has been able to do it year after year, for
over a decade.” In 2006, the media exclaim, “China did it again, saying
that its economy grew by a whopping 10.7 percent . . . the fastest pace
in more than a decade” (Barboza 2007b). According to one story, favor-
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able economic trends continued in 2007, with the economy growing
“11.1 percent in the ‹rst quarter” of 2007. China’s economic growth is
compared favorably to that of developing countries; indeed, according
to one story, China soon could “overtake Germany to become the
world’s third-largest economy, behind those of the United States and
Japan” (Barboza 2007d).
That China’s stock market is booming also receives attention in me-
dia coverage. In 2006, “the country’s key index—the Shanghai ex-
change—rose 130 percent to close at 2,675, a record and the best per-
formance of any major stock exchange in the world,” and it is reported
to have soared even higher in the opening weeks of 2007. The media
report that one “Chinese mutual fund raised $5 billion in a single day 
. . . before closing its doors to new investors.” The run-up in the stock
market, a reporter explains, means that “companies in China can once
again raise money in the Chinese market rather than relying on the
Hong Kong stock market” (Barboza 2007a).
Record trade ‹gures are used in the media narrative to provide addi-
tional evidence for China as a powerful force in the world economy. As
one story notes, “After posting a record $100 billion trade surplus in
2005, much of it with the United States and Europe,” China an-
nounced in June 2006 “that its total surplus had already reached nearly
$47 billion in the ‹rst ‹ve months of this year, a period that is tradi-
tionally slower for exports than the second half of the year.” During
that time, its “exports rose 25 percent, to $73 billion, while imports rose
22 percent, to $60 billion” (Barboza 2006).
China as an Unreliable Economic Partner
The media’s narrative around China also contains the theme that
China may be an unreliable economic partner. China does not have
much incentive to slow growth, the media explain, because the Com-
munist Party bases “its legitimacy on delivering economic growth,”
and local of‹cials “are promoted, foremost, for delivering economic
growth.” High growth “is needed simply to keep unemployment in
check, and top leaders fear that a slowdown could lead to social insta-
bility” (Yardley 2005b). The government, then, “is determined to keep
the economy expanding but is concerned about growing so quickly
that the economy might crash before 2008” (Barboza 2007a). “Right
now, the economy is growing at the upper limits of what is acceptable,”
Li Lianfa, an economist at Peking University, is quoted as saying. “The
De‹nition, Equivocation, Accumulation, and Anticipation
361
government is facing a lot of challenges.” Among the economic chal-
lenges, according to one reporter, “are balancing the supersize growth
and heavy investment, and trying to distribute the riches as evenly as
possible” (Barboza 2007a).
The discursive construction of China also contains the theme that
Beijing is under pressure to allow the Chinese currency, the yuan, to
appreciate more quickly against the dollar in the hope of easing the
country’s trade surplus with the United States. Chinese of‹cials, how-
ever, assert “that the pace of currency revaluation must be measured
and that they will not be pressed into moving hastily” (Barboza 2007d).
Reports on the value of the yuan against the dollar are common. One
story notes, for example, that the yuan strengthened somewhat against
the dollar in 2006, “climbing to about 7.8 yuan to the dollar, from 8.26
yuan in 2005.” News stories about the yuan explain that economists
“have warned that if the yuan does not continue to appreciate against
the dollar and other major currencies, China could face protectionist
action, which could pose an even more serious threat to economic
growth” (Barboza 2007b).
China also faces concerns about its “enormous rise in bank loans”
(Barboza 2006, C8); “too much money in the ‹nancial system,” the
media assert, “could ignite in›ation and perhaps fuel a stock market
bubble.” In January 2007, China’s central bank is reported to have
“raised the reserve requirement ratio for banks, the fourth increase in
six months, to further tighten the nation’s money supply,” a move that
increased “the reserve ratio by half a percentage point to 9.5 percent.”
“Raising the amount of cash reserves that Chinese banks keep on hand
with the central bank,” the media’s narrative explains, “effectively re-
stricts the amount of money that banks can lend” and curbs “excessive
lending to new factories, real estate projects, and road construction”
(Barboza 2007a).
China’s potential unreliability as an economic partner is also devel-
oped in media accounts through stories about the environmental dev-
astation its economic growth has generated. For the Chinese govern-
ment, these stories assert, the question is how to address the country’s
environmental problems without crippling the economy: “China, it
seems, has reached a tipping point familiar to many developed coun-
tries, including the United States, that have raced headlong after eco-
nomic development only to look up suddenly and see the environ-
mental carnage. The difference with China, as is so often the case, is
that the potential problems are much bigger, have happened much
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faster and could pose greater concerns for the entire world” (Yardley
2005b).
Some stories use prediction of negative consequences to develop this
theme. According to one account, pollution levels in China “could
more than quadruple within 15 years if the country does not curb its
rapid growth in energy consumption and automobile use.” Other envi-
ronmental problems are noted: “China is already the world’s second-
biggest producer of greenhouse gas emissions and is expected to sur-
pass the United States as the biggest. Roughly a third of China is
exposed to acid rain. A recent study by a Chinese research institute
found that 400,000 people die prematurely every year in China from
diseases linked to air pollution” (Yardley 2005b). One reporter provides
an explanation for why China is facing such problems by citing a local
of‹cial: “‘In the past, we never thought of the capacity of resources,’
said Huang Yan, the deputy director of the planning commission in
Beijing. ‘We only focused on development’” (Yardley 2005a).
All of the ideological spaces constructed through the media’s narra-
tion concerning China implicitly are designed to address the issue of
whether China will become a legitimate participant on the world stage.
The space of anticipation, however, is explicitly designed to function in
this way as the media present China’s credentials as a steady,
signi‹cant, reliable economic force and weigh those against potential
economic problems and the negative environmental impacts of a grow-
ing economy.
Spatial Construction of a Rhetoric 
of Reassurance
The ideological spaces of de‹nition, equivocation, accumulation, and
anticipation constructed by the American media regarding China con-
stitute a preferred reading of China that serves an important function
for the media themselves and for media consumers. China is, for these
audiences, a country with which they are forced to engage because of
its economic reach, its manufacture of vast numbers of products dis-
tributed worldwide and its sponsorship of the major sports competi-
tion in the world, to name a few reasons. But this entity with which
they must engage is still largely a mysterious unknown, a perception re-
inforced when, for example, Zheng Xiaoyu, the head of China’s equiv-
alent of the United States’ Food and Drug Administration, was exe-
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cuted for accepting gifts and bribes from pharmaceutical companies
(Barboza 2007c). Such incidents that suggest a dramatically different
system from the one in which they reside make vivid to the interna-
tional community their lack of knowledge about China, its govern-
ment policies and judicial system.
In response to the situation of forced engagement with a largely un-
known and powerful entity, the American media have chosen to con-
struct a narrative of reassurance. They seek to reassure those who must
deal with China—particularly those who have economic and political
interests at stake (the targeted audience for the New York Times and the
Wall Street Journal)—that their investments in China will be secure and
their relationships with the Chinese will be successful and productive.
The spaces function to provide reassurance by educating audiences
about China, avoiding construction of China as an enemy and assign-
ing agency to Americans and other outsiders rather than the Chinese.
One of the primary functions of the four spaces is that they educate
media audiences about China. For outside observers, the spaces take
the vast and complex information available on China and simplify it
into easily told and remembered narratives. The spaces reduce China to
four primary arenas, each clearly de‹ned, reassuring foreigners that
they can gain an understanding of China and can negotiate the culture
successfully. Although the ambiguity that derives from the constructed
liminal space between two options for the future is crucial for all of the
spaces, for audiences outside of China, the spaces limit that ambiguity
and make China an entity that is capable of being known. The spaces
thus constitute zones of safety and stability in that they help various
audiences know the issues and the boundaries with which they must
deal.
The ideological spaces provide reassurance as well in that they re-
frain from making China into an enemy. The constructed narrative
avoids such a depiction by presenting a balanced view of the various is-
sues that characterize its content. Certainly, part of the impetus for a
balanced presentation is due to the fact that readers’ expectations are
that the media will provide objective or balanced coverage. But this
kind of balance is unusual in an ideological construction; ideologies
typically present positive information about a favored person or group
and negative information about an opponent. Here, in contrast, when
one side of an issue within a space is presented by the media, the other
option is also typically presented. Just as China might begin to be seen
as negative in the constructed narrative because of its restrictions on
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the media, for example, the spaces point to China’s opening up of op-
portunities for foreign journalists. Enemies are threatening and create
unknown and unstable situations, so lack of construction of an enemy
reassures the media audience that its ‹nancial investments are safe and
its business dealings likely to be ongoing.
The media also eschew presentation of China as an enemy by sup-
pressing story lines already known to American and other audiences in
which China is de‹ned as a clear enemy. The prime example is the
complete lack of coverage in either newspaper about China’s dealings
with Tibet and the inclusion of Tibet in the Olympic games. These
events include coverage of the activists who protested the route of the
Olympic torch over Mount Everest and through Tibet, the “defection”
of the Tibetan antelope as an Olympic mascot, and the plans for Team
Tibet to bring the FreeTibet2008 message to Chinese embassies and
consulates throughout the world on August 8, 2007 (Students for a Free
Tibet).
Such coverage would call to mind for many readers China as impe-
rialist, repressive, and seeking to squash negotiations with the Dalai
Lama, the spiritual leader of Tibet and recipient of a Nobel Peace Prize.
If nothing related to Tibet is covered, this plotline and the concomitant
negative perspective on China are less likely to be recalled by audi-
ences. There is another reason, of course, why the elite American media
would not want to cover an enemy-sanctioning issue like Tibet: their
readers are not likely to be those most concerned about Tibet—an issue
that generates the most excitement among economically impoverished
college students, American Buddhists, and political activists.
Although coverage of Sudan in the media coverage of China seems
to violate the narrative tenet of suppression of story lines that would
make China into a clear enemy, that coverage was done in a particular
way—largely in terms of celebrities. Although nonpoliticos who act as
spokesperson for causes are becoming increasingly common in the
context of infotainment-dominated media (Kellner 2003, 13), a degree
of trivialization of an issue may evolve when that issue is embraced and
advocated for by, for example, an actor. Certainly, celebrities do “at-
tract press attention to various issues and explain why the public
should be concerned” and, “with the aid of willing media reporters,
this kind of coverage affects the national political agenda and some-
times even the deliberation of congressional legislators” (West and Or-
man 2003, 74). Celebrities, however, are not always successful in insur-
ing that their causes take precedence over the very nature of their
De‹nition, Equivocation, Accumulation, and Anticipation
365
celebrity. In America’s infotainment culture (Kellner 2003; West and
Orman 2003), the public’s attention tends to stay focused more on the
celebrities’ lives and activities per se and less on the issue itself, which
takes back stage to, for example, what the celebrity is wearing, with
whom she is seen, her current marital status, what her children are do-
ing, who their father is, and the nightclubs in which she makes an ap-
pearance. The presence of a celebrity helps reassure media audiences by
placing on center stage someone known and familiar to them rather
than a serious issue or China as a potential enemy. In this case, atten-
tion on the celebrity is allowed to displace the possibility of an enemy
in the narrative.
When China is not constructed as an enemy because of a balanced
presentation of issues and lack of coverage of polarizing plotlines, an-
other bene‹t accrues to the media and media consumers as well.
China’s image cannot become ‹xed and settled; one truth, in other
words, cannot emerge about China in this media construction. As a re-
sult, neither the media corporations nor their audiences can be caught
on the wrong side of any particular issue or argument; they are posi-
tioned in a liminal space of noncommitment. They can rest easy,
knowing that whichever way an issue unfolds or on whatever side a de-
cision is made, they have not committed themselves to the opposite
position. As a result of the four spaces in the media’s constructed nar-
rative, the truth about China is always ›uid and changing, and the me-
dia and media audiences are allowed to change with it, positioning
themselves in whatever ways are politically and economically most ad-
vantageous.
A third way in which the ideological spaces function to provide re-
assurance to media corporations and audiences is that they make
Americans in particular, and outsiders in general, the active agents in
the media narrative. The construction of the spaces provides reassur-
ance for audiences that they are in control of the mysterious entity that
is China. They are the ones who have the capacity to act and to make a
difference in this world, even though they are the outsiders. They func-
tion, in a sense, as omnipotent protagonists, and because they are all
seeing and all knowing, they are the ones who can act in the most ef-
fective ways.
What is striking in the narratives is the extent to which outsiders are
depicted as inhabiting the spaces, roaming across them, and playing
key roles in them. In the space of de‹nition, they are seen as driving
China’s transformation into a different kind of physical space. In the
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space of equivocation, they are positioned as judges, measuring and
passing judgment on China’s progress on human rights. In the space of
accumulation, they are the marketers and investors who stand to
bene‹t from the resources available in China. And in the space of an-
ticipation, they are the ones with the most to gain from China’s partic-
ipation in the global community. Although some Chinese people move
from space to space in the media narrative, the consistent occupants of
the spaces of China are not the Chinese. That Americans and other out-
siders have this capacity surely is reassuring to American corporations
and audiences.
Americans and other foreigners are given agency in the narrative as
well as in its trivialization of certain aspects of the Chinese culture. The
articles often present information about China in a mildly patronizing
tone, with readers expected to chuckle at the eccentricities of the Chi-
nese—their spitting and translation practices, bars that serve cocktails
of Chivas Regal and green tea, and museums on subjects such as tree
roots and piped water, for example. The position created for outsiders
in the narrative is thus one of superiority—they belong, the narrative
suggests, to a culture that is more civilized, re‹ned, normal, and sensi-
ble because it is lacking in the silly or boorish practices that character-
ize the Chinese culture. Positioned to pronounce judgment on the Chi-
nese, media audiences no longer feel as intimidated by the mysterious,
powerful China, and they are reassured that they will be able to handle
their interactions with the Chinese successfully.
The elite American media’s narrative concerning China in advance
of the 2008 Olympic Games offers four spatial arenas that negotiate
tensions between opposite perspectives on China in terms of de‹ni-
tion, equivocation, accumulation, and anticipation. Although such a
balanced approach is unusual for an ideological construction, the pre-
ferred reading presented by the media is one designed to serve the in-
terests of its readers as they seek to engage—often unwillingly or at
least warily—with China. Lee labels this type of coverage “established
pluralism” and notes that it “consists of a plurality of viewpoints
within a narrow range of the established order or of‹cial circle, thus
producing an orchestra of ‘diversity within unity’ in support of the
hegemonic voice” (Lee 2002, 345). In this case, the spaces function to
provide reassurance that engagement with the Chinese will be safe, se-
cure, worthwhile and, most important, under the control of the Amer-
icans or other outsiders.
That the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal would construct
De‹nition, Equivocation, Accumulation, and Anticipation
367
China with a balanced narrative that reassures themselves and their au-
diences concerning the unknown power that is China is not unex-
pected, of course. As Hallin points out, a newspaper such as the Times
is “basically a Fortune 500 company that positions its products to have
broad appeal and credibility” (2006, 44–45). As part of “a global media
market . . . closely linked to the rise of a signi‹cantly more integrated
‘neo-liberal’ global capitalist economy” (McChesney 1999, 78), such
newspapers construct news frames for a number of reasons, including
newsgathering routines and values, economic factors, government reg-
ulation, the physical structure of the medium, the political and eco-
nomic interests of the country constructing the news, deference to gov-
ernment of‹cials, and journalists’ personal biases (Innis 1951; Gitlin
1980; Chomsky 1989; Keshishian 1997). Perhaps most important, they
make decisions to frame news coverage in ways that bene‹t the inter-
ests of the elite—the wealthy and powerful few who have the most to
gain and lose from interactions with China (Lee 2002; McChesney
1999). The narrative of reassurance created by the four ideological
spaces in the news coverage around China is designed to address this
audience and to reassure it speci‹cally that interactions with China
will create “America’s China Dream” and not “America’s China Night-
mare” (Wasserstrom 2007; also see Wasserstrom’s chapter in this vol-
ume).
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The New Olympic Internationalism
Christopher J. Finlay
The Beijing Olympics represents a turning point for the International
Olympic Committee (IOC). Beijing 2008 embodies traditional aspects
of the Olympic Movement, but it also can be seen as ushering in a new
internationalist role for the IOC, as an organization responding to the
demands of twenty-‹rst century globalization. In this nascent role, the
IOC offers the Games as a tool for the transcultural negotiation of the
global identities of powerful states and other key global actors. Valu-
able insights about the Olympic Movement can be derived from the
cultural imperialism paradigm, but Beijing 2008 also points to the lim-
itations of this paradigm. Marwan Kraidy points to the “growing con-
sensus [that] has emerged to discard cultural imperialism” as a para-
digm for thinking about globalization (2002, 335). At the same time, he
warns that research that has attempted to push beyond a cultural im-
perialist model “oftentimes appears to be at best descriptive, at worst a
noncritical celebration of transnational culture as global multicultural-
ism” (2002, 318). He calls for researchers to continue to develop new
approaches to understanding global politics through a critical exami-
nation of the sociopolitical and economic factors that in›uence con-
temporary transcultural exchange. In this chapter, I attempt to take up
Kraidy’s call via an analysis of recent developments in the Olympic
Movement.
When thinking about Olympic internationalism, there is a tempta-
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tion to use international relations models that divide the world into fa-
miliar binaries such as Developed and Developing, North and South,
West and the Rest, or Core and Periphery. Implicit in all of these mod-
els is a notion of progress, where the development of global actors is
measured via comparison with the standards of the West or the core.
These measures are calculated based on contestable metrics, geography
to geopolitics, from a state’s GDP and its willingness to abide by inter-
national trade agreements to the development and enforcement of hu-
man rights and environmental standards. In effect, the progress narra-
tive that acts as a foundation for these binaries can be said to be a
measure of global assimilation to a single set of standards. Yet, the
›uidity, hybridity and interdependence of a newly globalizing world
have resulted in states who achieve power and global in›uence without
wholly assimilating the norms of “core” actors.
Traditional Olympic internationalism can be understood as a form
of global outreach. One of the functions of the global outreach model
of the Olympics was, at least on the surface, to measure a state’s
“progress,” or its assimilation of core values, when considering a host
city candidate. Thus, when a non-Western host city is granted the right
to host the Olympics, Whannel suggests it “constitutes a rite de passage
into the modern (western) world” (Whannel 1992, 166). I suggest that
while this sense of purpose still animates the Movement, a new
Olympic internationalism also positions the Games as a vehicle for ne-
gotiating the norms, aspirations, and roles of already powerful global
actors as they interact in an increasingly interdependent world. If the
Olympic Movement was once understood as a unidirectional force for
bringing the culture and media of the West into the developing world
of the periphery, I suggest that it is now reforming itself so that it oper-
ates as an enabling force for the multidirectional ›ows that bring mu-
tually in›uencing actors together to challenge old boundaries and dis-
tinctions and negotiate the terms of a new global social order.
In some ways the new Olympic internationalism can be said to mir-
ror the triple imperative of Hardt and Negri’s Empire, which describes a
modern shift from colonial imperialism and an accompanying ten-
dency to incorporate, differentiate, and manage in a political order of
globalization (2000, 201). In the moment of incorporation, “universal
inclusion [is achieved] by setting aside differences that are in›exible or
unmanageable” (2000, 198). In the differential moment, cultural dif-
ferences are celebrated. As Hardt and Negri suggest, cultural differences
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are thought to be “contingent rather than biological and essential, [and
thus] they are thought not to impinge on the central band of com-
monality or overlapping consensus that characterizes the Empire’s in-
clusionary mechanism” (2000, 199). Finally, ›uid and contingent dif-
ferences create “complex variables that change continuously and admit
a variety of always incomplete but nonetheless effective solutions”
(2000, 199). New Olympic internationalism differs from the Empire
model because it does not take the primacy of the United States and its
allies as a given. Indeed, it is the function of the new Olympic interna-
tionalism in supporting negotiations between powerful global actors,
new and old, that leads to the blurring of the distinction between the
West and the Rest, thus furthering a global hegemonic order that
bene‹ts multiple powerful actors.
It is important to note that the older global outreach model of
Olympic internationalism continues to be in›uential. For instance,
while the Beijing and Sochi Olympics can be read on one level as facil-
itating transcultural negotiation, they also remain opportunities for
in›uencing and pressuring China and Russia to conform to the shared
norms of those primarily Western states who continue to hold sway
over the IOC. Ultimately, the new Olympic internationalism outlined
in this chapter ‹nds the IOC and those who work with it in a transi-
tional moment in which the organization is reluctant to abandon the
global outreach model and in which it is just beginning to explore the
potential of its new role as facilitating greater interaction and negotia-
tion between powerful global actors.
Future Olympic host cities play an important role in the ongoing
construction of this new Olympic internationalist narrative. To date,
the IOC has announced three Olympic host cities subsequent to Bei-
jing. In 2012, the next Olympic Games will be held in London. In ad-
dition, two Winter Olympics host cities have been chosen: Vancouver
in 2010 and Sochi in 2014. The construction of narratives around these
host cities contributes to the IOC’s new internationalist project by em-
bodying this notion of transcultural negotiation at both the macro and
micro level. At the macro level, Beijing 2008 and Sochi 2014 can be un-
derstood as IOC attempts to contribute to and strengthen the negotia-
tions between powerful, yet unassimilated, states and those states
which have historically been most in›uential in the development of
the modern Olympics. At the micro level, London 2012 and Vancouver
2010, both of which are using the Games to foster greater cultural plu-
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ralism, are also addressing similar issues of transcultural negotiation.
Together, these host cities aid in a larger Olympic internationalist proj-
ect of transcultural negotiation.
Olympic Internationalism in the 
Twenty-‹rst Century
Internationalist aspirations have been a component of the Olympic
Movement since Pierre de Coubertin. As Hoberman observes with con-
cern, the Movement is seen as a force for “redemptive and inspirational
internationalism” (1995, 1). Redemption and inspiration speak to an al-
most Hegelian notion of universal progress that animates traditional
Olympic internationalism in which the Movement is seen as an agent
of change and a tool for measuring the advances and missteps of global
actors as they develop. In order to play this dual role, the Olympic
Movement purports to have already identi‹ed universal ideals and as-
pirational principles. This is clearly evident in the Fundamental Prin-
ciples of Olympics recorded in the Olympic Charter:
Olympism is a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a bal-
anced whole the qualities of body, will and mind. Blending sport with
culture and education, Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on
the joy of effort, the educational value of good example and respect for
universal fundamental ethical principles. (IOC, 2004)
In this passage, as elsewhere, Olympism remains vaguely de‹ned.
Roche notes that the Olympic Movement has always had an adaptive
capacity, which he suggests it is “currently displaying again in the con-
temporary era of globalization” (2006, 29). I contend that the vague
universal aspirations of the Movement contribute to the adaptability of
Olympism. The IOC has developed a complex bureaucratic system of
working groups, committees and Olympic legislation reform proce-
dures for interpreting and adapting Olympism to the demands of an
evolving context. The Olympic Charter, for example, has been subject
to signi‹cant revisal. One of the primary duties of the IOC Juridical
Commission, founded in 1974, is to consider draft amendments to the
Charter. Examples of working groups and committees include the
Women and Sport Working Group, established in 1994 and turned into
a commission in 2004, and the Sport and Environment Commission,
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which was created in 1995 after the IOC stated that it “has acknowl-
edged its particular responsibility in terms of promoting sustainable de-
velopment, and regards the environment as the third dimension of
Olympism, alongside sport and culture” (IOC 2007b).
These and other IOC activities have ensured that Olympism is able
to stay relevant to an evolving set of global trends while simultane-
ously remaining true to the principles of Coubertin’s philosophy. Al-
though the internal procedures through which the IOC identi‹es new
spaces for broadening the scope of Olympism remain shrouded in se-
crecy, it is clear that the changes in the focus of the IOC re›ect the in-
terests of powerful global actors. This indicates that the IOC is not an
independent author of the speci‹c components of the international-
ism that it promotes, but rather that it is responsible to the interests of
multiple actors in an ever-changing global context. Thus, the IOC is
perhaps best understood as a semiautonomous global actor, promoting
an internationalist agenda that speaks to the interests of a collection of
powerful global actors.
New Olympic internationalism can be linked to an increased recog-
nition of the interdependence—also to be read as vulnerability—of all
global actors. As Roche suggests, the desire to steer globalization
processes has taken on a greater urgency after the attacks of September
11, 2001 (2006, 27). The IOC has adapted to the demands of this inse-
cure and interdependent world by positioning itself as a tool for help-
ing to steer this process.
Traditional Western, or core, powers continue to be in›uential actors
in the Movement and continue to use the Games to promote their
agendas. And yet, the IOC is evolving and increasingly responding to
the imperatives of actors who have not traditionally been key players
in the organization. Today, the IOC’s internationalist agenda is discur-
sively constructed via the interaction of the IOC with three key cate-
gories of global actors: states, transnational corporations, and a loose
grouping of actors representing what is increasingly called global civil
society. These three categories include actors who have been tradition-
ally involved in the Olympic Movement and newer actors who have
not. All of these actors share an interest in the new Olympic interna-
tionalism because they can use the Games as a tool for expanding their
global reach and for constructing a viable position and purpose for
themselves.
Transnational corporations play an increasingly vital role in
Olympic internationalism. Corporations, such as McDonald’s, NBC, or
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Samsung (and new entrants like China’s Lenovo), who have signed
multi-Games sponsorship deals, have a profound impact in shaping
the themes of the ongoing Olympic story as it evolves from city to city
every two years. Tomlinson (2005), for example, reviewed Coca-Cola’s
funding of FIFA football initiatives in Asia and Africa. He argues that
the corporation’s generous funding of initiatives such as the World
Youth Cup is, in a large part, responsible for the increase in the number
of skilled players from these regions. As he writes, “the FIFA initiatives
clearly offered valuable international experience and competition that
were to stand Asian and African footballing nations in good stead on
the larger world stages of the World Cup and the Olympic Games”
(2005, 45). Thus, by contributing to an international environment
where fans from these regions could expect their teams to participate
competitively in international sporting events such as the Olympics, a
new audience was created for the Games and the products that sponsor
the event. As Whannel writes, “this then is the new Olympic interna-
tionalism—there we are with our Coke in one hand and our Visa card
in the other” (1992, 178).
The substantial role of Olympic sponsors in the IOC may lead to ac-
cusations that the new Olympic internationalist project is largely a cul-
tural imperialist project. Indeed, the majority of Olympic TOP sponsors
continue to have origins in the West. Yet, as transnational sponsors
continue to diversify and expand globally, it is becoming increasingly
problematic to continue to identify these actors as Western. While the
ultimate mission of transnational corporations is to continue to in-
crease sales of their products and services, this mission does not neces-
sarily translate to cultural imperialism. In fact, as transnational corpo-
rations open regional of‹ces and target new markets, they may best be
understood as trying to accomplish this mission via attempts to be-
come more responsive to a diverse global consumer base. Thus, “the
bottom line” for transnational corporations can be said to all but de-
mand that they research, represent, and respond to a growing global
plurality of voices and interests.
The state also participates in the discursive construction of new
Olympic internationalism. This is especially true when one of its cities
is bidding for the Games. States are heavily involved in the funding,
promotion, and crafting of the messages created for city bids. In Lon-
don’s ‹nal bid presentation, for instance, British Prime Minister Tony
Blair appealed to the IOC by stating, “my entire government and the
main opposition parties too, are behind this bid. It has total political
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support. It is the nation’s bid” (Blair, 2005). The Vancouver Organizing
Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games
(VANOC) describes the vision of 2010 as building “a stronger Canada
whose spirit is raised by its passion for sport, culture and sustainability”
(VANOC 2007b). The Sochi 2014 bid was aided by “the Russian gov-
ernment [which] has offered its full and unquali‹ed support to the Bid
and has implemented a US$12 billion Federal investment programme”
in the region (Sochi 2014 Bid Committee 2007c). In each case, the host
city is explicitly linked to the host state. Thus, in analyzing how Beijing
and future host cities contribute to the new Olympic internationalist
narrative, attention must be paid to the goals and global geopolitical
context of the states where the host cities are located.
It is important also to consider how those global civil society groups
that use the Olympics to further their own goals contribute to the con-
struction of new Olympic internationalism. The roster of actors in this
category is always shifting as each host city presents a unique set of is-
sues and causes that attract different groups. In the realm of civil soci-
ety, Western organizations posses the social networking contacts, tech-
nological sophistication and, in many cases, a legitimizing history of
activism that allows them to most successfully promote their view-
points. Close, Askew, and Xu suggest these groups play a role in facili-
tating Western cultural imperialism (2007, 170). The concentration of
Western moralists who have learned how to be heard by the IOC has
indeed led to a situation where the conscience of new internationalism
is primarily dictated by the West.
Consider the human rights groups who have been most successful in
presenting a case for boycotting the Beijing Games for issues ranging
from Darfur to Burma. They seem almost exclusively based in the West
(though this may be because of the mode of coverage of such actors or
because the particular forms of civil society that have been popularized
are Western in style and structure). And, the Olympic boycott narra-
tives that they have authored have become occasions for debate within
the West about the morality of China and, importantly, the morality of
the Olympic Movement itself. These debates have the potential to
in›uence the evolution of Olympic internationalism as the IOC strives
to stay relevant to the prerogatives of a spectrum of global actors.
Globalization has created an environment where powerful new ac-
tors, from rising states and transnational corporations to global civil so-
ciety groups, have acquired substantial international in›uence, and the
IOC has taken notice. But the transformation is not complete. Power,
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here as elsewhere, is a function of voice, and the IOC, in an attempt to
stay dynamic and relevant, has adapted to make itself a different strate-
gic tool for these new actors. And yet, as the authors in this volume
have found, a project of inclusion is hardly complete.
Host Cities and the New Olympic
Internationalist Narrative
When the IOC chooses a host for the Olympics, it considers multiple
factors that range from basic questions about the ability of the city to
engage in the massive infrastructure projects required by the Games to
macropolitical questions about the messages that the selection of the
city creates. In the history of the modern Olympic Movement, the se-
lection of host-states who are outside or who have contested relation-
ships with the West has served two important functions: graduation
and rehabilitation. Black and Van Der Westhuizen include Mexico City
1968 and Seoul 1988 as examples where the Olympics have been used
“to signal their ‘graduation’” to advanced nation status (2004, 1206).
They also suggest that “a succession of World War II Axis powers (Rome
1960; Tokyo 1964; Munich 1972) sought the Olympic Games in part to
signal their rehabilitation within the international community” (2004,
1206).
Allusions to these two functions can be found in the rhetoric sur-
rounding Beijing and Sochi, but the rhetoric of the two cities’ bids also
softly challenges the assumptions of the global paradigm that has en-
abled traditional Olympic internationalism. Historically, states that
sought rehabilitation, such as Germany or Japan, and states that pur-
sued the Games as a rite of passage, such as Mexico or South Korea,
were ultimately asking for permission to join an international commu-
nity of developed and like-minded states. Without this permission,
they remained outside and were unable to enjoy the status and eco-
nomic bene‹ts of membership in the international community. In ef-
fect, Games-related rehabilitation and graduation signaling can be un-
derstood as sanctioned power grabs. Via the Games, the international
community af‹rmed its own power by taking on the duty of judging
which states had earned the right to ask for more global in›uence.
For the majority of the second half of the twentieth century, the IOC
and the community of nations that worked with the organization were
in the enviable position of having a monopoly on political and eco-
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nomic power in the Western half of a bipolar world. Today, in a
post–Cold War globalized world, characterized by what Miller et al re-
fer to as a “polycentric notion of global ›ow” (2001, 14), the Western
monopoly on power has been challenged by the increased interdepen-
dence of states and the rapid rise of new global powers such as China.
The question has shifted from whether the IOC should consider the
host bids of global powers like China or Russia to a different kind of
salience: whether the IOC can afford to not hold an Olympics in these
states. And this change has occurred in a short period of time.
Consider Beijing’s bids for the 2000 and 2008 Games. Samuel Hunt-
ington (1996) suggests that in 1993, Beijing’s failure to win the 2000
Games was a message to China from the West that China and its poli-
cies remained unacceptable. Supporting evidence for Huntington’s as-
sertion can be found in the vocal opposition of states and international
human rights groups to the bid. In the United States, for example, the
House of Representatives passed a resolution against the Beijing 2000
bid with bipartisan support (CNN.com 2001). Close, Askew, and Xu re-
port that although China’s human rights violations were not the only
reason for opposition to the 2000 Beijing bid, it was a central issue for
a range of international groups (2007, 169). And, as Lenskyj reports,
competing 2000 host city candidate Sydney attempted to “discredit
the Beijing bid by drawing world attention to China’s human rights
record” (2000, 181). The “rehabilitation function” of the global out-
reach model of traditional Olympic internationalism serves to explain,
in large part, why Beijing did not host the 2000 Games. But the tradi-
tional approach does not adequately explain the award for 2008.
In 2001, during their ‹nal bid presentation for the 2008 Olympics,
the Chinese delegation rhetorically framed the 2000 loss as an appeal
to the “rehabilitation function:” “Eight years have already gone by
since our ‹rst bid for the 2000 Games. During this period of time, my
country has made tremendous strides on the road to modernization
and social progress” (Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee [BOBICO]
2006). It cannot be disputed that the transformations that China went
through between 1993 and 2001 were signi‹cant. China has emerged as
the next global superpower, has embraced the technology of the
knowledge economy, and appears to follow international trends such
as an increased focus on the environment. Beijing’s Green Olympics,
for example, speaks to China’s purported commitment to the global
environmental movement. At the same time, China’s human rights
record has remained a matter of great contention. The 2008 Games
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have become a touchstone for groups who wish to bring attention to
China’s internal and external human rights policies. Internal issues
that have gained international notoriety include high pro‹le examples
such as child labor, suppression of the Falun Gong, the destruction of
Tibet, and the absence of a free press. China has been criticized for pur-
suing a foreign policy that supports violations of human rights in Su-
dan and, most recently, Burma. As to some of these issues, particularly
in foreign policy, geopolitical opinions may differ. But from the per-
spective of the “rehabilitation function,” the award to China was in the
category of aspiration rather than recognition of accomplished change.
There are those who hope that the Games will act as a mechanism for
pressuring China to address its violations of a Western-constructed hu-
man rights regime. For instance, Beijing has had a contractual obliga-
tion to the IOC that requires it to develop the 2008 Games according
to strict IOC regulations. Further, the Olympics placed an international
spotlight on China and it is now contending with a much greater level
of scrutiny. China is not immune to this pressure as its response to the
“Genocide Olympics” campaign indicates, but the minimal adjust-
ments it has made thus far suggest that China will by and large con-
tinue to pursue its existing policies. Ultimately, China has little reason
to give in to pressure. It is not South Korea, dependent on increasing
foreign investment and support to develop. Thus, the expectations of
international human rights groups and other actors who are attempt-
ing to use Beijing 2008 to further their goals must be tempered by the
recognition of the fact that China is already deeply and irreversibly in-
tegrated into the interdependent global political economy.
The dynamics of Sochi 2014 are similar to Beijing 2008. Russia is a
powerful global actor with a strong economy. Despite inconsistent
commitments to democracy Russia’s global in›uence continues to
grow. Sochi’s bid committee, which included Russia’s deputy prime
minister Alexander Zhukov and ‹nance minister Alexei Krudrin (Sochi
2014 Bid Committee 2007b), constructed a bid that appeared to hint
and nod to the rehabilitation themes of traditional Olympic interna-
tionalism but with language so subtle as to recognize the global shift.
This is perhaps best captured in the Sochi bid’s Olympic Vision, which
states that the Winter Olympics is expected to “drive positive change
across multiple areas of social life, including integration of people with
disabilities, environmental awareness, corporate transparency and ac-
countability” (Sochi 2014 Bid Committee 2007d). In the bid, Sochi ad-
dresses the role of the Olympics as an agent of change, but in a care-
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fully cushioned way: “A celebration of the ‘new Russia’ during the 2014
Olympic Winter Games will showcase the nation’s renewal and high-
light the contribution of the Olympic Movement to the transformation
of developing countries” (Sochi 2014 Bid Committee 2007a).
Both the Chinese and Russian bids, and Beijing’s execution of 2008,
re›ect an intense nationalism and commitment to visions of a return
to national glory. The Sochi bid actively positioned the Games as a
“Gateway to the Russian Renaissance,” expected to “open a door to a
dynamic and exciting future for the people of Russia and leave a prece-
dent-setting for the Olympic Movement” (Sochi 2014 Bid Committee
2007d). The term Renaissance differs importantly from the terms New
China and New Russia, both of which are also present in discourse about
the Olympics and the two cities, because it connects aspirations for fu-
ture greatness to glorious, even mythical pasts. Renaissance points to
the restoration of these once great nations to their rightful place as
in›uential global actors. The terms New China and New Russia could be
said to speak for graduation into world power status via assimilation
into a global order. At the same time, a renaissance endows the states
with a level of autonomy as they pursue a future that speaks to the glo-
ries of their own past.
In winning the Games, China and Russia were able to embrace a
rhetoric that spoke to traditional Olympic internationalism, while rely-
ing on the realpolitik of today’s emerging global order. Close, Askew,
and Xu state that globalization processes “are being directed mainly by
the West and in the interests of the West, Western hegemony and West-
ernization” (2007, 178). Transformations in the IOC’s focus demonstrate
that while Western actors certainly have an extraordinary interest and
role in shaping globalization processes, globalization alters Western
hegemony. The new Olympic internationalism facilitates exchanges
and negotiations between Western actors and these new actors, who by
virtue of their quick rise to power, almost demand attention.
This chapter has focused on the 2008 and 2014 bids as evidence of
the IOC’s new internationalism. But a few words about London 2012
and Vancouver 2010 are in order. Asu Aksoy suggests that there has
been “a change in the language of inclusion and exclusion, a focus on
the economic barriers rather than what had been customarily couched
in terms of a political and cultural jargon” (2006, 102). She continues,
“it inscribes the issue of social inclusion on a new terrain of econom-
ics” (2006, 102). The London 2012 and Vancouver 2010 bids, both of
which shared commitments to social and economic outreach to some
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of the respective nations’ poorest and most violent regions, conform to
the pattern that Aksoy identi‹es. Both bids explained how Olympic
Legacies programs would directly initiate positive changes via various
Olympic-related outreach programs. In both cases, the bids focused on
the interaction of economic problems and social problems. In the two
bids, the interaction between the social and the economic, as suspected
causes of suffering in Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside and East Lon-
don, have been converted into causes for celebration. In both bids, cul-
tural tensions, understood as perpetuating socioeconomic disparities,
are challenged by cultural pluralist policies, which perpetuate a posi-
tive rendering of cultural difference in the service of universalizing ne-
oliberal economic solutions. Ultimately, both bids can be said to enun-
ciate a universal goal of socioeconomic reform buoyed by a celebration
of managed difference. This is a slightly different expression of the new
internationalism.
London 2012, more than Vancouver, has aggressively and success-
fully presented a transcultural vision of itself that speaks to the new in-
ternationalism.1 In a large part this is because, as Modood argues, “Lon-
don is not simply an English or a British or even a European city, but a
world city” (2005, 193). As a world city, London is a key member of
what Saskia Sassen (2006) refers to as a network of global cities that op-
erate within nation-states but that are heavily in›uenced by an eco-
nomic elite global class who operate in an “intermediate position be-
tween the subnational and the global” (2006, 301). There is a growing
trend to think about global cities as somewhat autonomous from the
state, putting the demands of global actors ahead of the expectations of
the state. London’s winning transcultural global city bid can be read as
evidence of this trend. It worked within a pro-diversity paradigm al-
ready given life by London mayor Ken Livingstone, despite years of
multicultural policy waf›ing and missteps by the national Labour
Party. However, national support for the bid and the role of the federal
government in the organization and thematic construction of the
Games must not be underestimated.
As preparations for the 2012 Games continue, the United Kingdom
is both using and contributing to the narrative of London, the World
City, to try and strengthen its own position as a key global state. The
Games are intended to “celebrate cultures, people and languages—in
London, the UK and around the world.” The organizers “have taken a
deliberately broad and inclusive de‹nition of culture, representing the
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breadth of London’s and the UK’s expertise and world standing” (Lon-
don 2012 2007). Massey argues, “London is not only multicultural. It is
also—for instance—a heartland of the production, command and
propagation of what we have come to call neoliberal globalization”
(2006, 65). London 2012 is constructing the city as a microcosm of the
globalizing world that the new internationalism seeks to work within.
In so doing, it is working to challenge critics who argue that London-
istan (Phillips 2006) is spiraling into multicultural chaos by presenting
a transcultural World City whose global competitiveness is due, in part,
to the contributions of a diverse population. Although there are doubts
about whether 2012 will be successful, the London Games have the po-
tential to contribute signi‹cantly to the IOC’s new internationalism.
Games organizers are promoting London as a city that implicitly en-
courages the blurring of old binaries by pointing to its multiple popu-
lations who represent and can negotiate with different parts of the
world. If it can be said that Russia and China, by virtue of their status
as emerging global powers, have virtually demanded the IOC’s atten-
tion, it can be also be said that the IOC’s new internationalism must ad-
dress London, a city whose diverse population makes it a proxy for ad-
dressing China, Russia, and other powerful non-Western global actors.
In 1978 Los Angeles was selected to host the 1984 Games because it
was the only city willing to bid (Shoval 2002, 583). In 2005 an impres-
sive list of world-class candidate cities including London, Paris, and
New York battled viciously for the 2012 Games. Already, a diverse list of
host cities are lining up to bid for the 2016 Games. Con‹rmed bids in-
clude Tokyo, Chicago, Madrid, Rio de Janeiro, Doha, and Prague. How
did the Olympics transform from a grim duty that nobody wanted to a
highly coveted prize in less than three decades? Part of the answer is
that the economic debacle of the 1976 Montreal Games (Hamlyn and
Hudson 2005; Whitson and Horne 2006) has been forgotten by poten-
tial host cities and that the lucrative 1984 Los Angeles Games has be-
come the de facto Olympic model to which host cities point when try-
ing to convince their businesses, their citizens, and themselves that
they ought to host the Games (Burbank, Andranovich, and Heying
2001; Whannel 1992). The evolution of new global internationalism is
also part of the answer. The IOC has found a narrative that, whether
wholly warranted or not, gives it a geopolitical purpose; one in which
it puts a ›uid and shifting alliance of states and sponsoring corpora-




1. The Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Para-
lympic Winter Games (VANOC) has committed to “create a strong founda-
tion for sustainable socio-economic development in Vancouver’s inner-city
neighbourhoods” (VANOC 2002). In Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside, infa-
mous for having one of “the highest HIV infection rates of any community
in the Western world” (Adilman and Kliewer 2000, 422), soaring rates of in-
jection-drug use related deaths and fetal alcohol syndrome, Aboriginals are
disproportionately the victims. Throughout Vancouver 2010’s promotional
materials, Aboriginal groups are referenced speci‹cally and separately from
other references to cultural diversity. For instance, the 2010 Games are ex-
pected to “re›ect the great cultural diversity, rich Aboriginal heritage and
lively, progressive arts scene, of both Vancouver and Canada” (VANOC
2007a). Difference, not assimilation, is promoted, but the implications of dif-
ference are reframed in a positive light where Aboriginals are positioned as
contributing to a diverse Canada, not as victims of an intolerant state.
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The Olympics exemplify a class of occurrences that are not only pre-
planned and heralded long in advance, but also inscribed on calendars.
The issue is not whether or not they will take place. We know they will.
And since the “what” of the event is already known, the “how” be-
comes the important issue. Given the predictable nature of the
Olympic formula, the Olympics tend to be no longer envisaged as
“events-on-their-own” (as expressive actions, or as gestures). They are
not seen as messages but as media. They are used as blank slates, as
empty stages available for all sorts of new dramaturgies besides their
own. The Olympics thus become palimpsests, scrolls that have been
written upon, scraped almost clean, and written upon again.
The Olympics have a discontinuous existence made of long intervals
and of episodic reenactments. They are an unusual form of “repertory”
events. As in repertory theater, each enactment means to be different.
Yet the play or event must be recognizable from repeat to repeat, from
episode to episode. This might lead to a “freezing” of the event. Short
of freezing the event, the organizers try to control its performance.
In the case of the Olympics, two models of episodic reenactments
come to mind. The ‹rst model is religious. The Olympic “religion” is
dominated by an almost mystical entity: the Olympic “spirit,” a doc-
trine that, like all dogmas, calls for a hermeneutic approach. A body of
specialized literature is devoted to identifying, contextualizing, and up-
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dating this “spirit” in reference to the pronouncements of the institu-
tion’s entrepreneurial prophet, Pierre de Coubertin. Conducted in the
name of this doctrinal belief, the orthodoxy of the Games generates a
whole bureaucracy of semantic gestures, symbolic displays, and ritual
manifestations. Like the Vatican bureaucracy, the IOC bureaucracy
seems ferociously attached to detail, and the Olympics are not open to
unnegotiated change.
Yet, unlike the church, the IOC cannot rely on threats of excommu-
nication. Attempts by the IOC to impose a given reading of the
Olympics involve, therefore, another dimension. This second dimen-
sion is legalistic. A given script is handed over and must be imple-
mented. Variability is accepted but only within limits. Implementation
is governed by contract. In this regard, the IOC is not very different
from the Dutch television company, Endemol, whose reality television
shows—including the universally imitated Big Brother—are franchised
into formats meant to encourage successful reproduction. Like Ende-
mol, the Olympics offer “probabilistic” dramaturgies: ready-to-imple-
ment situational plots. Delivered to very different sets of actors and
countries, these dramaturgies are meant to function independently of
cultural contexts and speci‹c outcomes. In the case of the Olympics, as
in the case of Endemol (and, of course in the case of many other serials
as well), the dramaturgies are submitted to managerial rationalization.
One could describe them as “Taylorized” or “bureaucratic.”
In 1992, Elihu Katz and I wrote Media Events:The Live Broadcasting of
History about those great occasions—mostly occasions of state—that
are televised as they take place and trans‹x a nation or the world. We
called these events—which include epic contests of politics and sports,
charismatic missions, and the rites of passage of the great—Contests,
Conquests, and Coronations. In so doing, we were seeking to identify a
narrative genre that employed the unique potential of the electronic
media to command attention universally and simultaneously in order
to tell a primordial story about current affairs. These were events, we ar-
gued, that in effect placed a halo over the television set, thus trans-
forming the viewing experience. Fifteen years have now passed since
Media Events was ‹rst published. The world has changed. We have
learned from experience and from the many who have commented on
our writings. This volume on the Beijing Olympics provides an oppor-
tunity to revisit several aspects of our joint approach to the phenom-
ena of modern communications. For example, in our book, we focused
on three story forms, or “scripts,” that constitute the main narrative
Conclusion
392
possibilities within the genre of Contests, Conquests, and Coronations.
We argued that these three story forms are dramatic embodiments of
Weber’s (1946) three types of authority: rationality, charisma, and tra-
dition. The present volume opens the possibility of additional themes
that are less tied to celebration and that re›ect new tensions in the
world, including what Tamar Liebes (1998) calls “disaster marathons”
and what James Carey (1998) describes as television rituals of “shame”
and “degradation.”
When we wrote Media Events, we found that the fact that the events
were preplanned—announced and advertised in advance—was
signi‹cant, as advance notice gives time for negotiation, but also for
anticipation and preparation on the part of both broadcasters and au-
diences. These broadcast events were generally presented with rever-
ence and ceremony. In the past, journalists who presided over them
suspended their normally critical stance and treated their subject with
respect, even awe. Even when these programs addressed con›ict—as
they often did—they frequently celebrated not con›ict but reconcilia-
tion. On our reading, media events were generally ceremonial efforts to
redress con›ict or restore order or, more rarely, institute change. They
called for a cessation of hostilities, at least for a moment, very much in
keeping with the ancient Greek tradition of an Olympic truce. Here
too, there have been great changes. Each of us has been contemplating
whether there is a retreat from the genres of media events, as we de-
scribed them, and an increase in the live broadcasting of disruptive
events of disaster, terror, and armed con›ict.
In our book we also discussed how media events preview the future
of media technology. We suggested that when radio became a medium
of segmentation—subdividing audiences by age and education—broad-
cast television replaced it as the medium of national integration. But
that too has changed, as so many have recognized. Beijing is not the
‹rst Olympics to take place in this fundamentally altered television en-
vironment, but it is clearly a theater for seeing the implications of new
distribution methods. As new media technology multiplies the number
of channels, television has become a medium of segmentation, and
television-as-we-knew-it continues to disappear. It is not clear that any
medium has replaced or will replace it; if anything, the newest tech-
nologies, like mobile, further increase this segmentation. In 1992 we
wrote that “the nation-state itself may be on the way out, its bound-
aries out of sync with the new media technology. Media events may
then create and integrate communities larger than nations. Indeed, the
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genre of media events may itself be seen as a response to the integrative
needs of national and, increasingly, international communities and or-
ganizations.” Beijing seems to be a laboratory for these and related
ideas.
The moments that Elihu Katz and I characterized as “Media Events”
offered a powerful contrast to ordinary news. Media Events, as we
de‹ned them, invite their audiences to stop being spectators and to be-
come witnesses or participants of a television performance. Rephrasing
in a slightly different vocabulary the characteristics explored in the
original volume, I would hold that the concept of Media Events in-
cludes the following four major features:
• Insistence and emphasis
• An explicitly “performative,” gestural dimension 
• Loyalty to the event’s self de‹nition; and 
• Access to a shared viewing experience. 
The ‹rst feature, emphasis, is manifested through the omnipresence
of the transmitted events; the length of broadcasts that disrupt orga-
nized schedules without being themselves disrupted; the live dimen-
sion of these broadcasts; and the repetition of certain shots in seem-
ingly endless loops. Performativity means that Media Events have
nothing to do with balance, neutrality, or objectivity. They are not ac-
counts but gestures: gestures that actively create realities. Loyalty con-
sists in accepting the de‹nition of the event as proposed by the orga-
nizers. It means that the proposed dramaturgy is not questioned but
substantially endorsed and relayed. And, ‹nally, Media Events provide
not only knowledge or information but, also, a shared experience. This
participatory function leads to formats that rely on narrative continu-
ity, visual proximity, and shared temporality. Media Events, in our orig-
inal formulation, were about the construction or reconstruction of
“we.”
The Beijing Olympics exemplify in many other ways the established
sense of media events, as de‹ned in the analytical framework we
sought to forward in 1992. Audiences recognize Media Events as an in-
vitation—even a command—to stop their daily routines. If festive
viewing is to ordinary viewing what holidays are to the everyday, these
events are among the highest holy days of mass communication. In
keeping with this insight, our original project attempted to bring the
anthropology of ceremony (Durkheim 1915; Handelman 1990; Levi-
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Strauss 1963; Turner 1985) to bear on the process of mass communica-
tion. In this way, we de‹ned the corpus of events in terms of three cat-
egories inspired by linguistics—syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics.
We showed that a media event, as a contemporary form of ceremony,
deals reverently with sacred matters (semantics), interrupts the ›ow of
daily life (syntactics), and involves the response (pragmatics) of a com-
mitted audience.
Because the Beijing Olympics is taking place in a different world
from the one in which Media Events was ‹rst published, it is useful to
reprise the three categories as a means of marking the contrast. To bet-
ter understand the nature and some of the consequences of the
changes I will brie›y explore the semantics of con›ictualization, the
syntactics of banalization, and the pragmatics of disenchantment. All
are characteristics of today’s media events and ways of differentiating
today’s “media events” from the Media Events in the grand sense we
implied in 1992.
In terms of semantics, an ideological sea change has taken place. In
1992, what had particular resonance was the end of con›icts, the wan-
ing of feuds, the rise of gestures that seemed to lessen the possibility of
war. This mood was later captured in the title of Francis Fukuyama’s
book The End of History and the Last Man (1992). On the eve of the Bei-
jing Olympics, the themes that resonate globally are signi‹cantly more
somber than those of the late 1980s and 1990s. After a long eclipse,
Foucault’s “order of supplices” seems to be back, lending its macabre
accoutrements to televised ordeals, punishments, and tortures. Numer-
ous events are in keeping with, and indeed extend, James Carey’s em-
phasis on stigmatization and shaming. War rituals multiply. Agon is
back, where the dramaturgy of “contest” succeeded in civilizing the
brutality of con›ict. Media events have stopped being “irenic.” Their
semantics is no longer dominated by the theme of a reduction of
con›ict through mediation and resolution of differences. Rather, they
could be characterized by Gregory Bateson’s notion of “schismogene-
sis” (1935), that process through which one provokes irremediable hos-
tility, fosters divides, and installs and perpetuates schisms.
In terms of syntactics, there is also a signi‹cant change. The format
of media events has been dismantled into discrete elements, many of
which have migrated toward other genres. As a result of this dissemi-
nation, the rhetoric of media events no longer stands out as radically
distinct. Take the notion of an event that is automatically guaranteed a
monopoly of attention, a characteristic imputed to the royal weddings,
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coronations, and moon walks of an earlier day. This kind of exclusive
focusing on one event at any given time is now becoming almost im-
possible. Instead, there is a “‹eld” of events in which different candi-
dates compete with each other for privileged status, with the help of
entrepreneurial journalists. Social and political polarization and its ef-
fect on media mean that it is harder to achieve a broad consensus about
the importance of particular events. News and media events are no
longer starkly differentiated entities but exist rather on a continuum.
This banalization of the format leads to the emergence of an interme-
diate zone characterized by the proliferation of what I would call “al-
most” media events.
Finally, the pragmatics of media events have also changed. One of
the characteristics of classical Media Events was the way in which such
events seemed capable of transforming the home into a public space by
inviting spectators to assemble into actual viewing communities. The
power of those events resided, ‹rst and foremost, in the rare realization
of the full potential of electronic media technology. Students of media
effects know that at most times and places this potential of radio and
television is restricted by society. In principle, radio and television are
capable of reaching everybody simultaneously and directly; their mes-
sage, in other words, can be total, immediate, and unmediated. But this
condition hardly ever obtains. Messages are multiple; audiences are se-
lective; social networks intervene; diffusion takes time. In the case of
media events, however, these intervening mechanisms are suspended.
Interpersonal networks and diffusion processes are active before and af-
ter the event, mobilizing attention to the event and fostering intensive
hermeneutic attempts to identify its meaning. But during the liminal
moments we described in 1992, totality and simultaneity were un-
bound; organizers and broadcasters resonated together; competing
channels merged into one; viewers gathered at the same time and in
every place. All eyes were ‹xed on the ceremonial center, through
which each nuclear cell was connected to all the rest. Social integration
of the highest order was thus achieved via mass communication 
(Kornhauser 1959).
Since the 1990s, entertainment genres such as reality TV have called
for a similar transformation of the home into a communal, public,
space while media events themselves have offered less of a communal
experience. One may watch the Olympics in a living room or even in a
stadium, but in both cases, the ubiquitous cell phone is a constant in-
vitation to disengage from the surrounding community. Reliance on
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new media has reintroduced individualized reception, and this in turn
has led to what seems to me to be one of the most signi‹cant differ-
ences in context: it is not merely the notion of a shared social experi-
ence that wanes, it is the very notion of “communitas.” What charac-
terized great Media Events was a kind of agreed conspiracy among
organizer, broadcaster, and audience: a tacit decision to suspend disbe-
lief, repress cynicism, and enter a “subjunctive” mode of culture. It is
this machinery of suspension that is now at risk.
The resonance of media events used to be associated with what Vic-
tor Turner called the “as if” or subjunctive modes of culture. Even when
an event was perceived as “mere spectacle,” authors like John
MacAloon (Rite, Drama, Festival, Spectacle 1984) believed in a process
through which it would ultimately transcend this status and become
truly festive and participatory. But a noticeable change of mood has
taken place at the level of reception. Media events produce cynical be-
haviors. They foster rather than suspend disbelief. Spectators and
publics act like Clausewitzian strategists. While they do so, they are
themselves being negotiated, acquired, or stolen. Media events still mo-
bilize huge audiences, but they have lost a large part of their enchant-
ment. Bureaucratically managed, they are an exploited resource within
a political economy of collective attention. Their magic is dissipating.
They have become strategic venues.
These changes in the character of media events have at least two impli-
cations. The ‹rst implication is theoretical. By virtue of their explicitly
“performative” nature, media events are an excellent starting point for
understanding the status of news images. Yet the visual “performa-
tives” at play in media events are not to be opposed to some “nor-
mal”—that is, devoid of performatives—status of television news im-
ages. Quite the contrary. While media events display a spectacular
performative dimension, a performative dimension characterizes news
as well. Indeed, excluding those systems of unmanned video surveil-
lance (whose function involves neither watching nor showing any-
thing, but retroactively retrieving the recorded traces of past occur-
rences), television never offers images that are merely informative,
images that are enunciatively neutral.
Yet this does not mean that the two performances—news and media
events—are or should be identical. They call for a distinct set of rules
and for different grammars. And the nature of these grammars brings
us to the second implication, a political one. It concerns the quest for
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proximity that characterizes media events, and almost specializes them
in the construction of what I have suggested is a collective “we.” In the
case of Media Events, the process of “we” construction is perfectly ex-
plicit. This process is what the event is about: it is heralded, discussed,
negotiated, in advance. The construction of a “we” becomes much less
explicit for events in which the sharing of an experience is imposed by
a merely journalistic decision. In this case, the construction of a “we”
(insuf‹ciently heralded, negotiated, or discussed) intervenes before
and/or without any sort of debate. News quietly turns into rituals.
When this transformation takes place on a daily basis, when we attend
a constant banalization of the format, the very multiplication of “al-
most” media events leads to the emergence of a “gray” zone, inhabited
by images that are neither Media Events nor news.
Any event can be turned into a media event through an addition of
speci‹c features. The same event can be given more or less space, more
or less attention. The same incident can be summed up in a few shots,
or treated as a continuous narrative. It can be told retrospectively or
transmitted live. It can be shown once or repeated in a continuous
loop. Events, and their producers, contend with each other for being
awarded the largest amount of features. In today’s “gray zone,” where
there is a blurring of the limits between media events and news, each
event can be treated as a news item and as a media event at once. Each
situation can be simultaneously addressed through different formats,
lending itself to a whole array of discursive statements. Such state-
ments enter in dialogue or debate with each other. Rather than being
spoken by a single, monolithic voice—the voice of the nation—any
event becomes part of a conversation involving competing versions of
the same event, some of them local, some of them foreign. This con-
versation enacts a new model of public affairs in which the centrality
of events seems to have dethroned that of newscasts (Csigo 2007). In-
stead of dominant media organizing and conferring a hierarchy on the
multiplicity of events, dominant events now serve as the contested
ground for a multiplicity of media voices.
Following Daniel Hallin (The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam
1986), Michael Schudson (2006) proposes a strong distinction between
two exclusive modes of functioning of the public sphere. One corre-
sponds to the normal regime of a democratic society. It is the “sphere
of legitimate controversy.” The other corresponds to exceptional mo-
ments, such as wars, crises, and periods of rede‹nition of identity. It is
a sphere dominated by consensus and complemented by a mirroring
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sphere, the sphere of deviance. One sphere is meant to allow delibera-
tion and debate. The other sphere is meant to sti›e it in the name of
some higher general interest.
I would suggest that one sphere is characterized by the normal, crit-
ical, informative functioning of news while the other is characterized
by a situation where all news items tend to be treated as if they were
media events. Schudson points to the danger of allowing the sphere of
consensus/deviance to persist beyond moments of acute crisis, of al-
lowing it to take over functions that are normally performed in the
sphere of debate. This—I believe—is the danger involved in the undue
generalization of a media event model to all news forms, in the ram-
pant progression of the gray zone.
Disenchantment and the Loss of the “We”
These issues are obviously relevant to the Beijing Olympics and the
contested territory of media events. Events compete with each other
for the conquest of public attention. All aspire to the privilege of being
on all media at once. In this competition, there will be not only efforts
by the organizers of an event to persuade but efforts by many to shape
the pattern of that persuasion. Any media event happens because it is
willed by some entity, but every media event is also offered as a “pub-
lic” event. This dual status entails a series of tensions. Such tensions are
‹rst of all a matter of production versus reception. From the point of
view of spectators, it is clear that the producers of an event have no
right to claim ownership over its meaning. The event’s meaning de-
pends on their own responses and interpretations. But there are other
tensions as well: between the rati‹ed performers of a given event and
other would-be performers; between the “bona ‹de” de‹nition of the
event and alternative de‹nitions of the same event; between the core
of the event and the crowd of parasitic manifestations that proliferates
around it, as so many doppelgangers or satellites, as discussed in Price’s
chapter in this volume.
In the contest for ownership, media events lend themselves to a rich
grammar of appropriations. They fall prey to entities that are neither
their organizers nor their publics. They may be subverted (denounced),
diverted (derailed), or perverted (hijacked). They can be used as Trojan
horses or placed under the threat of a sword of Damocles. These multi-
ple tensions and the calculated moves of various public actors inter-
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ested in the exploitation of the event’s charisma ask the question of “le-
gitimate ownership” and undue appropriation. Can anyone own a
public event?
This legalistic question is in a way typical of today’s media events. It
is one of the main questions raised by the Beijing Olympics and by the
general transformation undergone by the Games. The Olympics,
meant to propose a normative enactment, have become a provider of
collective attention on a grand scale. For the IOC, international power
consists in brokering such attention. For political publics, the Olympics
provide an opportunity of harnessing that attention to the bene‹t of
neglected agendas. For national organizers, the Games offer the
prospect of a rite de passage into a certain “elite” of nations. For adver-
tisers, this attention is available in serendipitous quantities. For specta-
tors they are a spectacle or entertainment. What about those who em-
body that attention? What about the public and the spectators? Is it
cynicism or communitas, skepticism or suspension of disbelief?
In each case what seems at risk is a certain form of “enchantment.”
Of course disenchantment is not a particularly new development. John
MacAloon’s classical analysis of the Olympic experience (Rite, Drama,
Festival, Spectacle 1984) is centrally concerned with this disenchant-
ment, a disenchantment it does acknowledge but transforms into a
mere prelude to the real experience of the Games. Thus a complex ini-
tiation process takes the spectators of the Olympics through a succes-
sion of steps, or frames. The Olympic experience is framed as spectacle,
festival, ritual, and ‹nally as access to truth. MacAloon’s process starts
with skepticism (spectacle) and ends with belief (truth). Is this progres-
sion still conceivable today? Is there any room for an Olympic experi-
ence framed as an access to some truth? Or should we rewrite
MacAloon’s sequence in a style inspired by Baudrillard: “spectacle, fes-
tival, ritual, and ‹nally: . . . simulacrum?”
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